,:XJ 



:':::\fxri^j 



c;»':~:p: 



'j^fjKt;; 









UrKca:::-; 



igWRij 


^^i5Hf: 


lBCSCl|wiBi[ililt*»it 


^S2JHH^^ 




aranssrj^r^ 



zn'trCaxt^''.'. 






:^i:xxjtr: 



;!]:;:;'; 




aassl3Jl4S 
Book ' M 5 



AN INQUIRY^/ '''^ 

INTO THE 

NATURE, FOUNDATION, AND EXTENT 

OF 

MORAL OBLIGATION, 



INVOLVING THE 



NATURE OF DUTY, OF HOLINESS, AND OF SIN, 



i AN INTRODUCTION 



I 



SITIDY OP MOEAL SCIENCE IN All ITS BEANCHES, 



INCLUDING THE 



LEGAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND GOVERNMENTAL. 
By DAVID METCALF. 



" God is Love." — 1 John 4:8. 
"Holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord." — Hebrews 12: 14. 



BOSTON: 
CROSBY, NICHOLS, LEE AND COMPANY. 

WORCESTER: WILLIAM IT. SANFOKD. 

18 6 0. 



^^ 






Entered accoi'ding to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by 

DAVID METCALF, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 



C A M B 11 1 1) G E : 
Allcu and Furnham, Stereotypers and Prinfeers. 



TESTIMONIALS 



[From Rev. George AUen, formerly Cliaplain of the Insane Hospital, Worcester.] 

Havestg examined, with care, mncli of the Rev. Mr. Metealf s In- 
quiry into the Nature, Foundation, and Extent of Moral Obligation, I 
-would hereby confidently commend it to the perusal of all who take 
an interest in the investigation of that important subject. The work 
is the result of diligent research into the views and reasons of the 
ablest authors who have hitherto led the world in mental and moral 
science ; and of that manly independence which calls no man master 
on earth. 

The study of Mr. Metealf s work would be a useful discipline of 
the mind in the course of its education ; while its perusal by the adept 
in moral science would give assurance of the author's extensive learn- 
ing and acute discrimination in regard to the subject he has taken in 
hand. 

The catechetical method adopted by Mr. Metealf, while it distin- 
guishes his work from most if not all others on the subject, will com- 
mend itself as an aid both to the memory and the understanding of 
such as are discouraged from the study of intellectual and moral 
science in their usual forms. 

Worcester, July 22, 1859. 



[From Rev. Noah Porter, D. JD., Professor of Moral Philosophy, Yale College.] 

Rev. DaA' id Metealf has read to me several chapters of the Treatise 
on Moral Obligation which he proposes to publish. He has evidently 
read extensively and thought carefully and independently on the sub- 
ject, whUe his arguments and criticisms seem to me to be acute and 
able. I think his work will be both timely and useful. It is well 
fitted to awaken an interest in the subject of which it treats, and to 
excite to a thorough discussion of it. 

Yale College, September 26, 1859. 



{From Rev. Eleazar T. Fitch, D. D., ProfessorofEomiletics, Theological Depart- 
ment, Yale College.] 

The Rev. David Metealf has read to me, from his manuscript, the 
general outlines, and distinct portions in full, of a work he has pre- 
pared on the subject of Moral Obligation. 

The treatise I consider to be eminently worthy of perusal and 
attentive study. It presents a clear analysis of the subject. It shows 



TESTIMONIALS. 

the various points wMch enter into tlie analysis to be true, in accord- 
ance with the dictates of reason and common sense, and the teachings 
of revelation. 

The form of questions and answers in which the treatise is con- 
ducted, gives the writer opportunity to present to his readers the 
same points in different attitudes and relations, more fully than a 
severer method of sequence would have allowed him : — to take them 
round about the strength of Zion, as well as through it, and thus to 
mark well all her towers and bulwarks of defence. 

This discussion is an interesting one to all who seek after vital 
truth, especially to teachers of moral science and religion ; and is 
demanded, in order to clear away the fogs of indiscrimination, so 
often brought into the forum and the pulpit, which becloud the clear, 
shining light of reason and revelation. 

New Haven, September 26, 1859. 



[From Professor James JBusliee, Teacher of various Branches of Literature and 

Science.] 

Having read portions of Mr. Metcalf's work, in manuscript, on 
'■'■Moral Obligation," it gives me pleasure to bear testimony in its 
favor. 

Although it needs no other testimonials to commend its merits to 
public notice than those already given by Messrs. Allen, Porter, and 
Fitch, with which I cheerfully concur, yet I may perhaps add a word 
in reference to one or two points which seem worthy of notice. 

The originality/ of tlie plan, and the familiar interrogatory style in 
which it is written, it seems to me, will do much towards introducing 
the subject to a more extensive class of readers, and thus render the 
work a valuable aid in extending this important department of knowl- 
edge. 

Another feature of interest may be found in the judicious quota- 
tions, at the close of the discussion, of prominent topics, giving the 
critical student an opportunity of comparing the views of the most 
eminent writers upon the subject. 

While Mr. Metcalf has succeeded, at least to some extent, in bring- 
ing this abstract and metaphysical subject within the comprehension 
of youth of ordinary capacity and attainments, and in adapting the 
work to class-room instruction, he has not diminished its adaptation 
to the wants of the scholar ; since it embraces a more thorough and 
comprehensive analysis of the subject than any other work I have 
seen. 

Worcester, Mass. June, 1860. 



CONTENTS. 



To THE Eeader page 1 

A WoKD TO Reviewers 2 

Preface 5 

CHAPTER I. 

THE NECESSARY LAW OF REASONING. 

Preliminary statements. — First principles. — The moral constitution of the 
universe. — Definition of the term moral, as applied to acts, obligation, 
relation, agent, law, influence, government, and character pages 15-27 

CHAPTER II. 

The antagonism of holiness and sin, as moral opposites, resulting in their 
corresponding natural opposites, happiness and misery. — Holiness and 
sin distinguished from every object of thought but the acts of moi-al 
agents. — Acts distinguished from effects. — Amoral agent must be 
a rational, sentient, and voluntary being, that he may act Avith re- 
sponsibility in view of motives. — Motive, its various modifications, as 
subjective and objective. — A moral agent, as distinguished from all 
other agents, must have intellect, reason, conscience, sensibility, and 
will. — Moral acts distinguished from exercises of the intellect and sen- 
sibility, — from all other acts of moral agents, and shown to consist in 
choice or acts of will 27-36 

CHAPTER III. 

Constitutional endowments not moral character. — Intellect, sensibility, 
and will described as embracing all the faculties of the mind. — Con- 
science a complex faculty, being both intelligent and sentient. — All 
the operations of the mind, therefore, of necessity, included in three 
classes, — thoughts, feelings, and volitions, or acts of will. — No moral 
quality predicable of mere exercises of the intellect, nor of the sensibil- 
ity, nor of external acts in themselves, nor of mere executive volitions. — 
Evils of an incorrect mental analysis. — The evidence summed up that 
no moral quality pertains to the exercises of the intellect or sensibility, 
but only to the acts of the will. — In what sense external acts and execu- 
tive volitions have moral character. — Points previously established, re- 
capitulated. — Authors quoted who hold that moral quality pertains only 
to the phenomena of will. — Dr. Thomas Rcitl, Dr. Thomas Chalmers, 
A * (V) 



VI CONTENTS. 

Sir James Mackintosh, Dr. Nathaniel Wm. Taylor, Dr. Nathaniel Em- 
mons, Bishop Joseph Butler, D. D,, Dr. Jonathan Edwards, Dr. Stephen 
West, J. J. Burlamaqui, Counsellor of State and Prof, of Natural and 
Civil Law at Geneva, Pres. Jonathan Edwards, Bishop Richard Cumber- 
land, D. D., Hugo Grotius, Baron Puffendorf, and Sir Wm. Blackstone 

37-51 
CHAPTER IV. 

The turning- point between fatalism and free agency. — Concerning the 
nature and objects of choice and its relation to motives, subjective and 
objective : no choice without both, nor without power to the contrary. — 
Desire of happiness comprehending all possible subjective motive. — 
Happiness constitutes all possible, ultimate, objective motive. — Objec- 
tions : that there is a desire of right as an ultimate object ; that there is 
a desire of " spirit-worthiness " as an ultimate object ; that there is a 
sense of right. — Views of Dr. Edvrards and President Edwards. — Re- 
capitulation of the main points reached in the argument . . . 52-70 

CHAPTER V. 

The objects of choice stated. — The general idea of good, or goodness. — 
Absolute and ultimate good identical with happiness. — All good, and 
of course all objects of choice, included in happiness and the means of 
happiness, and in beings capable of happiness, confirming the point that 
desire of happiness comprehends all subjective motive, and that happi- 
ness is the ultimate object of all possible choice. — All good besides hap- 
piness is relative good, including holiness. — Therefore all objects of 
choice, all good included in absolute and relative good, in happiness, 
and its means 70-83 

CHAPTER VI. 

Happiness not the only good. — Natural, incidental, and moral goodness 
distinguished. — Moral goodness in the concrete and in the abstract. — 
Why tendency to happiness may have been supposed not an element of 
virtuousness. — Natural and moral goodness include all good . 84-93 

CHAPTER VII. 

Different kinds of good classed. — Natural and moi-al, ultimate, absolute, 
and relative. — Natural and moral evil. — Absolute and relative evil. — 
Reasons for calling moral goodness moral excellence. — Two objections 
removed : 1, that it is derogatory to holiness to regard it as means to an 
ulterior end — as mere relative good ; 2, that holiness is a nobler, higher 
good than happiness. — The comparative value of holiness as relative 
good, and that of happiness as absolute and ultimate good. — In what 
sense virtuousness, and in what sense happiness, can be said to be high- 
est good. — A further and different classification of the different kinds 
of good. — The supreme good. — Neither highest holiness nor highest 
happiness can be sacrificed for any other thing 93-105 



CONTENTS. Vll 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Right and -wi-ong acts distinguished. — Obligation the requisiteness to pro- 
mote happiness by design, founded in power rationally to promote hap- 
piness, and measured by that power. — What power to promote happi- 
ness implies. — Holiness obedience to, and sin transgression of, known 
law. — Man under the absolute natural necessity of seeking his own happi- 
ness. — Self-love, selfishness, and benevolence distinguished. — Man's 
moral relation to his own and the universal happiness ; his obligation to 
seek both, and in the exercise of impartial benevolence. — The arguments 
in proof summarily stated. — Butler and Edwards cited in confirmation 

105-128 
CHAPTER IX. 

Benevolence more particularly defined, — The elements or qualities which 
constitute its virtuousness, and the reasons why. — The first element of 
benevolence. — Its first quality or element being dictated by intelligence. 

— To be benevolent, an act must be in accordance with one's best light, 
judgment, or knowledge. — Capacity to know our duty essential to moral 
agency. — Views of Drs. Edwards, Emmons, and Reid. — The happiness 
of the agent the ultimate subjective object, the general happiness the ulti- 
mate objective object. — Desire of happiness an essential element in the 
ultimate foundation of moral obligation 129-147 

CHAPTER X. 

Elements of benevolent acts continued. — The second element of benev- 
olence, tendency to the agent's happiness ; third element, tendency to 
the general happiness, — Views of Dr. Edwards and Dr. Emmons. — 
The objection obviated, that the nature of virtue is entirely distinct from 
all its tendencies, especially from its tendency to the agent's happiness. 

— There must be a subjective as well as an objective object of a benevo- 
^ lent act, while the happiness of others in the nature of the case cannot 

be a subjective object. — Views of Dr. Edwards, Pres. Edwards, Drs. 
Paley and Reid. — Tendency to highest happiness inseparable from 
virtuous action ; found in no other moral action 148-175 

CHAPTER XI. 

Elements of virtuous acts continued. — Fourth element, voluntariness. — 
Benevolent love supreme, impartial, universal. — Former position as to 
the two tendencies of virtue, 1st, to individual, and 2d, to universal hap- 
piness, confirmed. — Reasons why duty must be measured by ability, as 
ability is the foundation of obligation. — Objection, that utility, or useful 
tendency, requires so much calculation as to make virtue impracticable. 

— Benevolent love, a purpose to promote highest holiness, as well as 
highest happiness 176-190 



VllI CONTENTS, 



CHAPTER XII. 

Holiness, that operation of the will Avhich would secure the harmonious 
cooperation of the intellect, reason, conscience, sensibility, and will. — 
Universally prevailing, it would be the harmonious cooperation of all 
the moral powers in the universe. — Then there would be no sin to 
lament, and none to be punished, and no punishment to be suffered, and 
nothing to prevent heaven from being boundless as the universe, and as 
holy and happy as God, with the cooperation of all rational beings, 
could make it. — Views of Pres. Edwards. — Holiness and sin viewed 
in the light of the previous development of their nature. — As holiness 
is the source of harmony and bliss, so sin is the source of discord, con- 
tention, war, and desolation, and of condemnation in the mind of each 
transgressor, he being at war with himself and all the universe besides 

191-204 
CHAPTER XIII. 

Benevolence, being identical and coextensive with holiness in the concrete, 
includes all the specific virtues. — The objects of benevolent love and of 
benevolent hatred, divided into three corresponding classes of each. — 
Desire of happiness, the primary source of obligation. — Happiness, the 
ultimate object of benevolent love. — All benevolent love comprehended 
in three general forms corresponding to the objects of that love. — Love 
to these three classes of objects implies benevolent hatred to the opposite 
objects. — The love of highest happiness shown to be benevolence in its 
simplest form, and the generic source the one vital principle of benevo- 
lence in all its forms and modes. — Reasons why benevolence must have 
this relation to happiness. — Gratitude as a virtue. — Reasons why we 
ought to love one being more than another. — Veracity as a virtue dis- 
tinguished from selfish truthfulness 205-218 

CHAPTER XIV. 

The terms merit, demerit, ill-desert, and guilt explained. — General justice « 
identical with general benevolence, and with distributive justice. — 
Pounded in the public good. — Exercised in governmental justice, or 
that which is peculiar to a perfect moral governor, in the administration 
of law by the necessary sanctions of rewards and penalties for the sup- 
port of authority, including atoning and forgiving justice . . 219-228 

CHAPTER XV. 

Righteous moral government. — Its object. — Qualifications of a perfect 
moral governor. — His laws must accord with the principle of eternal 
right, and be sustained by the moral influence of adequate sanctions, re- 
wards, and penalties. — Moral and pliysical power and influence distin- 
guished. — What justice requires of a moral governor: that his laws 
should be so framed as to require nothing but benevolence, and so ad- 



CONTENTS. IX 

ministered as to promote, in the highest degree, and in the best possible 
way, the general happiness, and that of individuals. — Justice, grace, 
and mercy, their identity : their distinctions and relations to each other. 
— Benevolent and right action identical. — The difference between right 
as a quality of law, and as a quality of action 228-239 

CHAPTER XVI. 

The import of the statement, that virtue is founded in utility. — Benevo- 
lent usefulness, its essence consisting in its intelligent intent and ten- 
dency to promote highest happiness. — Reason why this doctrine has so 
strong a hold on the public mind. — Proof that benevolence has an in- 
separable, effectual tendency to promote the highest happiness in the 
agent's power. — Erom the nature of the subject, it must be such an in- 
tent as will tend to highest happiness 239-245 

CHAPTER XVII. 

The general objection that the doctrine of benevolent utility is inconsistent 
with the structure of language, answered in this and in the two follow- 
ing chapters. — That this doctrine of utility is inconsistent with the 
meaning of the terms rights, rectitude, etc. — Another objection, that it 
substitutes the effect for the cause 245-254 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

Objections continued. — Tbat, according to the utilitarian doctrine, virtue 
is too nearly synonymous with interest, advantage, with usefulness, util- 
ity, and tendency to promote happiness. — That it leaves no room to 
distinguish between virtue and beauty, virtue and sublimity, etc. — That 
virtue is too nearly synonymous with calcu.lation of consequences. — That 
there is too little difference between calculation and approbation, between 
intellectual and virtuous wisdom, between prudence and virtue, between 
expediency and right action 254-264 

CHAPTER XIX. 

Objections continued. — That the doctrine of benevolent utility takes away 
from conscience its appropriate office, and from the word conscience its 
time meaning. — The meaning of a good, tender, a guilty or evil, a 
seared and hardened conscience. — How to be sure that conscience will 
guide us right. — That in the whole theory of utility, the foundation 
principle of right is not contained 264-269 

CHAPTER XX. 

The different tendencies of benevolence described, and divided into three 
corresponding classes : 1, its tendency to the happiness of those who 



X CONTENTS. 

approve it ; 2, of those who are the objects of it ; and 3, of those who 
practice it. — The separation of these tendencies from virtue, its anni- 
hilation 270-274 

CHAPTTilR XXI. 

Eeasons why certain acts of the will are right, and why others are wrong. 

— The certainty that benevolent design will promote higher happiness 
than any other action or thing in its place 275-280 

CHAPTER XXII. 

Concerning the objection to the doctrine of benevolent utility, that the idea 
of right is a simple idea. — Reasons to show that it is not a simple idea. 

— Reasons considered, which have been adduced to show that right is a 
simple idea 281-293 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Recapitulation of the foregoing delineation of virtue, considering whether 
it excludes every tiling which does not belong to its true nature, and 
whether it includes every thing that does belong to it. — The inquiry ex- 
amined, whether other theories of the nature of virtue can be reconciled, 
on the ground of benevolent rectitude and utility, so far as those theories 
are founded in truth. — The relation of this doctrine of holiness to the will 
and glory of God, to the end of our being, and to the tenet that " sin is the 
necessary means of the greatest good." — The advantage of clear, correct, 
and definite views of moral law, and its application to duty . 294-306 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

The diiferent natures and tendencies of holiness and sin compared and 
contrasted. — One the highest wisdom, the other the greatest folly. — 
Their tendencies in a degree may be thwarted, but cannot be changed. 

— The certainty of their different results. — The comparative value of 
those results 306-316 

CHAPTER XXV. 

The doctrine of benevolent rectitude tested by human consciousness, and 
by an appeal to the Bible. — Motives of the Bible addressed to the de- 
sire of happiness. — Desire of happiness, implying also a dread of mis 
ery, the only motive that can be addressed, to promote highest happiness 
being the only rational ultimate object. — How to form rules of moral 
conduct. — How to determine one's own moral character . . 316-327 

CONCLUSION. 
Two ways and conditions through which moral beings may stand with ac- 
ceptance before God. — How a sinner may forsake sin, comply with the 
conditions of salvation, and secure the end of his being. — Closing in- 
vocation 328-334 



CONTENTS. XI 



APPENDIX. 

A. 

A specimen of Socratic reasoning on the efficiency of Divine Providence. 
— An anecdote in point 335-339 

B. 

SECTION I. 

Certain doctrines inconsistent with free responsible agency, and tending to 
fatalism, refuted : 1. That actions of the will are not voluntary. 2. That 
sin consists in constitutional, innate, involuntary dispositions, inclina- 
tions, affections, and propensities, previous to all voluntary action. 
3. The doctrine of moral necessity and moral ability, which amounts 
only to natural necessity. 4. That man has no power to originate his 
own volitions. These four doctrines implying an irresistible necessity. 
5. A view of natural and moral ability and moral inability, wliich im- 
plies a natural inability. 6. That ability, in regard to acts of will, is not 
commensurate with duty. 7. A direct denial that man has the power of 
contrary choice. — These seven doctrines, each of them shown to be a 
virtual denial of the self-evident principle, that what ought to be done 
can be done. — Fatalism defined. — These seven doctrines proved sever- 
ally and unitedly to result in fatalism 340-353 

SECTION II. 

The American Theological Eeview on the power of contrary choice. — 
Power to the contrary essential to the scheme of free agency, — This 
scheme gaining currency. — A call by the Am. Theol. Eeview for argu- 
ment in its defence. — The call answered by referring to the object of 
this book, and by an argument from the Bible, and one from the Am. 
Theol. Review itself.' — Power to the contrary explained. — These two 
positions, that certainty of action is inconsistent with freedom of action, 
and no power to the contrary, because never exerted, refuted, — Distinc- 
tion between natural and moral ability and inability. — Ability, the basis 
ofobhgation. — All sin voluntary 353-361 



Prof, Pinney's views on moral government, on the ground and condi- 
tion of obligation. — Pres. Mahan's views compared with Prof. Pinney's 
on utility and the ultimate end of morally right action . . . 361-364 

D. 

The Princeton Eeview and the Am. Theol. Eeview on the dogma, " Sin 
the necessary means of the greatest good " 364-368 



XIl CONTENTS. 



E. 

SECTION I. 

Two anti-utilitarian theories, the spiritual- worthiness theory and the Bibli- 
othecan, examined. — Objections arising from these theories: 1. That 
holiness is a good in itself. 2. That the doctrine of utility leads to self- 
ishness. 3. That virtue is not a means, but an end. 4. That it is not 
right, merely because it is useful. 5. That holiness would be greatest 
good, if it did not tend to happiness. 6, Various forms of statement, 
implying that virtue is independent, absolute good. 7. That the idea of 
virtue is a simple and absolute idea. 8. Some of Dr. Emmons's views 
compared with some of his other views 368-391 

SECTION II. 

Consideration of the Kantial or rightarian doctrine, as held by M. Victor 
Cousin (pronounced by some in America Coo-zan), in which it is main- 
tained that virtuous action cannot be performed from the motives of in- 
terest, advantage, utility, or from any desire of happiness . . 391-408 

SECTION III. 

A more particular examination of the rightarian theory of the spirit's 
worthiness, as held by Dr. Hickok and his reviewers in the Presb. Quar. 
Review, and in the Bib. Sacra 408-425 

SECTION IV. 

Comparison of ethical theories — Cousinistic, Edwardean, Bibliothccan, and 
Pres. Mahan's. — Extracts from Whewell, Pope, Milton, and Homer; 
from Grove, Taylor, and Seneca 425-441 

SECTION V. 

Dependent and independent, or rightarian morality. — The utilitarian and 
the anti-utilitarian theories contrasted, and shown to be irreconcilable ; 
their difference pointed out. — The views of Aristotle, Prof. Joseph 
Haven, and Emanuel Kant considered 441-448 

SECTION VI. 

Strictures on the Essay on Intuitive Morals 448-458 

F. 

Strictures on Dr. Joseph Harvey's Letters to Dr. Bennct Tyler. — Review 
of a sermon on ability and inability to fulfil obligation . . . 458-472 

Views of M'Cosh on liberty, causation, and virtue, examined . 473-480 



TO THE READER. 



Instead of merely referring the reader to various authors for 
consultation, we have chosen rather to make liberal quotations, sup- 
posing that most of our readers might not have access to them and 
that many might not even have the time to consult them, and if they 
had, it would be a saving of time and labor to know definitely what 
particular statements we rely upon as the most important. 

As the reader ponders the following pages, we ask him to consider, 
whether the principles thereon inculcated, carried to their legitimate 
results, would not abolish every tyrannical, arbitrary, and oppressive 
law throughout the world, and eradicate from the minds of the peo- 
ple and from the creeds of various churches many false doctrines now 
taught throughout Christendom. We have been repeatedly inquired 
of if our treatise is sectarian. We have not designed it to be so at 
all, but to be an investigation entirely independent of any sect and 
of all sects, and to be only such an investigation as the nature of the 
subject, viewed in the light of reason and of revelation, imperatively 
demands. If the truth affects one review, author, or denomination 
more unfavorably than others, so much the worse for all who are 
thus affected, till they bring their interests to accord with the inter- 
ests of truth. Then the truth will make them free, so as to be free 
indeed, and thus the knowledge of the truth will result in their 
benefit. 

If these principles tend to such results, it would be impossible to 
estimate how great the advantage would be, to have them early, in- 
telligently, and distinctly estabhshed in the minds and hearts of our 
youth generally, to say nothing of people more advanced in life. 

It may facilitate the understanding of our method, to notice that in 
some instances the answer to one question is contained in the answers 
1 (1) 



2 TO THE READER. 

of a greater or less number of the succeeding questions, the whole 
treatise being an answer to the Inquiry into the Nature, Foundation, 
and Extent of Moral Obligation, together with the removal of objec- 
tions to the doctrines laid down in the investigation. 

We crave of the reader that he should have patience with our 
repetitions. Our apology for them is, the necessity of repeating the 
same thoughts, in order to show their bearing upon different parts of 
the subject, especially upon objections, that in this way the reader 
may have the evidence, in support of each important and separate 
point, clearly and distinctly before his mind, so that he may with 
more accuracy and certainty decide what is truth. 

We have judged it best to make thorough work in removing ob- 
jections wherever found, and by whomsoever maintained, in order 
that the reader may have oj)portunity and the means more fully to 
understand the principles inculcated, and to see and feel their power 
to cut a wide, straight, and plain path, in which the lover of truth 
and virtue may walk through abounding errors, to their final results 
in wisdom and knowledge and obedience to the truth, as revealed in 
the reason of man and in the Word of God. 

We have also considered it important to remove particular objec- 
tions in connection with the arguments by which they have been 
supported by their respective authors. This has occasioned an amount 
of repetition which we would gladly have avoided, if we could with- 
out loss. 

K those readers who approve of the main points and arguments of 
this treatise will endeavor to extend a knowledge of them, either by 
promoting a circulation of the book, or by forming companies or 
classes for the study of its principles and general teachings, or in such 
other ways as they may deem expedient, ideas may be developed 
which will secure extensive and valuable results in the present and 
future ages, in this world and in that which is to come. 

The reader is requested to notice that where words in this treatise 
are italicized in quotations, and the italicizing is preceded by a single 
bracket and not inclosed by another, the italicizing is done by the 
writer who quotes, and not by the original author. 



A WORD TO REVIEWERS. 

Gentlemen of the Quill, — If any of your honorable, highly useful 
and important profession should deign to notice our humble work, 



TO THE EEADER. 3 

and should judge that it deserves to be opposed, before you enter 
upon the work of opposing it, we have a right to hope that you will 
undertake the task of correctly understanding the true meaning we 
have intended to express in the doctrines laid down ; and that you 
will also take a thorough and careful survey of the extent to which 
these doctrines have been sustained by the ablest minds in past 
ages. 

We are aware that great and good men hold and teach opinions 
diiFerent from some of those expressed in the following treatise. If 
any one should discover any of our statements to be untrue, inaccu- 
rate, or inconsistent, and therefore of hurtful tendency, and will point 
out their defects, and set forth in clear and certain light the opposite 
truth, in the friendly and fraternal spirit of true benevolence, we 
will thank him beforehand ; or perchance any shall choose to point out 
our errors in an opposite spirit, we say to him in advance, " Fas est 
et ab Jioste doceri" or in plain English, we have a right to be taught 
even by an enemy. But let him who objects remember that it is a 
far easier task to find fault with the statements of other men, than, on 
difficult points, to make faultless statements ourselves. 

If we can be convinced of important, substantial error, we will 
retract and sustain the opposite truth, as we have abiUty and oppor- 
tunity. Mere dogmatism, or the ipse dixit of any one, we will not 
hold ourselves bound to notice or regard. 

So great is our confidence that our doctrine is mainly true, that if 
the above suggestions should be complied with, in the exercise of a 
candid spirit searching for the truth, we think the doctrine of Benev- 
olent Utility will be admitted as true by a vast majority of those who 
obtain a fair understanding of it. Nor can we say as an eminent 
author once said, that ' he did not expect his arguments to be more 
convincing to others, than theirs had been to him.' 

It is our firm belief that, according to reason and the Holy 
Scriptures, the doctrine of Benevolent Utility, properly understood 
and explained, is the chief corner-stone of moral science in all its 
branches, legal, theological, and governmental ; and that if the moral, 
political, religious, and theological teaching of the United States 
should be so modified as to be consistent with this doctrine, or even 
with the fundamental fact set forth and defended in this treatise, 
namely, that duty lies within the limits of possibility, it would more 
than double the value of that teaching and its efficacy to bless the 
nation and the world. We hope that those reviewers who admit the 



4 TO THE READER. 

truth of tliese points will lend their influence to establish them as 
firmly and as extensively as possible in the public mind. 

Of those reviewers who think our teaching fundamentally errone- 
ous, we have no favors to ask, only that they will as thoroughly as 
possible expose our errors and point out the truth, not forgetting their 
responsibility to explain the true nature, foundation, and extent of 
moral obligation. We trust that no honorable man will intimate that 
our teaching is erroneous, without pointing out the particular error 
into which he thinks we have fallen, and offering something better as 
a substitute, and which, being supported by better evidence, in his 
own judgment at least, accords with the truth. If the appropriate 
truth should be substituted for any of our errors, it would be a gain 
for which we should have occasion to rejoice. We hope the doctrine 
of Benevolent UtiHty will be discussed until the question of its truth 
shall be settled in the public mind throughout Christendom. 

If the teaching of this treatise should be proved to have inaccu- 
racies and inconsistencies to any supposable amount, and in conse- 
quence thereof, these imperfections, by some able hand, should be 
removed, and the exact truth should be brought into clear light and 
so become permanently established; or if an approximation to this 
should be made, our labor will not have been in vain. 



PREFACE. 



I KNOW that I am, and that something else is — that there is 
a world in which I am. In me and in the world around me, 
there is evidence which proves dependence upon a designing 
cause. From this, the inference is inevitable that there is an 
intelligent, personal God. I have learned from the teaching of 
God in my reason and in his revealed word, that I am to exist 
through the endless duration of eternity, — that my existence is 
to endure as long as the existence of God endures. And besides 
myself, I have learned that there are myriads of intelhgent, 
rational beings destined also to live forever. 

I am conscious of a desire of happiness, resulting from the 
very constitution of my being, — a pleasing hope, — a longing 
after blessedness and immortality. I learn that my fellow-beings 
have desires similar to that of my own. 

Now, therefore, I want to know what I can do to secure my 
own highest blessedness for the whole duration of my existence. 
And I desire also, to know what I can do to promote the highest 
amount, the greatest sum total, of happiness in the universe of 
intelligent beings, for the whole duration of their existence. I 
want to know how to secure for myself, and as far as I can for 
my fellow-beings, this one needful thing — this eternal well-being 
— the end for which we were made. 

1* (5) 



6 PKEFACE. 

I want also to know, and I desire that my fellow-men should 
know, what each and all intelligent beings can do to promote the 
most valuable amount of happiness, both in kind and degree, 
for each and all rational beings in the universe, for the whole 
duration of eternity. In short, to this end, I want to know and 
to make known the true nature, foundation, and extent of moral 
obligation, — the true nature of holiness and sin, as they are 
distinguished from each other, and from every other object of 
thought. To supply this want is the object of the following 
investigation. 

The investigation of this subject in past ages, has occupied 
many of the ablest and best minds in the world. And the 
number of those who apply their best powers to this inquiry is 
still increasing. That the public mind feels a deep and growing 
interest in the nature of moral obligation, is made manifest, 
among other things, by the frequent discussion of the subject in 
our ablest periodicals, and in the works of the ablest authors, as 
well as by the attention paid to it in our colleges and theological 
seminaries. 

This continual discussion in published works evinces also, that 
the subject has never been fully and satisfactorily explained, or 
that, if such explanation as ought to satisfy was ever made, it 
has been lost, or not duly appreciated. 

The more fully the fundamental principles of moral obligation 
are understood, and the more familiar they are made in the 
public mind, the greater will their power become, to control the 
public morals, and to secure the general well-being. 

In the following discussion we have endeavored to obtain and 
to give such a definition of holiness and sin, as will clearly dis- 
tinguish them from each other and from every other conceivable 
thing. We have had it in view to find and make manifest the 



PREFACE. 7 

" j»0M sto " — the place whereon to rest the moral lever, by 
which a sinful world is to be raised from its moral degradation 
and debasement. Our attempt mainly has been to define holi- 
ness and sin in the concrete, i. e. as they exist in holy and sinful 
acts, so as to distinguish virtuous acts from all acts of the soul 
which are not virtuous, especially from sinful acts, and to show 
that moral obligation is that, which requires rational beings to 
aim at the promotion of the highest general good and well-being, 
— that holiness is the necessary and most excellent means of 
the most excellent happiness, and is therefore a utility, — that 
holiness and universal, impartial benevolence are one and the 
same thing, precisely identical, and that all sin is selfishness, and 
that all selfishness is sin, — that sin is the most efficacious cause 
of misery, and is therefore a detriment. If holiness and sin can 
be defined correctly, as they exist — in the concrete — in holy 
and sinful acts, since they are performed and actually can exist 
only in the concrete, and never in the abstract, the remaining 
question. What is holiness in the abstract ? would appear to be 
of minor consideration. The importance of this latter question 
apparently lies chiefly, if not entirely, in its bearing on the ques- 
tion. What are virtuous acts ? Therefore, if we can know fully 
and adequately what moral obligation is, and what are virtuous 
acts, we can afford, without any great and essential loss, to leave 
the abstract question to those who are fond of mere abstractions. 
There is a common and truthful proverb, that it is easier to 
ask questions than to answer them. It is equally true, that a 
question skilfully framed goes far in suggesting the right answer. 
Questions correctly presented have a great advantage in exciting 
the attention, and in fixing the mind on the precise point of 
inquiry and investigation. They excite, encourage, and enable 
the mind to use more successfully its own powers to discover the 



8 PREFACE. 

truth sought, and to know it with greater certainty. Such 
questions awaken inquiry, and put the mind on the right track 
in the pursuit of truth. 

By questions and answers, instruction more clear and definite 
may be given, perhaps, than in any other way. The more 
clear and definite and certainly true, instruction is made to 
appear, the more deeply the truth communicated will be im- 
planted in the mind, and the more easily and permanently it 
can be retained in the memory ; and therefore, the more power- 
ful its influence will be in the formation both of the intellectual 
and moral character. 

There is yet another advantage arising from questions 
candidly and carefully proposed, which is worthy of regard. 
They have a decided tendency to conciliate the mind of the 
reader and inspire him with confidence in the author, and to 
lead him to devise the true answer, if, in his judgment, that is 
not given by the author. These are some of the reasons why 
this method has been adopted in the following pages. 

When it was recommended to us to undertake this work, 
the inquiry arose, What class of readers shall be addressed? 
and the conclusion was, that by a thorough and somewhat 
extensive examination of the statements of others, and by care- 
fully weighing our own words, we would make our statements 
as free as we could from error and from objections to minds 
of the keenest logical discrimination, and at the same time to 
make our meaning as plain as possible to the largest class of 
persons. 

To this end, we have endeavored to avoid such metaphysical 
niceties as are too subtile to be comprehended by common 
sense. To write hastily and to publish what is thus written 
on such a theme, would be an offence to the public deserving 



PREFACE. 9 

earnest repreliension. But, notwithstanding all the care we 
have taken, it must not be presumed that there is no inaccu- 
racy, inconsistency, or error in the statements we have made. 
But if we have advanced error upon the main points, the way 
is open for some abler hand to prove it, to show what the truth 
is, and to make known better principles, on the ground of which 
different theories may be reconciled, and whatever of truth 
these theories contain may be made consistently to appear, and 
thus to advance the science of virtue. 'If we could in any 
way perform the more than Herculean task of destroying the 
invisible power of opinions held in past times by other men, 
as well as of our own former opinions and feelings, and build 
anew, and in the right use of reason, on the solid basis of facts, 
we might reap the full reward of our labor in the consciousness 
of having discovered the truth.' Former writers upon morals 
labored under a great disadvantage from an incorrect mental 
philosophy, which is now in some degree removed. It is not 
to be expected that a correct system of ethical science will 
generally prevail until a more correct and complete psychology 
is permanently established. 

The names by which doctrines are called often raise a preju- 
dice against them, and in various ways cause them to be mis- 
understood, and for these reasons they become obnoxious to 
the popular mind. It is desirable, therefore, that the name of 
a doctrine should designate its true character, so as fairly to 
distinguish it from all other doctrines. 

That which we regard as the true doctrine on the nature 
of virtue may with propriety be designated the doctrine of 
benevolent utility, or benevolent rectitude, or universal benevo- 
lence. By these terms the true doctrine is purposely distin- 
guished, 1. From the theory that mere undesigned utility is 



10 PEEFACE. 

virtue ; 2. From all the theories that involve selfishness as an 
element of virtue ; 3. From all the forms of utilitarianism which 
discard impartial, universal, and disinterested benevolence ; 
4. From all the theories which deny that benevolence includes 
rectitude and all that is holiness ; 5. From all the theories which 
deny that utility is an element in the foundation of obligation ; 
6. And from all those which maintain that holiness is an end, 
but not a means, — that it is an ultimate end in and of itself, 
having no end ulterior to itself; 7. And from the notion that 
the idea of virtue or right is a simple idea. 

The doctrine of Benevolent Utility we understand to be 
the doctrine of both the Edwardses,* Hopkins and Dwight, of 
the New England theology generally, and of the Bible. "We 
believe that every result to which we have arrived is justified 
by the principles laid down by Bishop Cumberland, Bishop 
Butler, and by the elder Edwards, in his two great dissertations 
on God's Last End in Creation, and on the Nature of Virtue, 
and still more definitely stated in the works of the younger 
Edwards. 

In the preface, and by the editor of these dissertations, it is 
set forth that they were designed for the learned, and that the 
manner in which the subjects are treated is somewhat above 
the level of common readers. 

Our object has been to simplify and render the discussion 
less abstruse, and, if possible, by the aid of an improved psy- 
chology, to bring the subject more within the comprehension 
of the common mind. Fully to understand Edwards, requires 
an amount of labor which we apprehend few are willing to 
bestow. 

* Both tlic Edwavdscs, father and son, were named Jonathan, and were 
college presidents ; the son only had the title of D.D. 



PREFACE. 11 

The principles contained in these dissertations of President 
Edwards have for a long time constituted the key-note of the 
New England theology, notwithstanding all the opposition with 
which they have been and still are assailed ; and if we rightly 
judge, these principles are destined to be regarded as funda- 
mental, in a true moral and theological system, till the end of 
time. 

"We ask not our readers to adopt opinions on the authority 
of great names, either of individuals or of large bodies of men, 
however renowned for wisdom and knowledge. "Truth is 
learned only at the pure fountains of evidence. Authority does 
not create it ; dogmatism recommends it not ; neither does vio- 
lence impose it : from such taskmasters conscience retreats, 
that she may hear, in the still silence of her musings, the voice 
of God." 

"The honest advocate of truth, while inculcating it upon 
others, will be mindful of this only process of conviction. He 
will quietly conduct them by his reasonings to the sources of 
evidence, that truth may captivate them by her own persuasive 
energies." 

We have been induced to undertake this investigation, in 
part, by the hope of doing something to ascertain the true 
ground on which the different theories of the nature, founda- 
tion, and extent of moral obligation, so far as these theories 
contain portions of the true doctrine, may be reconciled with 
each other, and on which the moral forces of the good, espec- 
ially of the teachers of virtue, can be united for the spread of 
holiness, and the speedy establishment of its dominion over the 
w^orld. Our aim and hope is to guide the reader to the orig- 
inal fountain of eternal rectitude and holiness — to the primary 
source and rule of moral, spiritual life — and to show what are. 



12 PKEFACE. 

and how to lay, the foundations of many generations. We 
invite the attention of those who know how, and are not afraid, 
to reason. 

The want of union of views which prevails among authors 
and teachers of ethical science (that which is taught by one 
author and in one seminary being so much dissented from and, 
opposed by others), is to be seriously deprecated. On this 
account (it is believed), the cultivation of both intellectual and 
moral science is discouraged, and of course progress in these 
departments of knowledge is seriously retarded. 

If there could be effected a full or even a substantial agree- 
ment in the truth upon the elements of morality among our 
authors and teachers in the various schools and institutions of 
learning in the land, an inestimable advantage would be gained 
over the present condition of affairs in relation to this subject. 
No small amount of error would be avoided, which now has to 
be learned, and then has to be either unlearned or retained in 
its darkening and bewildering influence upon the mind, retard- 
ing the progress of knowledge and virtue, promoting divisions 
and sectarianism of various kinds, and, with all this, a vast 
waste of mind in opposing mind. Union in the truth among 
the teachers of truth, especially of the elements and first prin- 
ciples of truth, would vastly increase its power over the public 
mind. 

IDEAS, if they do not exert an absolute and irresistible con- 
trol over the minds and actions of men, still have an influence, 
too vast to be measured, for weal or woe, over the affairs of 
the world. Of all the ideas that can be conceived of, not one 
can be compared, in the power, permanency, and extent of its 
influence, with that of right as distinguished from wrong, in its 
relations to happiness and misery, througliout this world and 



PEEFACE. 13 

the world to come. What has given to any truly reformatory 
cause its main power, but the idea of right ? 

This idea, with its corresponding reality, constitutes the firm 
foundation of the throne of God. Any government not founded 
on RIGHT and sustained by righteousness, must sooner or later 
be overthrown, and remembered only in disgrace. If our 
attempt to unfold this idea and render it familiar to the public 
mind, and thus to increase its power over men, shall prove in 
some good degree successful, we shall never regret the labor it 
has cost us, but have occasion for great rejoicing and thankful- 
ness to the Giver of every blessing. 

The results of our labors are now commended to the friends 
and teachers of truth and virtue, to the enemies of error and 
sin, and to all who labor and pray for the prev^ence of sound 
science and sound religion in all our schools of learning, and 
everywhere else among men ; and to the blessing of Him whose 
holiness is perfect, whose benevolence is impartial, universal, 
and infinite ; whose favor is life, and who has determined that 
truth and righteousness shall pervade the earth. 

WoECESTEE, Mass., January, 1860. 

2 



NATURE AND FOUNDATION 



MORAL OBLIGATION 



CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS AND DEFINITION OF TERMS. 

One of the greatest and most obvious difficulties, 
which writers on the nature of moral obligation meet 
with, is to find suitable terms definitely to express their 
meaning, and at the same time such terms as their 
opponents cannot pervert, or turn away from their true 
and proper meaning. This difficulty arises, in part, 
from the want of terms sufficiently adapted to meta- 
physical discussion, and to express with metaphysical 
accuracy our ideas on a subject so abstruse and so much 
controverted, as is the nature of virtue. 

1. What method, then, is it necessary to adopt, to 
avoid as much as possible this difficulty arising from the 
want of terms ? 

To make our meaning clear and definite, and to 
prevent as much as possible its perversion, in treating 
upon so difficult a subject as the nature and foundation 

(15) 



16 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 2. 

of virtue, it is necessary carefully to select and accurately 
to define the principal terms employed, and at the same 
time to define and use terms in that sense which is 
established by the best authority, and to make but a 
sparing use, if any, of metaphorical language. 

2. In what way can we know, with unfailing cer- 
tainty, that our conclusions are true ? 

In order that we may be fully certain that our con- 
clusions, derived from a process of reasoning, are true, 
in the first place we must know that our premises are 
accurate and true. They must be either the first prin- 
ciples of truth, or they must have their foundation in, 
and be the legitimate results of, those principles. And 
then we must proceed step by step, with intuitive cer- 
tainty, until we arrive at the legitimate conclusion. But 
if we cannot proceed with intuitive and absolute cer- 
tainty, in each and every step, then we should come as 
near to it as we can, and thus have our conclusions as 
near certain as is practicable. 

3. Why is it necessary to assume the premises of an 
argument as true, without attempting to prove them to 
be true ? 

The premises of an argument must be assumed as 
true, because, from the nature of an argument, no other 
way is possible. If we attempt to prove our premises 
by a previous argument, we must assume the premises 
of this previous argument, and so on forever. So that 
the only possible way to begin an argument is to assume 
the premises as true, without proof or needing proof. 
If he, to whom you would communicate knowledge, 
cannot perceive the truth of your premises, he cannot 
legitimately gain either knowledge or wisdom by your 
arguments, and, therefore, you may as well leave him to 
himself, because he cannot be legitimately convinced 



Quest. 3.J OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 17 

by an argument, until he can perceive the truth of the 
premises. 

To him who knows nothing, nothing can be com- 
municated, either by argument or by any affirmation 
expressed in language. If you say to a man, God is 
good, he cannot imderstand what you mean, unless 
he has some knowledge of God and of what goodness 
is. If you undertake to prove to him, that God is good, 
by the fact that he has sent us rain from heaven and 
fruitful seasons, — that in this way he has fed us by 
the bounties of his providence, and thus filled our hearts 
with gladness, if he does not know what gladness is, 
then he cannot understand your argument, and if he 
does not know, and cannot believe, that God has sent 
us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, then of course 
your argument can have no weight in his judgment, and 
therefore, it will not and cannot carry any legitimate 
conviction to his mind. Your argument can afford no 
evidence to his mind that God is good. But if he 
knows what gladness is, by having felt it in his own 
soul, and if he perceives that he has been made glad, 
by the rain and fruitful seasons, which God has sent 
from heaven, for the purpose of making his creatures 
happy, then he can understand what the goodness of 
God is, by perceiving that it has by the design of God 
made him glad, and then he will be able to appreciate 
the force of your argument to prove the goodness of God. 

That no argument can be framed without first assum- 
ing the premises of it, was well illustrated by the 
famous attempt of the eminent French philosopher 
Des Cartes, not to assume or admit any thing which 
he had not first proved, in which he thus began, " I 
think, therefore I am." By the word I, the first word 
he uttered, he assumed the truth which he meant to 
2* 



18 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 4. 

prove. Unless he knew that / existed^ he had no ground 
to affirm, I think. / must exist in order to think, but I 
cannot think (before I exist), in order to exist. 

4. Is such power as is adequate to fulfil moral obfi- 
gation, necessary to the existence of such obHgation ? 
and is this a first principle in morals ? 

That power fuUy adequate to fulfil moral obfigation 
is necessary to the existence of such obligation, is 
an essential truth, and it is one of the first and funda- 
mental principles, on which all correct reasoning upon 
morals is, and necessarily must be, founded. All reason- 
ing based on its denial must lead to false conclusions. 

That what ought to he done can he done, and that 
what ought to he avoided can he avoided, is a prime 
and self-evident principle in moral truth. All duties are 
possibilities, and therefore no impossibifities can be 
duties. In all cases sin is that which can be avoided. 
Power adequate to fulfil the demands of duty is essen- 
tial to the foundation on which aU moral obligation 
must rest, or not exist. 

That which a person by the best use of his powers is 
unable to do, he can be under no moral obligation to do. 

5. What is impHed in this power adequate to fulfil 
moral obfigation ? 

This adequatepowerof a moral being implies, (1.) That 
he has a sufficient opportunity to fulfil such obligation. 
(2.) That he has the knowledge of, or the ability and 
means of knowing some rule of duty, which he is under 
obligation to obey, or to him that obligation cannot 
exist. Therefore, present obligation can never exceed 
present ability ; duty always does, and must, lie within 
the limits of possibility, or, in the precise and definite 
language of Bishop Butler, " Moral obligations can ex- 
tend no further than to natural possibilities.' ' The truth 



Quest, 6.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 19 

of this principle is affirmed by the universal reason of 
mankind, and is self-evident. Nothing plainer can be 
affirmed to prove it, and nothing more evident can be 
affirmed to disprove it. Every man acts, and must act, 
under the influence of this truth. If I do not know 
this truth with certainty, then it is in vain for me to 
claim that I do or can know any thing. 

Taking the principle, that what ought to be done can 
be done, for the ffi'st rule to guide us, 

6. What is the second fundamental principle, which 
must be regarded in aU right reasoning upon moral 
obligation ? 

A second fundamental moral principle, which must 
be regarded in all reasoning upon moral obligation, in 
order to come to right and just conclusions, is that 
all the GOOD which can he done ought to be done. 

To unite these two principles in one rule, all and only 
that good which can be done ought to be done. 

7. What are the essential characteristics of this prin- 
ciple ? 

To the essential nature of this principle, three char- 
acteristics belong. It is Eternal, Immutable, and Uni- 
versal. 

(1.) Eternal, without beginning or end. It never had 
a cause, or any kind of dependence ; it is, therefore, un- 
originated, necessary, and absolute in its own nature. 

(2.) Immutable. It cannot be changed, amended, or 
destroyed. 

(3.) It is universal, obligatory upon aU moral beings. 

8. What, then, is the moral constitution of the uni- 
verse ? 

This principle, that all and only that good which can 
be done ought to be done, is the primary, fundamental, 
original law, and ultimate rule of all moral obligation, 



20 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Qukst. 8. 

of duty, of right, of justice, and of all righteous doing. 
It is the moral constitution of the universe, which never 
can be changed or amended, according to which all 
righteous moral government must proceed, and in ac- 
cordance with which, all righteous law must be made, 
and by which all righteous execution of law must be 
forever controlled. 

The laws and commandments of God are all based 
upon this moral constitution, and are made in accord- 
ance with it. They are expHcations of it, and they are 
the applications of it, made by Infinite Wisdom, to the 
various relations of moral beings to each other and to 
their Creator. 

This principle is not dependent on any will, nor on 
any number of wills, but, without qualification or ex- 
ception, it is, and forever will be, and must be univer- 
sally binding on all intelligent wiQs throughout the 
universe. No kings nor autocrats, no rulers, no ma- 
jorities, not all the people, nor all judges of the earth, 
combined with all the rulers and all the people together, 
can either change or annihilate it. What all that good 
is, which can be done, is a point to be considered in its 
proper place, particularly in chapter 5, and in the sequel. 
These two principles thus united in one rule, must, 
therefore, by a rightful AUTHOEITY, be the guide 
of our inquiries, into the nature, foundation, and ex- 
tent of moral obligation, — into the nature of duty, of 
holiness and sin, and then, if our reasoning is correct, 
this principle will be an eternal, unchangeable, and im- 
movable support of our doctrine of moral obligation, 
of duty, of holiness and sin, and then the principle and 
doctrine must both stand together, and stand forever. 
Neither can fall without the other. 

This great principle, fully and rightly developed in its 



Quest. 9.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 21 

application to all cases of duty, of right and wrong, 
comprehends, and is coextensive with, moral law. It is 
the ultimate and perfect rule, standard, and test of all 
justice, of all right and wrong in moral acts and moral 
character, of all moral obligation, moral law, and moral 
government, from which there is no appeal. 

9. What idea is signified by the term moral^ when 
used to express a quality of the acts, doings, and char- 
acter of rational beings ? 

(1.) The term moral, when applied to the acts, doings, 
and character of rational beings, expresses that quality 
which renders those acts, doings, and character either 
holy or sinful, worthy of approbation or disapprobation, 
praise or blame, reward or punishment. In this sense 
of moral, the term expresses a quality which is predica- 
ble only of those acts, doings, or character of rational 
beings, for which they are responsible under a moral 
government. 

(2.) In this same sense, moral quality is predicable 
only pf voluntary character, acts, and doings, i. e. acts 
of will or choice, so that, therefore, nothing in this 
sense is moral, either holy or sinful, right or wrong, 
which is not voluntary. All moral quality lies in, or is 
immediately connected with, voluntariness, — free, un- 
necessitated choice. 

(3.) All moral acts are of the will, voluntary ; they are 
choices which rational beings make between the various 
objects of choice, aU the objects of their choice being 
different kinds of happiness,, and the real or supposed 
means, sources, or causes, including capacities, of hap- 
piness within their power ; no other moral choice, aside 
from choice between these objects, from the unchange- 
able nature both of moral agents and of moral agency, 
being possible. 



22 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 10. 

10. What is meant, in this discussion, by the phrase, 
means of happiness ? 

When the sense requires it, the phrase, means of 
happiness, is to be understood as including the sources, 
causes, and capacities of happiness; i. e. all that is 
essential to the existence of happiness. This is said 
here to be borne in mind in the future discussion. 

11. What idea is expressed by the term moral, when 
applied to obligation ? 

Moral obligation is that which requires and obligates 
rational beings to perform moral acts of a certain de- 
scription, and to abstain from moral acts of the oppo- 
site kind. It is that by which they are bound to 
choose, according to the best light and knowledge 
within their reach, the best and most efficacious means 
of doing all the good in their power. Moral obligation 
not only arises from a relation, but is itself a relation, 
between a moral being and the objects or ends which 
duty requires him to promote. 

12. What is a moral relation ? 

A moral relation is one that implies moral obliga- 
tion. 

13. What is a moral agent ? 

A moral agent is one who has power to perform 
moral acts, in obedience or disobedience to a known 
law. Or, a moral agent is one who, having the requi- 
site power, knowledge, and opportunity to obey a known 
rule of duty, can obey or transgi-ess ; i. e. having both 
in his power, he can do either, obey or transgress a 
known law. 

14. What is moral law ? 

Moral law is a rule of duty to be done, — a rule of 
voluntary action to moral agents, which rule points 
out to such agents, and with a rightful authority re- 



Quest. 15.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 23 

quires of them such moral acts as are best adapted, 
and because they are best adapted and most efSca- 
cious, to produce the most valuable amount of general 
well-being, which those agents can promote by the 
best use of all their powers. 

The laws of voluntary action which can be diso- 
beyed, but which ought to be obeyed, are moral laws. 
Those laws which can not be disobeyed are not moral 
laws. 

Moral laws should be carefully distinguished from 
all such laws as can by no possibility be disobeyed, 
but must inevitably be obeyed ; e. g. (1.) The law of 
gravitation. In all the voluntary movements of our 
material frame, we must act under the influence of 
this law, and in obedience to it ; not voluntarily, but 
by necessity. This law compels us to travel on soUd 
ground, and not in bee-lines through the air. 

(2.) Again. It is a universal law, that rational mind 
must think. By no possibility can aU thought be 
avoided. 

(3.) That mind must choose when objects of choice 
are presented ; that is, it must accept or reject, choose 
or refuse — there is no alternative. From this law 
there is no possibility of escape. 

(4.) It is a law, imposed by an invincible necessity of 
his nature upon every rational, sentient, voluntary be- 
ing, that in all his voluntary action, he must seek hap- 
piness. To escape from the dominion of this law is 
an absolute impossibility. (Compare q. 114.) 

(5.) Any law that is or can be irresistibly enforced, is 
not moral law. That action which is necessitated by 
an irresistible necessity, is not obedience to moral 
law. 

15. What is moral influence ? 



24 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 16. 

(1.) Moral influence is the influence of motives. It 
is that which draws, invites, or tends to move or induce 
a moral agent to do right or wrong. That which 
tempts to sin or allures to holiness, that which pre- 
sents or impresses motives to moral action, is moral 
influence. 

(2.) The influence of mind over mind by the presen- 
tation and impression of motives, whether accomplished 
by truth or error, is moral influence. 

Moral influence is expressed by the following forms 
of language. * The power and force of truth — the effi- 
cacy of the Gospel — the energy of the Divine "Word — 
the melting influence of the character of Christ — the 
subduing force of the attributes of God — the influence 
of eternal rewards and eternal penalties — the might 
of eloquence — the persuasive strength of motives — 
the vigor of appeals — the overwhelming power of out- 
ward temptation — the exciting, inviting, inciting, al- 
luring, persuading, inducing, attracting influence of 
motives presented to the mind in objective truths — the 
enticing, tempting, seducing, instigating, prompting, 
alluring, persuasive influence of motives presented to 
the mind in objective errors and false doctrines.' * 

(3.) Moral influence is the influence of motives which 
can be resisted. By this it is meant that when con- 
trary motives — motives which oppose each other — are 
exciting the mind to act in different directions, the mind 
has the power to resist and overcome either set of mo- 
tives, and comply with the other. And thus the mind 
has, within itself, the power to decide what voluntary 
actions it will perform, and what not. 

16. What is moral government ? 

*Bib. Sacra, 1853, p. 402. 



Quest. 17.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 25 

(1.) Moral government is the moral influence of mind 
over mind, exerted in the administration of moral law 
over moral agents, by means of the motives arising 
from the necessary sanctions of law, consisting of re- 
wards and penalties. 

(2.) A righteous moral government is the exercise of 
authority in administering and upholding righteous 
moral law, by the moral influence of rewards and pen- 
alties, for. the purpose of promoting in the highest 
degree the welfare of its subjects, by securing the 
fulfilment, by moral agents, of their obligations to 
obey moral law, which requires them to promote the 
greatest universal good. 

17. What is moral character ? 

Moral character is that which every moral being 
forms for himself, by the moral acts which he performs, 
under the moral influence of motives, and by the choice 
which he makes of the supreme object of his love and 
pursuit. 

18. What is meant by the nature, foundation, and 
extent of moral obligation ? 

The nature of moral obligation is determined by 
and consists in that which a moral agent is required 
by his duty to do ; e. g. to promote highest happi- 
ness. 

By the nature of moral obligation, we mean that 
demand which arises from the nature and relations of 
rational, voluntary beings, that they should promote the 
greatest amount of happiness in their power. 

The foundation of moral obligation consists in, and 
includes all, that is essential to the possibility of moral 
action. This possibility includes all that is necessarily 
implied in the power of right moral action ; all that is 
implied in the intrinsic value of the ultimate good 
3 



26 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 19. 

sought in such action, as well as in the power of seek- 
ing that good and of promoting it as an ultimate end. 

In this Inquiry, by the foundation, of moral obliga- 
tion we mean, not any one thing alone that may be 
essential to the existence of such obligation, not merely 
the ground of obligation that is found in the intrinsic 
value of the good which constitutes the ultimate object 
of virtue, but all those powers of mind and those quali- 
ties of things that are absolutely essential to the possibil- 
ity of making a virtuous choice, — or of forming a right 
predominant or supreme intention, or of forming a holy 
character. This sense of the term appears to have 
been long established by the best usage, and by some 
of the ablest authors, ancient and modern. 

By the extent of obligation, we mean the amount of 
duty required, which is to be measured by the powers 
of each moral agent to promote the ultimate object of 
moral action, viz. happiness. 

19. What is the meaning of eligible, infallible, un- 
failing, impossible, impossibihty, invincible, certain, cer- 
tainty, and necessity ? 

Eligihle means possible to be chosen ; to be eligible 
an object must be that which may be desired — that 
which cannot be desired, cannot be chosen. 

Infallible — cannot fail. Unfailing — certain never 
to fail. 

Impossible and impossibility are sometimes used to 
mean certain and certainty not to be, but commonly in 
a quite different sense of cannot be, no power to be, 
impossible to be for the want of actual power to be or 
to be done. 

Invincible — cannot be overcome or conquered. 

Certain^ certainty. That which is certain to be will 
bSj whether there is power to prevent it or not. There 



Quest. 20.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 27 

may be a power able to prevent, although it certainly 
will not prevent that which is certain to be. "We be- 
lieve the sun is certain to rise to-morrow, but still God 
has power to prevent it. He once caused the sun and 
moon to stand still. 

Necessity sometimes means needfulness, indispensa- 
ble requisiteness ; but more commonly that which must 
be, either by an irresistible causation, or because there 
is no supposable power to the contrary, as time and 
space. To use the term necessity in the sense of mere 
certainty, is bad usage. 

If when these terms and terms like these are used, 
the sense in which they are used should be definitely 
fixed, it would aid essentially in precision of thought 
and the accurate perception of truth. 



I 



CHAPTER II. 

HOLINESS AND SIN DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER AND 
FROM EVERY OBJECT OF THOUGHT, EXCEPT THE ACTS OF 
MORAL AGENTS. OTHER TERMS DEFINED. 

The main object of this chapter is to show that 
moral quality is predicable only of the acts of moral 
agents. To accomplish this object, we begin with the 
question, — 

20. What is virtue? 

Virtue is the same with moral goodness, moral worth 
or worthiness, moral excellence, holiness, rectitude, and 
righteousness. But these are only synonymous terms, 
and constitute no real or logical definition, and, there- 
fore, the question remains to be presented again. 



28 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 21 

21. What is holiness ? 

Holiness is the moral opposite of sin. Holiness and 
sin are opposed to each other. Between them there is 
an entire antagonism. That which promotes one pre- 
vents the other. The triumph of one is, for the time, 
the suspension or the overthrow of the other. Their 
natural and final results are as opposite as their natures 
and tendencies. One results in happiness, the other 
results in misery. The tendency of each is to thwart 
the tendency of the other, and to an indefinite extent 
they do thwart each other's influence. One exalts to 
glory and honor, the other debases and leads to dis- 
honor, shame, self-condemnation, remorse, and everlast- 
ing contempt. 

22. What are the natural opposites, which correspond 
to the moral opposites of holiness and sin ? 

Happiness and misery are the corresponding natural 
opposites, which result from holiness and sin. That 
which promotes one hinders the other. 

23. In what other respects are holiness and sin moral 
opposites ? 

HoHness is that which reason and conscience demand, 
which deserves approbation, praise, and reward, and 
which carries along with it the conviction of obligation, 
— a conviction that it can and ought to be done. 

Sin is that which reason and conscience forbid and 
condemn, — that which deserves disapprobation, blame, 
and punishment, and should carry along with it a sense 
of obligation to the contrary, — a perception of ought 
not, a conviction that it can and ought to be avoided. 

Holiness is that which God requires, in the moral 
law made known by his works and word, and which, if 
persevered in, he will reward with everlasting happi- 
ness. 



Quest. 24.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 29 

Sin is that which God's law forbids, and for which 
he will inflict upon the incorrigible transgressor the 
deserved penalty, — such a penalty as is adequate to 
sustain his authority as lawgiver. Here, again, the 
question returns, — 

24. What is that virtue which God and our con- 
sciences demand and approve, and what is sin, its 
opposite, as distinguished from every created thing, and 
from every unoriginated thing that is what it is by the 
necessity of nature ? 

As distinguished from every created thing, and from 
every unoriginated thing that can be conceived of, vir- 
tue and its opposite, holiness and sin, must consist in 
the acts of a living agent. They do, and must, consist 
in acts of mind, in distinction from mind itself, and 
from its nature and powers, and from all its constitu- 
tional properties. 

Created or inherited constitution, and moral charac- 
ter which can be formed by moral acts alone, are 
entirely distinct from each other. Nothing that belongs 
to mind, in distinction from its acts, can be virtue or 
sin. JNIind can no more be virtuous or vicious, in being 
what it is caused to be by creative power, or by any 
other irresistible causation, than matter can be, by being 
what it was created. That for which a moral being is 
deserving of approbation or disapprobation, reward or 
penalty, is an act, in distinction from every created 
thing, substance, or being, and from the created nature 
of every existing thing or being, and from every created 
element or quality of every substance, whether it be 
matter or mind, material or immaterial. 

It is no unoriginated object of thought, that is what 
it is by an uncaused necessity. It is neither time nor 
space, figure nor dimension, quantity nor number, nor 
3* 



30 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 25. 

any thing that belongs to mathematical truth of any 
kind. 

We have made this particular and minute statement, 
that our premises may be distinctly understood and 
carefully remembered. As thus distinguished, both 
holiness and sin must be the acts of a living agent, 
who has the power necessary to perform moral acts, 
and of course these acts must be originated by the 
agent's own power. 

25. What is the difference between an act and an 
effect ? 

An act is the exertion of power, as motion is the 
moving of a body, — its passing from one place to an- 
other. Power exerted in action is cause. An effect is 
a result produced by power acting, i. e. by an act, and, 
therefore, an effect is and must be a consequence of an 
act, and not the act itself. There is the same difference 
between an act and an effect as between a cause and 
its effect. One is prerequisite in the order of nature 
to the other. 

An act of the will is an exertion of the mind's power 
of choosing. It is the mind's exerting itself in choosing ; 
of course, such an act cannot be an effect, in the strict 
sense of the term effect. To suppose it involves ab- 
surdity. 

An external, muscular action or movement of the 
body is an effect of an act of the will. 

The exertion of creative power, which God alone can 
put forth, may produce results and effects to any sup- 
posable extent which does not involve absurdity. But 
effects produced by Omnipotence must be just what that 
power, when exerted, causes those effects to be. That 
there is no other power in the universe sufficient to 
resist and counteract the exertion of Omnipotence, needs 



Quest. 26.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 31 

no proof. Therefore, effects thus produced can never 
be the free, voluntary, responsible acts of moral agents, 
because in all such acts they have poiver to the contrary. 
To suppose that such acts are produced by omnipotent 
causation, which in its own nature must be irresistible^ 
involves a palpable absurdity.* 

26. What results have followed from regarding moral 
acts as literal effects ? 

Regarding moral acts as literal effects produced 
directly or indirectly by Almighty efficiency has been a 
prolific source of error and confusion, in morals and 
theology. 

27. What truth can be inferred from the established 
fact, that all holiness and sin must consist in acts of 
living agents having power to perform such acts ? 

If all holiness and sin are acts, then, since both holi- 
ness and sin are moral, they are moral acts. And if 
they are moral acts and acts of living agents (see q. 24), 
then, they are the acts of moral agents, and then, they 
are acts for which their authors are responsible. (See 
q.9.) 

28. Why must both holiness and sin be the acts of 
moral agents ? 

Both holiness and sin must be the acts of m.oral 
agents, because such acts are absolutely impossible to 
all other beings, and because, to suppose that any being 
should perform such acts, and not be a moral agent, 
would be an absurdity. 

Since all holiness and sin are moral acts and must of 
course be the acts of moral agents, our next inquiry is, 

29. What kind of being is it necessary that a 



* See Appendix, note A. 



32 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 30. 

moral agent should be ? (See q. 13, defining a moral 
agent.) 

It is necessary that a moral agent should be a rational, 
sentient, and voluntary being. 

Virtue and its opposite must be the act of a rational 
mind, in distinction from brutes, which are utterly devoid 
of the rationality essential to make moral distinctions. 
To act responsibly, a moral agent must have the posses- 
sion and use of his reason, in distinction from such 
infants as know not good from evil, so as to be able to 
choose the good and refuse the evil, and in distinction 
from all persons in such a state, as to be incapable of 
moral distinctions ; for instance, persons asleep, somnam- 
bulists, idiots, and maniacs bereft of their reason. That 
no mind in such a state is capable of virtue or vice, is 
an assertion which carries in itself the evidence of its 
own truth. 

30. Why must a moral act be the act of a rational 
mind ? 

A moral act must be the act of a rational mind, be- 
cause none but a rational mind can perceive what will 
promote, hinder, or diminish either happiness or misery. 
None but a rational mind can understand what will 
secure, or what will prevent, the highest good and well- 
being of an individual, or of a moral community. None 
but such a mind can perceive or understand what 
moral obligation is, nor what the difference is between 
moral good and evil. None but a rational mind can 
approve or disapprove of a moral act. Therefore, none 
but such a mind can know what virtue or vice is, or 
know how to perform a moral act, or be able to perform 
such acts. 

To make the meaning of what we are about to say 
as definite as possible, it may here be expedient to 
answer the question, 



Quest. 31.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 33 

31. What is meant by motive, in its various modifi- 
cations, as a mental phenomenon ? 

Motive is that which moves, incites, induces, influences, 
invites, or leads the mind to act voluntarily. Moral 
influence, incitement, inducement, impulse to voluntary 
action of the mind in choosing, is what we mean by 
motive. (See q. 15.) 

32. What is the difference between the subjective 
and objective motive ? 

The motive, felt in the consciousness of the mind, is 
called the internal, subjective motive, to distinguish it 
from the object sought or from the objective motive. 

33. What is meant by subjective and objective as 
applied to motives ? 

The motive felt in the consciousness of the mind is 
called the subjective motive, because it is the motive of 
which the mind is the subject. It is called the internal 
motive, because it exists only in the mind. It is quite 
necessary to distinguish this motive from the external 
and ultimate objects of choice, which are called objec- 
tive motives, because they are the objects of desire, of 
choice and pursuit, and to distinguish them from those 
internal and subjective motives which are the primary 
moving springs to voluntary action in aU cases. Sub- 
jective and objective motives are correlative, and 
mutually imply each other, so that neither can exist 
without the other. There can be no desire without an 
object of that desire, which is actually desired, and vice 
vei'sa. The deske of an object is a subjective motive, 
and the object desired is the objective motive. Nothing 
can be an objective motive which does not excite for 
itself that desire in the mind which constitutes the sub- 
jective motive. The mind of man can have no motive 
in any sense, without having a desire for some object. 



M NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 34. 

The subjective motive is the primary, moving induce- 
ment for choosing, — the objective motive is the object 
chosen when the choice is made. Many objects are 
desired which are not chosen. 

The answer to the last two questions is given here, 
to aid in understanding the answer to the next ques- 
tion. 

34. Why must a moral agent be a sentient being ? 

None but a sentient being is capable of happiness 
or misery, pleasure or displeasure. Without a sensi- 
bility, no being can have the peculiar satisfaction and 
happiness which attends and follows the approbation 
of conscience, or the opposite feeling, which , attends 
and follows the disapprobation of conscience. 

A being incapable of pleasure or pain can have no 
motive whatever, neither subjective nor objective, ^nd 
therefore he can have no power to act voluntarily at all, 
either virtuously or viciously. Such a being can have 
neither motive nor power, in the least degree, for any 
moral or voluntary action whatever. 

All possible internal, subjective motive is compre- 
hended and lies in the mind^s desire to gain or enjoy 
happiness and to avoid misery. A mind incapable of 
happiness can have no desire of happiness, and no idea 
of happiness, nor of promoting it, nor of any voluntary 
action, and, therefore, can have no idea of moral obli- 
gation, of virtue, or of sin. Such a mind can have no 
knowledge of duty, and, of course, can have no con- 
science, and therefore can have no power to fulfil or 
violate moral obligation. An insentient being can have 
no relation to any obligation, either to obtain or pro- 
mote happiness, to shun misery himself, or prevent the 
misery of others. 

" A disposition [a susceptibility] to be injluenced by 



Quest. 35.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 35 

right motives is as absolutely necessary to render us 
moral agents, as a capacity to [discern right motives. 
Since a disposition [or susceptibility] to be influenced 
by right motives is a sine qua non [an indispensable pre- 
requisite] to virtuous actions, an indifferency to right 
motives must incapacitate us for virtuous actions, or 
render us in that particular not moral agents. " * 

Since a being not susceptible of pleasure or pain can 
have no power to perform moral acts, and since the 
susceptibihty of receiving pleasure from right action 
and of having a desire to perform it, is absolutely indis- 
pensable to the possibility of performing right action, 
for these reasons, the tendency of right action to excite 
and gratify this desire is an essential element in the 
foundation of moral obligation. These are the reasons, 
then, why a virtuous act must be the act of a sentient 
being, who can gain happiness for himself by perform- 
ing right acts, and by promoting the happiness of 
others. 

35. Why must all moral acts, both right and wrong, 
be performed by a voluntary being ? 

All moral acts must be performed by a voluntary 
being, having the power of will and choice, because 
this is the power, and the only power, by which an act, 
good or bad, can be immediately performed, or can be 
possible. 

Suppose a being to feel, to the greatest possible ex- 
tent, the power of motives urging him to seek and pro- 
mote happiness ; suppose him to have a capacity as 
great as may be for enjoying happiness ; suppose him 
to be possessed of ail conceivable knowledge, and to 
understand all mysteries, and all conceivable ways of 

* Bishop Butler. Quoted from Bib. Sacra; 1857, p. 442. 



S6 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 36. 

gaining happiness for himself and of communicating it 
to others, without the power of choice, he would have 
no power to act for the promotion of any object what- 
ever, and, therefore, he could not be under obligation to 
act either for the promotion of his own happiness, or 
to promote the general well-being, or for any other 
object. 

36. What do the facts stated in the answers to ques- 
tions 29, 30, 34, and 35, prove ? 

The facts stated in these four answers prove that all 
moral acts, whether holy or sinful, are the acts of ra- 
tional^ sentient^ and voluntary beings ; that the posses- 
sion and use of the rational, sentient, and voluntary 
faculties are indispensably necessary to the power of 
performing a moral act] and that no other being can 
perform a moral act. Because these three powers are 
essential to the possibility of performing moral acts, 
they are properly termed moral powers. (Comp. q. 4 
and 5.) 

37. What powers, then, are requisite to constitute a 
moral agent, i. e. to qualify a being to act as a moral 
agent ? 

Intellect, sensibility, and will. This analysis of the 
mind is now generally adopted by the most eminent 
mental philosophers. 



Quest. 38.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 37 



CHAPTER III. 

CONSTITUTIONAL ENDOWMENTS NEITHER SINFUL NOR HOLY. 

MENTAL POWERS AND OPERATIONS CLASSIFIED. MORAL 

QUALITY PREDICABLE ONLY OF ACTS OF WILL BY MORAL 
AGENTS. 

38. Does the mere possession of all the moral facul- 
ties constitute moral, responsible character, either holy 
or sinful, previous to any exercise of them in the per- 
formance of moral acts ? 

Suppose a person to be endowed with a rational 
intellect, a delicate sensibility, and a free will, powers 
by which he may accurately know his duty, and by 
which he may feel powerfully pressed by the proper 
motives to do it, and by which he is made fully able 
to perform, and to rejoice in performing, his whole duty, 
— all this, here supposed, is prerequisite to the perform- 
ance of duty or its opposite, of course is entirely dis- 
tinct from such performance. The power of choice 
before choosing, and choice subsequently made, are 
two entirely distinct things. Therefore these powers 
are prerequisite to the possibility of moral character of 
any kind, either holy or sinful, and therefore are not 
moral character itself. 

Constitutional endowments are not moral character, 
for the reason that man is not the creator of his own 
constitutional powers and endowments. His moral 
character consists not in the possession of these en- 
dowments, but in the voluntary use and exercise of 
4 



2f& NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 39. 

them. " It is not a man's constitution, but the use he 
makes of it, that stamps him good or vile." * 

With these powers his whole moral character may- 
be either holy or sinful, and that in the highest possible 
degree ; and for the plain reason that his moral charac- 
ter cannot consist in any created or inherited constitu- 
tional nature, power, or property of his being, but must 
be what he himself forms it by his own acts. 

39. What is the difference between an intellectual 
and a mental phenomenon? Mental is a term more 
general than intellectual. An intellectual phenomenon 
is some act, exercise, or state of the intellect A mental 
phenomenon may be either an act, exercise, or state of 
the intellect, sensibility, or wiU. Any act, state, or ex- 
ercise of mind, is mental. 

40. What is the intellect ? 

The intellect is the power of thought and knowl- 
edge, — the power to think and to know. Reason is 
an intellectual power. Conscience, in its intellectual 
function, is the reason applied to approve or disapprove, 
to justify or condemn, moral acts. Some of the princi- 
pal terms by which intellectual acts are denoted, are, 
thoughts, conceptions, ideas, imaginations, perceptions, 
cognition, knowledge, judgment, remembering, appro- 
bation, disapprobation, and reasoning. All intellectual 
acts are thoughts. 

41. What is the sensibility ? 

The sensibility is that power or property by which the 
mind feels. The different states, exercises, or phenom- 
ena of the sensibility, are designated principally by the 
terms feelings of pleasure and pain, sensations, emo- 
tions, desires, affections, and passions. All exercises of 
the sensibility are involwntary feelings. Whenever the 

* Minister's Wooing, p. 479. 



Quest. 42.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 39 

terms desires and affections are used to express volun- 
tary exercises, they denote phenomena of the will, not 
of the sensibility. The mind's sensibility or capacity 
of feeling in view of right and wrong is conscience in 
one of its offices. 

42. Whatis the wiU? 

The will is that power of the mind by which we 
choose, and by which we perform voluntary internal 
acts, and not that by which (strictly speaking) we de- 
sire. 

" The caution of being careful not to be misled by 
expressions that do not enough keep up the difference 
between the will and several acts of the mind that are 
quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary; be- 
cause I find the will often confounded with several of 
the affections, especially desire, and one put for the 
other; and that by men who would not willingly be 
thought not to have had distinct notions, and not to 
have writ very clearly about them." " The will is per- 
fectly distinct from desire." " It is evident that desir- 
ing- and willing are two distinct acts of the mind ; and 
consequently that the will, which is the power of voli- 
tion, is much more distinct from desire J^ — (Locke, 
Book 11. chap. 21, § 30.) 

43. What are the principal terms which signify acts 
of the will ? 

The principal terms which signify acts of the wiU 
are purpose, design, intent, intention, determination, 
resolution, choice, will, and volition, and the verbs 
which correspond to these nouns. All acts of the will 
are voluntary acts, — they are all choices, and they are 
all volitions. They are those particular acts of the 
mind which are in its immediate power to perform or 
avoid, as its intellectual and sentient acts are not. 



40 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Qukst. 44. 

44. By what three terms are all the mental acts com- 
prehended ? 

All mental acts are either thoughts, feelings^ or voli- 
tions. 

45. Into how many classes, then, may the mental acts 
of moral agents be divided ? 

All the mental acts and exercises of moral agents 
may be divided into three classes, intellectual, sentient, 
and voluntary, — acts of the intellect, sensibility, and 
will, thoughts, feelings, and volitions. 

46. Can moral quality, good or bad, be affirmed of 
mere acts of the intellect? 

No moral quality, in the least degree, can be predi- 
cated or affirmed of mere intellectual acts, — mere 
thoughts. Whatever is consistent with the most per- 
fect holiness is not sinful. Whatever is consistent with 
the most perfect wickedness is not virtuous. Whatever 
act is necessitated by an irresistible necessity, is done 
unavoidably, and cannot therefore be a moral act, nei- 
ther virtue nor vice. Holiness or sin necessitated is an 
absurdity, because necessity excludes choice, in which 
alone moral quality can exist. 

Let these statements be borne in mind while the 
following things are supposed. Suppose that a man 
has the intuitive conviction, that time or duration never 
had a beginning, and never will have an end, — that 
space is infinite, boundless, — that two and two are 
four, — that a triangle, a square, and a circle, are dif- 
ferent figures, — that he knows and approves what is 
right, he knows and disapproves what is wrong, — that 
he perceives a gi'eat many ideas which have a corre- 
sponding reality, and a great many imaginary ideas 
which have no corresponding reality, — that he has a 
present perception of his past knowledge of many past 



Quest. 47.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 41 

— that he perceives the various objects of sense when 
they are presented to the organs of sensation, — that he 
knows, and that he must know, a great many things 
which he can by no possibility avoid knowing. He 
knows what duty is, and that he ought to do many things, 
and that he ought to avoid a great many other things. 

K we could know all the above suppositions to be 
true of a man, it would not show whether his moral 
character were good or bad. He might be as wicked 
as the wickedest, and all this be true of him ; or he 
might be as holy as the holiest man in the world, and 
all this be true of him still. 

It is, then, an unavoidable conclusion, — a conclusion 
demanded by sound reason, that, separated entirely from 
all connection with the consent of the will, mere intel- 
lectual pereceptions of either truth, probability, or fic- 
tion, have no moral quality, virtuous or vicious. 

47. Can moral quality of any kind be predicated of 
the feelings of the sensibility ? 

Again, let us suppose that a man feels the pain of 
the tooth-ache, neuralgia, gout, or rheumatism, or any 
other kind of pain from any unavoidable cause, accident, 
or calamity, — that he has all the variety of sensational 
pleasures which are to be derived from food and cloth- 
ing, air and health, and all the other good things which 
the world aifords, — that he has at times the pleasant 
emotions which arise from the approbation, and the 
unpleasant emotions arising from the disapprobation, 
which he bestows upon various doings that come under 
his observation from time to time, — that he desires 
happiness and to avoid misery, — that he has the delight- 
ful emotions which are derived from the exercise of a 
lively imagination and from the beauties of nature and 
art, and from subUmity and grandeur ; in all this there 



42 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 48. 

is neither holiness nor sin, nothing to evince in any 
degree his moral character. It is, therefore, an inevita- 
ble conclusion, that all the states and exercises of the 
sensibility, separated entirely from all connection with 
the consent of the will, have no moral character what- 
ever. 

48. What evils have resulted from an erroneous anal- 
ysis of the mind ? 

Very few writers on morals have properly distin- 
guished between the phenomena of the sensibility and 
those of the will, — between the voluntary and invol- 
untary ; and this has made it impossible for them accu- 
rately to distinguish between moral acts and acts not 
moral. Within but a short period have any writers, 
within our knowledge, accurately made this distinc- 
tion. 

One of the most productive sources of error, false 
systems, false theories, and false doctrines, in morals 
and theology, has been that analysis of the mind which 
regards the understanding and will as comprehending 
all the mental powers. In this analysis the distinc- 
tion between the acts of the will and the feelings of 
the sensibility is overlooked, and in this way the feel- 
ings of the sensibility are regarded sometimes as holy 
and sometimes sinful, when in strict sense they are 
neither, and therefore have no moral character. This 
error has been one of the greatest obstacles to the prog- 
ress of sound doctrine in regard to moral obligation, 
duty, holiness, and sin. This analysis of the mental 
faculties is now, by the most eminent mental philoso- 
phers, generally repudiated. 

Bishop Butler and President Edwards are regarded 
as among the most profound thinkers. In their writ- 
ings we fmd the fundamental points of our doctrine 



Quest. 49.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 43 

clearly stated and ably maintained. By quoting their 
statements of these points, we do not say or mean to 
imply that they do not make other statements incon- 
sistent wdth these. That they did not keep consistent 
with their statements of fundamental truth, was in a 
great degree owing to their confounding the feelings of 
the sensibility with the action of the will. 

Especially is it true of Butler, that in his sermon on 
love to our neighbor he confounds those feelings of the 
sensibility which prompt to benevolence with benevo- 
lence itself. Notwithstanding their inconsistent state- 
ments, we regard Butler and Edwards as among the 
ablest supporters of the fundamental principles of the 
doctrine of benevolent utility. 

49. What is the sum of the evidence, that neither 
virtue nor vice can be found in the mere acts of the 
intellect, nor in the feelings of the sensibility ? 

(1.) As a general rule, intellectual perceptions are un- 
avoidable^ and therefore necessary^ in the circumstances 
in which they take place. The same is true of the 
feelings of the sensibility. Our involuntary feelings, 
desires, sensations, and emotions must be what they 
are in the circumstances in which they take place. 

Many of our intellectual perceptions must be what 
they are, in aU circumstances, if we think at all on 
certain subjects. We think that no mature person of 
a sound mind, if he understand the terms, can avoid 
perceiving that space and duration are infinite, bound- 
less ; that two and two are four ; that a triangle is not 
a circle nor a square ; that there is a difference between 
right and wrong; that power to do right is essentially 
necessary to the existence of moral obligation, and 
that a moral being ought to do all the good he can. 
The same may be said of many other perceptions, and 



44 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 49. 

also of many of our feelings. No man can avoid hav- 
ing a desire of happiness and dread of misery. 

It is most evident that none of our thoughts or per- 
ceptions, sensations, desires, or emotions, are so imme- 
diately in our power to have or avoid, as are our acts 
of willing or choosing. 

(2.) Nothing can be said to be immediately in our 
power but the acts of our wills, i. e. willing or choos- 
ing. And nothing can properly be said to be mediately 
in our power besides those things which can be pro- 
duced by the action of our wills. I can move my hand 
only through the medium of the action of my will. 

(3.) If all our thoughts and feelings were imme- 
diately in our power, as the actions of our wills are, 
then we might at any time think and feel directly the 
opposite of what we do at that time think and feel. 
And then we might have at any time the opposite 
thoughts, perceptions, knowledge, and feelings, from 
those which we really have ; and all this without even 
willing it. If we should have to will our thoughts 
and feelings to be different, in order to cause them to 
be different, then our acts of willing would be the me- 
dium of causing our thoughts and feelings to be differ- 
ent ; and then they would not be mmediately in our 
power, as our choices are when they are made. 

(4.) If all our thoughts and knowledge were imme- 
diately in our power, as our choices are, we might 
know that space has limits ; that both space and time 
have had a beginning and will have an end ; that two 
and two are not four ; that a triangle has neither three 
sides nor three angles ; that absurdities are realities, 
and contradictory assertions veritable propositions. If 
our feelings were immediately in our power, with 
power to the contrary, as our choices are, then we 



Quest. 50.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 45 

could at once, in all circumstances, banish all pain from 
our minds and take to ourselves the opposite pleasures, 
changing the most intolerable pangs of remorse into 
the most satisfactory and delightful emotions, now- 
attainable only by those acts of the will which con- 
science approves. 

50. In what sense may external acts be regarded as 
having moral character ? 

External acts in themselves have no moral character. 

For example, (1.) Whatever is done by unavoidable 
accident. Suppose that I shot a man instead of a 
lion which I intended to shoot, and thus destroyed a 
life which I intended to save. The external act in 
itself has no moral character, and in this case it can 
derive none from the intention, because it was not in- 
tended. Suppose, again, that I had intended to shoot 
the man when the deed was done. The external act 
would be the same in the two cases. In the first it 
would have no moral character ; in the second it would 
have none, except that which it would derive from the 
intention. 

(2.) External actions not under our control, as the 
actions of one having the St. Vitus's dance, the actions 
of one in any kind of fit, and all spasmodic, involun- 
tary actions. By a spasmodic action which I did not 
intend, I threw a dollar into a contribution box. All 
such actions have no moral quality. 

Those external actions which are immediately pro- 
duced by executive volitions, so far as they may be 
supposed to partake of a moral character, derive it not 
from the executive volitions by which they are pro- 
duced, but from the ultimate intention or purpose 
which they are designed to fulfil. For illustration: I 
ran to my neighbor's house to extinguish fire, to save 



4m NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 51. 

property and life. By executive volitions I took every 
step and performed every act in the whole process. 
The moral character of these external acts is to be 
found, not in themselves, not in the executive volitions 
by which they were put forth, but, if anywhere, in the 
generic or general intention which they were designed 
to fulfil. 

51. What, then, is it which may be supposed in some 
sense to give moral character to external actions, and 
to imperative or executive volitions ? 

So far as they have moral character at all, it is given 
by the general intention from which they spring. 

52. What points have been proved in the progress of 
our argument ? 

We have seen it proved, in the course of our argu- 
ment, (1.) That neither holiness nor sin can consist in 
any necessary or necessitated act or thing, not in any 
created substance, nor in the created constitution, na- 
ture, powers, or properties of any being, nor in any 
adaptation or unavoidable tendencies of any created 
substance, either matter or mind, but, that holiness and 
sin consist in the moral acts of moral agents. 

(2.) We have seen that all the mental acts and 
exercises are divided into three classes, viz. exercises 
of the intellect, sensibility, and will, and that no moral 
quality, of any kind or in any degree, is predicable of 
any mere act, exercise, or state of either the intellect 
or sensibility, and that external actions and executive 
volitions have in themselves no moral quality, and none 
in any sense, except what they derive from preceding 
intention. 

53. What, then, is the present position of our argu- 
ment ? And does all holiness and does all sin consist 
in voluntary acts of moral agents ? 



Quest. 54.] OF M K AL OB L I G AT I N. 47 

We have now been led by our argument to the con- 
clusion, that all holiness and sin must consist in the 
voluntary acts of the mind ; i. e. in the free intentions, 
purposes, or choice of moral agents, or nowhere. 

54. Is the doctrine, that moral quality can be affirmed 
only of voluntary action of moral agents, sustained by 
many of the ablest and wisest of men ? 

To show the coincidence of doctrines, held by some 
of the wisest among men, with the conclusion that 
moral quality is predicable only of the voluntary acts 
of the mind, we quote from eminent authors the follow- 
ing statements : — 

Dr. Reid says : " What is in no degree voluntary, can 
neither deserve moral approbation nor blame." * 

Dr. Chalmers's language is : " The first of these popu- 
lar, or rather universal decisions ... is, that nothing is 
moral or immoral which is not voluntary." 

" But the point of the deepest interest is that step of 
the process, at which the character of right or wrong 
comes to be applicable. It is not at that point when 
the appetites or affections of our natm-e solicit from the 
will a particular movement ; neither is it at that point 
when either a rational self-love or a sense of duty 
remonstra-tes against it. It is not at that point when 
the consent of the will is pleaded for, on the one side 
or other, — but aU-important to be borne in mind, it is 
at that point when the consent is given." f 

" The moral faculty always aims exclusively at vol- 
untary action." J 



* Reid's 5th Essay on Morals ; Works, vol. 3, p. 39. 

t Bridgewater Treatise, pp. 267, 271. 

X Sir James Mackintosh on Ethical Philosophy, p. 269. 



48 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 54. 

" That sin or guilt pertains exclusively to voluntary- 
action, is the true principle of orthodoxy." * 

" Both sin and holiness consist in voluntary exercises." 
" Pleasant and painful sensations are common to saints 
and sinners, and to all sensitive natures, and have no 
moral quality belonging to them." f 

Bishop Butler says : " Acting, conduct, behavior, . . . 
is itself the natural object of the moral discernment, as 
speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. 
[Intention of such and such consequences indeed is 
always included [in action], for it is a part of the action 
itself" X 

" As the will is the only active faculty, and the seat 
of liberty and moral agency, so there is no morality in 
any other faculty, actions, or impressions, than those of 
the wiU." § 

" Moral evil is a voluntary act impairing the genera] 
good, consisting in the glory of God and the happiness 
of the created system." || 

" In fact, the true reason why a person cannot com- 
plain of being made answerable for an action, is that 
he has produced it himself knowingly and willingly. 
Every thing almost that is said and done in human 
society, supposes this principle generally received, and 
everybody acquiesces in it from an inward conviction." 

" We must, therefore, lay down as an incontestable 
principle of the imputability of human actions, that 
every voluntary action is susceptible of imputation, or 



* Dr. N. W. Taylor's Concio, p. 25. 

f Dr. Emmons, vol. 2, pp. 277, 261. 

X Butler on the Nat. of Vir. added to his Analogy, p. 387. 

§ Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. 1, p. 357. 

II Ibid. p. 138. 



Quest. 54.J F M R AL BLI G A TI N. 49 

to express the same thing in other terms, that every 
action or omission subject to the direction of man, can 
be charged to the account of the person in whose power 
it was to do it or let it alone ; and, on the contrary, every 
action, whose existence or non-existence does not de- 
pend on our will cannot be imputed to us." * 

" To make use of liberty but in order to choose the 
best, — this sage direction of the will is properly called 
virtue, and sometimes goes by the name of reason." f 

" Moral agency (without any metaphysical subtilty 
or refinement) consisteth in spontaneous^ voluntary ex- 
ertion." " Whatever be the cause out of which vol- 
untary exertion ariseth . . . where such an effect is 
formed, there is moral agency; and where it is not, 
there it is in vain to look for moral quality, . . . either 
virtue or vice." J 

" Virtue, by such of the late philosophers as seem to 
be in chief repute, is placed in public affection or gen- 
eral benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies 
[primarily/ in this, then the love of virtue is itself 
virtuous, no otherwise than as it is implied in, or arises 
from, this public affection, or extensive benevolence of 
mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he 
necessarily loves love of the public." § ^ 

" True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence 
to being in general. Or, perhaps, to speak more accu- 
rately, it is that [consenty propensity, and union of heart, 
to being in general, that is immediately exercised in 
[good-wiW^ 



* Burlamaqui on Natural Law, p. 22. 
f Burlamaqui. 

X Dr. Stephen West on Moral Agency, pp. 15, 18. 
§ Edwards on the Last End, p. 47, sec. 4, chap. 1. 
5 



50 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 64. 

" It is abundantly plain by the Holy Scriptures, and 
generally allowed, not only by Christian divines, but by 
the most considerable Deists, that virtue most essen- 
tially consists in love." * 

" It is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent 
in that good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and 
vice (and not the occasion of it), which is their worthi- 
ness of* esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise, accord- 
ing to the common sense of mankind." f 

" The soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the 
most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or com- 
ply with, any command, but the faculty of the will ; 
and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly 
disobey, or refuse compliance ; for the very notions of 
consenting^ yielding^ accepting^ complying^ refusings re- 
jecting^ &c., are, according to the meaning of the terms, 
nothing but certain acts of the will." J 

" There are certain powers and properties essential to 
constitute a being a moral agent, capable of willing in 
a manner that is morally right or that is morally wrong. 
Now it is of such an agent in the actual exercises of 
his will ; in the volitions, choices, or preferences, which 
he actually makes, that I predicate either sin or holi- 
ness." § 

" Only voluntary actions can be governed by human 
reason^ and those only which regard intelligent beings 
are considered in morality; and seeing the object of 
the will is good^ [or happiness] ... it is evident 
that a more general notion of such actions cannot be 



* Ibid, on the Nature of Virtue, chap. 1. 

f Edwards on the Will, part 4, sec. 1 . 

% Edwards on the Will, part 3, sec. 4, § 1. 

§ Discourse on the Nature of Sin, p. 4, by Prof. Eleazar T. Fitch. 



Quest. 54.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 51 

formed, than what falls under the name of benevo- 
lence." * 

This eminent and learned author, speaking of " Things 
morally good^'' says, " these are only voluntary actions 
conformable to some lawP f 

" These acts that are unavoidable by human nature, 
are not to be punished by human laws. For though 
nothing be imputed to us as a sin but what hath the 
concurrence of the will, and is done freely." \ 

" Now that a moral action should belong, or be im- 
puted to any man, . . . there can be no other reason or 
cause, but that the man had power and ability to do it, 
or not to do it ; to perform or omit it." " Every action 
dirigible by a moral rule, w^hich a man is able to do or 
not to do, may be imputed to him ; and, on the con- 
trary, . . whatever neither in itself, nor in its cause, 
was in a man's power and disposal, cannot be rightly 
imputed to him. ^ Faults of the mind are voluntary.' 
On which foundation are built those common maxims, 
that impossibilities are incapable of obligation." § 

An involuntary act, as it hath no claim to merit, so 
neither can it induce any guilt. The concurrence of 
the will, when it has its choice either to do or avoid the 
fact in question, being the only thing that renders 
human actions either praiseworthy or culpable. || 

* Bishop Cumberland. Inquiry into the Laws of Nature, chap. 1, 
§8. 

t Ibid. chap. 5, § 9. 

X Hugo Grotius, on War and Peace, book ii. chap. 20, § 19. 

§ Baron Pufendorff. Law of Nations, book ii. chap. 5, §§ 5, 7, 8. 

II Sir VVm. Blackstone's Com. book iv. chap. 2, p. 1. 



NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 55. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE TURNING POINT BETWEEN FATALISM AND FREE AGENCY. 
POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 

55. What is the turning point between fatalism and 
free agency? 

The turning point between fatalism and free agency 
(between those who deny and those who hold that there 
is a foundation for moral obligation in the nature, the 
powers, and relations of rational beings, and that there 
is an immutable distinction between right and wrong, 
holiness and sin) lies in the questions, — 

What is that which the human mind universally 
regards as choice ? What is the power of choice ? 
And does choice imply power to . make the contrary 
choice ? 

56. What, then, is the comparative importance of 
understanding what choice is ? 

If we understand correctly what is implied in acts of 
the will, — what choice and choosing is, then we shall 
know what that power is by which we choose, and 
which we call the wiU. Rightly to understand this is 
essential, in order philosophically or fully to understand 
the nature, foundation, and extent of moral obligation, 
and to distinguish between free, responsible agency and 
fatalism. 

57. What is choice, and what is it to choose ? 
Choice comprehends all the action of the will. (See 

q. 43.) 



Quest. 57.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 53 

All choice implies that two ways of action by the will 
are possible, or that two acts of will are at the same 
time possible ; not that the two different acts of choice 
can both be performed at once, but that both being in 
the power of the mind, either can be performed and 
either can be avoided. K only one of two or more 
ways of action, or only one of two or more acts are 
possible, and that way or that act is unavoidable by all 
the power in the agent's possession, then no choice is 
possible. For example, all rational, voluntary beings 
do, and inevitably must, seek then* own (but not always 
exclusively their own) happiness in all their voluntary 
doings. Here, then, only one way is possible. Now, 
if this be so, then there never is and never can be a 
choice made between seeking and not seeking one's 
own happiness. Therefore, all the objects of choice 
are comprehended in the possible means of happiness 
to the agent choosing, and the different kinds and meas- 
ures of his happiness supposed by him to be obtainable 
by those means. Therefore, again, all choices possible, 
when made must be between the different means and 
kinds and degrees of happiness, which the agent seeks 
to gain for himself. But here it should be observed 
and carefully remembered, that although in all virtuous 
action the agent'' s happiness must, from the essential 
nature of a moral agent, be his subjective object, the 
greatest general happiness must be his objective object. 

Again. If one certain act in certain circumstances 
must be performed, and cannot be avoided by perform- 
ing any other act in its stead, nor in any way, by any 
power in the agent's possession, however agreeable that 
certain act may be to his inclinations and feelings, that 
act is not a choice. All choice imphes, in the being 
choosing, power to the contrary, i. e. when the choice is 
5* 



54 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 58. 

made the agent has the adequate power to make a dif- 
ferent and opposite choice from the one which is made. 

If this were not so, if men had no power to make 
choices contrary to those which they do make, they 
would have no power to choose at all — if they had no 
power of willing otherwise than they do will, then no 
act of holiness — no duty could be performed which is 
neglected, and no sin could be avoided which is com- 
mitted; and for these reasons, both holiness and sin 
would be impossibilities. 

Now, since impossibilities are never performed, and 
never will be, it would follow that holiness and sin are 
mere imaginary ideas without any corresponding reality ; 
all which is sufficiently absurd, and contrary to the 
common sense of mankind. 

One thing is certain, either choice implies power to 
the contrary choice, or moral obligation is nothing but 
a name. 

Precisely this is the turning point between fatalism 
and free agency, between moral responsibility and in- 
fidelity. 

Let us, then, carefully consider the question, 

58. Does all choice imply motives, and does it imply, 
in the agent choosing, power to the contrary choice ? 

It is a settled principle in the science of mind, that 
all voluntary action, or choice of an intelligent moral 
being, implies a motive. In order to the possibihty of 
cMlbice there must be in the mind of the agent (not out of 
it) some felt impulse, some conscious incentive, induce- 
ment, or subjective motive, some influence moving the 
mind to choose, or to make the choice, so that no 
voluntary action is possible without a subjective motive 
to choose something, and some thing or object to be 
chosen. 



Quest. 58.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 55 

In further proof that no choice can be made without 
a motive, let the following points be carefully observed. 

(1.) First, then, all voluntary action implies choice. 

(2.) All choice implies a motive, by and in conse- 
quence of which the mind is moved or induced to make 
the choice. 

(3.) All choice implies at least two objects of choice, 
between which the choice is, or is to be made. When 
a choice is made, it implies that some object is chosen, 
rather than, and in preference to, some other object, 
which could be chosen, instead of the one which is 
chosen. Therefore, when one choice is made, two 
choices are in the mind's power, either of which could 
be made, but not both at once. To suppose this pos- 
sible is absurd. 

(4.) An object of choice is something which can be 
chosen, because that which cannot be chosen is by the 
meaning of terms not an object of choice. As an ulti- 
mate object, misery cannot be chosen ; and for this rea- 
son, it is not an ultimate object of choice. 

(D.) Nothing can be chosen, or be an object of choice, 
which does not excite desire. Misery cannot excite 
desire for itself; and, therefore, cannot for itself be 
chosen. 

(6.) All objects of choice, whether chosen or not, — 
all objects between which choice is or can be made, are 
those, and only those, which do or may excite desire, so 
that therefore, 

(7.) Desire is the only possible internal subjective 
motive to acts of will, i. e. it comprehends all possible 
subjective motive, so that there is no possible internal 
motive not comprehended in desire ; and therefore desire 
is and must be the universal subjective motive to volun- 
tary action, so that no voluntary action is possible, 



56 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 58. 

unless there be some desire prompting to its perform- 
ance. (Comp. q. 34.) According to Locke, b. ii. ch. 21, 
" The uneasiness of desire is the spring of action." 
" If it be asked, what moves desire ? I answer, hap- 
piness, and that alone." 

" Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of hap- 
piness and an aversion to misery ; these, indeed, are in- 
nate practical principles, which do continue constantly 
to operate, and influence all our actions, without ceas- 
ing." — Locke on the Understanding, b. i. ch. 3, § 3. 

(8.) Therefore the gratification of the various desires 
of the mind, and the various means, methods, and 
causes of gratifying its desires, comprehend all the ob- 
jects of choice.* 



* To be conformed to the law of right is an object of desire, and it 
is so by virtue of the fact that this conformity has, in its true and 
essential nature, an adaptation and tendency to gratify this desire ; 
which gratification is the mind's happiness. To take away this adap- 
tation and tendency from the nature of virtue, therefore, would be 
to annihilate the possibility of the mind's having a subjective motive 
for conformity to the law of right. We admit that there is a ground 
of appeal in the mind to its desire of right, and that this appeal has 
a tremendous power with a truly rational and enlightened conscience 
— a power that will carry a man who has it in proper exercise, to the 
stake, or to face the cannon's moutli. But we claim that the ultimate 
basis of this appeal lies in a desire of the happy result in the mind, 
which is ulterior' in the order of nature to its virtuous action, and 
produced by it. 

" It is evident that there can be no idea formed of love [not even 
the love of right], which does not contain the idea of benefit to him 
that loves." " To delight in any thing is to feel conscious benefit in 
it." — (Correspondence of Bishop John Jebb and A. Knox, Esq., vol. 
1, p. 325, — an English work.) " The mind always knows more or 
less that which it desires, . . . desire [being] defined to be the idea 
of good which a man possesses not, but hopes to possess. Desire is 
distinguished by this from the blind tendency which urges every being 



Quest. 58.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 57 

(9.) The gratification of desire is pleasure, enjoy- 
ment, or some degree of happiness. 

(10.) Therefore the different kinds and degrees and 
capacities of happiness^ and the different occasions, 
means, methods, and causes of happiness, comprehend 
all the possible objects of desire, of love, of choice, and 
of voluntary pursuit, and therefore desire of happiness 
comprehends all possible subjective motive for volun- 
tary action, and therefore happiness is the ultimate ob- 
ject of all possible desire and choice.* 



towards its end, wlietlier it know it or not." — (Walker's Stewart on 
Moral Philosopliy, p. 59.) 

But it has been asked, by way of objection. Can tke act of a per- 
son be virtuous wken lie thinlcs of liis own happiness as the moving 
cause of his performing the act ? 

I reply. Can I intend to take my pleasm-e in doing the will of 
God, so as actually to be cheerful and happy in it, and not know that 
I do thus take pleasure, and that 1 am happy ? i. e. can I voluntarily 
take my happiness and not know that I do so ? Suppose that I re- 
joice in God, — that I am consciously moved to promote to the extent 
of my power the high interests of his kingdom by the fact that I 
desire to do his will, and that I take pleasure in making his kingdom 
happy, — now is my virtue litiated by this fact ? In what other way 
can I be moved to glorify God and enjoy him forever ? 

" Imagination never yet placed me in a situation not to experience 
the goodness of God in some way or another. If I do love him, how 
can it be but because he is good, and to me good ? " — (IVIary's Letter 
to Dr. Hopkins, Minister's Wooing, p. 485.) What is love to God but 
voluntarily taking delight in doing his will, rejoicing that God reigiis 
over his kingdom in love ? What is love to God but practically regard- 
ing Him, his government, his service, as good to all his creatures, and 
to me good ? " The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear him." — 
(Ps. 147 : 11.) " We can find happiness in duty, in self-sacrifice, in 
calm, sincere, and honest friendship." — Minister's Wooing, 479. 

* Some have, indeed, undertaken to distinguish between pleasure 
and happiness, as generically different. But they have done little 
more than to show that there are different kinds of enjoyment ; to 



58 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 58. 

(11.) Every choice has a subjective motive opposed 
by some other subjective motive, and it has an object 
opposed by some other object. 

(12.) Different objects of choice excite different de- 
sires, and opposite objects opposing desires. An actual 
choice is an election between opposing desires — an 
election of desires to be gratified, and of the objects to 
be sought by which they are to be gratified — an elec- 
tion made between the means and methods, the kinds 
and degrees of gratification or happiness. 

When an agent makes a choice, he chooses the grati- 
fication of some desire of happiness, by some object or 
by some means, in preference to the gratification of 
some other desire of happiness which is, or is supposed 



one kind applying the term pleasure, and to another happiness. 
There may be a popular use of these terms, to some extent corre- 
sponding to this distinction, but it is often not regarded, as when it is 
said, " At thy right hand there are pleasures forevermore." 

The term pleasure is used to express all kinds and degrees of en- 
joyment or happiness, even that of God himself, as, " For thy [pleas- 
ure they are, and were created." An able writer has said : " We 
must love brutes on account of and in proportion to their capacity 
for happiness." So the term happiness is used to signify all kinds of 
enjoyment and all kinds of pleasure. With propriety we say there 
is in all pleasure some degree of happiness, meaning some degree of 
enjoyment. The established use of language is such as to lead those 
who maintain this distinction to use these terms in violation of their 
own principle. 

It may, however, be admitted, that the term happiness is used to 
signify the higher kinds and degrees of c njoyment which spring from 
intellectual and moral action, more commonly than it is to express 
sensual pleasure. 

The task has also been undertaken to prove that desire of happi- 
ness, or self-love as a constitutional endowment, does not include all 
the springs and subjective motives to voluntary action of which the 
human mind is capable, but, in our judgment, without success. 



Quest. 59.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 59 

to be, in his power to gratify by some other means of 
happiness. Therefore, 

(13.) Choice necessarily implies the power of choice 
by which we choose, and power to choose necessarily 
imphes power to the contrary choice, — power to make 
a choice contrary to the one which is actually made. 
This power to make the contrary choice is absolutely 
essential to free, responsible, moral agents. 

This conclusion very evidently corresponds with the 
universal understanding of mankind. No man of sane 
mind can act, for any considerable length of time, con- 
sistently with the opposite beUef. For these reasons, 
it is evident, man has a free will or power of choice, 
with the power of contrary choice, and is a moral 
agent. 

That Dr. Edwards held to the power of contrary 
choice, appears from his own definite and precise state- 
ment. He says : " It has been inquired concerning 
President Edwards's moral inability, whether the man 
who is the subject of it can remove it? I answer, 
yes." * 

As the two principles — that desire of happiness com- 
prehends all possible subjective motive to voluntary 
action conceivable, and that happiness is the only pos- 
sible ultimate object of voluntary action — are funda- 
mental, and as they mutually imply each other, so that 
if either is true both must be, and therefore a true test 
of one must be a test of both, they deserve to be very 
carefully scrutinized, so as to be certain that there is no 
deception in regard to them, leading the mind astray 
from the truth. 

59. What if it be true, that the desire of happiness 

* Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. 1, p. 309. 



60 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 69. 

comprehends all possible subjective motive, and happiness 
itself all possible objective, ultimate motive, — what ad- 
vantage is to be gained from knowing this truth ? 

If we know it to be true, that desire of happiness is 
the only subjective motive, and happiness the only- 
ultimate object of all possible voluntary action, both 
right and wrong, then we can perceive that power to 
gain and promote happiness is the essential, and com- 
prehends the only possible, foundation of the claims of 
God upon men for their obedience to his laws; and 
that in this truth we have full ground for making the 
most powerful appeal conceivable to the sinner's con- 
science that he should turn from sin to righteousness 
and obey the gospel, and seek that happiness which 
alone is the result of holiness, because in this alone he 
can gain the true end and perfection of his being. 

The two facts, that desire of happiness comprehends 
all possible subjective motive^ and that happiness is the 
only possible ultimate object of the voluntary actions of 
rational beings, are essential to the basis of moral ob- 
ligation, and constitute the basis in the soul of man 
for moral obligation, — the place whereon to rest the 
moral lever by which a sinful world is to be raised from 
its moral degradation and debasement. 

This principle in the nature of moral, responsible 
beings, is essential to the existence of any and of all 
moral government, even that of the Most High on earth 
and in heaven. Divest the human mind of this prin- 
ciple, and the Bible would then have no more influ- 
ence with men than it now has with the brute creation. 
And then, too, there could be no possible motive for 
right moral action. Promises and threatenings, rewards 
and penalties, would then be of no possible avail. 

60. How, then, can the principle, that desire of hap- 



Quest. 60.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 61 

piness comprehends all possible subjective motive for 
voluntary action, be tested ? 

This principle may be tested by a scrutiny carried on 
in every one's own consciousness, aided by whatever 
light he can obtain from reading, conversation, and 
observation by applying it to the two principal objec- 
tions against it. 

Obj, I. That a desire of right is a motive to do 
right, distinct from a desire of happiness. 

Arts. (1.) K desire of right leads to doing right, this 
doing right will gratify that desire, and this gratification 
will be some degree of happiness. Most evidently right 
is a source of happiness, and must be so regarded, 
or it could not be desired. Therefore nothing, happi- 
ness itself alone excepted, can be desired, loved, 
sought after, or practiced, which is not desired for the 
sake of resulting- happiness. It is therefore essential to 
the possibility of doing right, that it be so adapted to 
our nature as to excite in us a desire for the happiness 
which that doing affords. 

Ans. (2.) Should it be said that we may desire to do 
right for the sake of glorifying God, then to glorify 
God would be to us a source of happiness. To glorify 
God from a desire to glorify him, and to take pleasure, 
delight, or happiness in promoting his glory, are one 
and the same thing. And so of every other voluntary 
action. Hence it follows, that desire of happiness is 
the only possible subjective motive for voluntary action, 
and this of necessity implies that happiness is the gen- 
eral ultimate object of choice. 

Obj. II. It is claimed that the " souVs dignity " apd 

the " spirifs worthiness,''^ and not happiness, is the 

ultimate object of desire and pursuit in all holy action. 

According to the theory on which this objection is 

6 



62 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. CO. 

founded, the ultimate rule of duty is, " Act worthy of 
your nature as a rational, immortal being." The object 
of obedience to this rule is the soul's dignity or worthi- 
ness. This object cannot be sought, unless there is in 
the soul a sensibility moved with a desire for it. Sup- 
pose the soul is moved by this desire to obey the rule 
and gain the object. Gaining the object ends in the 
gratification of this desire, which gratification is happi- 
ness. Thus proving that happiness is and must be the 
ultimate end aimed at, even when we obey the rule, 
" Act worthy of the souPs dignity." The spirifs worthi- 
ness, even in this case, is and must be subservient to 
the ulterior object and end of the soul's happiness. If 
it were not so, if the spirit's worthiness did not excite 
in the soul a desire for happiness, nor gratify that desire 
when the object of the spirit's worthiness is gained, 
then such an object, for the want of motive, could 
never be sought ; and then the law which should re- 
quire men to act for such an object would require an 
impossibility, and therefore be an absurdity. Such is 
not the law of moral obligation, — such is not the law 
of God. 

Since writing the above, we have met with an objec- 
tion to our doctrine in this form, — ' That all motives that 
come to the mind find their ultimate ground of appeal 
in the desire of personal happiness, is not admitted, 
because the desire of right doing is also an ultimate 
ground of appeal for right doing.' 

The esteemed author of this objection admits that, 
as the ground of this appeal, there must be in the mind 
a desire of right, or of conforming to the right, as an 
indispensable motive to right action. Admitting this, 
our appeal here is directly to the consciousness of every 
rational mind, that nothing can be an object of desire. 



Quest. 60.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 63 

happiness itself alone excepted, which is not, or is not 
regarded to be, a source of happiness to the mind that 
desires it. We seem to perceive with certainty, from 
our own consciousness, that the nature of rational mind 
is and must be such that the attainment of the object 
of its desires, of absolute necessity, constitutes the 
gratification of those desires, which gratification is 
synonymous and identical with the mind's pleasure or 
happiness, and is, from the natm-e of the case, ulterior 
to the right which is the means of it. By these rea- 
sons, we are compelled to believe that when the appeal 
is made to the mind's desire and regard for the right 
in moral action, the ultimate ground of this appeal is 
the mind's susceptibility of happiness, and therefore of 
a desire for the happiness which is to be found in right 
intention, fulfilled in right, subordinate, specific action. 

When it is admitted that right action must have the 
general good and well-being as the ultimate objective 
end in which that action is to terminate, it seems to us 
necessarily to follow, that the mind's personal gratifica- 
tion in the accomplishment of that objective end, is and 
must be the ultimate subjective end of that right action. 
Therefore, we think that each of these two points im- 
plies the other, and that the question in regard to each 
or both of these points, is in strict reality but one ques- 
tion. If this be not so, let some abler hand be earnest- 
ly and honestly addressed to the task of bringing the 
real truth out to the light, so the world can see it and 
rejoice in it. Let us be told intelligibly what obligation 
requires us to do^ and what the ground of that obligation is. 

One thing more. What is a desire of the right, 
rather than the wrong in moral action, but an involun- 
tary preference of the pleasure known to be insepara- 
bly connected with right moral action? "In keeping 



64 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 60. 

them [God's commands] there is great reward." — Ps. 
19, 11. 

It seems to be a contradiction, that a rational agent 
should have two ultimate subjective objects in the same 
action, and equally absul-d to suppose two ultimate 
subjective motives for the same action. Suppose that 
time and light should establish it as a fact, that the con- 
stitutional desire of conformity to the law of right, and 
not a desire of happiness, is the ulti?nate ground of ap- 
peal to persuade, induce, or move a person to right 
action, what result would this have in modifying a sys- 
tem of morals ? 

From this fact would it not follow, that, so far as 
one should act from a desire of personal happiness, his 
action would not be right? And then would it not 
follow, that entire disregard to our personal happiness 
would be our sacred, indispensable duty, to the extent 
of entire self-forgetfulness and self-annihilation ? And 
then would it not appear that instead of being be- 
crazed by a bewildered, enthusiastic imagination, that 
the woman was going upon a rational and glorious 
mission who started with a basin of water in one hand 
and a censer of fire in the other, and on being asked 
what she was going to do, rephed, that with the water 
she intended to quench the fires of hell, and with the 
fire she was going to burn up Paradise, to the end that 
men might practice virtue for its own sake, — from the 
pure, disinterested love of it ? 

And then, what could be done with the instructions 
of Jesus Christ and his Apostles, e. g. " Flee from the 
wrath to come." " Lay up for yourselves treasures in 
heaven." " Rejoice not that the devils are subject unto 
you, but rather that your names are written in 
heaven." " To them who by patient continuance in 



Quest. 60.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 65 

well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality ; 
eternal life." 

If the desire of right is ultimate, and therefore to be 
regarded as distinct from the desire of happiness, would 
it not follow that there are two different ultimate ob- 
jects which moral agents seek, while but one of them 
is right, and yet the other unavoidably must be sought, 
while it is still not right to seek it ? Then, can there be 
two such ultimate objects of right human action ? Cer- 
tainly not. 

Leaving out of view the impossibility of virtuous 
action on this principle, we should think that the need- 
ful modifications of the system of ethics, which this 
idea would require, would afford sufficient evidence 
that it is a mere fanciful imagination, having no cor- 
responding reality in truth. 

We are satisfied that if improvements are to be made 
in theology (and of this we have no doubt), they must 
be sought in some other direction than the supposition 
that right, and not happiness, can be the ultimate end 
of right action, in any sense either subjective or objec- 
tive. 

Another form of objection, somewhat different, may 
here be briefly noticed. 

Suppose the transcendental anti-utilitarian to say, 
" My deske of my own personal happiness is an affair 
exclusively my own, and if I choose to sacrifice or 
neglect that, whose business is it? In that case no 
one has a right to say aught or in any way to interfere, 
and therefore my love of happiness can be no ground 
of moral obligation. So that if my obligation to love 
my neighbor and promote his happiness ultimately rests 
nowhere but on my desire of happiness, or on my love 
to myself, then this obligation has no foundation at all, 
6* 



66 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 60. 

and of course it would follow that there is no founda- 
tion for any moral obligation whatever." 

Our reply to this is, that it is a denial of a first truth 
in morals, viz. : That I am bound to do all the good I 
can; that I am bound to promote my own personal 
happiness is a self-evident truth also, of which this 
argument is a denial. If I am not thus bound, no 
reason can be given why I should be bound to love 
my neighbor. If I am not bound to love myself, I 
cannot be bound to love my neighbor at all, because if 
I am not bound to, and do not, love myself, then to love 
my neighbor only as myself would be to love him not 
at all. 

But I am bound to love myself and to promote my 
own happiness, because my happiness is a good and 
valuable object, and to me valuable and good. K I am 
not bound to promote those good and valuable objects 
which are in my power, I am not under obligation to 
do any thing. My neighbor's good is worth no more 
for being his instead of mine. And therefore if I am 
under no obligation to promote my own good, I cannot 
be bound to promote another's good. Again ; if my 
neighbor's good is not, and is not esteemed, as a good 
to me, I cannot seek it. To do this would be an im- 
possibility, and therefore I could not be under obliga- 
tion to do it. 

Now let me ask my anti-utilitarian transcendental 
brother. What, according to your theory, is the founda- 
tion of obligation ? He replies, A sense of right, or a 
desire that right should be done, which is the same 
thing. I say. Very well. Now you are on the right track, 
because by doing right in the promotion of happiness, 
your desire, that right should be done, will obtain its 
gratification, which is your happiness. And no man 



Quest. 60.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 67 

can do right without first having a desire to do it, and 
of course a desire for the gratification arising from right 
doing; so, then, desire of happiness is the ultimate 
ground of obligation to promote happiness, which 
comprehends all duty. 

"We should suppose that the following, from Dr. Ed- 
wards, must be conclusive with every mind that is able 
and willing duly to appreciate his statements : — 

" To choose any thing without motive, is really a con- 
tradiction ; it is to choose it and not to choose it at the 
same time. Whatever is chosen, is chosen as being 
agreeable in some respect or other ; and whatever is 
agreeable, is agreeable either in itself immediately, or 
on account of its [relation to, or] connection [or com- 
parison] with, something else and subserviency to it, 
which something is immediately [agreeable in itself. 
Now, whatever is agreeable on account of its con- 
nection with something else [and is for that reason 
chosen], is chosen on account of that something else, 
as the motive. Whatever is agreeable to a man [and 
is for that reason chosen] , is chosen from the motive of 
his appetite, taste, or bias, which is included in Presi- 
dent Edwards's sense of motive. And whatever is not 
agreeable to a man on one or other of these accounts 
is not agreeable to him at all, and therefore is not 
chosen." 

If this be so, of which there can be no reasonable 
doubt, then it follows that the different kinds and de- 
grees of happiness, and the different means of happi- 
ness, comprehend all conceivable objects of choice and 
love. But to continue our quotation, — 

" To choose an object without motive, is to choose it 
without end or design, either of immediate or remote 
gratification of any principle in him who makes the 



68 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 61. 

choice. And whether this be possible or conceivable, I 
wish every candid person to judge." 

An act of choice without a motive, as defined by 
President Edwards, is an event without a cause. For 
[except the agent's power of action], every cause of 
volition is included in President Edwards's definition 
of motive. " By motive," says he, " I mean the whole 
of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to 
volition, whether it be one thing singly, or many things 
conjunctly." * 

61. What now is the position of our argument, and 
is moral quality according to it predicable only of 
voluntary acts of the mind, or acts of the will ? 

Having shown in the Appendix (for the benefit of 
such as are able, and choose to make thorough work in 
mastering this subject), the invalidity of the most im- 
portant objections, in addition to those noticed in the 
body of the work, we are left in possession of the doc- 
trine, that man has a free will and the power of choice 
between moral opposites. Since removing objections 
is not necessary to the completeness of a sound argu- 
ment, they who can trust in the argument given and 
do not choose to puzzle their minds with objections, 
can let them take care of themselves, and proceed 
directly with the argument. And, now, since by a 
former conclusion (see q. 50), if holiness and sin exist, 
as without dispute they do, they must be found in acts 
of the will, we are now brought to the conclusion, that 
so far as man is responsible, both holiness and sin are 
found only in acts of the human will, and therefore, 
moral quality is predicable only of the acts of the wilLf 



* Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. 1, p. 372. 

t See Appendix, note B, for answer to objections. 



Quest. 62.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 69 

62. On what ground have we affirmed that holiness 
and sin can exist only in acts of will ? 

(1.) We have affirmed that holiness and sin can exist 
only in acts of will, and can be affirmed only of moral 
agents in the actual exercise of their powers, on the 
ground that voluntary exercises are, and nothing else is, 
immediately in the controlling power of voluntary 
beings. Whatever else is in their power to perform or 
avoid must be accomplished through the medium of the 
action of the will. 

(2.) That men are moral agents, that holiness and 
sin are in their power to perform or avoid, is a truth 
sustained by the consciousness of the race, and carries 
its own evidence in itself. It must be assented to by 
every rational mind, as soon as it is fairly and fully 
understood. Nothing more evident can be said to prove 
or disprove it. And yet let it be remembered, other 
things equally evident may be said by way of illustra- 
tion and explanation, — to remove objections and thus 
to confirm this truth. 

(3.) Since holiness and sin are somewhere and can 
be found nowhere else, they must be found in the 
voluntary acts of rational beings, — in the nature and 
tendencies of their moral choices. 

To recapitulate, 

63. What are the main points already established ? 
In the preceding inquiry we have established, 

(1.) That neither virtue nor vice can exist in any 
thing or act necessitated by an invincible necessity to 
be what it is ; nor in any created substance, object, oi 
thing ; nor in the created constitution, nature, or powers ; 
nor in the created properties ; nor in any adaptation or 
unavoidable tendencies of any created substance, either 
matter or mind. 



70 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 64. 

(2.) That neither virtue nor vice can exist in any un- 
originated truth, or any un originated object of thought 
whatever. 

(3.) That moral quality cannot be predicated of mere 
thought, mere intellectual perceptions, or conceptions or 
knowledge of any kind, separated from all connection 
with the will. 

(4.) That no mere feelings, involuntary desires, 
emotions or exercises of the sensibility of any kind, are 
virtuous or vicious in any degree. 

(5.) That virtue and vice, holiness and sin, are found 
alone in the free, unnecessitated intentions, purposes, or 
choices of rational moral agents, in distinction from 
every thing else. 



CHAPTER V. 

OBJECTS OF CHOICE. DIFFERENT KINDS OF GOOD. 

DESIRE OP HAPPINESS. 

64. What is the next topic of investigation ? 

Having shown that all holiness and sin must consist 
in the voluntary acts or choices of the mind, we pro- 
ceed, next, to consider the objects between which all 
moral choices must be made, and to define that object 
which must constitute the ultimate end of all choice 
and of all voluntary action, and thus to confirm and 
illustrate the position, already taken in Chapter IV., that 
the desire of happiness is the generic motive, which 
comprehends all primary motive of voluntary and moral 
action, and that happiness is the ultimate end and object 
of all desire and of all choice and voluntary pursuit. 



Quest. 65.J OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 71 

This leads us, in the next place, to the consideration 
of good. Good in the concrete is the thing that is 
good ; the quality of any thing which constitutes or 
renders it good, is goodness in the abstract ; goodness 
is the name of the quality or state of being good. 
Good in the concrete and goodness in the abstract are 
so nearly alike that we sometimes use the terms inter- 
changeably. 

That we may be the better able to distinguish moral 
goodness, after which we are looking, from all other 
kinds of goodness, we proceed to inquire, — 

65. What is good in the most comprehensive sense 
of the term ? 

(1.) All good consists either in some agreeable feel- 
ing, of which sentient beings are conscious, in some 
happy state, condition, or exercise of the sensibilities 
of sentient beings, or in some thing, being, or cause so 
suited to their sensibihties, as to be productive of some 
happy state, condition, exercise, or feeling of those sensi- 
bilities. In short, aU good consists in happiness, and 
the means of happiness. 

(2.) Good is that which is or can be desired. Every 
thing or being which is, or can be, the object of desire 
or love, is in some sense good. That which cannot be 
desired nor loved is not good. Good is a very general 
term. Goodness, as a quality, is predicable of every 
desirable, valuable, or useful thing. And goodness is 
the only quality which constitutes the true value and 
deskableness of every thing or being which is truly 
valuable, desirable, or lovely. Goodness comprehends 
all that is valuable in every good thing. 

(3.) Nothing is desirable, valuable, useful, or amiable, 
which is not in itself an ultimate good, or good as the 
means of procuring something that is an ultimate 



73 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 65. 

good, — a good in itself aside from, and independent 
of, all its relations. 

(4.) The happiness of an agent is to him a good in 
itself when considered as separated from, and irrespec- 
tive of, all its relations. When we say that happiness, 
or any degree of pleasure, independent and irrespective 
of all its relations, is in and of itself a good to him who 
has it, we mean that it is so, when viewed entirely in 
and by itself, having no regard whatever to any of its 
causes or consequences, or to any of its relations to 
any other thing. 

But, according to established usage, any thing besides 
happiness is a good in itself, when, by being what it is 
in itself, it is a source of present, immediate happiness 
to any being. Any thing besides happiness is a good 
in itself to any being to whom it is immediately a 
source of happiness, instead of being the means or 
cause of some other thing, which is, or may be, a 
source of happiness. 

We have seen (q. 58) that any gratification of desire 
is some degree of pleasure or happiness. Nothing but 
pleasure or some degree of happiness is, or can be, 
gratification of desire. The proof of this is to be 
found in every one's own consciousness. That which 
procures or produces this gratification is the means of 
his happiness. 

(5.) As nothing but happiness, or the means of it, can 
gratify desire, nothing but happiness or that which, in 
the mind's view, tends to some degree of happiness, or 
relief from pain, can excite desire. 

In order that any desire should ever be felt in the 
mind, some pleasurable emotion must first be experi- 
enced to excite desire. And this is so, because desire 
consists in some appetite or craving for the continuance 



Quest. 65.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 73 

or repetition of some kind of pleasure which, or the 
like of which, the mind has aheady experienced, in its 
own consciousness, and of which it has thus formed an 
idea and learned the value. 

Surely, it is self-evident that a person can never 
desire pain or suffering for itself. He may, it is true, 
voluntarily endure it for the sake of some ulterior 
benefit or good, but never for the sake of the pain 
merely. If he chooses to endure it, it must be for some 
desired gratification, of which he has formed a concep- 
tion and some degree of hope. Relief from pain may 
be an object of desire, and when obtained will afford 
some degree of gratification or happiness. Let it be 
understood that the desire to be relieved from and to 
avoid pain is generically the same thing as the desire 
of happiness. It is but a seK-evident proposition, that 
we can have no desire in regard to an object, while to 
that object we are indifferent. We can neither desire 
to gain nor avoid it. We can neither hope for nor fear 
that towards which we are indifferent. As fear implies 
the real or supposed danger of some evil which is 
dreaded^ so hope implies that something desired is in 
some degree expected. We deske to gain and enjoy 
that which we hope for ; we desire to avoid that which 
we dread and fear. All this is so, because indifference 
is the name which we give to that state of mind 
towards all those things about which we have no desire 
whatever. 

To say that we can have, concerning that to which 
we are indifferent, any desire whatever, either to pro- 
mote or prevent, to enjoy or avoid, to gain or shun, 
would be to assert a simple contradiction. 

It is merely absurd to suppose that we can have for 
7 



74 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 66. 

any person, object, or cause, a disinterested regard, in 
the sense of an wmnterested regard. 

(6.) If one's pleasure or his happiness in some de- 
gree ^5, and if nothing else is or can be either the ulti- 
mate exciting cause or the gratification of his desire, then 
some form of that individual's happiness cannot but be 
the ultimate subjective object of all desire possible to 
him, and of all possible choice and voluntary pursuit, 
and of all voluntary and involuntary love ; and therefore 
his happiness and the means of it must constitute all 
that which is or can be to him good. 

(7.) From this truth, thus established, it follows, that 
since universal happiness consists in the aggregate hap- 
piness of individuals, therefore, the happiness of aU 
individual beings, together with the means of that hap- 
piness, constitutes and includes aU possible good, — 
includes all general and universal good ; and therefore 
aU the possible objects of choice. 

The terms satisfaction, gratification, pleasure, enjoy- 
ment, and happiness, it is important to notice, are 
designed and adapted to express substantially the same 
sense, meaning, or idea. 

66. Does the evidence that happiness and the means 
of happiness constitute the sum of all good amount to 
a demonstration ? 

(1.) K happiness is the only primary exciting cause 
of desire, then it must be the only ultimate object of 
that desire, of which it is the only possible ultimate 
gratification ; and then happiness is the only possible 
ultimate object of choice and pursuit, and of course the 
only ultimate good. 

(2.) Again : if happiness is the only ultimate good, 
then desire of happiness is the only possible subjective 
motive of all acts of will. These two facts, that hap- 



Quest. 66.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 75 

piness is the only ultimate good, and that desire of 
happiness is the only subjective motive, reciprocally 
imply each other, and they are fundamental facts. 

(3.) We have seen (q. 65, § 2) that all good is desir- 
able. * All actual choice is to be happy.' In the lan- 
guage of Dr. Emmons : " The ultimate end of all labor 
is . . . enjoyment." Butler says, — 

" That which makes the question concerning a future 
life to be of so great importance to us is our capacity 
of happiness and misery. And that which makes the 
consideration of it to be of so great importance to us 
is the supposition of our happmess and misery here- 
after depending on our actions here. Without this, 
indeed, curiosity could not but sometimes bring a sub- 
ject, in which we may be so highly interested, to our 
thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others, or 
the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men 
would not take any farther thought about hereafter, 
than what should happen thus occasionally to rise 
in their minds, if we were certain that our future 
interest no way depended upon our present behavior ; 
whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, either from 
analogy or any thing else, to think it does, then there is 
reason also for the most active thought and solicitude to 
secure that interest, to behave so as that we may escape 
that misery and obtain that happiness in another life, 
which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but 
which we apprehend is also put in our own power." * 

" In short, every man in every thing he does, natu- 
rally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of 
avoiding evil and obtaining good; and if the natural 
course of things be the appointment of God, and our 

* Bisliop Butler's Analogy, pt. 1, chap. 2. 



76 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 66. 

natural faculties of knowledge and experience are 
given us by Him, then the good and bad consequences 
which follow our actions are his appointment, and our 
foresight of those consequences is a warning given us 
by him how we are to act." * 

" If there 's a power above us 
(And that there is, all nature cries aloud 
Through all her works), He must \_deliglit in virtue; 
And that which He delights in must be happy." f 

1. e. must be a source of happiness to those who prac- 
tice it. 

Nothing can be either desired or loved or sought 
besides happiness, and the means of happiness. And 
for these reasons, as we have before proved, happiness 
is the only ultimate good ; and, therefore, happiness and 
the means of happiness include and constitute all g-ood, — 
all objects of choice which are possible to be conceived 
of. What that good is or can be, which is neither hap- 
piness, nor so suited to the sensibilities of sentient 
beings as to be either immediately or ultimately pro- 
ductive of happiness, we cannot conceive, and we have 
found no one who is able to tell. 

To disprove this conclusion, two things are essential ; 
and without accomplishing both, to disprove it is im- 
possible. 

The first is to find some thing, — some object or be- 
ing that is good and desirable, and that in fact excites 
desire and so is desired, and which in reality is neither 
happiness nor in any sense the source or cause of hap- 
piness. 

And the second is to prove, that happiness is not the 

* Bishop Butler's Analogy, pt. 1, chap. 2. 
t Cato's Soliloquy ; Shakspeare. 



Quest. 67.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 77 

only ultimate and absolute good. We are conscious 
of a full assurance that neither of these two things can 
ever be done ; to suppose it, involves absurdity. 

In confirmation of this conclusion, we adduce the fol- 
lowing from Essays on Lord Shaftesbury's Character- 
istics, by John Brown, London edition, 1751. 

" Having at length gained an adequate idea of virtue, 
and found that it is no other than the voluntary pro- 
duction of the greatest public happiness, we may safely 
proceed to consider the [subjective] motives by which 
mankind may be induced to practice it." — p. 168. 

" To love my friend is to feel a pleasure in doing 
him good. And conversely, to feel a pleasure in doing 
good to my friend is to love him." - — p. 164. 

" There is no other [subjective] principle of human 
action, but that of immediate or foreseen happiness of 
the agent." — p. 166. " For as we have seen, the 
sense or prospect of happiness is the only possible 
[subjective] motive to action." — p. 219. " So that it 
will now appear that the [subjective] motives of man 
to the practice of virtue, can only arise from a sense of 
his present^ or a prospect of his future, happiness." — p. 
167. The sense of these extracts seems to be this : 
Vu'tue consists in gratifying our desires for happiness 
by promoting the greatest public good. 

67. What is the difference between the production 
and promotion of happiness ? 

We may produce happiness without promoting it, 
but we cannot promote without producing it. That 
which produces some happiness but more misery, pro- 
motes misery. The same means which produces some 
pain or suffering, but more happiness, promotes hap- 
piness ; i. e. increases the comparative sum on the 
whole, and thus secures an increase of good. 
7* 



78 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 68. 

68. Why is it important to mark this distinction ? 

Sin produces some pleasure, or a degree of happi- 
ness, but more misery, and therefore promotes, and is, 
the voluntary promotion of misery, although the promo- 
tion of misery may not be directly designed. 

Holiness sometimes produces some suffering and 
pain, but always more happiness, and is both the de- 
signed and actual production and promotion of happi- 
ness. 

69. What is meant by highest happiness ? 

Ans. Highest happiness may mean the greatest en- 
joyment of which an individual is susceptible, or of 
which the universe is susceptible. Sometimes, in this 
discussion, we mean the greatest comparative sum total 
in the agent's power, and sometimes the greatest sum, 
the promotion of which is possible to all moral agents 
united. This different use of terms should be carefully 
observed and remembered. 

70. What is absolute good ? 

Absolute good is a good complete, — not unlimited, 
but entire in itself; i. e. wholly independent of any 
relation to any thing else. 

71. What is ultimate good ? 

Ultimate good is that to which all other good is sub- 
servient, and for which alone all other good is sought 
which is sought. The ultimate good is that for wliich 
all other good is desired, loved, chosen, or pursued. 
Ultimate good is that which is last in the order of time 
and of pursuit. 

72. Are absolute and ultimate good one and the 
same thing ? 

As an absolute good is that which is good indepen- 
dently of any relation, and an ultimate good is the only 
good which is good independently of any relation to 



Quest. 73.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 79 

any ulterior good, therefore absolute and ultimate good 
are identical. 

73. "Why is happiness the only absolute good ? 

(1.) Happiness is the only absolute good, because it 
is the only object which can be desired^ independently 
of all its relations. And, 

(2.) Because it is the only thing which is good^ inde- 
pendent of aU its relations. Happiness is the only ab- 
solute good, because it is the only good complete in 
itself, irrespective of aU its relations to any other and 
every other object. To be free from misery and to 
enjoy happiness is a good in itself, irrespective of all 
its possible relations, causes, or consequences. And 
nothing else is. Right can be desired, but not as inde- 
pendent of its relations. Independent of its relations, 
ends, and aims, or results aimed at, it is not a good ; it 
is nothing. 

74. Why is happiness the only ultimate good ? 

Happiness alone is the ultimate object of all possi- 
ble desire, of all love, choice, and voluntary pursuit. 
On this point Mr. Locke says : " If it be asked what 
moves desire ? I answer happiness, and that alone." 
Nothing else can be ultimate gratification of desire but 
enjoyment, pleasure, or some degree of happiness ; and, 
for these reasons, happiness is the only possible ulti- 
mate good conceivable. Hence, it appears that happi- 
ness constitutes aU absolute and ultimate good, as 
absolute and ultimate good are identical. 

All other good things, then, besides happiness, are 
good only on account of their having some relation to 
happiness. AU the relations of other good things to 
happiness which constitute the goodness of those things 
consist in designed or undesigned conduciveness to hap- 
piness, or in the designed or undesigned means of hap- 



80 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 75. 

piness. All other good, therefore, besides happiness, 
must have the relation to happiness of being conducive 
to it, whether this good be the source, means, occasion, 
ground, capacity, support, cause, or reason of happiness, 
or a sentient being capable of happiness. 

The fact that happiness is the only absolute and ulti- 
mate good, necessarily implies that all other good is 
good and valuable only on account of its relation to 
happiness ; and this, again, implies that happiness and 
the means of happiness constitute the sum of all good, 
and of all possible objects of choice. 

A person can regard nothing as good to him which 
is neither immediately pleasant nor ultimately pleasant 
to him in any of its consequences. 

" By happiness^ we are to understand the internal sat- 
isfaction of the mind arising from the possession of 
good, and by good, whatever is suitable or agreeable 
to man for his preservation, perfection, conveniency, or 
pleasure. The idea of good determines that of evil, 
which, in its most general signification, implies what- 
ever is opposite to the preservation, perfection, conven- 
iency, or pleasure of man." * 

75. What is relative good ? 

Relative good is that which is good on account of its 
relation to some good ulterior to itself; it is that which 
relates to and is productive of some ulterior good. 

76. Why is all good besides happiness relative good ? 

All other good besides happiness is good and valua- 
ble only on account of its relation to happiness, and 
therefore all other good is relative good. Whatever is 
good and valuable, because it is so suited to the sensi- 
bilities of rational beings as to be productive of their 

* Burlamaqui, p. 9. 



Quest. 77.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 81 

happiness, is to them a relative good. Whatever is 
good or valuable as the means of happiness, is relative 
good. Whatever is either immediately pleasant and 
agreeable on account of what it is in itself, or agreea- 
ble in its ultimate consequences, and which can be dis- 
tinguished from happiness, is good ; and its goodness, 
in either or both of these respects, so far forth as it can 
be distinguished from happiness, consists in its being, 
by design or without design, a source or cause of hap- 
piness. 

Since happiness is the only possible ultimate object 
of pursuit, — ultimate in the sense of final or last, in 
point of time and in the order of desire, choice, and 
pursuit, — all other possible good is and must be good, 
by having to happiness the relation of conduciveness 
to it. This subserviency to happiness must be either 
intended or unintended. The indispensable necessity 
of this relation of all other good to happiness arises 
from the nature of the human mind, — from the nature 
which is essential to a moral being. 

The aim of a rational being to promote the greatest 
sum of general happiness in his power has the com- 
pound relation of purposing to promote, and of tending 
to promote, and of actually promoting, that happiness, 
and in this way it is the means of promoting it, and by 
having this compound relation to happiness it is a rela- 
tive good. All good is included in absolute and relative 
good. 

77. Is holiness, then, relative good ? 

(1.) Holiness is the aim to promote greatest hap- 
piness, and is so suited to the sensibilities of rational, 
moral beings as to be both productive and promotive of 
personal, individual, and the general good and happi- 
piness ; and, where holiness is perfect, it is conducive of 



82 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 77. 

the general happiness in the highest possible degree, 
and is thus in its own intrinsic nature relative good. 

(2.) Holiness is the designed promotion of the happi- 
ness both of its subjects and of its objects ; of those who 
exercise it, and of those towards whom it is exercised. 
And because it is what it is thus seen to be, it is, both 
immediately^ in and hy itself^ and in its natural and 
essential tendencies and consequences, pleasing to God 
and all holy beings. 

The primary cause of one's approval of or compla- 
cency in holiness is, that it is an intent to promote, and 
therefore tends to promote, happiness. If its intent 
and tendency were, what they are not and cannot be, 
namely, to promote misery, it would be unamiable — it 
would not be an object of approval or complacency. 
Hence it follows, that the just measure of our compla- 
cent regard to holiness is our best possible appreciation 
of its intent and tendency to promote happiness. The 
intent and tendency of holy action to promote happi- 
ness is the reason why it is, in and of itself, immedi- 
ately pleasing, agreeable, and comely in the sight of 
God and all holy beings. Now, for these reasons, or 
because holiness is what it is in and of itself, it is a 
relative good, in distinction from ultimate good, and in 
distinction from what is, in strict sense, the only abso- 
lute good. 

(3.) Again ; that holiness, aside from its being so 
suited to our sensibilities as to be agreeable, cannot be 
to us a good, and therefore cannot by us be desired, 
would seem to be a self-evident proposition. 

All possible conception of goodness, as the quality 
of an act, must imply the adaptation of that act to the 
sensibilities of some being to which that act is a good, 
and such an adaptation as is productive of his happi- 
ness. 



Quest. 77.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 83 

If, as it has been well said, " all virtues terminate 
in a regard for the general happiness in some of its 
forms," then that happiness is so adapted to our sen- 
sibilities as to excite a desire to promote it. 

If this were not so, if the general happiness were not 
so suited to our sensibihties as to excite in us any 
desne to promote that happiness, we could have no 
motive to promote it, and then we could have no mo- 
tive to be holy, and having no motive for holiness, it 
would be an impossibility. Now, from this and from 
what is said under q. 58 (7), and from what is manifest 
in itself, if holiness could not be desired nor practiced, 
then, for these reasons, it could not exist, and it would 
be good for nothing if it could. 

Thus it appears that the supposition that productive- 
ness of happiness is not an element essential to the 
nature of holiness, — that holiness is not suited to the 
sensibilities of moral beings, if it were true or acted 
upon as true, would, by the necessary laws of mental 
action, make holiness an impossibility. Therefore, the 
separation of holiness from all its relations and tenden- 
cies to happiness would be its inevitable annihilation. 

That, in the view of Pres. Edwards, nothing can be 
an ultimate end which is distinct from, and does not 
involve, happiness, is evident from the following state- 
ments of his. " Let what will be God's last end, that 
he must have a real and proper pleasure in." " And if 
he has a real pleasure in attaining his end, then the 
attainment of it belongs to his happiness." * And here, 
again, we arrive at the conclusion, that hoHness is and 
must be in its essential nature, relative good. 



* Last End, chap. 1, § 4. 



81 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 78. 



CHAPTEU VI. 

HAPriNESS NOT THE ONLY GOOD. VIRTUE TENDS TO 

HAPPINESS. 

78. In the further investigation of our subject, on 
what ground shall we proceed? 

We are now to proceed, in this investigation, on the 
four grounds already established, viz. : (1.) That happi- 
ness is the only ultimate end for which aU other good 
is or can be desired or loved or sought or practiced, 
and is therefore the only ultimate good conceivable. 
(2.) That happiness is the only good complete, in and 
of itself, irrespective of all its relations to any thing and 
every thing else ; that it is therefore the only absolute 
good. (3.) That desire of happiness comprehends aU 
possible subjective motive for voluntary action. (4.) 
That holiness^ by its essential and necessary relations to 
happiness, is constituted relative good, these relations 
being a design and tendency to promote it. 

79. Is happiness, therefore, the only good ? 
Happiness is not the only good. Happiness cannot 

exist without a cause or source from which it is derived, 
therefore the causes and sources of happiness are good, 
whether they are or are not of a moral, voluntary 
nature, whether they consist of hoUness or of mere 
natural causes. 

It may be well here to observe, that in a chain of 
reasoning, wisdom requires, that, as we proceed to sup- 



Quest. 80.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. S§ 

ply one link after another, we should be vigilant to see 
that no link is left out. So that while we stop to 
inquire after the meaning of terms, we should not 
forget the last link of the chain which has been sup- 
plied, but carefully notice if it is properly connected 
with the next link in the chain. 

80. What is the meaning of the term natural, as used 
in this discussion ? 

We have occasion to use the word natural, in two 
very different senses. 

(1.) Natural is that which belongs to nature. The 
natural properties, qualities, or tendencies of any thing, 
are those which belong to the nature of that thing. 
The same object may have different natures. A man 
may have a moral nature and a physical nature, the 
nature of a moral agent and the nature of an animal. 
To him may appertain the nature of mind and of mat- 
ter. His moral nature requires holy action. His physi- 
cal and material nature requires food, bodily exercise, 
etc. An act may have a moral nature, and an acci- 
dental goodness which is not moral. Those elements 
of an act, which constitute it right or wrong, belong to 
its moral nature. The goodness of a moral act, which 
is not moral goodness, does not belong to its moral 
nature. 

Moral acts and various other objects have a goodness 
which is not moral goodness. Moral acts sometimes 
produce undesigned accidental happiness. This is not 
moral goodness. The goodness of a horse, an ox, of 
the sun, light, air, food, clothing, etc., is not moral, but 
natural goodness. This brings us to the second mean- 
ing of the term. 

(2.) Natural sometimes means not moral In this sense 
all objects of thought, which are not moral, are natural 
8 



86' NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 81. 

objects. The goodness of a moral act, which does con- 
stitute its moral quality or character, is termed its natu- 
ral goodness to distinguish it from the moral goodness 
of that act. Natural and moral objects comprehend all 
objects. 

When we use the term natural in the sense of belong- 
ing to the nature of an object, the meaning will be 
qualified by the kind of nature which we have in view ; 
e. g. whether it be the moral nature of that object, or 
its nature which is not moral, and whether it be the 
nature of mind or matter. 

81. What is natural good? 

(1.) Happiness is natural good, in contradistinction 
from moral goodness. It has no moral character or 
moral quality whatever, and in its highest degree, it is 
but the result, the effect, and consequent of moral char- 
acter. 

(2.) All means of happiness which are undesignedly 
or unexpectedly means of happiness are so far natural 
good. Any production of happiness, besides the vir- 
tuous, designed production of happiness, is natural 
goodness. All relative goodness not included in moral 
goodness is natural goodness. All unforeseen, unex- 
pected, and unintended production of happiness, al- 
though it results from voluntary action, and even from 
right moral action, so far as it is unintended, is not 
moral, but natural goodness. All production of happi- 
ness without possible foresight or expectation of the 
result, according to the common course of nature, is 
natural goodness. All the goodness of all these things 
is mere natural goodness. 

(3.) Supremely selfish men may perform many useful 
acts, — they may exercise all the natural affections, and 
do all that natural affection will prompt them to do; 



Quest. 81.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 87 

they may be kind to their friends and neighbors ; they 
may give to the poor ; they may be good mechanics, far- 
mers, physicians, and lawyers ; they may sing well, and 
play well on instruments ; and by their voluntary doings 
in many ways, they may produce great good. By mere 
humanity and mere philanthropy, — by a mere regard to 
the temporal wants and interests of mankind, which 
falls below universal benevolence, such men, while they 
are supremely selfish, may produce a great amount of 
happiness. But in aU this there is no moral goodness, 
because there is no aim in it all, — no impartial design 
to promote the highest general good. All this good- 
ness is but natural goodness. The goodness of all those 
actions, which spring from no higher principle, is mere 
natural goodness. 

(4.) Happiness, and the natural means of happiness, 
constitute aU natural good. 

"While there is no disposition nor intention to promote 
the highest general good known to be in their power, 
while they have no regard to God or his authority, they 
are acting from the lower instead of the higher motive, 
— from a motive too low and partial to constitute their 
doings morally good or holy. 

For a controlling principle of action, natural affection 
is not only defective, but, without a higher principle to 
control, it would lead a parent to rebel against God 
because he takes away a beloved child by death. 

So the mere philanthropist, who loves man more than 
he loves God, w^ould, if he had the power, break open 
the prison of the universe, and rescue those condemned 
to death from their doom. No moral principle would 
prevent him. 

" If any being or beings have by natm-al instinct, or 
any other means, a determination of mind to benev- 



88 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 82. 

olence, extending only to some particular persons or 
private system, however large that system may be, or 
however great a number of individuals it may contain, 
so long as it contains an infinitely small part of uni- 
versal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great 
and universal system, — such limited private benevo- 
lence, not arising from nor being subordinate to benev- 
olence to being in general, cannot have the nature of 
true virtue. ... It is evident to a demonstration, those 
affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue from 
these two things. 

" First, That they do not arise from a principle of 
virtue, 

" Secondly, These private affections, if they do not 
arise from general benevolence, and they are not con- 
nected with it in its first existence, have no tendency to 
produce it." * 

This prepares the way to inquire, 

82. What is moral goodness ? 

(1.) Moral goodness is the voluntary, designed good- 
ness of holy action. Moral goodness includes all the 
goodness of holy action which can be properly and truly 
distinguished from the accidental or mere natural good- 
ness of such action. All the accidental tendencies, 
which could not be foreseen, of holy action, to produce 
happiness, may be termed the natural goodness to dis- 
tinguish it from the moral goodness of that action. The 
proper, the known, the designed tendencies of holy 
action, those tendencies, which, according to the dictates 
of natural reason and conscience, belong to holy action, 
to promote happiness, are moral goodness. 

(2.) The goodness of duty done, all the moral 

* Pres. Edwards' Nature of Virtue, eh. 6. 



Quest. 83.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 89 

goodness and moral value of holy action, lies ultimately 
in its being the voluntary, intended promotion of happi- 
ness; or in the designed adaptation and tendency of 
that action to promote the greatest happiness, as its 
ultimate object. And therefore aU moral goodness is 
relative goodness, — relative in distinction from ultimate 
and absolute good. 

83. What is the difference between the moral and the 
incidental goodness of a right act? 

(1.) The moral goodness of a right act consists in the 
known and designed nature and in the proper tenden- 
cies of that act, — in its voluntary and intended adap- 
tation to the promotion of the gi'eatest happiness in the 
agent's power. 

(2.) The difference between the two kinds of goodness 
is, that moral goodness has this nature, these tendencies, 
and this adaptation to promote the greatest good by 
design, while the incidental goodness of a right act 
consists only in undesigned or accidental tendencies to 
happiness, which could not be foreseen or in any degree 
expected, and, therefore, do not belong to the moral 
nature of that act. 

So far as a holy act produces unintended happiness, 
which could not be expected, this may be termed its 
accidental or natural, in distinction from moral goodness. 
Such accidental tendencies constitute no element of its 
moral goodness. 

(3.) There may be a natural goodness of a sinful 
act, consisting either in its selfish, partial, voluntary 
production of inferior happiness, or of the lower, instead 
of the higher good, or in its involuntary, unintended 
production of happiness, or in both united. So far as a 
sinful act produces happiness, it may be regarded as 
having a natural goodness in distinction from a holy 
8* 



90 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 84, 

goodness, whether that goodness be intended or unin- 
tended. 

84. What is the difference between moral goodness 
in the concrete and in the abstract ? 

Moral goodness in the concrete consists in right moral 
acts. In the abstract it is that quality of right acts 
which constitutes them right. 

Or right in the abstract may be regarded as the prin- 
ciple or law of right, and then right, as the quahty of 
an act, consists in those qualities of the act which con- 
stitute its conformity, fitness, or adaptation to the law. 

Here let it be carefully observed and remembered, 
that moral goodness as constituting moral character, 
can exist only in the concrete, and never in the abstract. 

85. Why have some supposed that tendency to pro- 
mote happiness does not belong to the moral nature of 
virtue ? 

Some of the principal reasons, which have led some 
to suppose that tendency to promote happiness does 
not belong, as an essential element, to the moral nature 
of virtue, may be comprised in the following facts. 

(1.) Right moral acts do in many cases fail to 
accomplish their desired and supposed results, because 
the agents have aimed at results not within their power 
to accomplish ; e. g. a person endeavoring to train his 
child to M^alk in the right way, or to persuade a sinner 
to forsake his sins. 

(2.) Right moral acts sometimes have accidental ten- 
dencies, which depend on the moral character of those 
acts, but do not constitute the moral character of those 
acts, and, of course, do not belong to their moral nature. 

A man may be overheard in prayer or in holy conver- 
sation, and be the unexpected means of good to the 
hearer. 



Quest. 85.]* OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 91 

Virtuous efforts are wisely made in a thousand ways 
to save life and property, and to accomplish various 
objects which prove to be impracticable, to neglect 
which would, be most evidently sinful. 

We may make strenuous efforts to save men from 
death by drowning, by fire or sickness or other causes, 
and fail of success for the want of power. In such 
cases that we have done our best, is a source of pleas- 
ure and self-approbation, which if we had not done 
would have been a source of self-condemnation and 
remorse. 

(3.) Right acts are sometimes the occasion of unde- 
signed results, which do not depend upon their moral 
character, and are not the proper results of the character 
of those acts ; e. g. a wicked man may sing the songs 
of Zion and turn some to righteousness, with no 
better design than to fill his pockets with money, to 
be spent in debauchery, wiihout being aware that 
any are even likely to be morally benefited by his 
singing. 

(4.) A forgetfulness or not considering that tendency 
to promote or secure an object belongs to the intrinsic, 
essential nature of an intelligent choice to promote that 
object, when it is in the agent's power. 

These are some of the most prominent and probable 
reasons which we can assign why some philosophers 
have been led to believe and defend the doctrine, that 
the inseparable and designed tendencies of virtue to 
promote happiness do not belong to its moral nature, — 
that holy action is a good in and of itself quite inde- 
pendent and irrespective of its tendencies and conse- 
quences or effects. That this doctrine cannot be true 
is evident from the fact, that the moral character of a 



92 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 86. 

design must depend upon the objects and consequences 
which that design is intended to promote. 

The facts above noticed, which may have led to the 
belief that the tendency of virtue to promote happiness 
does not belong to its nature, so far from establishing 
this doctrine, appear, when carefully considered, to be 
consistent with the opposite doctrine, that the insepa- 
rable tendencies of virtue to promote happiness belong 
to its nature so essentially, that, if virtue were devoid 
of those tendencies, it would be an impossibility. 

The fact that a person fails to accomplish what he 
had intended because he aimed at what proved to be 
an impossibility, is not inconsistent with the truth, that 
any act, known or supposed to have no tendency, in 
any of its relations, to produce happiness, would be an 
impossibility. 

Because right moral acts often have unintended, un- 
expected, accidental tendencies, which do not, for that 
reason, belong to their moral nature, affords no evidence 
that the inseparable^ purposed^ and essential tendencies 
of virtue to promote happiness do not belong to its 
moral nature, nor that tendency to promote an object 
does not belong to the intrinsic, essential nature of an 
intelligent intention to promote that object, when the 
author of the intention has the promotion of that object 
in his power. 

86. What would obviate a large proportion of the 
objections to the doctrine of benevolent utility ? 

(1.) A correct understanding of the doctrine. 

If the doctrine of virtuous utUity were properly ap- 
prehended, this of itself would obviate a large propor- 
tion of the objections raised against it. Much of the 
opposition is directed against false views of it, rather 



Quest. 87.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 93 

than against the true doctrine itself, and thus many- 
minds are confused by false issues. 

(2.) Much that has been said and written has been 
directed, and well directed against the infidel notion 
that mere^ unintelligent, undesigned utility, — mere, 
unintended, useful tendency is virtuous. Much of this 
has been done apparently under the impression that the 
arguments were forcible against the doctrine of benev- 
olent utility, while against this doctrine they had no 
application, and therefore no weight at all. The pro^ 
priety of these statements may appear as we proceed 
in the development of the doctrine. 

N. B. — Natural goodness and moral goodness com- 
prehend all possible goodness conceivable. 

So also, as will by and by appear, absolute and rel- 
ative goodness embrace all goodness. 

So also, as it has already been shown, happiness and 
the means of happiness include all possible good con- 
ceivable. 



CHAPTER VII. 

DIFFERENT KINDS OF GOOD CLASSED. THEIR COMPARA- 
TIVE VALUE. THE SUPREME GOOD. 

87. How many kinds of natural good are there ? 

There are are two kinds of natural good. (1.) Hap- 
piness, or the only absolute and ultimate good ; (2.) All 
the means of happiness not included in holiness or vir- 
tuous goodness. All natural good consists in absolute 
good, and that one kind of relative good which is not 
holy. 



94 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 88. 

88. How many kinds of relative goodness are there ? 
All relative goodness consists of two kinds. (1.) 

Moral goodness. (2.) All natural goodness except hap- 
piness ; or thus, 

(1.) The holy and designed means of happiness ; (2.) 
All other means of happiness, or the natural in dis- 
tinction from the holy and designed mear^s of happi- 
ness. The second kind of relative goodness includes 
whatever of natural, in distinction from moral, good- 
ness appertains to moral acts, right or wrong, and all 
other means of happiness found in nature ; e. g. good 
animals, good land, good climate, air, light, health, 
food, clothing, buildings, skill, knowledge, mental and 
bodily powers, and all other good things which the 
world affords. These are all relative good. And their 
goodness consists alone in being the means of happi- 
ness. 

89. How many kinds of absolute and ultimate good 
are there ? 

Happiness includes all absolute and ultimate good. 

90. How many kinds of moral goodness are there ? 
Holiness includes all moral goodness. 

91. What is absolute and natural evil ? 

Misery, suffering, pain, is both absolute and natural 
evil. Absolute and natural evil is the opposite of abso- 
lute and natural good* As there are natural, in dis- 
tinction from holy means of happiness, so there are 
natural, in distinction from moral means of suffering. 
The natural means of suffering include all the means 
of suffering but those which are of a moral nature. 

92. "What is moral evil ? 

Sin, the opposite of holiness, is moral evil. Sin, in 
some important respects, but not in all, bears very much 
the same relation to misery that holiness does to happi- 



Quest. S3.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 95 

ness, and is therefore relative evil, as well as moral 
evil. 

93. What reason can be given for calling moral good- 
ness moral excellence ? 

(1.) Moral goodness may be called moral excellence, 
because it excels all other means of happiness. 

(2.) Because the happiness, of which it is the indis- 
pensable means, excels all other happiness. It procures 
a higher, greater, and more excellent and valuable hap- 
piness and well-being than can be procured by any 
other and all other means of happiness combined. The 
excellence of holiness is its excellence over all other 
means of happiness. Moral goodness is the most ex- 
cellent means of the most excellent happiness, and 
therefore is moral excellence. 

94. Ohj. L But, says the objector, is it not deroga- 
tory to the sacred character of holiness to regard it as 
means to an end, as mere relative goodness ? 

(1.) Since moral obhgation is itself a relation of 
moral beings to their moral acts, and, through their 
moral acts, a relation to the happiness and misery 
which are in their power to promote or prevent, and 
since the obligation which rational beings are under to 
promote happiness and prevent misery comprehends 
all the obligation there is or can be in the universe, the 
fulfilment of this obligation comprehends all the holi- 
ness that there is or can be, and, therefore, all possible 
holiness is and must be a goodness which has an indis- 
pensable relation to happiness, and is thus constituted 
in its essential nature relative goodness, — the best 
means of the best happiness. 

(2.) Since holiness is not happiness, but entirely a 
distinct thing, — since holiness is an act of the will, and 
happiness is an exercise or state of the sensibility, and 



96 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 94. 

since nothing is good but happiness and the means of 
happiness, — to maintain that it is not essential to the 
nature of holiness to be the means of happiness, or, 
which is the same thing, that holiness is not a relative 
good, is to degrade it to the level of that which is 
worthless, good for nothing ; than which (however weU 
meant it may be) there is no greater absurdity. It is, 
therefore, very manifestly true, that holiness is not and 
cannot be an absolute good ; that it cannot be a good 
in and of itself, aside from its being, by and in the 
tendencies and adaptation of its own nature, both pro- 
ductive and promotive of happiness. Therefore, to re- 
gard holiness as a relative good is not derogatory to 
its true nature. 

(3.) Holiness is, and must be, productive of happi- 
ness, or its nature must be changed. This, in the 
nature of things, is as impossible by any conceivable 
power, as that space should be annihilated. It must, 
therefore, be a most manifest truth, that holiness is 
and must remain (by the designed adaptation and the 
known tendencies of its nature to produce happiness) 
suited to the sensibilities of a rational mind, with such 
an adaptation to produce happiness as is superior to 
any and aU other conceivable means of happiness, and 
that it is suited to produce a happiness that is more ex- 
cellent and valuable, in kind and degree, than any and 
all other happiness that can be conceived of. 

(4.) " Nothing can be of greater moment than that 
subservience to Christian feeling [the happy feelings of 
Christians] which belongs to the nature of holiness ; 
for holiness is the joy of heaven." It is the main 
source, the grand pillar and support, of all true blessed- 
ness, that ever was or ever will be throughout the uni- 
verse. It is the source of infinite delight even to God 



Quest. 95.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 97 

himself. President Edwards has said : " According to 
Scripture, communicating good to the creature is what 
is in itself pleasing to God. And this is . . . what 
God is inclined to on its own account, and what he 
delights in simply and ultimately." — Last End, chap. 
2, § 5. This communicating good, this promotion 
of happiness, is holiness. It is what God regards as a 
good in itself, because it is the communication of good, 
and is to Mm a source of pleasure. To maintain this, 
is not derogatory to the sacred character of holiness, 
but placing it in its true light as a relative good. 

(5.) If holiness were not in any degree a source or 
means of happiness and well-being, then there would 
be as much well-being in the universe, and the king- 
dom of God would be as weU off without holiness as 
with it ; and then holiness would be of no value, and 
it could be neither desired, loved, sought, nor practiced. 
On the contrary, as the truth now is, all the real value 
of holiness lies in its aiming to be, and in its actually 
being, productive of happiness. If holiness were ban- 
ished from the universe, nothing desirable would re- 
main, but desolation and misery would everywhere 
abound. Therefore, instead of being derogatory to its 
sacred character, the doctrine that universal, perfect, and 
perpetual holiness would secure the greatest amount of 
universal, constant, and everlasting bliss, is in the high- 
est possible degree honorable to the true nature of 
holiness, and ascribes to it the highest conceivable 
value. 

95. Ohj. 11. Again, the objector inquires, is not holi- 
ness a nobler and higher good than happiness ? 

The comparison instituted in this question seems 
not to be founded in the strictest propriety, because, if 
by nobler and higher, he meant more honorable, more 
9 



98 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 96. 

worthy of moral esteem, approbation, praise, or reward, 
then we say, there is nothing in happiness in its own 
peculiar nature, which is worthy of moral esteem, ap- 
probation, or praise in the least degree. In this regard, 
the claims of holiness and happiness will bear no com- 
parison whatever. Voluntary, benevolent action, and 
that alone, is morally excellent, noble, honorable, or 
praiseworthy. Happiness, therefore, in a moral point 
of view, cannot be compared with hoUness, nor be said 
to be either a higher or lower, a more noble or less 
noble good, because it is not moral goodness at all. 

If one kind of happiness is ever in any sense properly 
regarded as more noble, honorable, or praiseworthy than 
any other, it must be solely on account of the means 
by which it is obtained. That happiness which is de- 
rived from benevolence, by the principle of association, 
may be imagined to partake of the character of the 
source from which it is derived. In this way it may be 
esteemed as a nobler and higher happiness than that 
derived from any other source. But, strictly speaking, 
the nobler, the more honorable and praiseworthy qual- 
ity belongs, not to the happiness, but to the benevolence 
by which it is obtained. Happiness derived from one 
source may be higher and more excellent in kind and 
degree than that derived from another source, but, since 
happiness has no moral goodness whatever, the excel- 
lence of one kind of happiness over another (in the 
strict sense) is not moral excellence. 

96. On what does the value of any thing and every 
thing, besides happiness, depend ? 

The logical value of every thing which is not happi- 
piness depends upon its being, in the true and proper 
adaptation and tendency of its nature, the means of 
happiness, and upon the amount of happiness of which 



Quest. 97.1 F MO E AL OBLI G AT I N. 99 

it may be the means. The value of the means of hap- 
piness can be estimated by comparing the value of 
those means with the value of the happiness to be 
obtained by them. 

The value of means to an end depends upon the 
value of the end or object to be obtained by those 
means. The value of the means of happiness depends 
upon the value of the happiness produced by them, or 
which may be produced by them. ^ 

97. In what way, then, can the comparative value of 
holiness and happiness be estimated ? 

The value of holiness is to be estimated in the same 
way in which the value of the necessary means of 
any object is to be estimated. 

Suppose I have in my possession a medicine which 
is the indispensable and certain means of preserving 
my life. That medicine is of equal value to me with 
that of my life. * In such a case the subordinate end 
may be as much valued as the last end, because the 
last end . . . does altogether depend upon, and is 
wholly and certainly conveyed by it.' — Pres. Edwards. 

Although there is no propriety in attempting to com- 
pare the moral goodness of right moral action with the 
moral goodness of happiness, when happiness has no 
moral quality, yet it may be proper to consider the 
question, — 

98. What is the comparative, logical value of holi- 
ness and happiness as different kinds of good ? 

In answering this question, it should be borne in 
mind that holiness is moral goodness, and that happi- 
ness is natural good and not morally good in the least 
degree. It should be remembered also, that theu* com- 
parative value is not to be estimated by the moral quali- 
ties of each, because happiness has no moral quality. 



100 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 99. 

Their comparative value depends upon their insepa- 
rable connection and unchangeable relation to each 
other. 

The relation of holiness to happiness is that of means 
to their ends, of designs to their objects, of causes to 
their effects, and the relation of highest happiness to 
holiness is that of ends to their means, and of effects 
to their causes. 

Ans. 1. Since the highest and most excellent happi- 
ness and well-being of the universe, so far as it exists, 
depends upon holiness as its necessary means, without 
which it could not be, and since the perfect and per- 
petual holiness of the intelligent universe would pro- 
duce and secure the highest possible amount of happi- 
ness and well-being, and since the value of holiness 
depends upon the value of that happiness, which it pro- 
duces and is designedly adapted to produce, the greatest 
possible amount of universal holiness would be of 
equal value to the greatest possible amount of universal 
happiness, and therefore, vice versa, the value of highest 
happiness is equal to the value of highest holiness. 
The value of one can be neither more nor less than the 
value of the other. 

Ans, 2. The logical value of moral goodness, not- 
withstanding it is relative good, is equal to the value 
of that happiness of which it is the indispensable 
means, notwithstanding happiness is the only abso- 
lute good. Therefore the highest possible holiness, 
of all intelligent beings in the universe, is equal in 
value to the highest possible happiness of the whole 
universe. 

99. In what sense can the highest amount of holiness 
be said to be the highest good ? 

We have seen that there are two kinds of good, 



Quest. 100.1 OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 101 

which include all possible good, viz. relative and 
absolute. 

Holiness is relative goodness, and the highest kind 
of relative goodness. As there are various kinds of 
relative goodness, holiness is the highest goodness of 
its kind. Highest hoUness is the highest relative good- 
ness. In addition to this, — 

Holiness can be said to be the highest good only in 
the sense that it is the necessary, the most excellent and 
exalted means of the highest conceivable happiness, 
and that highest holiness comprehends all possible 
moral goodness and moral perfection. 

100. In what sense is highest happiness the highest 
good? 

Happiness exists in various kinds and degrees. High- 
est happiness is a higher good than any lower or less 
degree of happiness. That happiness which is highest 
in kind and degree is the highest good, when compared 
with any happiness of a lower kind or degree. Highest 
happiness in kind and degree is the highest good in the 
sense that it is a higher good than any other good with 
which it can be contrasted, or to which it is opposed. 
It cannot with propriety, as a good, be contrasted with 
highest holiness, because it is not opposed to it. High- 
est holiness and highest happiness are necessarily and 
inseparably connected. So that neither can be sacri- 
ficed for the other. The sacrifice of either would be 
the sacrifice of both. 

Highest happiness is the highest kind and degree of 
absolute good. 

Happiness is the highest good in the sense that the 

value of all other good depends upon its being, in some 

of its relations, the designed or undesigned production 

of some kind or degree of happiness. All other good 

9* 



102 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 101. 

derives its value from this its essential relation to hap- 
piness, viz. of being either its designed or undesigned 
means of some kind or degree of happiness. What- 
ever, besides happiness, has none of these relations to 
happiness, has no goodness in it. No other good is 
higher than the highest happiness in any sense or de- 
gree in which the two kinds of good can with propriety 
be compared or contrasted. 

Perfect holiness is highest relative^good. And high- 
est happiness is highest absolute good. When we say 
that holiness is not an absolute good, we never mean 
that it is not unqualifiedly and positively a good, and 
an indispensable good. 

Happiness is a good in one sense superior to all 
other good, because all other good is constituted good 
by being in some of its relations subservient to happi- 
ness, and because, therefore, that happiness is the only 
absolute and ultimate good. 

Since happiness cannot exist without a cause, to 
annihilate the relations of subserviency which holiness 
and all other good things sustain in various ways to 
happiness, would be to annihilate all good at once and 
forever. Until this is done, all other good besides hap- 
piness must be relative good, and happiness must be 
the only absolute and ultimate good. Therefore, 

To destroy this essential relation of holiness to hap- 
piness would be the eternal annihilation of both. 

101. Into how many kinds may all good be divided, 
taking another method of classification ? 

All good is included in, and may be divided into, 

I. Happiness; 

H. Two kinds of the means of happiness. 1. The 
virtuous means of happiness ; 2. AU the means of 
happiness which are not virtuous. 



Quest. 102.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 103 

Those means of happiness which are not virtuous 
may be subdivided, 

(1.) Into those which are ; and, (2.) Those which are 
not the sinful means of happiness. 

Again : All good is included in, 

I. Absolute good; and, 

II. Relative good. 

Relative good is divided into two kinds. 

(1.) Holiness. 

(2.) All the natural means of happiness ; i. e. all 
other means of happiness not included in holy action, 
nor in the sinful means of what in common language 
are called sinful pleasures. 

There is a natural, in distinction from moral good- 
ness, in the natural affections, the kindness, humanity, 
patriotism, and philanthropy of the supremely selfish. 

Again : All good is included in, 

I. Natural good, or happiness and the natural means 
of happiness. 

II. And in moral good, or holy action. 

102. What, then, may we now conclude is the su- 
preme good, that which the ancients called the Sum- 
mum Bonum? 

The supreme, the highest possible good, the summum 
bonum, consists neither in holiness nor happiness sepa- 
rated from their immutable relations to each other, but 
in the greatest possible sum of both holiness and hap- 
piness, united in their proper, inseparable, and un- 
changeable relations to each other. This must be so, 
because one of these cannot exist without the other. 
The highest happiness cannot be obtained without the 
highest holiness, which never can fail to produce it. 
We cannot, in fact, separate the happiness which is 
produced by holiness, from the holiness which produces 



104 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 103. 

it. Nor the holiness from the happiness which it pro- 
duces. Although they may be in thought distinguished, 
they are in their own nature necessarily and insepara- 
bly connected, so that the more holiness the more hap- 
piness, and therefore the greatest sum of both is the 
highest or the supreme good. 

103. Since happiness is the only absolute and ulti- 
mate good, why may not holiness be " bartered " * or 
sacrificed for any, not even the highest degree of hap- 
piness ? 

Holiness must not be " bartered " nor sacrificed for 
any thing nor for every thing else. It must not be 
" bartered " for happiness of any kind or degree, be- 
cause this cannot be done without sacrificing both the 
highest happiness and the highest holiness, — without, 
in short, sacrificing the supreme good. 

104. Why may not the most valuable happiness, in 
kind and degree, be given up for the promotion of the 
highest possible degree of holiness ? 

Because the greatest happiness cannot be given up 
without sacrificing both the highest degree of holiness 
and the most valuable happiness in kind and degree, 
which would be sacrificing the supreme good. Since 
the highest possible sum total of holiness and the high- 
est possible amount of happiness are necessarily and 
inseparably connected in their own nature, neither can be 
given up without sacrificing both. It is therefore plain 
vihy holiness "cannot be sacrificed for any thing else 
without unavoidable debasement and contempt," — why 
"other things [except highest happiness] may all be 
sold for it, but this cannot be bought for any thing 



* See Hickok's Moral Science, p. 49, and its review, in the Presby- 
terian Quarterly Review, 1855, Dec. No., p. 43G. 



Quest. 105.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 105 

lower," — why " the man who would barter it for hap- 
piness of any kind has already lost it." And it is, 
therefore, also equally plain why the highest happiness 
which can be produced by holiness, may not be wisely 
lost nor given up for any possible equivalent. Neither 
highest holiness nor highest happiness can be sacrificed 
for any thing else without losing both, and therefore 
holiness is not ' the only good which may not be lost for 
any possible equivalent.' 



CHAPTER VIII. 

RIGHT AND WRONG ACTS DISTINGUISHED. OBLIGATION, 

ITS NATURE, FOUNDATION, AND EXTENT. MAN's NATURAL 

AND NECESSARY RELATION TO HIS OWN HAPPINESS. 

SELF-LOVE, SELFISHNESS, AND BENEVOLENCE DISTIN- 
GUISHED. man's moral relations to his own AND 

TO THE PUBLIC HAPPINESS. 

105. What principle has thus far presided over 
our investigations, and what principle will now need to 
be had more fully in requisition ? 

By a careful examination in review of our progi*ess 
thus far, it may be seen that the one controlling prin- 
ciple, which has hitherto presided in the main over these 
investigations, is, that moral obligation, wherever it 
exists, can be fulfilled, — that the holiness required of a 
moral agent, is that which he can perform, and sin that 
which he can avoid. Or, what ought to be done can 
be done, and what ought to be avoided can be avoided. 

In answering our next question, and in future, we 



106 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 106. 

shall need more fully to put in requisition our second 
fundamental principle, — that all the good which can be 
done ought to be done. 

Since according to what has before been proved (q. 
62), all holiness and sin consist in the free voluntary- 
acts or choices of moral agents, the next question is, 

106. What are holy in distinction from sinful acts ? 

Since all moral acts binding upon moral agents must 
lie within the limits of the possibility of being done and 
of being avoided, so that the agent can do or avoid 
doing the acts required or forbidden, since all the good 
which can be done ought to be done, and since happi- 
ness is the only possible ultimate good, those acts of 
the mind which are by design adapted to promote the 
highest happiness which we can promote, and, because 
they are thus adapted, are right, holy, just, and good. 
Those acts, in which we aim with all our heart, soul, 
mind, and strength to promote all the happiness we can, 
are adapted to its promotion, and are, therefore, right. 
The supreme and predominant choice, therefore, which 
we ought to make, is to promote all the happiness which 
we can promote. And to this choice all our other 
specific choices ought to be made subservient, and then 
they will be right and good in distinction from being 
sinful.* 



* When the supreme, predominant purpose of a person is to pro- 
mote happiness to the extent of his ability, he has the virtuous 
character of a good man. And the degree of his goodness depends 
upon the strength, predominance, permanence, and stability of this 
general purpose, tested by the extent to which he resists temptation, 
and to which he endeavors, with success, to make his specific acts sub- 
servient to his supreme object. In short, the degree of one's good- 
ness consists in the energy with which lie makes the particular acts 
of his life subservient to this supreme object. The promotion of the 



Quest. 107.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 107 

All choices which in their nature and tendency are 
known to be opposed to and to hinder the promotion 
of the highest happiness in our power, are wrong and 
sinful, and therefore ought to be and can be avoided. 

107. What, then, is the true nature of moral obli- 
gation ? 

From what has been proved, it follows that moral 
obligation in its true nature is a relation, and a most 
important relation, between moral agents, and that 
happiness and misery of sentient beings, which are or 
may be supposed to be, in their power to promote or 
prevent. And that relation is, that they ought to pro- 
mote as much happiness and prevent as much misery 



highest good being the object of his supreme purpose, constitutes liis 
character good. His moral character consists in this purpose, and 
from it his particular acts derive their character, so far as they are 
subservient to it or dictated by it. 

It is all-important to be considered and remembered, that no acts 
are virtuous any farther than they spring from a benevolent spirit, 
are dictated by, or "are by design subservient to, the purpose which 
has for its supreme object the highest general good. So that without 
a generic principle or purpose of benevolence, i. e. while a person is 
and continues to be of a supremely selfish spirit and purpose, it would 
be a contradiction to suppose any act of his could spring from or be 
dictated by a benevolent choice ; and therefore no act, performed by 
the supremely selfish, can have the virtuous quality, or be a morally 
right and holy act. To remember this is needful, in order to under- 
stand the intended meaning of the following discussion, as well as on 
account of its being essential truth. 

When we say moral quality is predicable only of choice or of acts 
of the will, let us not be understood as confining moral quality to 
specific volitions, nor to the action of the will in making choices or 
forming purposes ; but as including in acts of the will, not only sub- 
ordinate volitions, but the predominant, supreme purpose, and not 
only the act of the will in forming this purpose, but that exercise or 
state of the will maintaining and carrying it into execution. 



108 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 108. 

as they have power to do. Moral obligation, then, in its 
true nature, is that which imperatively/ requires moral 
beings to promote as much happiness, and to prevent as 
much misery, as they can. 

" Every exercise of our faculties, that tends of itself 
to the perfection and happiness of man, meets with the 
approbation of reason, which condemns whatever leads 
to a contrary end," * 

108. What is implied in promoting the greatest 
amount of happiness in our power ? 

(1.) In promoting the most valuable sum of happiness 
in our power, it is implied that we should do all we can 
for the highest amount of the general weal, welfare, or 
happiness ; i. e. for the happiness of all who are known, 
or may be supposed to be within the reach of our in- 
fluence. This is doing all the good we can ; this is 
doing all we can to please and glorify God, and to 
honor him in all his authority ; this is doing all we 
can to make our neighbors, our friends and enemies, 
all men and the whole universe of beings, happy. To 
do this would be to fulfil all our moral obligations, and 
would therefore be that holiness which the law of God 
of us requires. 

(2.) Promoting all the happiness we can, will lead to 
and imply promoting all the holiness in our power, be- 
cause holiness is the necessary means of highest happi- 
ness. 

109. What, therefore, is the foundation and extent 
of moral obligation, — the extent of our obligation be- 
ing understood in the sense of how much is required 
by it? 

(1.) Since moral obligation, in its true nature, is that 

* Burlamaqui, p. 44. 



Quest. 109.J F M K AL BLI G A T I ON. 109 

which imperatively requires and obligates us to pro- 
mote the greatest amount of well-being or happiness 
in our power, — since happiness is the only ultimate 
good which it is possible for moral beings to promote, 
— since we ought to do all the good we can, — it fol- 
lows inevitably, that the rational power wisely to pro- 
mote happiness is the foundation, in a moral being, of 
the moral obhgation which binds him to do all the good 
in his power. 

(2.) Herein it appears, that since a moral agent's 
power to promote happiness is the basis, it must also 
be the measure of his obligation, because the obhga- 
tion does and must extend just as far, and no farther, 
than there is foundation and support for it, — just as 
far as he has power to promote happiness, and thus to 
fulfil that obhgation to promote it ; for, where this 
power is, moral obhgation is, and where it is not, obli- 
gation is not and cannot be, because there is no foun- 
dation nor support for it. 

(3.) In the language of Professor Haven, " The foun- 
dation of accountabihty and obhgation is freedom. 
Take this away, and you strike a fatal blow at man's 
moral nature. It is no longer possible for me to feel 
under obligation to do what I have no power to do, or 
to beheve myself accountable for doing what I could 
not possibly avoid." — Mental Philosophy, p. 543. 

Neither the ox nor the horse, neither the lion nor the 
tiger, has power, self-directed, intehigently to fulfil ob- 
hgation. K they had the power of inteUigent moral 
agents to promote happiness, they would then be under 
the same obligation to do good which binds rational 
beings. A dog, led by instinct, has some power to do 
some things which promote happiness ; but he has no 
power intelhgently and rationally to aim at the result- 
10 



110 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 110. 

ing, ultimate happiness. He has no power intelligently 
to perceive, and therefore no power to fulfil, moral ob- 
ligation. 

(4.) Since power intelligently to promote happiness 
is the foundation of obligation, that obligation is 
founded in the nature of moral beings, and in the na- 
ture of their relations to each other and to each other's 
happiness, and in their relations to whatever there is in 
the things which exist, or in the nature of things which 
can be used as the means of promoting the happiness 
of any and all sentient beings. Therefore, the extent 
of our obligation (it being measured by our power) is 
to promote as much happiness as we can. Such are 
the nature, powers, and relations of men to each other, 
to other sentient beings and to God, that they have 
the ability and opportunity to obtain happiness for 
themselves by promoting the general good, — by pleas- 
ing God; and therefore, on these grounds, they are 
under obligation to promote the most valuable happi- 
ness, both for themselves and for the public in general, 
to the greatest extent in their power. Therefore, the 
intelligent, rational power to gain and promote happi- 
ness in the kingdom of God is the basis which our 
heavenly Father has laid in the soul of man, on which 
he lays our obligations to virtue and holiness. Or thus, 
— the basis of obhgation which God has laid in the 
soul of man is his power to obtain and promote hap- 
piness. 

Here it is incumbent carefully to consider, 

110. What is implied in this power to promote hap- 
piness, which is the foundation of moral obligation ? 

(1.) Power to promote happiness implies the requi- 
site knowledge, or the power of knowing what acts and 
choices are properly adapted in their nature and ten- 



Quest. 110.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. Ill 

dency, according to the common course in the nature 
of things, to promote or to prevent happiness. 

(2.) It implies, also, the opportunity to exert itself in 
the promotion of happiness, or in doing good. It is 
only in an abstract sense, that I could be said to have 
power to lift an old-fashioned fifty-six, while there is 
none within the possibility of my reach. 

(3.) It also impHes the capacity of taking pleasure 
in doing right, — in promoting the general happiness 
and well-being. K neither doing good, promoting hap- 
piness, nor the general happiness itself, is so suited to 
the sensibility of any being as to excite his desire to 
promote that good and happiness, then he has no power 
to promote, and therefore can be under no obligation to 
promote it. 

Therefore, again, that holy action should be so suited 
to the sensibility of a moral being as to excite his de- 
sire for happiness, so that in that desire he may have 
the motive for holy action which is essential to the pos- 
sibility and to the power of performing that action, is 
one element in the foundation of moral obligation. 
(Compare qs. 4-7, 10, 12-14, 30, 34-36, 144.) 

(4.) " A disposition [or susceptibility] to be influ- 
enced by right motives is as absolutely necessary to 
render us moral agents, as a capacity to discern right 
motives is. Since a disposition [or capacity] to be 
influenced by right motives is a sine qua non [an in- 
dispensable prerequisite] to virtuous actions, an indifler- 
ency to right motives must incapacitate us for virtu- 
ous actions, or render us in that particular not moral 
agents." * 

Again : Power to promote happiness implies all that 

* Bishop Butler, quoted from Bib. Sacra, 1857, p. 442. 



112 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 111. 

is essential to the possibility of moral action, or to con- 
stitute a moral agent, to wit, intellect to know what 
duty requires, susceptibility to the influence of motives 
for right action, and the power of will to choose in ac- 
cordance with the prompting of those motives to right 
and holy choice. It also implies all the ground of 
obligation that exists in the intrinsic value of the abso- 
lute good which constitutes the end of holy choice, or 
the virtuous elective preference. This ultimate end 
of holy action includes the objective object, viz. the 
highest general good, and the subjective object, viz. the 
highest happiness of the agent. 

The power to promote happiness, as being the ground 
of obligation, implies and includes the two facts : first, 
the relation of the object to the agent, of having a ten- 
dency to beget and to gratify his desire for his personal 
happiness ; and second, the fact that our aim, to pro- 
mote the object which duty requires, has a natural ten- 
dency to secure that object. 

Now, all this impKes that moral obUgation is founded 
in the nature and relations of moral beings to each 
other, and to the happiness of all sentient beings, and 
in their relations to whatever there is in the nature of 
things which can be made the means of promoting the 
highest general happiness ; and that there is in the na- 
ture of moral beings a capacity for the perception and 
sense of right and obligation, connected with and based 
upon their desire of happiness, to which a powerful 
appeal may be made in favor of right action.* 

111. What, now, must we conclude that holiness is, 
and sin its opposite ? 

In the above manner we reach the following conclu- 
sions : — 

* See Appendix, Note C. 



Quest. n2.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 113 

(1.) That holiness in the concrete (that is, as it takes 
place, and as alone it can take place, in moral character 
and action), consists in the voluntary, designed fulfil- 
ment of known obligation, — in voluntary obedience to 
known law, which law consists in the unoriginated, 
eternal principle and law of right and of righteous 
doing. 

(2.) That all choice, which is known to be by design 
adapted in its tendencies and nature, to prevent misery 
and to promote the general welfare and happiness, is 
holy action, — is holiness, and comprehends all holiness 
in every form in which holiness can take place, or in 
which it can be exercised. 

(3.) That sin, the opposite of holiness, is voluntary 
violation of known obligation, — it is voluntary diso- 
bedience of, and a refusal to obey, the eternal and known 
law of right. All choice, which is known by its author 
to be adapted in its nature and tendency to hinder the 
general welfare and to oppose the highest general good, 
is sin. 

Sin IS a refusal to obey the law, which requii*es the 
promotion of highest happiness, and is therefore the 
voluntary prevention of happiness and promotion of 
misery. 

112. Have these conclusions concerning the nature 
of holiness and sin, — the natm-e, foundation, and extent 
of moral obligation, been demonstrated ? 

If the four following principles are each and all of 
them eternally and unchangeably true, (1.) What ought 
to be done can be done. (2.) All the good which can 
be done ought to be done. (3.) Happiness is the only 
possible, absolute, and ultimate good. (4.) The desire 
of happiness includes all possible, subjective motive, 
then, to promote happiness, comprehends all the pos- 
10* 



114 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 114. 

sible good which can be done, — if these four principles 
are eternal truths (as we hold that they most certainly 
are), our conclusions, above stated, concerning the nature 
of holiness and sin, the nature, foundation, and extent 
of moral obligation, result from them with demonstra- 
tive certainty. 

If it can be shown that any action which ought to be 
done cannot be done, by the agent who ought to do it, 
and at the time in which he ought to do it, then our 
argument and doctrine are annihilated; then we can 
have no idea of what obligation, duty, or holiness is. 

113. What must be the only way, if any, in which 
the above conclusions are to be refuted ? 

If the above conclusions as to the nature of obliga- 
tion, holiness, and sin, are to be refuted, it must be 
done either by showing that something which ought to 
be done cannot be done, or that we are not under obli- 
gation to do as much good as we can, or that happiness 
is not the only ultimate good, — the last in point of 
time and order of pursuit and acquisition, or that there is 
some subjective motive which is not included in the 
desire of happiness. 

The arguments on which we rely for the proof that 
moral obligation, holiness, and sin are what we have 
described them to be, are based on the utter impossi- 
bility of their being any thing else essentially different. 
The impossibility of its being otherwise is the general 
idea which may be found lying at the bottom of the 
arguments on which we mainly rely for the support of 
our teaching and doctrine. Therefore, to suppose holi- 
ness to be substantially different from what we have 
represented it to be would make it an impossibility. 

114. What, then, is the natural relation which men 
sustain to their own happiness, and is every man under 



Quest. 114.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 115 

the natural, unavoidable necessity of seeking his own 
happiness in all he does ? 

" Every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts 
upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil 
or obtaining good." — Butler's Analogy, p. 103. 

" Every being that has understanding and will, neces- 
sarily loves happiness . . . [and] must, of necessity, 
have an inclination to happiness." — Edwards on the 
Nature of Virtue, chap. 8. 

" To choose an object without a motive is to choose 
it without any end or design, either of immediate or 
remote [gratification of any principle in him who makes 
the choice. And whether this be possible or conceiv- 
able, I wish every candid person to judge." — Dr. Ed- 
wards, vol. i. p. 272. 

" Now let man reflect but never so little on himself, 
he will perceive that every thing he does is with a view 
to happiness, and that this is the ultimate end he pro- 
poses in all his actions, or the last term to which he 
reduces them. This is a first truth, of which we have 
a continual conviction from our internal sense." " Such 
is the instinct that attaches us to hfe, and the desire of 
happiness the primum mobile [primary motive] of all 
our actions." — J. J. Burlamaqui, Counsellor of State 
and Professor of Law at Geneva, on Natural Law, p. 
29. (See q. 58, § 7.) 

Our constitution as rational, sentient, voluntary beings 
is such, that by the irresistible necessity of nature, we 
must seek, — it is utterly impossible for us to avoid 
seeking, our own happiness in all our voluntary doings, 
right or wrong. That we should do this is a matter, not 
of choice, but of a natural necessity. In the language 
of President Edwards, "love of happiness is neces- 



116 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 115. 

sary." Therefore, it is not inconsistent with duty to 
seek our happiness in all we do. 

Since every man is under the inevitable necessity of 
seeking his own happiness in all his voluntary, moral 
action, there must be a right course as well as a wrong 
one, in which his happiness can be sought ; and since 
selfishness and benevolence comprehend all the ways in 
which this can be done, i. e. I must either regard and 
seek my own personal happiness as the supreme good, 
which is selfishness ; or I must regard the general hap- 
piness as the supreme good and seek my personal hap- 
piness in promoting it, which is benevolence. No third 
way is possible or supposable ; then one of these modes 
must be right and the other wrong. 

The only possible supreme choice which we can 
make in regard to our seeking happiness, is to choose 
in which of these two methods, — whether in benevo- 
lence or selfishness, in the right or wrong, we will seek 
it ; in other words, to choose from what sources we will 
seek to derive our happiness, and on what objects we 
will place our supreme affections. So, then, the natural 
relation of men to their own happiness is, that they are 
under a natural necessity of deriving and seeking it in 
all they voluntarily do. (Comp. q. 14, § 4.) 

115. In which of these two methods, then, are all 
moral beings under the obligation of duty to seek hap- 
piness for themselves ? 

In order that we may answer this question with the 
highest degree of certainty possible, it is needful to 
ascertain accurately what supreme selfishness and true 
benevolence are, as distinguished from each other, and 
what self-love is, as distinguished from both. (See q. 
120.) 

The preliminary question to be considered is. 



Quest. 116.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 117 

116. What is self-love? 

Every rational, sentient being is the subject of a con- 
stitutional self-love, — an involuntary desire or love of 
happiness, which is an essential, inseparable element 
of his being. Every man by the necessity of his na- 
ture is the subject of this kind of self-love, but he may 
or may not have a selfish love of self, which is not con- 
sistent with benevolence, and he may or may not have 
a benevolent love of self, which is consistent with a 
universal benevolence. As Pres. Edwards ver^/ well 
says, " Many assert that [all love arises from self-love. 
In order to determine this point, it should be clearly 
determined what is meant by self-love." 

" Self-love, I think, is generally defined, — a man's 
love of his own happiness: which is short, and may 
be thought very plain ; but indeed is an ambiguous 
definition, as the pronoun, his ovm, is equivocal, and 
liable to be taken in two very different senses. For a 
man's own happiness may either (1.) be taken univer- 
sally, for all the happiness or pleasure which the mind 
is in any regard the subject of, or whatever is grateful 
and pleasing to men ; or, (2.) it may be taken for the 
pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and 
separate good." 

" Self-love may be taken for the same as his loving 
whatsoever is grateful or pleasing to him. Which 
com.es only to this, that self-love is a man's liking, and 
being suited and pleased in that which he likes, and 
which pleases him ; or, that it is a man's loving what 
he loves. For whatever a man loves, that thing is 
grateful and pleasing to him, whether that be his own 
peculiar happiness or the happiness of others. And if 
this be all that they mean by self-love, no wonder that they 
think that all [voluntary^ love may be resolved into [or 



118 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 116. 

be said to spring from] self-love," as its subjective mo- 
tive. Now we say this is all that is meant. 

" If by self-love is meant nothing else but a man's 
loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being 
averse to what is disagreeable, this is calling that self- 
love, which is only a general capacity of loving or hat- 
ing; or a capacity of being pleased or displeased; 
which is the same thing as [being essential to] a man's 
having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be 
either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable, 
to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and [there- 
fore could] will nothing. But if he is capable of hav- 
ing incKnation, will, and choice, then what he inclines 
to and chooses is grateful to him, whatever that be ; 
whether it be his own private good, the good of his 
neighbor, or the glory of God. And so far as it is 
pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, 
or happiness." — Edwds. on Virtue, chap. 4, § 1. 

To quote the language of Prof. Dugald Stewart: " In 
prefixing to this chapter the title of self-love^ the ordi- 
nary language of modern philosophy has been followed. 
. . . The expression, however, is exceptionable, for it 
suggests an analogy (where there is none in fact) be- 
tween that regard which every rational being must 
necessarily have to his own happiness, and those benev- 
olent affections which attach us to our fellow-creatures. 
There is surely nothing in the former of these princi- 
ples [i. e. the involuntary desire of happiness] analogous 
to the affection of [voluntary] love ; and therefore to call 
it by the appellation of self-love is to suggest a theory 
in respect to its nature, and a theory which has no 
foundation in truth." 

" The word philautia was used among the Greeks 
nearly in the same sense, and introduced similar inac- 



Quest. 116.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 119 

curacies into their reasonings concerning the principle 
of morals. In our language, however, the impropriety 
does not stop here ; for not only is the phrase self-love 
used as synonymous with the desire of happiness, but 
is often confounded (in consequence of an unfortunate 
connection in their etymology) with the word selfishness^ 
which certainly, in strict propriety, denotes a very dif- 
ferent disposition of mind. In proof of this it is suf- 
ficient to observe, that the word selfishness is always 
used in an unfavorable sense, [whereas self-love^ or the 
desire of happiness^ is inseparable from our nature as 
rational and sensitive heings.^^ — Moral Powers, p. 97. 

" Reasonable self-love [or a benevolent regard for our 
highest interest] and conscience are the chief or supe- 
rior principles in the nature of man : because an action 
may be suitable to this nature, though all other princi- 
ples be violated ; but becomes unsuitable if either of 
those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand 
our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty 
and interest are always coincident; for the most part 
in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we 
take in the future and the whole ; this being implied in 
a perfect administration of things. Thus they who 
have been so wise in their generation as to regard only 
their own supposed interest, at the expense and to the 
injury of others, shall at last find that he who has given 
up all the advantages of the present world rather than 
violate his conscience and the relations of life, has 
infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his 
own interest and happiness." — Butler's Third Sermon 
on Human Nature. 

" When benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, 
it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a prin- 
ciple in reasonable creatures and so to be directed by 



120 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 116. 

their reason ; for reason and reflection come into our 
notion of a moral agent." — Butler's Sermon on Love 
to our Neighbor. 

Prof. Stewart, in the same chapter from which the 
above citation is taken, refers to Aristotle as remarkably 
coinciding with himself in his views of self-love, and 
in the use of that term. 

Aristotle says : " The good man must necessarily 
be a self-lover ; for he wiU be delighted in performing 
honorable acts himself, and will benefit others. But 
the wicked man ought to be so ; for he injures both 
himself and his neighbors by following his evil pas- 
sions. To the wicked man, therefore, what he ought 
to do and what he does are at variance ; but the good 
man does what he ought to do ; for all intellect chooses 
what is best for itself. It is true, also, of the good man, 
that he performs many acts for his friends and for his 
country, nay, even if it is his duty to die for them; 
for he will give up money, . . . and, in short, all the 
good things which others contend for, if he can secure 
to himself that which is honorable. For he would pre- 
fer being pleased a short time exceedingly, than for a 
long time slightly ; and to live one year honorably, than 
many years in the ordinary manner; and to perform 
one honorable and great act, rather than many small 
ones. Those who die for their country, this, perhaps, 
actually befalls." — Ethics, book ix. chap. 8. 

Therefore, according to Aristotle, President Edwards, 
and Prof. D. Stewart, desire of happiness, or self-love, 
and the voluntary action of the mind, are to be distin- 
guished ; self-love being a constitutional property, — an 
essential element in the capacity for all voluntary ac- 
tion, right or wrong, and the subjective motive from 
which all possible moral action must spring. And yet 



Quest. 11 r.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 121 

all of these great and learned men failed to a great ex- 
tent to conform either their language or their doctrines 
to these psychological facts, — and facts, too, implied 
in their own language. 

We think it quite probable, that if Aristotle had 
formed such a system of ethics as consistency with 
these mental facts requires, the learned world, to say 
the least, would long before this have perceived the 
correctness and truth of his system, and acquiesced in 
it, and thus a true system of ethics would have been 
permanently established. 

We believe also, that if Edwards had constructed 
such a system of theology as these facts absolutely 
require in order to be consistent with truth, he would 
have avoided some, not to say many, important incon- 
sistencies in the doctrines which he taught. In this 
case, too, he would have been saved from teaching the 
doctrine in regard to regeneration which is ascribed to 
him in No. II. of the American Theological Review, 
and which may be fitly termed the doctrine of physical 
regeneration, which, of course, implies physical deprav- 
ity and a physical incapacity of all men either to be- 
come holy or to perform a holy act. 

We believe also, that had Professor Dugald Stewart, 
in his teachings of the theory of morality, consistently 
controlled himself by these well-established psychologi- 
cal facts, the value of his doctrine on this subject would 
have been more than doubled. 

117. What, then, is supreme selfishness, as distin- 
guished from impartial benevolence and from self-love ? 

(1.) Supreme selfishness is seeking our own happi- 
ness in our own way, according to our own pleas- 
ure, whatever that may happen to be, without regard 
to the eternal law of right, and in ways opposed to our 
11 



122 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 117. 

highest present and future and eternal happiness, and 
in opposition to the true interests and happiness of our 
fellow-men, to the good pleasure and authority of God, 
and to the best good of his whole kingdom. 

(2.) President Edwards says : " "When any one does 
good to another from confined self-love, which is op- 
posed to a general benevolence, this kind of self-love is 
called selfishness." AU the instinctive, constitutional, 
natural affections to kindred, — love of country, philan- 
thropy, and humanity, — which, in their voluntary ex- 
ercise, fall short of impartial, general benevolence, are 
not true and holy virtue. This kind of doing good to 
others (in these various modes) is often, in common 
language, when no reference is had to holiness or sin, 
called benevolence. But as it springs from a narrow, 
confined, partial^ and selfish principle, it is not an im- 
partial^ and therefore not a holy benevolence, — not true 
virtue. It must come into the category of selfishness, 
because it belongs to that order of ideas. Natural 
affections, so far as they are involuntary, have no moral 
character. 

(3.) Selfishness, or "the selfish principle, is not a 
merely instinctive impulse, not merely that desire of 
happiness which is inseparable from the nature of a 
sentient being, but a voluntary state [or choice] or habit 
of mind, a moral affection which fixes on self as the 
center of the universe, and refuses to recognize it as 
man's chief end to glorify God and enjoy him for- 
ever." * 

(4.) In the exercise of supreme selfishness, a man 
regards his own happiness as the supreme good ; and 
the proof of this is, that he seeks it in ways that are 

* Views and Kcviews by Leonard Bacon, No. ii. p. 113. 



Quest. 118.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 123 

inconsistent with, and in opposition to, the best good 
of the universe. He thus practically prefers his own 
happiness to the general good. He prefers and seeks 
the pleasures of sin, rather than the pleasures which he 
might find in holiness — in the promotion of the best 
good of the universe. In this way his true interests 
and happiness cannot be found, but must be prevented. 
Therefore, in this way they cannot be wisely nor rightly 
sought. To seek happiness in this way is to prevent 
our own and the general good, and is therefore sin. 

" Moral evil is in itself, or in its own nature, odious, 
and the proper object of disapprobation and abhorrence. 
By its own nature, I mean its [tendency to evil, the dis- 
honor of the Deity, and the misery or diminution of the 
happiness of the created system." 

" The essence of moral evil is, that it [tends to im- 
pair the good and happiness of the universe ; in that 
the odiousness of sin or moral evil consists." * 

(5.) Supreme selfishness is the essential principle of 
sin, — the source whence spring all the specific sinful 
acts of supremely selfish, unsanctified men. Seeking 
happiness for ourselves in this way is in violation of 
the eternal law of right, the transgression of which is 
sin. For these reasons it cannot be consistent with 
duty, much less can duty demand, that we should seek 
our happiness in this way. To seek it in benevolence, 
then, is the only alternative. 

118. What, then, is supreme, impartial, universal 
benevolence, as distinguished from self-love and selfish- 
ness? 

(1.) True, impartial benevolence, or " the benevolent 
principle, ... is not a mere constitutional capacity of 

* Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. i. pp. 38, 43. 



124 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 118. 

being moved to choice by the contemplation of the 
general happiness, but an habitual state of the will, 
involving [elective] preference, — an immanent deter- 
mination, blending with the excitement of the sensi- 
bility, and constituting a [right and holy] moral 
affection." " The saint is actuated by awakened de- 
sires, which have their gratification in the welfare of 
the universe and in the glory of God, [while] the sinner, 
in whom that higher capacity of his nature is slumber- 
ing or suppressed, is actuated by no other desires than 
those which have their gratification in his own personal 
and separate interest," * separated in all cases from the 
supreme and general good. 

(2.) In the exercise of enlightened, enlarged, and 
supreme benevolence, a man regards the greatest hap- 
piness of the universe (of course including his own), 
together with the necessary means of that happiness, 
as the supreme and ultimate good to be sought, and he 
seeks his own happiness, not exclusively, nor as the su- 
preme good, but according to its value as a part of that 
good, and of course as a subordinate good, — he also 
seeks his own, not as being opposed to, but he seeks it 
by promoting the supreme good, and as necessarily 
involved in that good. 

(3.) Supreme benevolence is a supreme regard for 
the highest good, including the highest happiness and 
the highest holiness of the universe (as a whole, and as 
made up of individuals), as a better and a higher good 
than any other which can ever come in competition 
with it. The true interest, the highest good, the most 
valuable happiness of ^a probationer, therefore, can 
never come in competition with the supreme good, 

* Views and Reviews, No. ii. p. 113. 



Quest. 117.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 125 

Therefore, the strongest desire of, and the strictest and 
wisest regard to, united with the most ardent and per- 
severing pursuit of, one's personal and true interest and 
happiness, all together, are not inconsistent with, but 
are actually demanded by, supreme, impartial, and 
universal benevolence ; and in reality constitute that 
true benevolence, and are therefore identical with it. 

(4.) True benevolence is termed supreme^ because it 
is a choice to promote, as far as is in our power, the 
supreme good, — the summum bonum, rather than any 
less good or any thing else which can come in competi- 
tion with it. Dr. Emmons says : " The law . . . which 
is founded in the nature of things, requires men to seek 
hoKness and happiness for themselves and others." 
The good Samaritan " placed his happiness in the 
happiness of others, which is the essence of holy in 
distinction from selfish love." " The Supreme Being 
designed from eternity f o promote his own felicity in giv- 
ing existence and happiness to his creatures." 

(5.) Pres. Edwards says : " In some sense the most 
benevolent, generous person in the world seeks his own 
happiness in doing good to others ; because he places 
his happiness in their good. His mind is so enlarged 
as to take them, as it were, into himself. Thus when 
they are happy he feels it ; he partakes with them and 
is happy in their happiness. This is so far from being 
inconsistent with free beneficence, that on the con- 
trary fi-ee benevolence and kindness consist in it. 

" True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence 
to [sentient] being in general," * and this consists in 
love to the general happiness, and contains the primor- 
dial elements, the essential constituents, of holiness. 



* Last End, chap. 1, sec. 4. 
11* 



126 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 119. 

(6.) Benevolence is the grand, primary, and only 
source of all the specific forms of holy action; so that 
all holy acts are comprehended in true benevolence. 
Seeking our own happiness in the exercise of benevo- 
lence, to the extent which the law demands, is the 
promotion of the highest amount of universal happi- 
ness in our power, — it is perfect obedience to the 
eternal, unoriginated law of right, and is, therefore, 
right, virtuous, and holy action. 

119. In regard to our own happiness, why are we 
bound to seek it in the exercise of benevolence, rather 
than selfishness ? 

Of all that we have said on this point this is the 
sum. 

Since we must either seek our personal happiness as 
the supreme good, or seek it in promoting the general 
happiness as the supreme good, and since we both can- 
not and ought not to find the highest kind and degree 
of our personal happiness by seeking it as the supreme 
good, but can find the highest kind and degree of it by 
seeking it in promoting the general good as the supreme 
good ; therefore, we ought to seek it in the exercise of 
benevolence. Or thus. 

Since we are under the inevitable necessity of seek- 
ing our happiness in selfishness or benevolence, and 
since we cannot find our true happiness in selfishness, 
we cannot be under obligation to seek it in that way ; 
and since we can find it in the exercise of benevolence, 
it foUows, from each of these reasons separately, and 
from them all unitedly, that we ought to seek our 
true interest and happiness in benevolence ; and be- 
cause, in benevolence we seek the highest general good 
as supremely valuable. 

In short, we ought to seek our highest happiness in 



QuKST. 120.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 127 

benevolence, because to do this is the only way in 
which w^e can find it, or exercise benevolence, or seek 
to promote the general good. 

120. What, then, for the above reasons, is the moral 
relation which every person sustains to his own personal 
happiness ? 

From the truths contained in the above statements, it 
follows that we are morally bound to seek our own 
personal happiness, not at all in selfishness, but in pure, 
holy benevolence. 

To let the argument have its full force, consider the 
following simple form of its truth. Since every moral 
agent is under the absolute necessity of seeking his 
own happiness in all his moral action, — since he ought 
not, and cannot find his highest happiness in selfishness, 
and since seeking his own happiness, in the exercise and 
habitual practice of impartial and universal benevolence, 
is the way, and the only possible way, in which he can 
either obtain his highest happiness, or do his duty and 
be holy, — it follows most logically, that every moral 
accountable being ought to seek his own personal 
happiness in all he does, by and in the habitual exercise 
and practice of impartial, general benevolence. 

To do this would be to place and to seek his own 
individual happiness in promoting the highest amount 
of general happiness in his power, — this would be to 
fulfil the proper end of his being, — the end for which 
he was made, and, of course, this would fulfil the pref- 
erence, the will and command of God in the highest 
and best sense. 

" Delight thyself in the Lord, and he shall grant thee 
the desires of thine heart." — Ps. 37 : 4. Take your 
pleasure in doing the will of God, and such desires for 
happiness shall be gratified. 



128 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 120. 

" Resolved, that I will do whatsoever I think to be 
most to God's glory and my own good, profit, and 
pleasure in the whole of my duration ; without any con- 
sideration of the time, whether now or never so many 
myriads of ages hence." — Pres. Edwards. 

" A practical regard to what is, upon the whole, our 
happiness, ... is not only coincident with the principle 
of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea 
itself." " So little cause is there for moralists to dis- 
claim this principle." — Butler's Analogy, p. 162. 

To act from the principle of a truly wise, enlarged, 
and benevolent regard to our own highest interest and 
happiness on the whole, in the long run, is precisely one 
and the same thing with acting from an enhghtened 
and benevolent regard to the highest general good on 
the whole and in the long run. Neither can be done 
without doing the other. 

The fundamental dogma of Edwards, " that the will 
is as the greatest apparent good " (whether it be true in 
regard to sinful action, or not, as some doubt), there is 
no doubt about its truth in regard to right action ; and 
it implies two things : (1.) That " Good in some form, — 
that which is to the mind's sensibility good, — that 
which the mind, at the moment of choosing, views as 
the greatest good [which, can be no other than happi- 
ness], — is the ultimate end," * and (2.) That the mind's 
desire of happiness is the primary subjective motive 
of all choice, and therefore of all holy action. 

*■ Views and Reviews, No. ii. p. 114. 



Quest. 121.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 129 



CHAPTER IX. 

BENEVOLENCE MORE PARTICULARLY DEFINED. 

In order that we may obtain a true, comprehensive, 
full, and accurate idea of holiness, let it be borne in 
mind, that virtue, impartial benevolence, and holiness in 
the concrete, are one and the same thing ; and therefore 
a correct definition of one is a correct definition of the 
others. Virtue is benevolence, and benevolence is virtue. 

121. What, then, is benevolence as more particularly- 
defined ? 

(1.) Benevolence primarily consists in the intention 
of a rational being to do as much good as he can ; to 
promote as great an amount of happiness on the 
whole as he can ; i. e. all he wisely can, and that is all 
he can promote^ and all which does not interfere with 
or prevent the greatest good. 

(2.) Another comprehensive definition. Benevolence 
is a voluntary preference, in all cases, of the greatest 
good in one's power, to any lower and less good, and 
includes a purpose to pursue, obtain, or promote that 
good accordingly. 

(3.) Benevolence, to be holy, must be supreme, im- 
partial, and universal; impartial love to the highest 
happiness of each and all rational beings, including a 
proper regard to the happiness of all sentient beings, 
according to (what is practically sLipposable) its pro- 
portionate worth. 

By an able writer the doctrine of Pres. Edwards is 
thus stated. 



ISO NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 121. 

(4.) "Virtue consists in love to sentient beings accord- 
ing to their relative value ; in benevolence to them on 
account of and in proportion [according to the best 
practicable estimate of that proportion], to the good that 
does or may exist in them ; a preference of the higher 
and greater to the lower and smaller kind and degree 
of good ; in a hatred of all that opposes the well-being 
of the universe." — Bib. Sacra, 1853, p. 723. 

Dr. Edwards thus states the views of his father, which 
were also his own. 

" Mr. Edwards teaches, that virtue consists in benevo- 
lence. He proves that every voluntary action, which, in 
its general [tendency and ultimate consequences, leads 
to happiness^ is virtuous ; and that every such action, 
which has not this [tendency, and does not lead to this 
consequence, is vicious. By happiness, in this case, he 
does not mean the happiness of the agent only or prin- 
cipally, but happiness in general, happiness on the large 
scale. Virtuous or holy benevolence embraces both the 
agent himself and others — all intelligences, wherever 
found, who are capable of a rational and moral blessed- 
ness. All actions, proceeding from such a principle, he 
holds to be fit or agreeable to the fitness of things — 
agreeable equally to reason, and to a well-informed con- 
science, or moral sense, and to moral truth ; and agree- 
able especially to the will of God, who 'is love' or 
benevolence." — Vol. i. p. 485. 

(5.) Virtue is an intelligent purpose, intention, or 
choice of a moral being, according to the best light and 
knowledge in his possession, impartially to promote the 
sum of the most excellent and valuable happiness, for 
himself and for all others known to be within the reach 
of his influence, to the full extent which is possible to 
him, by the best use which he can make of all his 
powers. 



Quest. 122.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 131 

(6.) As a matter of logical necessity, holiness includes 
the purpose to promote holiness, to the greatest possible 
extent. 

(7.) Complete holiness, i. e. the complete fulfilment of 
obUgation, is that exercise of the will which would 
secure the harmonious operation of all our mental 
powers. It is that voluntary use of our powers which 
is demanded by our moral natures and moral relations, 
by our reason and conscience, and by a just regard to 
our cravings for happiness. In holiness the wiU obeys 
the instructions of reason, and fulfils the demands of 
conscience in all its efforts to gratify the sensibility, so 
that peace, harmony, and blessedness pervades the soul. 

122. What is meant by saying that virtue must be 
an intelligent act ? 

In saying virtue must be an intelligent act, it is not 
meant that mere intelligence, a mere act of the intel- 
lect, can be virtuous, but it is meant that the intellect 
must be employed, in perceiving the relations, the na- 
ture and tendencies of the act to promote some object, 
or to prevent some other object. No act, good or bad, 
can be performed without an intelligent perception of 
some reason or some objective as well as subjective 
motive for performing it. In every act, good or bad, 
there must be perceived some tendency to promote or 
prevent happiness or misery. 

A voluntary act, dictated and guided by intelligence, 
is an intelligent act. Although iuteUigence is not vir- 
tue nor sin, it is a condition prerequisite and corequisite 
to both holiness and sin. 

123. Why must virtue be an intelligent act? 

(1.) The reasons before assigned in q. 80, why a 
moral act must be the act of a rational being, are in 
place here. 



132 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 123. 

(2.) Virtuous action is, and must be, obedience to a 
known moral law, in fulfilment of known moral obliga- 
tion. (Comp. qs. 5, 125, 146.) 

(3.) It must be performed not only for an intelligent 
reason, but for a supposed or known good reason. And 
therefore intelligence is not only prerequisite to the per- 
formance of virtuous action, but requisite during its 
performance. We think a man can no more act vir- 
tuously without the exercise of his intellect, than he 
can without the exercise of his will. 

(4.) No moral act can be performed without a knowl- 
edge of good and evil. Knowledge of good and evil 
implies a knowledge, to some extent, of what will pro- 
mote, or have some tendency to promote, happiness, 
and of what will prevent, or have some tendency to 
prevent it, and promote misery. No act can be duty 
which is not, and cannot be conceived to be, adapted 
to produce the highest happiness known to be in one's 
power at the time. No one can be under obligation to 
do that which he cannot know, or reasonably judge, to 
be promotive of happiness. 

In order that a person should perform a virtuous act, 
he must know of some acts which he can perform, that 
will produce happiness. Of those acts within his 
power, he ought to perform such as, according to the 
best evidence within his reach, he judges to be best 
adapted to promote happiness or prevent misery. 

To be virtuous in the highest degree, an act must be 
the one which, according to his best judgment, is best 
adapted to the promotion of happiness, within a person's 
knowledge and power. And if it be so, his obligation 
for the time being is fulfilled, no more can be required 
of him. 

(5.) If an act have no perceived adaptation nor ten- 



Quest. 123.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 133 

dency to produce happiness nor prevent misery in any 
degree, there can be no possible motive nor reason for 
performing, and of com-se no possibility of performing 
it, and therefore there can be no obhgation to perform 
such an act as has no tendency to produce happiness. 

(6.) An act, before it is performed, must be intelli- 
gently perceived to have an adaptation, and according 
to the common course of things, a probable tendency, to 
accomplish a good result, — to promote happiness ; and it 
must be designed to accomplish that result, or there can 
be no benevolence in the act when performed. An act 
cannot be known to be benevolent, until it is known 
that it is a design to be useful. He who does not know 
enough to know that benevolence is a design to pro- 
mote happiness, or, which is the same thing, to be use- 
ful, does not know what benevolence is. Hence it is 
concluded, that as soon as an act is loiown to be 
benevolent, it is known to be a design to be useful, and 
therefore known to be a useful design. Knowing one 
is knowing the other. 

(7.) It is the office of reason, in its capacity of con- 
science, to know moral good from moral evil, — to 
approve the good and disapprove the evil. A rational 
being must have a knowledge of moral good and evil, 
in order to have any emotion in view of right and 
wrong acts. The pecuHar feeling of the sensibility con- 
sequent (in the order of nature, if not of time) upon 
the approbation given by our reason to a virtuous act, 
is excited by a perception of the understanding or 
reason. This feehng is the effect, and not the cause, of 
the perception. The feeling is an exercise of the sensi- 
bility ; the perception is an act of the intellect or reason. 
The feeling is produced by the perception. Say, if you 
please, they exist at the same time. Nevertheless, the 
12 



134 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 124. 

perception is the cause of the feeling, and is first in the 
order of nature, first logically, if not chronologically. 

The reason must be used in perceiving the tendencies 
of our acts, or we cannot know what we ought to do, 
nor what we ought to refrain from doing. When, with 
the eye of reason, we see an act to be designedly 
adapted to secure the well-being of ourselves and 
others, we give it the approbation of our reason or 
conscience ; and we have at the same time a pecufiar 
feeling of happiness and satisfaction, which is excited 
in our sensibility, by this intelligent perception of the 
virtuousness of that act. By this it is manifest that 
we know what is right and virtuous by the dictates of 
our reason and conscience, rather than by those emo- 
tions of our sensibility which are excited by the percep- 
tions of our reason. Therefore our reason or conscience 
is a law to us, and it is a law which God has given us. 
The perception of what is right and wrong, and of the 
difference between them, is one of the offices of con- 
science, and is prerequisite to all moral acts, right or 
wrong. 

" Man finds within himself and in his own [reason 
the rule he ought to follow; and, since the counsels 
which reason gives him point out the shortest and 
safest road to his [perfection and happiness^ from thence 
a principle of obligation or cogent motive to square his 
actions by this primitive rule." — Burlamaqui, p. 47. 

124. "Why ought a virtuous act to be in accordance 
with the best light and knowledge which the agent, in 
the opportunities afforded him, can obtain ? 

Wisdom is profitable to direct, and if any wisdom is 
profitable, the more the better. If knowledge is power, 
then the more wisdom and knowledge one can obtain, 
the more power he will have to do good. 



Quest. 125.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 135 

No one can be under obligation to do better than lie 
can do, or than he can know how to do. Every one is 
under the same obhgation to know his duty as well as 
he can know it, that he is under to know it at all. And 
every one is under the same obligation to do as well as 
he can know how to do, that he is under to do well at 
all. No one can be under obligation to do good, any 
further than he can know, or reasonably judge, what is 
productive of good. 

125. " Is a capacity to know our duty necessary to 
moral agency ? " 

" The meaning of this question," says Dr. Edwards, 
" I conceive to be whether a capacity to know our duty 
or obligation in any case, be necessary to the existence 
of moral obhgation in that case ; and whether duty or 
moral obligation can extend any further than our capac- 
ity to know our duty ? In this sense of the question, 
I answer, that a capacity to know our duty is necessary 
to moral agency. 

" Capacity is power and opportunity. Power to know 
our duty is the power of rational understanding, and 
implies that the subject is a rational being ; ajid if ca- 
pacity to know our duty be not necessary to moral 
agency, neither is it necessary that we be possessed of 
reason. But we may be as stupid as brutes, and yet 
be moral agents." 

" If an incapacity of knowing our duty be not incon- 
sistent with moral agency, natural inability to do duty 
is not inconsistent with it." " I presume it will be 
granted, that knowledge, and the capacity and means 
of knowledge, of our duty, aggravate sin in any case, 
and that the less knowledge and the less capacity for 
knowing duty a person has, the less is his sin. Sin, 
then, is diminished in the same proportion as the capac- 



1^6 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 125. 

ity of knowledge is. And why is it not entirely ex- 
tinguished when capacity is ? Surely some substantial 
reason must be^ given to show that this is not the effect. 

" Where no law is, there is no transgression. But can 
a law be said to exist in regard to a person who has no 
power or capacity to know the law ? Suppose God 
should send us a law written in the language of the 
[Northwest Indians] . . . would it be a law with re- 
spect to us, so that, without any means of knowing its 
contents, we should be bound to obey it ? " 

" It will not be denied, that no law is binding on a 
creature which is not a just and a good law, subservient 
to the general good ; and that God is incapable of en- 
acting any other than such a law. Now, is not a law 
requiring services which the creature, if he be ever so 
attentive and candid, and though he be perfectly holy, 
is incapable of understanding, an unjust law ? And is 
it not manifest that such a law would not be a good 
law, and not subservient to the general good or the 
glory of God ? . . . We neither are nor can be bound 
to do any thing which we are incapable of knowing to 
be our duty." — Vol. ii. pp. 5, 12, 515. 

" God never did and never will place an intelligent 
creature in any situation in which it is naturally impos- 
sible for him to know his duty." — Dr. Emmons, vol. iv. 
p. 296. 

" God never requires of any sinner of the human 
family, in order to his salvation, that which he has not 
the knowledge of, and the ability to perform." — Bib. 
Sacra, 1857, p. 192. 

" In order to discharge an obligation we must be first 
acquainted with it, we must know what we do, and be 
able to square our actions by a certain rule." — J, J, 
Burlamaqui on Natural Law, p. 45. 



Quest. 126.1 OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 137 

" Morality requires not only that a man should act 
according to his judgment, but that he should use the 
best means in his power that his judgment be according 
to the truth. If he fail in either of these points he is 
worthy of blame; but if he fail in neither, I see not 
wherein he can be blamed." — Reid, vol. iii. p. 257. 

" The person obliged must have understanding and 
will, and some degree of active power. He must not 
only have the natural faculty of understanding, but the 
means of knowing his obligation. An invincible igno- 
rance of this, destroys all moral obHgation." — Ibid. p. 
154. 

" To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not 
to him it is sin." — James 4 : 17. 

" If ye were blind, ye should have no sin." — John 
9:41. 

126. Why must happiness be the last end aimed at 
and sought in all virtuous action? (See qs. 73, 74.) 

(1.) All voluntary action must have an objective 
motive, — an object chosen and sought, — an end aimed 
at; and happiness is that end, because it is the only 
ultimate end which is possible. And since happiness 
is the ultimate end of aU possible voluntary action, it 
must be the ultimate end of all holy action. 

(2.) Happiness is the only possible ultimate end of 
voluntary action, because it is the only absolute good ; 
the only good complete in itself, irrespective of and 
separate from all its relations. There is no other good 
that is good irrespective of all its relations. Holiness 
is not a good irrespective of its relations to happiness, 
of aiming and tending to secure it. 

Remark. When one degree of happiness, or the 
happiness of one person, or the happiness of many 
persons, is the means of other happiness, then so far as 
12* 



138 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 126. 

it is SO it is relative good as well as absolute good ; it 
is relative good because it has the relation of means to 
other good.* 

" It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence 
to mankind or any creature, but happiness. This, then, 
is all which any person can, in strictness of speaking, 
be said to have a right to. We can, therefore, owe no 
man any thing., but only to further and promote his hap- 
piness according to our abilities. And therefore a dis- 
position and endeavor to do good to all with whom we 
have to do, in the degree and manner which the differ- 
ent relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge 
of all the obligations we are under to them." — Butler's 
Sermon on Love to our Neighbor. 

" That and that only is a curse to a person, which, 
taken in its proper connections and dependencies, ren- 
ders him more miserable than he would be without it. 
On the contrary, that is a blessing to a person, which, 
taken in its proper connection and dependencies, ren- 
ders him more happy than he would be without it. It 
is just as great a blessing and just as great a privilege 
as happiness itself." f " The very idea of sin is a dam- 
age to the universe, a dishonor to God, and an injury to 
the creature." \ " Goodness always acquiesces in that 
which is consistent with the general good." § " The 
general good is the measure of justice." || " The 
law of nature is founded on the general good. What- 
ever the general good requires, reason requires in every 
instance ; and whatever reason requires, the law of 
nature requires." — Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. ii. p. 
255. 

* In further consideration of this question see Note E. sec. 3. 

t Dr. Edvvds's Works, vol. i. p. 27. 

X Ibid. p. 136. § Ibid. p. 137. || Ibid. p. 25G. 



Quest. 126.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 139 

On this topic we have Milton's views in the follow- 
ing Hnes : 

" To wlaom the tempter murm'ring thus reply'd. 
Think not so slight of glory ; therein least 
Resembling thy great Father : He seeks glory, 
And for his glory all things made, all things 
Orders and governs ; not content in heav'n 
By all his angels glorify'd requires 
Gloiy from men, good or bad. 
Wise or unwise, no difference, no exemption, 
Above all sacrifice, or hallow'd gift, 
Glory he requires, and glory he receives 
Promiscuous from all nations, Jew or Greek, 
Or barbarous, nor exception hath declared ; 
From his foes pronounc'd glory he exacts. 
To whom our Saviour fervently reply'd. 
And reason ; since this Word all things produced, 
[Though chiefly not for glory as prime end, 
But to show forth his goodness, [and impart 
His good communicahle to every soul 
Freely ; of whom what could be less expected 
Than glory and benediction, that is thanks. 
The shghtest, easiest, readiest recompense 
From them who could return him nothing else, 
And not returning that would likeliest render 
Contempt instead, dishonor, obloquy ? 
Hard recompense, unsuitable return 
For so much good, so much beneficence. 
But why should man seek glory, who of his own 
Hath nothing, and to whom nothing belongs 
But condemnation, ignominy, and shame ? 
Who for so many benefits receiv'd 
Turn'd recreant to God, ingrate and false, 
And so of all true good himself despoil'd, 
Yet sacrilegious to himself would take 
That which to God alone of right belongs : 
Yet so much bounty is in God, such grace. 
That who advance his glory, not their own [as chief] 
Them He himself to glory will advance." * 

* Paradise Regained, book 3, lines 108-144. 



140 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 127. 

" The goodness of God is that glorious attribute by 
which he is disposed to communicate happiness to his 
creatures." — Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. i. p. 121. 

" The perfect goodness of God doubtless impKes 
that he made aU things with a design to promote good 
on the whole, or on the large scale ; so that, taking the 
system of intelligent creatures together, there shall be 
the greatest possible happiness in it." — Ibid. vol. ii. 
p. 204. 

The following question was given to Dr. Bellamy by 
Dr. Davies, President of New Jersey College, and was 
handed over by Dr. Bellamy to Dr. Hopkins : 

127. " Is happiness so essential to the goodness of 
the universe, that it is so much the more perfect or ex- 
cellent by how much the more happiness there is in 
it?" 

To this question, Dr. Hopkins replied and said : " I 
answer in the affirmative. Doubtless, happiness is some- 
thing in itself valuable, which is to be valued, desired, 
and sought for its own sake. And if so, then the more 
there is of it the better ; and that system which has the 
most happiness in it is the best and most perfect ; and 
that plan alone is absolutely perfect in which there is 
provision for the highest possible degree of happiness." 
— Park's Memoir of Hopkins. 

" The law of nature is the law of reason ; and the 
law of reason is the law of the general good of the 
moral system, — the law which is entirely regulated by 
the general good, and which requires what that requires, 
and forbids and threatens only what that forbids and 
threatens." — Dr. Edwards, vol. ii. p. 256. 

" Real and extensive goodness, such as the goodness 
of God, is always governed by the general good, and 
seeks what is required by that only. It would be no 



Quest. 128.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 141 

goodness, but the very opposite of goodness, to seek an 
object which . . . does on the whole, and with respect 
to the entire system, obstruct good and happiness." — 
Ibid. p. 255. 

" Nothing is more evident than that an action does 
not merit the name of benevolent, unless it be done 
from a belief that it [tends to promote the good of our 
neighbor," and, by consequence, the general good. — 
Reid's "Works, vol. iii. p. 259. 

These extracts imply that happiness is the ultimate 
object, and therefore that utility is an essential element 
in the idea of virtue, and that it is essential to the foun- 
dation of moral obligation. 

128. In what sense is the happiness of the agent the 
ultimate end of his own holy action, and in what sense 
is the happiness of others the ultimate end of that ac- 
tion ? 

(1.) Let it be observed that, in answering this ques- 
tion, we view the psychological or mental facts in the 
order in which they take place in holy action. By the 
ultimate end of holy action we mean the final, the last 
result sought in the order of time. First, Then there 
is a rational agent, having an intelligent mind consti- 
tuted with a nature in which the susceptibility of the 
desire of happiness is an inseparable element. Second. 
Then there are various objects which afford pleasure to 
him, and therefore excite this desire. Among other 
objects, the greatest general happiness of others gives 
him pleasure, and thus excites this desire. Third. The 
agent chooses to gratify this desire by promoting that 
happiness of others, and he promotes it to the extent 
of his power. Fourth. And this, finally, results in the 
gratification of that desire which was excited by the 
happiness of others. 



142 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 128. 

This gratification is the happiness of the agent, and 
is the final result sought in himself by his holiness. It 
is the final, internal end which was sought and is ob- 
tained in himself, in the happiness of which he is the 
subject. This happiness of the agent, then, we call the 
final, internal^ subjective object or end of his holy choice 
and action. This greatest happiness of others^ chosen, 
sought, and promoted, we term the final, external^ ob- 
jective object and end of his holy choice and action. 
We call it external, to distinguish it from that end 
sought and found within the agent. We term it the 
objective object and end, to distinguish it from the sub- 
jective end. Each one of these ends is the final, ulti- 
mate, last end possible of its kind sought in holy action. 

(2.) The mind chooses among the different objects 
with which it is pleased because it is pleased, and be- 
cause it prefers the pleasure which may be derived from 
some of those objects above the pleasure which can 
be derived from other objects ; " but it never chooses 
between being pleased and being displeased. In this 
sense it is, then, that in [our] view, the love of happi- 
ness is the ' primary subjective motive,' and the happi- 
ness of the agent is the ultimate [subjective] end of all 
choice and voluntary action;" (Rev. Leonard Bacon's 
Views and Reviews, No. II. p. 116 ;) and, therefore, of 
all holy action performed by him. Every sane mind 
chooses the happiness to be derived from some object, 
comprehending in that object a greater or less amount 
of various good ; and he pursues that object as the 
chief source of his pleasure, rather than the happiness 
which could be derived from other sources. 

The holiness of a holy mind consists in seeking and 
finding his happiness in loving and serving and pleas- 
ing God, in contemplating and promoting the highest 



Quest. 128.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 143 

happiness, and of course the highest holiness, of all the 
subjects of his moral government. In this sense it is, 
then, in our view, that the highest happiness of all in- 
cludes, first, not only the ultimate objective object and 
end, but, second, the final subjective end, and therefore 
the supreme, ultimate end also of all holiness. In this 
it appears that the supreme, ultimate end of all holi- 
ness consists in these two ends, viz. the subjective and 
objective ends united in one. And thus the highest 
happiness of all sentient beings is seen to constitute 
the supreme and ultimate end of all holy action, while 
the sinfulness of the sinful mind consists in seeking his 
own pleasures as the supreme good. 

(3.) These ultimate objects of pursuit can be accom- 
plished only by accomplishing all the objects which are 
necessarily both subordinate and subservient to these 
objects themselves; and therefore the objects of holy 
action include all the subordinate as well as the final, 
ultimate objects, and they include the final, external, 
objective objects, as well as the ultimate, internal, sub- 
jective objects. 

The foregoing views of these undeniable mental facts 
plainly show for themselves that they are not justly 
chargeable with implying the "preposterous doctrine, 
that every man may and must make his own happiness 
his ONLY and ultimate object [or that it is even the 
virtuous man's only ultimate object] in all that he does ; 
and that all benevolence and self-denial, all justice, 
truth, purity, and mercy are merely mercenary, and 
differ from selfishness only in name." — Ibid. No. I. 
p. 111. Therefore, acting consistently for the promo- 
tion of the supreme good is the true way in which it is 
our duty (and it is the only way which is consistent 
with our duty) to seek our highest happiness. 



144: NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 128. 

Therefore this is not selfishness. This is the way, 
and the only way, in which any rational being can 
secure, either his own highest good and blessedness for 
time as well as for eternity, or the greatest public good 
in his power. 

This is the only way to deserve the approbation of 
reason, of conscience, and of God. This is the only 
possible way either to avoid selfishness or to do right, 
or to ' act worthy of the rational beings God has made 
us.' But in this way these three things can all be 
done. 

Agreeable to these views are the following of Dr. 
Edwards : — 

(4.) '• For any being to love himself is to love his own 
happiness. But all God's happiness consists in produc- 
ing a happy creation ; otherwise he is not a benevolent 
being. [?] Now, to say that God regards his own happi- 
ness infinitely more than he does that on which all his 
own happiness depends, is manifestly not true. The 
proposition rests on the supposition, that God has a 
private, selfish happiness, not consisting in benevolence 
and beneficence." 

" God makes himself his end as he makes his happi- 
ness his end. But the happiness which he makes his 
end is the happiness which he takes in benevolence and 
beneficence, or the happiness which he takes in the per- 
fect and highest happiness of the created universe. So 
that to make himself his [subjective] end, and to make 
the happiness of the creation his [objective] end, is per- 
fectly one and the same thing." — Quoted from the 
Memoir of Dr. Hopkins, p. 205. 

" As the glory of God, and the greatest happiness of 
the system of the universe, and even of the created 
system, mutually imply each other ; whenever I mention 



Quest. 129.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 145 

either of them, I wish to be understood to include in 
my meaning the other also." — Dr. Edwards, vol. i. p. 
121. 

In accordance with the above is the following senti- 
ment of Dr. Hopkins. 

" And though we are wont to speak of the glory of 
God and the happiness of the creature as distinct things, 
and as different and separate ends, which God has in 
view in his works ; yet they are perhaps in reality one 
and the same, and viewed as such by the divine all-com- 
prehending mind." — Memoir of Hopkins, p. 229. 

To prepare the way for the next question, let it be 
premised that the same thing may be primary or ulti- 
mate, according as the facts concerning which an in- 
quiry is made, are arranged in the mind in a particular 
order or the reverse of that order. If these facts have 
one order, in the mind, a certain fact inquired after wiU 
be primary. If they have the reversed order it wiU be 
ultimate, 

129. Is the constitutional sensibility and desire of 
happiness an essential element in the ultimate founda- 
tion of moral obligation ? 

Since it is true, "that there cannot be a voluntary 
agent without the capacity of being pleased or dis- 
pleased, or who does not necessarily prefer being pleas- 
ed to being &pleased, or who can possibly act volun- 
tarily, except by acting as he is pleased to act; that 
every objective motive, in order to be a motive, must 
appeal to some sensibility or desire of the mind that is 
to be moved by it, while the subjective motive is 
nothing else than the awakened desire moving the mind 
to choose ; and nothing can possibly be chosen which 
is not desired, and nothing can be desired which does 
13 



146 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 130. 

not seem desirable," * therefore, it most logically follows, 
that the constitutional sensibility or desire of happiness 
is an essential element in the ultimate or lowest founda- 
tion of moral obligation. Without this desire of happi- 
ness, no power could exist to act morally. 

And it also follows as certainly, that tendency to 
awaken this sensibility and gratify this desire, consist- 
ing in a tendency to promote highest happiness, belongs 
to and is an element in the intrinsic, essential nature of 
holiness. And further, this must all be so, because 
ability to fulfil obligation is the foundation, and there- 
fore the measure, of that obligation. 

If we were to " ask any obedient or holy mind on 
earth or in heaven," ' 

130. ''■Wliy do you obey God, why do you devote 
yourself to his praise and his service [and to honor him 
in all his authority], why employ your faculties and 
powers [in doing right] in this course of benevolent 
action?"— Ibid. 112. 

He might very naturally and truly answer, " Because 
I love it, because I delight in it, because it is my blessed- 
ness, my highest good," because I esteem the highest 
possible holiness and happiness of the universe the 
supreme good; the summum bonum. And therefore I 
seek my highest good in promoting the supreme good, 
and because this is the way to secure the highest degree 
of happiness which is the only possible ultimate good. 

In this answer, the last reason, that can with propriety 
be asked for, is given. And this is the last reason that 
can be given in answer to the why, and at the same 
time be based upon the true foundation of moral obli- 
gation. 

* Views and Reviews, No. i. p. 111. 



Quest. 130.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 147 

"He who ^hungers and thirsts after righteousness,' 
who says to God ' thou art the strength of my heart 
and my portion forever,' — ' whom have I in heaven but 
thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire besides 
thee,' * as the hart panteth after the water brooks, so 
panteth my soul after thee,' " * in so doing and saying 
does not subvert the foundation principle of right, 
equity, honor, and duty. 

" This instinctive, innate, irresistible yearning after 
good is the ultimate reason," the last reason that can 
be given for holy action, which would contain the true 
answer to the question now before us. In this order of 
viewing the subject, this sensibility or desire of happi- 
ness is strictly and metaphysically ultimate, there being 
nothing in the agent beyond it, to which holy action 
may be referred, and nothing anywhere else, but in the 
Creator's wUl, who made us what we are. Or, reversing 
this order of viewing the facts, that which was before 
ultimate^ becomes primary. These constitutional sen- 
sibilities and desires, with which men come into exist- 
ence, and which prompt to aU moral action both good 
and bad, are anterior and prerequisite to, and therefore 
are, the primary motives of aU moral action and of 
course of all holy action, and for these reasons must con- 
stitute an essential element in the foundation of moral 
obligation. 

* Views and Reviews, No. i. p. 112. 



14B NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 131. 



CHAPTER X. 

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. TENDENCY OP VIRTUE TO 

HIGHEST HAPPINESS. 

131. Why must a virtuous act, in its intrinsic nature, 
have an efficacious tendency to produce happiness ? 

An act having, and known to have, no such tendency 
in its true and proper nature, is an impossibihty, and 
would be perfectly worthless if it were possible. 

(1.) No object whatever can be desired, or in any 
sense either voluntarily or involuntarily loved, or 
chosen, or sought after, except it be known, or be sup- 
posed to have an efficacious tendency to afford to the 
agent some degree of pleasure or happiness. ' All 
choice is to be happy. No man can make any choice, 
right or wrong, which excludes all happiness as the 
object of that choice. Such a choice is inconceivable.' 

No intelligent, voluntary act, which is known to ex- 
clude from its true nature all efficacious tendency to 
produce happiness in its agent, can be performed, be- 
cause there can be no desire to perform it ; and without 
a desire there can be no motive, and without a motive 
there can be no possibility of performing the act, and 
without a possibility there can be no obligation to per- 
form such an act. 

(2.) No act can be duty, unless it be supposed to 
have an efficacious tendency to produce the highest 
sum of general happiness known to be in one's 
power. When two or more acts are before the mind, 



Quest. 131.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 149 

which are known to be possible, and one of them is 
known to have a more efficacious tendency to promote 
happiness than any other, moral obligation requires 
that that act should be performed which is known to 
be most productive of happiness. Whatever act is 
known to be more productive of happiness, than any 
other act is which we know to be within our power, 
that act is our duty. Duty must always be within the 
limits of our power to do it, and to know what it is. 

(3.) Any act or thing that is not happiness, and which 
has no efficacious tendency to produce happiness, is good 
for nothing. Any such thing or act is perfectly worth- 
less, and cannot be good in any sense. It can be 
neither absolute good nor relative good, neither natural 
good nor moral good. It has no value in any sense 
whatever. Any thing and every thing, besides happi- 
ness, that has no tendency in its nature to produce hap- 
piness, has no natural goodness. Therefore, an act of 
will^ in some of its relations, must have a tendency in 
its nature to produce happiness, or it \sall not have any 
natural goodness. It must have an intended tendency 
to promote happiness, or it wiU not have any moral 
goodness, — it will not be virtuous. But if it has such 
a tendency, it wiU be, to some extent, effectual to pro- 
duce and promote happiness. 

" Nothing is more evident than that an action does 
not merit the name of benevolent, unless it be done 
from a belief that it [tends to promote the good of our 
neighbor." * And then, not lightness, but happiness, is 
ultimate end. 

" WhUe [President] Edwards believed that virtue is 
a good in itself, and vice an evil in itself, he yet believed 



* Dr Eeid. Fifth Essay on the Active Powers^ p. 259. 

13* 



150 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 131. 

that the chief good of the creatures' virtue consists in 
its being an object of holy pleasure to the Creator and 
a means of manifesting his glory ; and that the chief 
evil of sin consists in its being an object of holy dis- 
pleasure to the Creator and a means of tarnishing his 
glory."* Of course, Edwards could not consistently 
mean by virtue's being a good in itself, that it is a good 
separated from all its tendencies, and apart from its 
being a source of pleasure to the Creator and a means 
of manifesting his glory. As adapted to these ends, in 
this sense, most surely virtue is a good in itself, and 
therefore a relative, but not an absolute, ultimate good. 
To be a means of manifesting the glory of God, and 
to be the means of promoting the highest happiness of 
the universe, is one and the same thing. That which 
will accomplish one, will accomplish the other.f The 
chief good of virtue, therefore, consists in the benevo- 
lent tendency of its nature, by which it is voluntarily 
adapted to be the means of highest happiness ; and the 
chief evil of sin consists in its malicious tendency to 
prevent happiness and promote misery. 

(4.) An act, to be virtuous, must have a tendency in 
its nature to excite that feeling of peculiar happiness 
called the feeling of approbation. And this tendency 
of the act must be seen and felt before the act is per- 
formed, or the act cannot be known to be duty before it 
is performed, and therefore will not be duty when per- 
formed. 

(5.) If virtue is correctly defined to be that which 
excites the feeUng of complacency, — a feeling of pecul- 



* Bibliotheca Sacra, 1853, p. 722. Kevlew of Edwards on Virtue, 
t See qs. 126-128, the quotations from Dr. Hopkins and Dr. Ed- 
wards. • 



Quest. 131.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 151 

iar happiness, called the feeling of approval and expec- 
tation of reward, then, tendency to produce that peculiar 
happiness surely belongs to the nature of virtue accord- 
ing to the definition, as well as in accordance with 
truth. For, if virtue had no tendency to excite this 
happy feeling of approval in a being, he could have no 
desire to perform a lioly act because it was holy. He 
could not even try to gain his own approval, nor the 
approval of any other being. He would be wanting in 
one of the constituent elements of conscience, which is 
one of the essential elements in the nature of a moral 
being. 

Again ; if vktue had in its nature no tendency to excite 
the soul's desire of happiness, then it could not be an 
object of either voluntary or involuntary love, desire, or 
choice, and then to make a holy choice (because it was 
holy, as any part of the reason for making it) would 
be an impossibility. But all this would subvert the 
important, the known and admitted truth, " That we 
have an instinctive, constitutional love of happi- 
ness subjectively prompting us to all acts, right or 
wrong." 

(6.) If there were no tendency in a supposed act or 
choice to produce some degree of one's own happiness, 
then, as we have already seen, there would be nothing 
in its nature to excite a desire to perform such act, and 
nothing in it, if performed, to gratify such desire, be« 
cause the gratification of that desire would be some 
degree of happiness ; and whatever should gratify such 
a desire would have an efficacious tendency to produce 
happiness. But, by the supposition, the act, purpose, 
or choice is to have no tendency whatever to be the 
means of happiness to any being. And then, as we 
have seen above, for a rational being to perform such 



152 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 131. 

an act would be an unqualified impossibility, and there- 
fore no obligation could exist to perform such an act. 
Even the martyr takes pleasure in confessing Christ, 
to such an extent that he goes to the stake so filled 
with joy that he is enabled to triumph over the suffer- 
ings of death, even amid the flames. 

(7.) But suppose we could dispose of this difficulty, 
which arises from a want of a tendency in the supposed 
act to promote the present gratification of the agent ; — 
if now it were possible to perform the act (which, in 
truth, it would not be), even then, we could gain noth- 
ing of future happiness by the performance of the act, 
for, by the supposition, it is to have in its true nature 
no tendency whatever to produce happiness, present or 
future. It must not be the means of happiness to one's 
self here nor hereafter. 

(8.) But suppose this difficulty also were obviated, 
and now, without any prospect of any possible gain or 
happiness to ourselves, now or in the future, we set 
ourselves by some act of ours to promote the happiness 
of others, — ■■ but, by the supposition, the act is to have 
in its nature no adaptation or tendency to promote hap- 
piness for ourselves, nor for any other being, — there 
certainly can be no benevolence in an act known be- 
forehand to have such a character. 

(9.) The question now before us may be answered, 
again, as follows : — 

All holiness is voluntary production, to some extent, 
of foreseen, intended happiness. As a matter of fact, 
and of admitted fact, holiness always is a design to 
produce happiness, and always does produce designed 
happiness, to a greater or less extent. As a matter of 
fact, then, holiness has, in its unchangeable nature, an 
efficacious tendency to produce happiness, which is in 



Quest. 131.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 153 

reality productiveness of happiness. Such, in its un- 
changeable nature, is the holiness of God. 

All the evidence that God has exhibited to us of his 
benevolence or holiness, has been done by its designed 
effects. "He has not left himself without witness, in 
that he doeth good, filling our hearts with food and 
gladness." This, his goodness to us, consists in his pro- 
duction of our happiness. He has proved to us his 
benevolent design by the results of that design, viz. 
making us happy, by sending us rain from heaven, 
fruitful seasons, food and gladness. He has proved 
his character and acts to be good in the only possible 
way, viz. by their effects. By knowing the designed 
tendencies and effects of his acts in our own happiness, 
we have evidence that his designs are holy and benevo- 
lent. And this appears to comprehend substantially 
all the evidence of the Divine goodness which the com- 
mon mind of man is competent to appreciate. 

(10.) Sound, unperverted reason, or common sense, 
decides the nature of things by their properties, effects, 
and tendencies. All we know of causes (external to 
our own minds) is by their effects, and by their effects 
we know some of their tendencies. Common sense, 
too, decides that the invariable, inseparable tendencies 
of any thing, in all its circumstances, belong to its na- 
ture. Therefore the designed tendencies of hohness to 
produce, and which invariably do produce, happiness, 
belong to the intrinsic nature of holiness. These ten- 
dencies are elements essential to constitute holiness 
what it is. For illustration : the tendency of an ox to 
feed on grass belongs to his nature. The tendency 
of a lion to feed on flesh belongs to his nature. Fii*e 
burns, and powder explodes. It is their nature, in ap- 
propriate circumstances, to do so. Not one of these 



154 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 131. 

tendencies, in the same circumstances, can be changed 
without changing the nature of the subject to which it 
belongs. The tendency of holiness to produce happi- 
ness may to some extent be thwarted, but can no more 
be changed than the nature of holiness can be. Neither 
can be changed without changing the other. And the 
nature of holiness can no more be changed than ten 
can be made a thousand, or space be annihilated. 

(11.) Without knowing the tendency of holiness to 
promote happiness, we never could know what the na- 
ture of holiness is. 

All our knowledge of the natural and inseparable 
tendencies of things is so much knowledge of their 
nature. Full and complete knowledge of the nature 
of things would be knowledge of all their tendencies. 
That the natural, inseparable tendencies of things be- 
long to their nature, seems to be the necessary and only 
consistent conclusion. To suppose the contrary, would 
be to suppose that their natural tendencies were not 
natural. 

" By their fruits [i. e. the effects which they produce] 
ye shall know them." By their fruits you may know 
the designed tendencies of their acts, and therefore the 
nature of their acts and designs, and of course their 
moral character. 

If the nature of things were to be changed, their ten- 
dencies would of necessity be changed also. If their 
tendencies, in given circumstances, were changed, their 
natures would be changed also. It is inconceivable, 
while the nature and relations of moral beings shall 
remain what they now are, that the nature of benevo- 
lence should be so changed as not to be productive of 
happiness. 

Thus it is proved that the supposition truly acted 



Quest. 131.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 155 

Upon, that holy action should have no tendency to pro- 
duce happiness, would take away from the mind for 
performing such action all possible motive, internal and 
external, subjective and objective, selfish or benevolent, 
gaining good for ourselves or others, present or future ; 
so that no desire can be either excited or gratified, and 
no object can be gained, no good be done, by forming 
the intention, by making the choice, nor by executing 
it, and therefore aU possibility of performing a virtuous 
act by tills supposition would be taken away, and with 
it all moral obhgation. 

That view of virtue, which would make it an impos- 
sibility/, and which if it were possible would make it a 
worthless thing to all the universe, cannot be true. 

If, then, virtue be a reality, if it be any thing in dis- 
tinction from nothing, efficacious tendency to produce 
happiness must belong to its essential nature. 

In coincidence with the above views we quote the 
following : 

" Moral evil is in itself, or in its own nature, odious, 
and the proper object of disapprobation and abhorrence. 
By its own nature I mean its [tendency to evil, the 
dishonor of the Deity, and the misery or diminution 
of the happiness of the created system." ..." The 
[essence of moral evil is, that it [tends to impair the 
good and happiness of the universe ; in that the odi- 
ousness of sin or of moral evil consists." ..." Moral 
evil is a voluntary act impairing the general good con- 
sisting in the glory of God and the happiness of the 
created system." — Dr. Edwards, vol. i. pp. 38, 43, 138. 

Notice here that moral evil is the opposite of moral 
goodness. 

" The Supreme Being designed from eternity to pro- 
mote his own fehcity in giving existence and happiness 



156 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 132. 

to his creatures." " God is love, and his goodness con- 
sists in love." ..." The perfect goodness of God must 
move him to make the intelligent universe as holy and 
[happy as [to him is] possible." " The moral law . . . 
which is founded in the nature of things, requires men 
to love and seek holiness and happiness for themselves 
and others. And it requires them to love and seek the 
. . . blessedness of God." — Emmons, vol. vi. p. 440; 
vol. iv. pp. 212, 213, 532. 

" The worth of virtue . . . consists in its usefulness 
to the public interest ; and the hatefulness of vice in its 
being detrimental to the general good and happiness." 
— Dr. Edwards, vol. ii. p. 462. 

132. What answer may be given to the claim, * that 
the nature of virtue is entirely distinct from all its ten- 
dencies and consequences ? ' * 

In opposition to the conclusion that tendency to pro- 
duce happiness is an essential element in the nature of 
virtue, it is maintained that virtue is not founded on 
any tendency to produce happiness, not the hig-hest hap- 
piness of the ag-ent, not even the highest happiness of 
all created beings and the Creator united. It is even 
maintained of late that the nature of virtue is distinct 
from all its tendencies and consequences, of whatever 
description,! that " the nature of benevolence is one 
thing, and its tendency another." J 

As this point is of fundamental importance, and as 
error here is logically adapted to lead to the subversion 
of aU foundation of moral obligation, notwithstanding 
the repetition, we judge it important to present the 

* See Prof. Haven on the Moral Faculty, Bib. Sac. 1856, p. 2G3, 
and bis Mor. Pliilos. p. 49. 
t See Bib. Sac. 1853, pp. 720, 721, 733. 
X Dr. Emmons, vol. iv. p. 226. 



Quest. 132.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 157 

subject in several attitudes and bearings, in connection 
with the following views : 

(1.) It may be conceded that virtuous acts may have 
unintended, unforeseen, and therefore incidental ten- 
dencies to produce happiness, which happiness, of 
course, was not intended, — tendencies which are super- 
induced on the acts, without power on the part of the 
agents to promote or prevent them, and that these ten- 
dencies, whether they exist or not, are not essential to 
the nature of hoHness ; e. g. a secret prayer may be 
overheard, and thus it may awaken and convict a sin- 
ner and lead him to repentance and faith in Christ, and 
in this way this prayer may have an undesigned, un- 
thought-of, and efficacious tendency to secure for him 
everlasting blessedness. 

In many ways right acts may have accidental, conse- 
quential tendencies to good and happiness, which their 
agents never designed or even thought of. But such 
accidental tendencies as are without any reason to be 
expected, constitute no element in the moral nature of 
those acts. These tendencies may be regarded as con- 
stituting an accidental, but not the moral goodness of 
those acts, because this goodness does not necessarily 
even depend upon their being right. The virtuousness 
of an act consists in its being an aim to secure^ or to 
accomplish, and therefore necessarily consists in the 
natural and proper tendency of that act as an aim, to 
secure a foreseen result. 

(2.) In answering the present question, it may be 
important here to consider by what reasons (in addition 
to those noticed in q. 85) some have been induced to 
believe and to advance the doctrine, that no tendency 
whatever to produce or promote happiness belongs as 
an essential element in the nature of virtue. 
14 



158 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 132. 

(i.) One of the reasons assigned to prove the doc- 
trine that no tendency whatever to promote happiness 
belongs to the nature of virtue is, that to determine the 
question of tendency would require so much calcula- 
tion. 

For an answer to this argument see q. 146. 

(ii.) Another argument alleged in proof of this point 
is, that the idea of right is a simple idea. In answer to 
this see qs. 236-241, and 133. 

(iii.) The dogma that sin, in all cases in which it 
occurs, is the necessary means of the greatest good, has 
by many been regarded as a cardinal point in their sys- 
tem of doctrine, and as the basis of a fundamental 
argument in proof of the goodness of God in the per- 
mission of sin. If sin were the necessary means of 
the greatest good and happiness of the universe as a 
whole, then sin would have a necessary and efficacious 
tendency to promote that good of which it were the 
necessary means, and holiness in its place must have an 
efficacious tendency to prevent that good and happi- 
ness. And, then, the tendency of holiness in all such 
cases would be to prevent happiness, and, of course, to 
promote misery (which is contrary to the true and gen- 
erally conceded nature of holiness), and the tendency 
of sin, also, in all the cases in which it were the neces- 
sary means of the greatest good and happiness, would 
be to promote happiness, which is also contrary to the 
known nature of sin. Hence the necessity of suppos- 
ing that the tendencies of both holiness and sin are 
distinct from their moral nature ; and that their tenden- 
cies may be changed without changing their natures. 

Since the dogma, that sin is the necessary means of 
the greatest good, is now extensively, and for the above 
reasons ought to be universally repudiated, the argument 



Quest. 132.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 159 

derived fi*om it against the principle, " that tendency to 
happiness is an element of holiness^^ appears to be en- 
tirely without foundation. K tendency to happiness is 
essential to the nature of holiness, and tendency to 
misery is essential to the nature of sin, then sin is not^ 
but holiness is^ the necessary means of the greatest 
good, and therefore the less sin and the more holiness 
the better.* 

(iv.) That holy actions so often do not have a ten- 
dency adequate to produce all the happiness designed 
and sought by their agents in those actions, because 
they endeavored to promote happiness which was not 
in their power, may have been a reason with some for 
supposing that tendency to happiness is not essential to 
the nature of holiness. 

The holiness of such acts may be evident, notwith- 
standing they have not a tendency of sufficient efficacy 
to produce all the happiness designed. This want of 
sufficient tendency does not destroy the moral ex- 
cellence of those actions. Nor does it show them to be 
without any tendency to produce designed happiness, 
nor without a sufficient tendency to produce all the 
happiness in their agent's power. 

That these facts do not interfere with our doctrine, 
may be seen by these two considerations. First. No 
man is under obligation to effect what he knows his 
best efforts w^ould fail to accomplish, nor to try to do 
what the best acts which he can perform are known to 
have no tendency to accomplish. Secondly. The acts 
in question have an efficacious tendency to promote 
happiness to some extent, and that the greatest possible 
to the agents, if not all that was desired and pm-posed. 

* See Note D, where tliese points are further discussed. 



160 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 132. 

When perfectly holy actions are put forth, they always 
do have a tendency to accomplish all that good which 
the author knows to be in his power, or which actually 
is in his power to promote by those actions. 

(3.) In proof that tendency to produce the happiness 
of the agent is an element essential to the nature of 
holiness, and essential to the foundation of moral obli- 
gation, and that virtue is not independent of its tenden- 
cies and consequences, let us observe. 

Those tendencies of holiness, which are essential to 
the possibility of moral action, and of course to the 
possibility of holy action, without which holiness could 
not exist from any cause whatever, must belong to its 
intrinsic nature. (To express the same idea in shorter 
phrase. That tendency of holiness without which holi- 
ness cannot be, must be a property of holiness itself.) 
(Comp. 108 and 129.) 

That instinctive, constitutional love of happiness 
which subjectively prompts us to all voluntary acts, 
right or wrong, itself of logical necessity cannot be volun- 
tary, unless there can be one volition before the first ; 
and therefore, it is and must be the involuntary desire 
of happiness, which results by necessity from the cre- 
ated nature of every human soul, and of course cannot 
have any moral character : now therefore (as has b^en 
fully shown in the preceding discussion), if happiness, 
in point of time and in the invariable order of pursuit, 
is the only possible ultimate object of desire and of 
voluntary action, then this constitutional love or desire 
of happiness (as has also been shown q. 58, § 10), 
comprehends all, and is therefore the only possible, sub- 
jective motive for all voluntary action of the mind both 
right and wrong, without which no voluntary action is 
possible, and hence, this desire is prerequisite to all 



Quest. 132.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 161 

moral character. From this it follows that all choice 
is to be happy, and therefore, it is inconceivable that a 
moral agent should choose any object for any motive 
not comprehended in the real or supposed tendency of 
that object, and the supposed tendency of the choice of 
that object, to gTatify his desire of happiness ; and then, 
it appears to a moral demonstration, that tendency to 
produce the happiness of the agent inevitably belongs 
to the intrinsic, essential nature of a virtuous and right 
act, because without such a tendency a right act would 
be an absolute impossibility ; and then, there would be 
no foundation for obligation to perform it. In this 
sense it is that the tendency of a right act to the happi- 
ness of the agent is essential to the existence of obli- 
gation. 

(4.) That it is consistent with holiness to act under 
the influence of the tendency of holy action to promote 
the happiness of the agent, is evident from the facts, the 
precepts and promises recorded in the Holy Scriptures. 

Moses acted under the influence of this kind of ten- 
dency, when " choosing rather to suffer affliction with 
the people of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin 
for a season : . . . for he had respect unto the recom- 
pense of reward." Christ also did the same, when " for 
the joy that was set before him he endured the cross, 
despising the shame." — Heb. 11 : 25. 12 : 22. 

John, the revelator, ascribes the same motive to God, 
when he says, " Thou hast created aU things, and for 
thy pleasure they [are^ and were created." — Rev. 4: 11. 

" To them who by patient continuance in well-doing 
seek for glory and honor and immortality ; eternal life." 
— Rom. 2:7. 

If holiness is now what it was in both the Old and 
New Testament times, we may safely infer, that while 
14* 



162 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 132. 

holiness requires us to labor for the highest general good 
and happiness, as the ultimate objective object of all 
our moral action, it also requires us to labor for our 
own highest good and happiness as the ultimate sub- 
jective object, in all our responsible action. And while 
holiness requires us to seek earnestly to secure for our- 
selves treasures in heaven, — Matt. 6 : 20, — or which is the 
same thing, to labor for our own highest eternal good in 
all we do, the very nature and constitution of our being 
makes it absolutely necessary (if we do so, or do 
not), that the desire of our own happiness should be 
the primary subjective motive, and that our happiness 
itself should be the ultimate subjective object, of all 
possible labor ; and therefore of all holy labor. 

Again : If our spirits are created in the spiritual or 
intellectual image of the Creating Spirit, and if the holi- 
ness of our spirits constitutes in us the moral image of 
the Divine Spirit, then we may safely infer, that while 
our own pleasure must be the ultimate subjective object 
in all our voluntary action, the greatest general good 
possible to us must be our ultimate objective object in 
all right action. 

(5.) In confirmation of the sentiment that tendency to 
promote the general welfare is an essential element in 
the nature of virtue, and that this tendency is essential 
to the foundation of moral obhgation for moral agents 
to promote the general weU-being, let us observe again : 

Among the ablest writers on the nature of virtue it 
is agreed that universal, impartial benevolence, which 
consists in aiming to promote the greatest and most 
valuable amount of general happiness, is right, because 
it aims to secure that result : " for what a man aims at, 
he must foresee and will." 

Is it possible so to aim at an object, as to act inde- 



Quest. 133.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 163 

pendently of all the tendencies of the aim, and of all the 
consequences to be produced by it ? To ask this ques- 
tion is to answer it. We submit whether it be possible 
to aim at, foresee and will a result, when we fully be- 
lieve and know that our action wiU have no possible 
tendency to promote, in any degree, that result, any 
more than it would be possible for a man in his senses 
seriously to purpose to bring gold from the moon, or 
from one of the fixed stars; even though he knew 
that the moon and stars were all made up of golden 
eagles. 

If, in such a case, to aim at any object would be im- 
possible for the want of a possible motive, then that 
benevolence, which should consist in aiming at the 
general good and happiness, and should be known to 
have no tendency to promote it, would be rationally im- 
possible ; or if any should claim it to be possible, even 
then, it could be nothing but perfect foUy. For these 
reasons, tendency to promote general happiness is es- 
sential to the nature of holy benevolence, and for the 
same reasons this tendency is essential to the founda- 
tion of obHgation to exercise general benevolence. 
Tendency to produce happiness, then, constitutes one 
essential element in the intrinsic nature of virtue. 

" There is not a plainer truth in morals, than that 
virtue or moral excellence is founded in its tendency to 
good." — Dr. Nathaniel Wm. Taylor, quoted from the 
A. T. R., 1859, p. 895. 

To view these points in a still different attitude, let 
us look at them in the light of the following ques- 
tion : — 

133. Is it possible to conceive of a right act (while 
conceiving of right as a simple, in distinction from a 
complex idea), which can be performed for no other 



164 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 133. 

actual reason than that the act is right, and as such, 
entirely separated from all its relations to happiness ? 

According to the supposition, no other reason is to 
be conceived by the agent why the act is to be done, 
but the single conception it ought, separated from aU 
conception and desire of happiness, and from all desire. 
By the supposition, the action must not be a desiga to 
promote happiness, — it must not be to please God, nor 
to do good to any creature, nor to supply any want, nor 
to relieve the distress of any living thing of God's crea- 
tion, — it must not be to obtain pleasure of any kind ; 
not even that which arises from the approbation of one's 
own conscience, nor from the approbation of God, nor 
from that of any other being, nor from any other source. 
It must not be to gratify any desire whatever, because 
acting to gratify desire would be acting to gain happi- 
ness. Now, it seems to me that no such act can be 
performed, nor can such an act be even rationally con- 
ceived of as right and obligatory, just as surely as that 
desire is the primary, subjective motive of all possible 
voluntary action (not to insist that happiness is the 
only ultimate object and end of all such desire and ac- 
tion). 

The reason for the act in question, is to be a purely 
simple idea, abstracted from every element but the un- 
compounded element of oug-ht (if there be any such 
idea). All idea of interest, profit, advantage, gratifica- 
tion, pleasure, and agreeableness of every kind, both to 
the agent and aU other beings, is to be excluded from 
the mind, as constituting any part of the reason or 
motive for performing said act. No kind of gratifica- 
tion of any kind of desire, not even of the desire to do 
a right act, must form any part of the object, because 
gratification of any desire of the agent, or of any other 



Quest. 133.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 165 

being, would be pleasure, which is to be excluded from 
being any part of the object. 

To form the conception of an act as nearly like the 
act above supposed as possible ; let us suppose that you 
owe a dollar to a man of immense wealth, so great that 
it is a real and acknowledged trouble to him, he does 
not know you owe him, and no being on earth besides 
yourself knows it ; so that no disappointment, and no 
injury of any kind from your not paying the debt, nor 
benefit from paying it, shall arise to him, — suppose 
every thing that you can, which would be true in such 
a case, still conscience will demand that you pay the 
debt if you are able. If you refuse to pay the debt, 
conscience will tell you of a law violated and dishon- 
ored, which ought to be sustained for the protection of 
the rights and interests of all the coming generations of 
men, and of all the vast interests of Jehovah's eternal 
kingdom. 

If you refuse to pay it, conscience will fill you with 
the painful feelings of shame and remorse ; but if you 
pay it to please God, and to sustain his law and au- 
thority, and thus to promote the general welfare, and to 
satisfy your own desire for peace of conscience, then 
conscience will give you the delightful feeHngs of self- 
approbation, and a consciousness that you have the 
approbation of God. 

Put yourself, then, if it be possible, in a state of indif- 
ference in regard to aU the considerations of utility, 
and of aU conceivable pleasure, of every kind and 
degree, and of all beings, and then you may rest as- 
sured you cannot pay that debt, or do any other con- 
ceivable act, simply and only because it is right .^ for you 
have set at nought aU the considerations which make it 
right or even possible. 



166 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 133. 

Let US suppose, now, that you set up the claim that 
you have performed a right act, and performed it for 
the pure, simple idea, or reason that it was a virtuous 
and right act, to the exclusion of all possible utility or 
beneficial consequences of that act, as constituting any 
part of the object of that act, or of the reason why you 
performed it. 

All the reasoning which you could employ to prove 
it right, would be reasoning in a ckcle, with no place to 
begin and nowhere to end. The supposition of a right 
act performed for the simple and only reason that it is 
right, aside from all its relations to happiness, implies 
that the supposed act is right on account of its being 
performed from a love of right, without any regard to 
any happiness of any being, and then that right which 
is loved must be the love of right, involving the ab- 
surdity of an endless series. " Unless the general hap- 
piness be finally regarded in holy choice, the definition 
will involve us in an infinite series of repetitions ; so far 
forth, likewise, as holiness is in the last resort the love 
of hofiness, just so far forth are we involved in an end- 
less circle." — Bibliotheca Sacra, 1853, p. 756. 

You cannot say that you have paid the debt for the 
sake of doing good to any individual, nor to the public, 
taken collectively; for, doing good implies promoting 
the happiness of those for whom the good is done. To 
say that you have paid the debt for the sake of doing 
right, would imply that you have done it for the pleas- 
ure which arises from doing right at the time of doing 
it, or in the future, or both. In saying this you would 
concede the point in debate. 

Not to insist on this, what is the right for the sake 
of which you did the deed ? A right act, which does 
not have happiness for its ultimate object, must termi- 



Quest. 133.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 167 

nate nowhere but in itself, like a circle, or like the end- 
less chain of a chain pump, or in an endless series, like 
that just pointed out, and also more fuUy in the first 
chapter of Edwards's treatise on the Nature of Virtue. 

To bring this point fairly to a full and final decision, 
let it be observed, in regard to objects of choice, that 
one of the two following things must be true, — 

Either, first, any thing to be an object of choice, must 
be some degree of pleasure, or something which is 
esteemed to be either immediately in itself, or in its 
consequences a source of pleasure, so as to excite a 
desire for it; or, in the second place, that object of 
choice must be such an object as can be chosen, when 
the mind is perfectly indifferent towards it, and has no 
desire for it, so that the supposed object is no more 
suited to give a person pleasure than any other ob- 
ject is. 

K the consciousness and common sense of mankind 
are any criterion of truth, the first and only the first of 
these statements can be true. 

Here the whole matter is reduced to this dilemma, 
either to regard right as a source of pleasure, and prac- 
tice it accordingly, or, on the other hand, to regard it 
with indifference and treat it accordingly. Who can 
doubt which way is true and right ? 

No act performed in a state of indifference to the 
right can be done because it is right. The supposition 
involves a contradiction. No act done without the pur- 
pose of doing any good, and with no intention of afford- 
ing any pleasure to any being in the universe, can be 
right, and therefore such an act cannot be done because 
it is right. But if common sense or unperverted reason 
is no criterion of truth, and if the second of these state- 
ments in this dilemma is true (which it cannot be, un- 



168 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 133. 

less a man can do an act without any desire of gaining 
or promoting happiness for himself or for others, be- 
cause such an act is right), then it follows that pleasure 
and pain, and our desires to enjoy the one and shun the 
other, are 'primarily the consequences of and depend en- 
tirely on our will and choice. And then our will and 
choice must precede all pleasure and pain and desire, 
instead of these latter feelings being the prerequisites 
of all conceivable action of the will, — instead of being 
preceded by some agreeable emotion, which may excite 
desire for more pleasure, and thus be a motive for moral 
action. 

If man has such a power, as that pleasure and pain 
thus depend on will and choice, then who can say that 
it is not " entirely in a man's power, and depends en- 
tirely on his own will, to render Nebuchadnezzar's fur- 
nace more pleasant than a bed of down perfumed with 
roses." — Dr. Edwards. 

When man has such power, and not till then, he may 
do acts called right, while perfectly indifferent towards 
righteousness, and with no desire to do good, or even 
to perform a right act. But even then, it would be im- 
possible to conceive that such actions would be holy or 
moral actions at all, or that he had done them because 
they were right. 

But if the first part of this dilemma is true, then de- 
sire of happiness is prerequisite as a motive, and essen- 
tial to the possibility of any and all holy actions ; and 
a right action, in order to be possible, must be so suited 
to our sensibilities as to give us some agreeable emo- 
tion, in view of right action, which will excite a desire 
for that happiness which right action affords. 

From the points established in the above reasoning, 
it appears impossible to avoid the conclusion, that the 



Quest. 134.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 169 

Rightarian and Independent theories of morals are des- 
titute of any solid foundation. 

Here let an appeal be made to the reader's conscious- 
ness. Suppose there is some act of self-denial which 
you feel under moral obligation to do. Is there nothing 
immediately pleasant in itself, nor in its consequences, 
in the idea of righteously fulfilling your obligation, so 
that you can enjoy the peace and approval of your 
own conscience, and of aU holy beings, and of aU other 
rational beings besides ? 

Finally, a right act cannot be conceived of, which 
should be done without the intention of doing any 
good, or of promoting the pleasure of any being in the 
universe. No such act can be done, and it would not 
be right if it could. 

If you stiU are not satisfied that the agent's pleasure 
must be the ultimate subjective object of all his holy or 
benevolent action, consider the following question : — 

134. Why cannot a moral agent make the happiness 
of others as fully^ and in the same sense, the ultimate 
object of his desires and voluntary exertions, as he can 
his own pleasure or happiness ? 

(1.) Because the constitution and nature of his men- 
tal powers and susceptibilities render it impossible. 

(2.) Because, in the nature of things, it is impossible 
that a rational agent should make that an ultimate ob- 
jective object of desire, choice, or effort, towards which 
he is indifferent, and for which he has no desire ; for that 
would be to desire without desiring, and to choose with- 
out a motive or any reason for choosing, which is absurd. 

(3.) Because it is impossible to have either any de- 
sire or love, whether it be voluntary or involuntary love, 
for an object which does not, when properly contem- 
plated, first awaken in the mind some emotion of pleas- 
15 



170 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 134. 

ure, and then a desire for the continuance or increase 
of that pleasure ; and because, to obtain or accomplish 
the object of our desire or love is to gratify that desire 
or love, which gratification constitutes the agent's hap- 
piness, and therefore must be the ultimate subjective ob- 
ject of all his doings. 

An object must first be regarded as a source of hap- 
piness to the mind, before it can desire or love that 
object. A person cannot first love an object that is not 
a source of pleasure to him, and thus make it an object 
of delight and a source of pleasure. The order of na- 
ture is, in fact, the reverse of this. 

(4.) Again : That nothing can be to a rational agent 
an ultimate objective object which is not supposed to 
have a tendency to secure, as the ultimate subjective 
object of that agent, his own happiness, is decisively 
shown in the statements which follow. 

" Now if there be something which God seeks as 
agreeable or grateful to him, then, in the accomplish- 
ment of it, he is gTatified. If the last end which he 
seeks in the creation of the world be a thing truly grate- 
ful to him (as certainly it is, if it be truly his end and 
truly the object of his will), then it is what he takes a 
real delight and pleasure in." 

" And if there be any such thing at all as what we 
mean by acts of will in God, then he is not indifferent 
whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not 
indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the 
fulfilment of his will ; or, which is the same thing, he 
has a pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in 
attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to 
his happiness. That in which God's delight or pleas- 
ure in any measure consists, his happiness in some 
measure consists." 



Quest. 134.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 171 

" Whatever is God's last end, ... is that which he 
truly delights in." — Last End, chap. 1, § 4. 

This reasoning is just as applicable to the human as 
to the Divine mind. 

Dr. Paley's definition of virtue is this : " Virtue is 
doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of 
God, for the sake of [one's] everlasting happiness." 
We think this definition not sufficiently comprehen- 
sive. It does not go deep enough to find the founda- 
tion of obligation. It is too shallow, in not finding 
this foundation in the power of promoting happiness 
according to the eternal, unoriginated rule of right, 
conformity to which constitutes the holiness of God. 
God's will is based upon right, instead of being the 
foundation of right. It is too narrow in its objects^ — 
doing good to mankind^ — whereas it should be to do 
good to all sentient beings as we have opportunity. 

The definition is too limited in its motives^ — "/or 
tlie sake of [one^s own] everlasting happiness^^^ — whereas 
the motives, subjective and objective, should be for the 
sake of all the good results which we can produce by 
holy action in pleasing and glorifying God, and in all 
the happiness which we can promote for ourselves and 
others in time and in eternity. 

That the proper tendency of moral acts belongs to 
their nature, in the opinion of President Edwards, ac- 
cording to the judgment of his son, Dr. Edwards, we 
have already seen (q. 121, § 4). And now the reader's 
attention is invited to the very explicit and convincing 
statements which the son has made of his own views. 

" The true ground of accountableness and of praise 
and blame, is . . . the nature, moral aspect, and ten- 
dency of [our] volitions, and of the actions which flow 
from them." 



:X7^ NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 134. 

" The true ground of [reward and punishment] seems 
to be this, that a rational, voluntary action [tends to 
good or to evil. When a man, in the exercise of his 
reason, voluntarily and designedly performs an action 
which [tends in its nature to the general good, or to 
good on the whole, with a design to do good, he is re- 
wardable. And, on the other hand, when in the exer- 
cise of his reason, he voluntarily performs an action 
which [tends^ and which he knows, or might know tends 
to the general detriment, or to evil on the whole, he is 
punishable." — Vol. ii. p. 358. 

" The worth of virtue . . . consists in its usefulness 
to the public interest ; and the hatefulness of vice, in 
its being detrimental to the general good and happi- 
ness." — p. 462. 

" I will now propose what I believe to be the true 
foundation of moral obligation, or of obligation to vir- 
tue. It is the [tendency of virtue to happiness, — 
happiness on the large scale, or happiness to the intel- 
lectual system, and the happiness of every individual 
being whose happiness is not inconsistent with that of 
the system. Thus I am obligated to love my fellow 
men, because that love [tends to their happiness, and to 
the happiness of the intellectual system." — p. 541. 

" It has been the opinion of the wisest men, in all 
ages, that this principle of regard to our good upon the 
whole, in a man duly enlightened, leads to the practice 
of every virtue." We have already quoted a similar 
opinion from Bishop Butler. 

" Wc ought to prefer a greater good, though a more 
distant, to a less ; and a less evil to a greater." 

" We have observed before, that ancient moralists, 
and many among the moderns, have deduced the whole 
of morals from this principle, and that when we make 



Quest. 135.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 173 

a right estimate of goods and evils according to their 
degree, their dignity, their duration, and according as 
they are more or less in our power, it leads to the prac- 
tice of every virtue.'* 

This principle " has this peculiar advantage, that its 
force is felt by the most ignorant, and even the most 
abandoned." 

" If a man can be induced to do his duty from a 
regard to his own happiness, he will soon find reason to 
love virtue for its own sake." 

" In the present state of human nature these [motives] 
are not useless to the best, and they are the only means 
left of reclaiming the abandoned." * 

" Choose that which is most useful^ and custom will 
make it most agreeable,'^ A beautiful saying of some 
author. 

135. Again : Is it conceivable that all productiveness 
of happiness should be separated from the nature of 
benevolence ? 

Wherever perfect benevolence is, there is productive- 
ness of higher, greater, more excellent and valuable 
happiness, than that which any thing else in its place 
would or could produce. And wherever the most de- 
sirable happiness exists, which can be produced by 
internal, voluntary action, it is the production of be- 
nevolence. Neither of these phenomena (in the sense 
above expressed), exists apart from the other. Perfect 
benevolence and productiveness of highest happiness 
go together. Therefore tendency to, and productiveness 
of, happiness belongs to the nature of benevolence. 

Should the objector still ask, — 

* Eeid's Works, vol. ili. pp. 141, 240, 241. See the Appendix, Note 
E, for a furtker discussion of the points considered in this chapter. 

15* 



174 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 136. 

136. May there not be intelligent, voluntary acts 
which tend to produce highest happiness, but which 
are not holy ? 

We answer : There can be no such acts as tend to 
produce highest happiness, unless they are designed to 
promote highest happiness, and if they are so designed, 
they are holy ; e. g. Suppose a surgeon, in the exercise 
of perfect benevolence, amputates a limb to save Hfe. 
Or, suppose Jenny Lind exercised perfect benevolence 
when she sung My Redeemer Liveth. In these per- 
formances, a great number of executive volitions are 
employed. And these executive volitions evidently 
tend to the highest happiness in the power of those 
agents. Their designs cannot be executed without 
them. No other acts can be substituted for them which 
will tend to produce an equal amount of happiness. 
They are dictated by the highest intelligence of which 
the agents are capable. Those executive acts are put 
forth in the fulfilment of the best designs which the 
agents can form. They, therefore, produce more hap- 
piness than if they were performed from any other 
design. Holy beings who know of these acts, God, 
angels, and men, are pleased, and they approve. They 
for whose benefit these acts are performed, are made 
more happy than they could be by any other acts which 
the same agents could substitute for them. The agents 
themselves are made more happy by these acts than 
they could be by any other acts which could have been 
substituted for them. Their reason fully approves of 
these acts, and their consciences are satisfied in the 
highest possible degree by all they have done in the 
premises. They have that peculiar satisfaction and 
• }^Y which nothing but an approving conscience can 
give. Suppose these same executive acts to have been 



Quest. 136.1 OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 175 

performed by these agents, but from a selfish instead 
of a benevolent design. In this case They most evi- 
dently could not tend to the same degree of happiness, 
as when performed from a benevolent purpose. They 
could not produce a just approval, nor the consequent 
feeling. 

Now, one thing (and that a most essential thing) is 
wanting to justify an affirmative answer to the question 
under consideration, and that is, to show that such 
executive acts, performed in fulfilment of a benevolent 
design, are not in any sense holy. 

We believe that the common sense of mankind is 
not competent to perceive, that such executive acts do 
not derive a holy character from the benevolent inten- 
tion which they are designed to fulfil. 

" Happiness is the result of hoHness, . . . [and] highest 
happiness is the consequent of holiness only." * This 
is said by an able ^nriter. From it the inference seems 
inevitable, that acts not holy do not tend to produce 
highest happiness. Therefore, we conclude there cannot 
be intelligent, voluntary acts, which tend to produce 
highest happiness, and which are not in some proper 
sense holy. 

It has been said that all language is formed on the 
idea that virtue is not founded on any tendency to pro- 
duce highest amount of happiness. If (as has been 
proved) vii-tue is founded both in the nature and ten- 
dency of an inteUigent aim (the tendency of an act 
being an element of its nature) to produce highest hap- 
piness, then the presumption is very strong that lan- 
guage is not formed on the opposite idea. In proof 
that no language is formed on this idea, see in the 
sequel, q. 198 and onward. 

* Bib. Sac. 1853, p. 732. 



176 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 137. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. DUTY MEASURED BY 

ABILITY. 

137. Why must the virtuous production of happiness 
be intentional? 

(1.) It has before been proved (see q. 62) that all 
moral acts must be voluntary, and for this reason no 
involuntary acts can be virtuous. 

(2.) The promotion of happiness must be voluntary 
and intentional, or it will not and cannot be moral 
goodness. By this is meant not merely that the act by 
which the happiness is produced must be voluntary, but 
that the happiness produced must be intended in the 
act which produces it. If the production of happiness 
were not intentional, it would be mere natural or inci- 
dental goodness, — mere usefulness. Unintended use- 
fulness would no more be moral goodness than the 
goodness of an ox or a horse, or than the utility of 
mioney, or of any other useful object in nature, is moral 
goodness. A voluntary act, although it may be the 
accidental occasion, in some of its relations, of happi- 
ness which was not designed and which constituted no 
part of its object, is no more virtuous than it would be 
if it were not, in any of its relations, the occasion of 
happiness. Suppose a man thrusts a dagger into 
another man's side, intending to murder him, and thus 
opens an abscess and saves his life, he is none the less 
guilty of i;nurder than he would have been if he had 
severed an artery and caused his victim's death, instead 



Quest. 137.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 177 

of saving Ms life and producing undesigned happi- 
ness. 

Again : For illustration, suppose you intend to shoot 
a man, but by accident shoot a tiger just ready to de- 
vour him, and thus save the man's life, which you 
intended to destroy. Your T\dcked act is thus the 
unintended, accidental occasion of a good result, but 
it is none the less wicked on account of the happiness 
produced, because no such result was intended. 

Mere voluntary, unintended, accidental production of 
happiness, especially if it could not be foreseen, how- 
ever great it may be, and however voluntary the act 
may be by w^hich it is produced, is not virtue. Mere 
useful tendency is not virtue. IMere usefulness is not 
virtue. K it were, not only the ox would be virtuous, 
but the food which he eats, and the cart and plow 
which he draws, would be virtuous, and the sun would 
be more virtuous still. 

If mere utihty were virtue, then whatever is useful 
would be virtuous, but many more things are useful 
than are virtuous. 

It has been truly said, that " the love of the general 
happiness . . . does not derive its goodness [merely 
from its being the means of the general happiness." 
Not^^^.thstanding this, it may be true, as we claim to 
have proved, that this " love " does derive its goodness 
from its being the intentional production of happiness — 
not merely from being the means of general happiness, 
but from being the intentional means of that happiness. 
In the language of Dr. Hopkins, President of WiUiams 
College, " Goodness is the intentional production of 
happiness." — Essays and Discourses, p. 35. 

'' There is no ultimate good but happiness." " The 
excellence of virtue consists wholly in this : that it is 
the cause of good ; i. e. of happiness, the ultimate 



178 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 138. 

good, the only good for which virtue is valuable. Its 
excellence consists in this, that it is the [volunta/ry 
cause of happiness." — Dwight's Theology; on the 
Nature of Virtue. 

" Duty and right are brothers. Their common mo- 
ther is [liherty,^^ " What makes the good and evil of 
an action is not the action itself, but the [intention that 
has determined it." — Cousin on The True, Beautiful, 
and Good, pp. 237, 244. 

" I only wish to establish that happiness is one thing 
and virtue another, that man necessarily aspires after 
happiness, but that he is only obligated to virtue." — 
Ibid. p. 243. "Virtue I know lies in the intent." — 
Seneca, 

" We regard the will as the seat of all virtue and 
vice." " There can be neither virtue nor vice where 
there is no exercise of the will." — Prof. James M' Cosh 
on Divine Government, pp. 299, 300. 

138. What is meant when it is said that benevolence 
should be supreme, impartial, and universal ? 

By supreme benevolence is meant, that benevolence 
which regards the greatest general good more than any 
other and less good, especially if the less good be op- 
posed to, and inconsistent with, the greater general 
good. Supreme benevolence regards the supreme good 
as such ; it is a supreme regard to the supreme good. 
(Comp. q. 118.) 

Impartial benevolence is a due, proper, and propor- 
tionate regard to the happiness, interests, and rights of 
all individuals, according to the best practicable estima- 
tion of their worth and real value. Impartial benevo- 
lence forbids the sacrifice of the greater good to the 
less. 

Love must be impartial in order to be benevolent, 
and to be impartial it must be a preference of the 



Quest. 138.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 179 

greater good of the whole to the less good of any part, 
however small or however large that part may be. 

Benevolence to different beings to be impartial, must 
be according to our best judgment and knowledge of, 
and a due and proportionate regard to, the different 
kinds and degrees of happiness which different beings are 
capable of enjoying, and to their different faculties for 
promoting happiness. A moral being, who regards and 
loves the different objects of love as best he can, ac- 
cording to their real value, exercises impartial benevo- 
lence, and of com'se he will love the greatest good more 
than, and choose to promote it rather than, any less 
and inferior good. 

The different objects which should be thus regarded, 
comprise the different kinds, degrees, means, and causes 
of happiness, and the different capacities and powers 
for enjoying and communicating happiness, which be- 
long to different beings, occupying different ranks in 
the scale of existence. 

On this scale an ox or a horse occupies a rank supe- 
rior to that of an insect or a reptile. A man is superior 
to a brute, one man may be superior to another, an 
angel is superior to a man, and God is infinitely supe- 
rior to all created beings. And therefore impartial 
benevolence would be, as far as is wisely practicable, a 
proportionate regard to the real value of the happiness, 
and to the capacities of different beings. 

As impartial benevolence would lead us to prefer the 
greater to the less good, and, of course, the good of 
the whole to the good of a part, it would lead us also 
to prefer those ways and means and opportunities of 
promoting happiness, in which we could do it to the 
best advantage and in the highest degree. As a gen- 
eral rule, every man can take care of his own welfare 



180 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 139. 

and interests to better advantage than he can the inter- 
ests of any other person. So it is in regard to the 
happiness of his own family, neighborhood, and coun- 
try. 

Impartial is opposed to selfish. Preferring the inter- 
ests and welfare of a part to the general good, whether 
that part include more than self or not, is partiality and 
selfishness. Impartial benevolence would lead a man 
to regard the interests of others according to their value 
as equal to his own, and to place his happiness in the 
promotion of the general good. 

By universal benevolence is meant an impartial re- 
gard for the good of all. Benevolence to be impartial 
must be universal, and to be universal it must be im- 
partial. 

139. What should be meant by disinterested benevo- 
lence ? 

Dmnterested is very liable to be understood as mean- 
ing, but should not be designed to mean, ^^mnterested. 
That it is so liable to be taken in that sense, is some 
objection to its use. The term, if used, should mean, 
and clearly mean, not selfishly, not partially interested. 
Disinterested benevolence, properly speaking, differs in 
nothing from impartial benevolence. 

When we say that love, to be holy, must be volun- 
tary, supreme, impartial, and universal, we really can 
add nothing, but rather detract, by saying it must be 
disinterested. 

140. Why must a virtuous intention to promote the 
general happiness be supreme, impartial, and univer- 
sal? 

It is necessary that love, to be benevolent, should be 
supreme, impartial, and universal, because the good of 
the whole universe of beings is greater, more desirable, 



Quest. 140.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 181 

more valuable, and ought, therefore, more to be sought 
than the good of any part of it. Universal good 
is worth more than partial good. The greater and 
higher good is worth more than any less and lower 
good. To sacrifice the greater for the less is most evi- 
dently >;\T:ong, but for no other reason than because it is 
less. To set up and seek the good of any individual, 
or of any part, instead of, or in opposition to, the good 
of the whole, is to sacrifice the greater general to the 
less and partial good. And further : to seek the good 
of a part, in opposition to the general good, is not only 
to obstruct and hinder the general good, but it is incon- 
sistent with, in opposition to, and destructive of, the 
greatest good of that part whose good is thus unwisely 
sought. K a man, in his selfishness, sets up his own 
happiness as a greater good than the general welfare, 
and seeks it accordingly, he not only opposes the gen- 
eral well-being, but he sacrifices his own highest hap- 
piness, for all coming time, for some partial, temporal 
gratification which, in his selfish folly, he may obtain. 

Therefore, if the intention to promote happiness be 
not impartial and universal benevolence, it cannot be 
fulfilled. The partial, selfish intention subverts its own 
end. The inevitable tendency of its nature is such, 
that, instead of promoting and increasing happiness, it 
not only brings evil to the public, but it brings suffering 
to the agent. 

And therefore, strictly speaking, a partial intention is 
not to promote the general good, nor even to the high- 
est good of the individual or part whose good is sought, 
but generally, if not universally, some lower, present, 
or earthly good, at the expense of the highest temporal 
and eternal good, both of the individual or part, and of 
the whole. 

16 



182 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 141. 

141. Why must the virtuous intention or choice be 
to promote the sum total of general happiness ? 

The intention or choice, in order to be virtuous, must 
be not merely to produce some happiness especially at 
the expense of more, as in the case of selfishness and 
sin, but to promote, to increase the sum of the general 
happiness ; because, unless this be the intention, no 
gain is intended. And if the object of the choice were 
to be accomplished, no good, on the whole, would be 
done. Nothing would be gained. 

In some parts of this treatise, the author has found 
difficulty in expressing what he conceives to be the ex- 
act truth, without implying more than is true. Al- 
though, in some instances, his language may possibly 
seem to imply that there can be no true virtue in a 
man's character when that character is not perfect in 
holiness or entirely free from sin, or that one can per- 
form no part of his duty without performing the whole, 
yet he has not designed to convey this sentiment. He 
fully beheves that the Christian character, as (to say 
the least) it has generally been exhibited, has not been 
entirely free from sin, but far from being so, and of 
course that it has not been perfect in holiness, as it 
ought to be. 

142. Why, to be benevolent, must the generic or su- 
preme purpose of a moral agent be, according to his 
best knowledge, to promote the total sum of the most 
excellent good and happiness, to the greatest extent in 
his power ? Or why, to be benevolent, must a moral 
agent's purpose be to do all the good he can ? 

It is necessary and essential to the benevolent qual- 
ity of the chief purpose of a moral agent, that it should 
be to do all the good he can, — 

(1.) Because the most excellent good is more valua- 



Quest. 142.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 183 

ble, and more to be desired than a less good is ; and 
because the greatest sum of good is more to be desired 
than a less sum is. The same reasons and obligations, 
in kind, which require the production of any good, re- 
quire the promotion of the greatest possible extent of 
good. The same principle of action that would lead a 
man to promote the general happiness, or to do good to 
any extent, would lead him, if consistent, to do good, 
or promote happiness, to the greatest extent known by 
him to be possible. 

(2.) If moral obligation requires the promotion of 
the greater amount or degree of happiness, rather than 
a less, because the greater is more valuable than the 
less, and if it be essential to the virtuousness or benev- 
olence of a choice that it be a choice or purpose of the 
greater good, rather than that which is known to be 
the less (as evidently this must be conceded), then it is 
essential to the virtuousness of the chief and predomi- 
nant purpose of a moral agent that it should be an aim 
to promote the greatest extent of good. K there be a 
mental reservation to commit some sin, now and then, 
as it may happen to be convenient for selfish purposes, 
there cannot be a spuit of true submission and obedi- 
ence to the will of God. 

Unless the law of right be taken as the rule of duty 
without reserve, there is not the beginning of the spirit 
of holy obedience to it. If an intention to disobey in 
one point be reserved, so that only partial obedience is 
intended, the whole purpose is vitiated. Not being a 
purpose of the highest good, it is wanting in an essen- 
tial element of virtue. 

(3.) If the promotion of the absolute good, as such, 
be the object, then, by nothing short of a design to pro- 
duce the greatest amount of that good can that object 



184 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 143. 

be promoted^ because to design less good than the great- 
est known to be in our power, would be to choose the 
less instead of the greater known good, which is sin. 
The same law which requires any good to be done, 
requires the greatest amount of good to be done which 
is possible to the agent. And therefore if the greatest 
amount of good, known by the agent to be possible to 
him, be not designed, there is no design to obey the 
law, and therefore the law is in no degree obeyed. 
Therefore, again, if the generic, or supreme purpose be 
not to promote the greatest known good in one's power, 
it is not true benevolence. It does not begin to partake 
of the benevolent or virtuous quahty. It is not in its 
nature adapted, because it is not designed to promote 
the highest good of aU, and therefore it is not adapted 
to promote the highest good of the individual. 

If the predominant purpose be aU in strength and 
ardor, which the law requires it to be, and if it be to 
promote the greatest sum of the most excellent good, 
then it wiU be adapted in the tendency of its nature to 
secure the highest good of the individual agent as well 
as that of all others. 

143. What is that holiness which is essential to the 
Christian character ? 

It may be proper and useful here to remark, — 

The purpose of the Christian to serve God has com- 
monly been wanting in that strength and ardor which 
is essential to its permanent and full control of the 
specific or particular acts of his Ufe. And yet it ap- 
pears evident from the preceding discussion, that the 
Christian's sincere and honest purpose must be to do 
the will of God in all things, i. e. to do aU the good he 
can. If, like Naaman, the Assyrian general, he reserves 
the intention to practice known sin, saying, " The Lord 



Quest. 144.J OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 185 

pardon thy servant in this thing" (2 Kings, 5 : 18), all 
pretension to a purpose to serve God is in vain. 

It is a most sublime and glorious truth, that a moral 
being is never under moral obligation to renounce, 
forego, or sacrifice his own highest happiness. That 
which produces the highest happiness of the individual, 
tends also to the highest happiness of the universe, 
which is in the individual's power to promote ; and that 
which produces the highest universal happiness, also 
produces the most excellent happiness for the individual, 
for each and all the parts. That which is promotive of 
one is promotive of the other. Production of happiness 
and tendency to produce it, so belong to the intrinsic 
nature of holiness, that the highest possible holiness of 
each and all moral beings in the universe, would pro- 
duce the highest possible happiness of the whole uni- 
verse, and of every individual in it; and nothing else 
can do this. " Happiness is the result of holiness, . . 
[and] the highest happiness is the consequent of holi- 
ness only," That which prevents the highest general 
happiness, will eventually prevent the highest happi- 
ness of each individual, and that which prevents the 
highest happiness of any intelligent being, does now, 
and will forever, to some extent, prevent the highest 
happiness of the universe as a whole. 

144. Why is the best use which we can make of all 
our powers, required in virtuous action ? 

We are required to make the best use of all our 
powers, because the best use which we can make of 
them is necessary, in order that the most excellent 
good, well-being, or happiness, which is in our power, 
may be accomplished. 

145. Why is our duty measured by our ability, so 
that one can neither fall short of, nor exceed the other ? 

16* 



186 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 145. 

(1.) Sound reason, — the conscience and common 
sense of mankind demand that our duty should be 
measured by our ability, so that it cannot exceed nor 
fall short of our ability to perform it, when we make 
the best use that we can of all our powers, because 
(according to q. 109) ability is the foundation of obli- 
gation. 

(2.) Power to know our duty is as essential to its exist- 
ence as power to perform it, because power to know it 
is essential to the power of performing it. If we choose, 
or design to do the greatest good within our knowledge, 
which we have the power to do, so far as we carry out 
such designs, our acts are virtuous. 

(3.) Reason demands that obligation and ability 
should be commensurate, because if our obligations 
should transcend the best use which we can make of 
all our powers, there never could any possible good 
come from its being so, for such obligations never could 
be fulfilled. Such obligations never were and never 
will be complied with. 

This supposition, that duty exceeds ability, would 
confound all moral distinctions, and render it impossible 
to form any consistent ideas of right or wrong, of 
moral character, or of duty. 

Right intentions are phenomena of the will, to which 
a moral agent is required to give existence. K he has 
not the power to will right, he is required to give exist- 
ence to results for which there is no possible cause — 
to exercise power which does not exist, to give exist- 
ence to an action which is to be an action of nothing — 
a phenomenon without a subject ; all which being as 
absurd to suppose as that Hteral effects should be pro- 
duced without a cause, which is impossible, even to 
Omnipotence. 



Quest, 146.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 187 

(4.) Virtue, consisting in the fulfilment of such obli- 
gations, never did exist, and never will, until all dis- 
tinction between truth and error shall cease. Holiness 
is compliance with obligation. If obligation could 
exceed ability in any instance, holiness in all such 
cases would consist in doing impossibilities, and, of 
course, would never, in such cases, exist ; and then sin 
would consist in not doing impossibilities ; and then, too, 
sin would be the universal and inevitable consequence 
of all such obligations whenever they should exist. 
Therefore, obligations which we do not and cannot 
know, or knowing, cannot comply with, cannot be 
binding upon us, and of course cannot to us exist. 
(See note F.) 

146. Does it require more calculation to perceive 
what actions are useful, than to perceive what actions 
are benevolent ? 

It has often been urged as an objection of great 
weight, against the doctrine of benevolent utility^ that it 
requires so much calculation to know what is useful, as 
to make it impracticable in that way to know what 
duty is. (Comp. qs. 5, 125.) 

It has been maintained by some moral philosophers, 
that before we can know what intentions are useful, 
long calculations are necessary, whereas they say we 
decide instinctively and instantaneously that benevolent 
intention is right. 

(1.) It seems to us that we and all the world in 
mature life know, that an intention is useful, just as 
soon as we know that it is benevolent. We never can 
know that an intention is benevolent, until we know 
that it is an intention to promote utihty, or to be use- 
ful, on the largest scale in one's power. To know one 
of these things is to know the other, for they are both 



188 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 146. 

precisely one and the same thing. It is prerequisite to 
our forming a benevolent intention, that we decide the 
accomplishment of some object to be useful. And then 
it appears that we must perceive the accomplishment 
of an object to be useful, before we can form a benev- 
olent intention to accomplish that object. If this be 
not so, then knowledge of duty is not prerequisite to 
the performance of duty, and then it is not essential to 
sin that it be transgression of known law. Which is 
absurd. 

To know what actions are benevolent is to know 
what actions are designed to be useful, because benev- 
olence is itself a design to be useful, and is, therefore, 
the design of utility. The idea of usefulness is a funda- 
mental element in the idea of holiness. If obligations, 
which cannot be known, cannot exist to him who can- 
not know them, then we cannot be under obligation to 
perform certain actions, any further than we can know, 
what actions are adapted to do good, and to be useful. 
One who does not and cannot know that an intention 
to do good is adapted to do good, and to promote hap- 
piness, cannot perceive any obligation for him to form 
such an intention ; for to him there can be no such ob- 
ligation. He who does not and cannot know this, does 
not know moral good from moral evil, and of course he 
does not know what moral obligation is ; and until he 
does, he cannot be under obligation to any duty. Thus 
it appears, that one who does not know, and cannot 
perceive that an intention to do good is adapted, by the 
tendency of its nature, to do good or to promote happi- 
ness, does not know what benevolence is, and, therefore, 
cannot know an act to be benevolent, nor decide it to 
be right and holy. No more calculation, therefore, is 
necessary to know what is morally useful, than is 



Quest. 147.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 189 

necessary to know what actions are benevolent, or to 
know what benevolence is, or than is necessary to know 
what actions are right. To know one of these things is 
to know the others also. 

(2.) Men accomplish various objects by their inten- 
tions. They promote happiness by their intentions to 
promote it. And they know as well, that benevolent 
intentions are adapted and tend to promote happiness, 
as they know that any intentions are adapted and tend 
to promote their objects. And they have better reason 
to know this, because holiness more uniformly pro- 
motes happiness, than other designs secure their ob- 
jects. 

147. How is an act perceived to be benevolent? 

Whatever manifests an intention to be that of pro- 
moting highest happiness, is the evidence of its benev- 
olence. Whatever indicates an intentional tendency in 
any act to promote highest happiness, shows that act to 
be benevolent. So that the benevolence of an intention 
cannot be perceived, without perceiving that it is an 
intention of utility. Men regard an intention to do 
good as doing good, because that is the way and the 
only way in which that which is morally good is done 
or can be done. 

It is believed, that the universal reason of mankind is 
not only competent to perceive, but does perceive, that 
tendency to do good, which belongs to the nature of an 
intention to do good, as plainly as they see the tendency 
of any other intention to accomplish its object. And 
therefore it is, that we decide so readily that benev-i 
olence is right. Hence we come again to the conclusion, 
that no more calculation is necessary to determine the 
utility of a benevolent action, than is necessary to de- 
termine the benevolence of any specified voluntary act. 



190 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 148. 

148. "Why must benevolent love imply and include a, 
purpose to promote highest holiness, as well as highest 
happiness ? 

(1.) Intelligent choice of any thing implies a choice 
of the means known to be necessary for the attainment 
of that thing. Holiness is the necessary means of the 
highest universal well-being. A purpose to promote 
the highest happiness, must, therefore, include the pur- 
pose to promote, to the greatest extent, the necessary 
means of the highest happiness, or which is the same 
thing, to promote holiness to the greatest extent. 

(2.) No man can intelligently intend to promote hap- 
piness to the extent of his ability, without, at the same 
time, intending to promote the means known to be 
necessary for the promotion of the highest happiness in 
his power. If I intend to promote happiness to the 
extent of my ability, to act consistently, I must employ 
the best means of happiness within my knowledge, and 
I must also promote to the extent of my ability the em- 
ployment of those means by others, so that I cannot 
promote happiness to the extent of my ability, without 
promoting the highest amount of holiness in my 
power. 

Since holiness is promotion of highest happiness, it 
follows also that no man can intelligently intend to 
promote holiness, without intending to promote highest 
happiness. 

Happiness is the ultimate object of all voluntary 
action. It is and must be, therefore, the ultimate object 
of all holy action, even when that holy action is im- 
mediately directed to the promotion of holiness. 



Quest. 149.! OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 191 



CHAPTER XII. 

HOLINESS, THAT ACT OF THE WILL WHICH WOULD SECURE 
THE HARMONIOUS OPERATION OP ALL THE MENTAL 
POWERS. 

149. How can it be shown that perfect holiness is 
that exercise of the will, which would secure the har- 
monious cooperation of all the mental powers ? 

All the mental powers are included in the Intellect, 
Sensibility, and Will. The answer to this question 
occupies most of this chapter. 

150. What is the office of the inteUect ? (See q. 40.) 
In the moral economy of our constitution there is the 

power of thought and knowledge, to think and know, 
designated by the terms intellect, understanding, and 
reason. 

Reason is the mind's eye to discover truth and duty, 
— the truth-discerning faculty. Its proper office is to 
think, to investigate truth, to consider and decide upon 
the proper objects of pursuit, to ascertain and point 
out the wisest, most effectual, and enduring means and 
modes of securing individual and general weU-being, 
and to perceive what acts of the will are best adapted 
to produce individual and universal happiness, and in 
this way to ascertain the laws of moral action, and to 
demand of the will obedience to those laws. There- 
fore, in this subordinate sense, the understanding or 
reason may be considered as a lawgiver to the will, — 
the viceroy or vicegerent of God in the soul of man. 
In this office, the Reason is to demand that action of 



192 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 151. 

the will which, in the end, will best satisfy the sensi- 
bility and promote the happiness of the soul. In this 
office of the reason, it is the conscience. The office of 
conscience, in perceiving duty and in demanding its 
performance, is intellectual, which may be regarded as 
its first office. In this office of conscience, it is the 
reason applied to moral subjects, deciding what is right 
and duty, and demanding its performance. 

The first office of conscience is fulfilled in forming 
the decisions of reason as to what are proper objects 
of pursuit, and as to what is right and duty, as well as 
to what is wrong ; and then, with authority to demand 
of the will a prompt, steady, and cheerful obedience, 
and also to reveal, to some extent, the rewards of obe- 
dience and the punishment of disobedience. 

151. What is the office of the sensibility ? (q. 41.) 

As it is the office of the intellect to think, so it is the 
office of the sensibiHty to feel. It feels pleasure and 
pain, joy and sorrow, happiness and misery, sensations, 
emotions, and passions of various kinds. The mind, 
in exercising its sensibility, desires happiness and dreads 
misery. Dread of misery implies a desire to shun it. 

The desires of the sensibility include all possible, 
subjective, internal motives to voluntary action, whether 
good or bad, right or wrong. Without a sensibility, as 
we have before seen (q. 34), there could be no motive, 
neither objective nor subjective, and, of course, without 
a sensibility, there could be neither right action nor 
wrong, for the reason that there could be no voluntary 
action at all. The primary motive power of the soul, 
and all its springs of action, lie, therefore, in the sensi- 
bility. 

In this sense, the sensibility is the prime mover of 
the soul, and its office is to supply the soul with all its 
subjective motives for duty, in its desires for happiness 



Quest. 151.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 193 

and dread of misery, and for the promotion of happi- 
ness in others ; and, of course, by an absolute necessity 
in the nature of the soul, the sensibility supplies mo- 
tives and temptations to commit sin. This it does in 
its blind desires for pleasures (for all its desires are 
blind), — pleasures which are inconsistent with the 
highest happiness and best good of the soul. Here let 
it be remembered that motives to choose cannot have 
an irresistible power to produce a given choice. This 
would be inconsistent with the nature of choice. It is 
not the office of the sensibility to govern, but only to 
offer motives. 

It is not the office of the sensibility to see and judge 
and know, but only to feel. Its desires, therefore, must 
be blind. One of its functions is to supply all the sub- 
jective motives for choice, — not to judge nor to choose 
between them. To judge and choose belong to the 
Reason and Will. Now, if all possible internal motives 
for choice are found in the desires of the sensibility, it 
must of necessity furnish motives for wrong choice, as 
well as right, for where there are no opposing motives, 
there can be no choice between them, right or wrong. 
It belongs to the office of the sensibility, also, to re- 
ceive, treasure up, and retain the rewards of obedience, 
and the penalties of disobedience, to the laws of the 
reason and to the authority of conscience. 

These rewards and penalties and disciplinary chas- 
tisements consist in the happy or unhappy states of the 
sensibility, secured by, or resulting from, the action of 
the will. The sensibility is the seat both of the soul's 
well-being or happiness, and of its misery. The exer- 
cises and feelings of the sensibility, in view of right 
and wrong moral action, are the operations of conscience 
in the sentient office of conscience. 
17 



:194 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 152. 

Conscience has two offices. In its intellectual office, 
as we have seen, it is the reason applying itself to moral 
subjects, distinguishing between right and wrong, per- 
ceiving duty and with authority demanding its per- 
formance, pointing out the good to be promoted by 
duty, and the good to be lost, and the misery to be pro- 
duced by sin, and, in this sense, giving laws to the 
will. In its sentient office, conscience is the sensibility 
experiencing the various feelings which arise in the 
mind from the fulfilment or violation of obligations, — 
the complacent feelings which arise from the approval 
of one's own reason, and from the approbation of all, 
both the good and bad, but especially of aU the holy of 
God's creation and of God himself; experiencing, also, 
the opposite feelings of shame, remorse, and self-con- 
demnation, and those feelings of shame and remorse 
which arise from the condemnation of all rational, cre- 
ated beings, and from the condemnation of the all-wise 
Creator. 

Thus it appears that conscience; in its complex, in- 
tellectual, and sentient office, is God's vicegerent in 
the soul, and, in this subordinate sense, is a lawgiver, 
judge, and the executive officer to the soul, both to 
reward and punish, and to receive rewards and punish- 
ments. 

152. What is the office of the will? (Refer to q. 4, 
§2.) 

The office of the will is to choose between the 
motives found in the desires of the sensibility, — to 
choose which desires shall be, and which shall not be, 
gratified. The will is the right arm of the soul's power 
to do good or evil. Its proper office and duty is to be in 
subjection and to obey the laws of the reason, — to ex- 
ecute the biddings of Conscience. The will is the power 



Quest. 152.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 195 

of the soul to obey or disobey the demands of reason 
and conscience. It is the power which, tempted by the 
desires of the sensibility for the pleasures which con- 
science forbids, can raise a mutiny in the soul and rebel 
against the authority of conscience. 

Will is that power which can keep order in the soul 
by obeying the purest dictates which reason can give 
for the time being, and then by holding the attention to 
careful and earnest inquiries after truth and duty, for 
the purpose of conforming thereto. It can preserve 
that order, and make further progress in knowledge and 
hoHness. 

" I will place within them as a guide 
My umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear, 
Light after light well us'd they shall attain, 
And to the end persisting, safe arrive." 

Milton^ Paradise Lost, book 3, 194. 

The will can and ought to be a dutiful subject, obe- 
dient to the reason and conscience ; but it can be a 
rebel against conscience, and, aided by the feelings and 
desires of the sensibihty, it can, to some extent, blind 
the eye of reason, and then bribe it, and by continu- 
ance in sin, sear and harden the conscience ; and thus, 
at length, carry off the whole soul, with all its powers, 
into the most determined rebellion against truth and 
right. The will can rebel, and then, to some extent, 
control the reason and conscience ; but its duty and 
proper office is to obey them, and by obeying, to aid 
them in the proper discharge of their appropriate func- 
tions. 

When the will freely exercises itself in the full dis- 
charge of its appropriate duties, then reason and con- 
science will fully perform their functions, and point out 



196 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 153. 

the path of wisdom and duty, and make it plain ; the 
sensibility will be filled with peace and joy; and thus 
all the faculties of the soul would be united in accom- 
plishing the great end of being. 

153. From what has been said upon the office of 
the intellect and sensibility, what is the nature and 
office of conscience ? 

From what has been advanced concerning the intel- 
lect and sensibility, it appears that conscience is a com- 
plex faculty, having the complex office of perceiving 
and laying down, with a rightful authority, the rules 
and demands of duty, and of feeling the motives 
which prompt to a compliance with those rules and de- 
mands. 

If conscience is the faculty that perceives duty, it 
must, of course, be supreme among the human faculties. 
Great credit was ascribed to Bishop Butler for discov- 
ering the supremacy of conscience. That conscience 
is supreme is only the self-evident truth, that the de- 
mands of duty ought to be obeyed. (See next q. §§ 6, 
7, 8.) 

154. To recapitulate : What is the substance of 
what has been said as to the harmonious cooperation 
of the powers of the human soul ? 

Of that which has been said of the harmonious oper- 
ation of all the mental powers, this is the sum. 

(1.) The soul of man has three faculties, reason and 
conscience being supreme among the faculties, are to 
act as the vicegerent of God in the soul, and under 
God, the law-giver, to sanction and sustain his laws in 
their supreme authority over the will^ while the will is 
the power to obey or disobey, and to fill the sensibility 
with a fulness of joy or of woe. Reason is the power 
of thought, the mind's eye to perceive truth and dis- 



Quest. 154.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 197 

cover duty, and with authority to demand of the will 
its cheerful performance. 

(2.) The sensibiUty is, in its own nature, the prime 
mover of the soul, containing within itself all the origi- 
nal motives or springs of all voluntary action, both 
right and wrong, prompting the will to choose the 
right, and while on probation by the necessity of its 
own nature tempting to sin, and when the will obeys 
the voice of reason and conscience, which is the voice 
of God, then the sensibility receives and retains for the 
soul a fulness of joy. And then there is a perfect 
harmony reigning throughout all the faculties of the 
mind. 

The demands of reason and conscience are satisfied. 
Conscience, the vicegerent of God, smiles approbation 
while its authority is obeyed. 

(3.) The will obeys the reason, and thus fulfils its 
own proper office with the highest conceivable honor, 
equity, and right. 

And through the sensibility a flood of joy sweeps 
over the soul. Each of the faculties is exercised in 
cooperation and perfect harmony with all the others. 

(4.) That unoriginated principle and law of right, 
which is the obligatory rule and law of all duty and 
righteous action, is the moral constitution of the uni- 
verse. (Refer to q. 8.) 

Under this constitution all the laws of God contained 
in his written revelation were enacted. 

This unoriginated principle, united with the laws of 
the written revelation, forms the moral constitution, in 
accordance with which human reason in its legitimate 
exercise, properly enHghtened, will always agree. 

(5.) The reason of man is not an emperor, with un- 
limited power of arbitrary legislation. It is a lawgiver 
17* 



198 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 154. 

in a subordinate sense, with only limited powers, bound 
by the necessity of its own nature to act under and in 
accordance with the unoriginated principle of right, 
which is developed in the works of nature, in itself, and 
in the precepts and laws of divine revelation. 

For illustration: The people of a state or nation 
adopt a civil constitution as their fundamental law. 
Then they choose a legislature to make specific, partic- 
ular laws under the authority granted by the constitu- 
tion. Of course, the legislature must be guided by the 
constitution in all the laws which it enacts, so as never 
to make a law which the constitution does not author- 
ize, much less a law that contravenes it. 

(6.) The fundamental, moral constitution, under the 
authority of which reason, as a legislator, enlightened 
and guided by divine revelation, in all its legitimate 
doings proceeds, is that eternal, unoriginated, unchange- 
able principle of honor, equity, and right, viz. That 
every moral being ought to promote as much general 
happiness as is in his power. 

The office of reason, guided by revelation, is to per- 
ceive, understand, and apply this eternal principle of 
right, to the moral actions of our lives, — to define 
specific laws, and to show their application to particu- 
lar cases of duty. 

Conscience, in one of its offices, is but another name 
for reason, when reason is employed in perceiving, de- 
ciding, and approving what is right, and in disapprov- 
ing what is wrong. 

(7.) Conscience performs this office according to the 
light it has, by necessity and not by choice. When 
properly enlightened, and not perverted by education or 
habit, and not bribed by the desires and passions of the 
sensibility, nor by the will, it always decides right. By 



Quest. 155.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 199 

necessity conscience decides, and by necessity it exe- 
cutes, and not by will and choice, 

" What, then, is the nature and office of conscience ? 
Her nature ... is intellectual and not cordial. She 
resides in the head and not in the heart. As to her 
office, it is manifold ; for she is director, inspector, re- 
prover, approver, informant, witness, advocate, and 
judge, as the nature of the conduct requires; she 
sometimes divests herself of the office of judge, and 
commences the most intolerable tormentor to the soul." 
— Dr. Samuel Spring on Duty, p. 145. 

(8.) In its complex office it is a complex faculty, 
consisting of reason and sensibility, and as such is, in 
part^ ju.dge of right and wrong and executioner, God's 
vicegerent in the soul, to adjudicate some of the awards 
of righteousness, and to execute some of its judgments, 
in rewards and penalties, in the pleasures of approba- 
tion, which right acts of will produce in the sensibility, 
and in the feelings of self-condemnation, shame, and 
remorse, which are the fruits of sin. 

Thus we see that in the organization which God has 
given us as moral beings, we have reason and con- 
science with the rightful authority to govern the action 
of the will, and to determine the objects of its pursuit, — 
a sensibility to supply us with the needful subjective 
motives, without which it would be impossible for the 
will to act at all, but with which the will has power to 
act, so as to fulfil the claims of reason and conscience, 
and to satisfy the highest aspirations of the sensibility 
after happiness. 

155. In what does the harmonious operation of the 
mental powers consist? 

Now we may see what would be the harmonious 
operation of these, our mental powers. Let each of 



200 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 155. 

the powers and capacities of mind fulfil its own proper 
office, and there will be a most glorious, harmonious, 
and righteous cooperation between them all. 

In the first place, reason will discover by intuition, 
what is right, to some extent, without the aid or choice 
of the will. And when reason has obtained some 
knowledge of duty, the will obeys the demands of 
conscience, follows the light which reason supplies, 
resists the motives which tempt to the commission of 
sin, listens to the voice of reason, and chooses those 
objects which reason decides will, in the best manner, 
and in the highest degree, gratify and satisfy the desires 
of the sensibility, obtain peace of conscience, and the 
approbation of God, and of all the rational beings in 
the universe besides. The sure way to obtain more 
light and knowledge of duty, is to obey what we have. 

In the second place, while obeying present light, the 
will holds the attention of the understanding to the 
most careful and skilful inquiries which it can make, 
after more knowledge of truth and duty. And now, as 
reason shall discover more and more what will best sub- 
serve the highest interests of the soul, and best accom- 
plish the true end of its being, and as conscience puts 
in her claims that the discoveries and decisions of the 
reason must be obeyed, if now the will fulfils its high 
and noble office according to its highest honor and 
dignity, and executes the high behests of reason, con- 
science, and duty, then, — 

In the third place, the sensibilities will be filled with 
a joy that passeth knowledge, and the peace of the 
soul will be like a river, and its righteousness like the 
waves of the sea. 

Holiness, when complete, is thus seen to be that exer- 
cise of the will which would secure the harmonious 



Quest. 155.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 201 

cooperation of all the faculties of the soul, while noth- 
ing else but the right exercise of the will can do this. 
This harmony of the soul includes the end for which 
the soul was made. This, and this alone, fulfils the 
will, — the chief end and aim of God in its creation. 

In this harmonious cooperation of all the faculties of 
the mind, reason and conscience fulfil their proper 
functions, and their demands are aU satisfied. The 
will, with the highest dignity and honor, has done its 
duty, the best desires of the sensibility are fulfilled and 
satisfied with an eternal fullness of joy and peace. 
Thus it is seen that holiness is that exercise of the will 
which would secure the harmonious operations of all 
the mental powers. 

N. B. That principle of action intelligently and vol- 
untarily obeyed, — that exercise of the will which would 
secure the harmonious cooperation of all the faculties 
of one soul, would also secm-e the harmonious coopera- 
tion of all the powers of all the moral beings in the 
universe, — God, angels, and men, would then consent 
to unite in love to the greatest happiness of being in 
general. Then there would be no sin to lament and 
none to punish, and no punishment to be endured. 
And then there would be no hell, and no lost sinners to 
suffer the pains of hell, nor to send up the smoke of 
their torment before a universe of beholders forever and 
ever. And then there would be nothing that could be 
prevented by wisdom and holiness, to impair, in the 
least degree, the happiness of the w^hole universe. All 
tears would be forever wiped away. Heaven would 
then be as boundless as God's dominions, and as per- 
fect, as holy, and as happy as God, with the cooperation 
of all intelligent beings, could make it. Oh what a 
heaven that would be ! bounded only by the cncle of 



2G2 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 155. 

creation, and in which the highest possible blessedness 
would forever reign. 

In confirmation of this, notice carefully what Presi- 
dent Edwards has said : " Virtue . . . consists in the 
cordial consent or union of being to being in general. 
And . . . that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to 
relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevo- 
lence or union of heart itself to being in general, or uni- 
versally a benevolent frame of mind ; because he whose 
temper is to love being in general, therein must have a 
disposition to approve and be pleased with [love to 
being in general." 

" There is no other temper [or moral character] but 
this that a man can have, and agree with himself, or be 
without self-inconsistence, that is, without having some 
inclinations and relishes [and choices] repugnant to 
others ; and that for these reasons. Every being that 
has understanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. 
For, to suppose any being not to love happiness, would 
be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to 
him ; which is a contradiction, or at least would imply, 
that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is 
the same as to say that he has no such thing as choice, 
or any [faculty of will. So that every being who has a 
faculty of will, [must of necessity have an inclination to 
happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with him- 
self, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, 
he must approve of those inclinations whereby beings 
desire [and choose] the happiness of being in general, 
and must be [in purpose] against a disposition to the 
misery of being in general : because otherwise he would 
approve of opposition to his own happiness. For if a 
temper [or a choice] inclined to the misery of being in 
general prevailed universally, it is apparent that it would 



Quest. 156.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 203 

tend to universal misery. But he that [voluntarily] 
loves a tendency to universal misery in effect loves a 
tendency to his own misery ; and as he necessarily hates 
his own misery, he has then one inclination [or choice] 
repugnant to another. And besides, it necessarily fol- 
lows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others ; 
because in this, others' love agrees with their own love. 
But if men loved hatred to being in general, they would, 
in effect, love the hatred of themselves, and so would 
be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural 
incliaation [and choice] contrary to another." — Nature 
of Virtue, chap. 8. 

156. What comprehensive definition can be given 
which shall contain the sum of aU the definitions, and 
all that has above been said of holiness ? 

Holiness is to place and seek our highest happiness 
in the promotion of the highest, the most valuable gen- 
eral happiness ; or, as Edwards says, " virtue consists 
in the cordial consent or union of being to being in 
general." — Nat. of Vir. chap. 8, 4. 

157. What, then, is sin, so far as in the preceding 
discussion it has been developed ? 

The opposite of holiness is sin. Seeking our own 
happiness as the supreme good, instead of the general 
happiness, is sin. 

(1.) Placing and seeking our own happiness in the 
happiness of a part, — in partial good instead of the 
general happiness, — the universal good, and thus re- 
garding our own happiness as the supreme good, in- 
stead of regarding the highest universal holiness and 
happiness as the supreme good, is sin. 

Seeking our own happiness in ways which are op- 
posed to the general good, instead of seeking it in the 
promotion of, and in subservience to, the general hap- 



204 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 157. 

piness, is sin. And this is selfishness, the sum of all 
sin, and the source of all the specific, particular sins 
of ungodly men. 

(2.) In sin the will has to carry on a war with rea- 
son and conscience, and conscience hurls back its 
reproaches, until it becomes more or less perverted in 
its operations, or perhaps so seared as scarcely to act 
at all, — the desires clamor for sinful gratification, and 
in the end the sensibilities have heaped upon them a 
load of shame, remorse, and various suffering too heavy 
to be borne. Thus it is seen that in sin there is an 
antagonism, a conflict and war, a discord and conten- 
tion between all the faculties of the soul of man. The 
desires and will are in rebellion against the reason, the 
reason is dissatisfied and at war with the will, and the 
sensibilities are pained with the conflict. 

(3.) As every sinner is at war with himself, and his 
own interests, so also every sinner is at war with the 
best interests of every other sinner, and of the whole 
universe besides. Sin in its natural tendency, unre- 
strained by the infinite omnipotence of Jehovah (if it 
could) would go on in its direful work of damage to 
the universe, until it had rolled the volume of desola- 
tion through the empire of the Eternal. 



Quest. 158.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 205 



CHAPTER XIII. 

BENEVOLENCE INCLUDES ALL THE VIRTUES. 

The following entire chapter is designed to be an 
answer to the question, 

158. Does benevolence include all the specific vir- 
tues, — all that is holiness, in the proper sense of the 
term? 

In the first place we give a fuU and explicit but only 
a general answer, and then proceed to a more minute 
consideration of particulars. 

Benevolence is benevolent love. The term is com- 
pounded of bene and volens, rightly willing, — good- 
will, or holy love. It is that love which both the writ- 
ten and unwritten law of God requires, — it is that 
love which is the fulfilling of this law. All benevo- 
lence, therefore, consists in right acts of will, and all 
right acts of will are benevolence. 

Since all holiness consists in right acts of will, benev- 
olence must include the general principles of holiness, 
and all its modes and forms of manifestation. There- 
fore, benevolence includes all that is holiness in all its 
senses. 

Since all possible good consists in happiness and the 

means of happiness, all holiness must consist in the 

benevolent love of happiness, and in the love of the 

appropriate and best means and causes of happiness. 

18 



206 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 159. 

There is no other good that ought to be or can be loved 
with a holy love. 

Benevolence is sometimes used in the restricted sense 
of doing good to others, not comprehending doing good 
to ourselves. The meaning of benevolence in this dis- 
cussion comprehends doing good to all, ourselves and 
others. 

159. Into how many classes may the objects of 
benevolence be divided ? 

(1.) Happiness, and all beings capable of happiness, 
and all who are capable of intelligently promoting hap- 
piness, are comprehended in one class. 

(2.) All the natural means of happiness in distinc- 
tion from those means which have a moral character, 
either sinful or holy. Whatever natural object may be 
with propriety used as the means of increasing happi- 
ness, is a proper object of benevolent love. 

(3.) Holiness and holy beings, or the benevolent 
means and causes of happiness, form a third class of 
the objects of benevolent love. 

160. Into how many classes may the objects of 
benevolent hatred be divided ? 

The objects of benevolent hatred may be divided 
into three classes corresponding to the objects of benev- 
olent love. 

(1.) Misery. 

(2.) The natural means and causes of misery which 
have no moral character, and which tend to increase 
natural evil. 

(3.) Sin and sinners, or those means and causes of 
misery which have a sinful character. 

N. B. Love to an object implies hatred to its oppo- 
site. Love of holiness implies hatred of sin. Hatred 
to a sinner on account of his sinning implies a disposi- 



Quest. 161.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 207 

idon to approve of his being punished, but is consistent 
with a choice that he may be reclaimed, forgiven, and 
made happy. A benevolent hatred to the sinner for 
opposing the greatest public happiness necessarily 
springs from love to that happiness. The choice to 
obtain or promote an object implies a choice of the 
necessary means of obtaining or promoting it. There- 
fore, the voluntary love of an impersonal object implies 
the choice of the means necessary to obtain or promote 
that object. Benevolent love to a person implies choice 
to promote his happiness. 

161. What is the primary source of all obligation, 
law, and duty ? 

The primary, original source of all obligation, law, 
and duty, lies in the greatest good, and the need that 
that good should be gained, and in the power to pro- 
mote it, which includes the involuntary love or desire 
of happiness which exists as an essential element in 
the nature of moral beings. This desire is necessarily 
inherent in our created constitution; for without it 
there could be no possible motive to duty and no power 
whatever to perform it. 

Therefore, the voluntary love of highest happiness as 
the ultimate good, is and must be the essential, ele- 
mentary principle, in the nature of holiness in all the 
modes and forms in which it can be exercised. 

162. What, then, are the general forms of benevo- 
lence which comprehend all the more specific modes in 
which holiness can be exercised ? 

Since aU the objects of benevolent love are compre- 
hended in the three classes above designated, all holi- 
ness must be comprehended in the three corresponding 
general forms of benevolence. 



208 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 163. 

(1.) Benevolent love of happiness. 

(2.) Benevolent love of the natural^ appropriate 
means of happiness. 

(3.) The benevolent love of the benevolent means 
and causes of happiness. This is complacent love, or 
complacential benevolence, or the love of holiness or 
holy beings because they are holy. These three forms 
of benevolent love imply three corresponding forms of 
benevolent hatred of the three corresponding opposite 
classes of objects. From all this it follows, that what- 
ever in the nature of things is or may be made the 
means of increasing general happiness, constitutes a 
foundation of moral obligation to moral beings to use 
those means in the promotion of happiness, whenever 
there is opportunity to do so. 

163. What is benevolence in its simplest form ? 

Benevolence in its simplest, elementary form is vol- 
untary love of highest happiness, or love to sentient 
beings, rational and irrational, as capable of happiness 
and capable of promoting it, and should bear a reason- 
able proportion to the extent or amount of capacity for 
happiness and for promoting it, which in our judgment 
they possess. It is a disposition and choice to promote 
their best good and happiness in our power as there 
may be opportunity. 

This is the fundamental, elementary principle of holi- 
ness. It is the primary fountain and general source 
from which all the specific forms of virtue flow. This 
is the mainspring which gives to benevolence in its 
more complex forms its vitality, activity, and energy. 
It is the only possible source, from which holy action in 
specific forms can proceed. 

164. Why must holiness, in all its forms of manifesta- 



Quest. 164.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 209 

tion, in all circumstances, have this relation to happiness, 
of being the voluntary love of highest general happiness, 
and thus be relative good ? 

That holiness, in all the forms and circumstances of 
its manifestation, should have the relation to happiness, 
of being the voluntary love of the highest general hap- 
piness, appears to be absolutely essential to its true 
nature, and necessary to the possibility of its existence, 
for the following reasons, — 

(1.) Because the desire of happiness is the generic 
motive, which comprehends aU possible motives to 
voluntary action of whatever kind, and because without 
this no voluntary action whatever is possible. 

(2.) Because happiness is the only ultimate, absolute, 
and complete good in itself, which is possible, or which 
can possibly be conceived of. No other good is ulti- 
mate, absolute, or complete in itself as happiness is. 

(3.) Because highest general happiness is a greater 
good, than any less or partial, private good can be. 

For these reasons holiness in its own unchangeable 
nature, and in the necessary nature of moral beings, 
must have the relation to happiness, of being the volun- 
tary love and choice of the highest general happiness, 
because this relation of moral action to happiness is an 
essential constituent of holiness; by this the essential 
relation of hohness to happiness it is constituted holi- 
ness. It must, therefore, in its own essential nature 
be relative good, but not ultimate and absolute good 
as happiness is. If holiness had not the relation to happi- 
ness of being in some degree productive of happiness, 
it would not be a possibihty in human action ; and, 
therefore, because it is productive of happiness, it is a 
possible good. And because it is promotive of happi- 
ness on the whole, it is a real and valuable good, and 
18* 



210 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 165. 

because it is the designed, rational, and voluntary pro- 
motion of highest happiness, it is a moral good, and for 
all these reasons together it is right. 

165. Why are we under obligation, with the simplest 
form of benevolent love, to love one being more than 
another ? 

(1.) The reason why we are under obligation to love 
any sentient being, with the simplest kind of love, is 
that he is capable of happiness, and because all happi- 
ness is an ultimate good, valuable in and for itself as 
nothing else is. The most insignificant insect that 
comes in our way and is capable of happiness, is on 
that account worthy of our regard, in proportion to our 
knowledge or judgment of its capacity for happiness. 
All needless infliction of pain or the prevention of hap- 
piness is wrong, is sin. 

(2.) The first reason why we are bound to love some 
beings more than others is, that they are capable of more 
happiness than others are ; and the second is, that some 
beings are capable of promoting more happiness than 
others are ; and the third is, that, for various reasons, we 
can promote more happiness for some beings than for 
others ; and the fourth is, that a greater amount of hap- 
piness is a greater and more valuable good than a less. 

For these reasons (in this sense of love) we should 
love a man more than a brute, and some persons more 
than others. 

"We should love God (with this kind of love) more 
than all other beings because he is capable of more 
happiness, and of promoting more happiness, than all 
other beings, his pleasure is more than that of all other 
beings, and therefore we are under supreme obligation 
to please him. 

166. Why is it necessary to qualify the love of happi- 
ness with the predicate benevolent ? 



Quest. 167.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 211 

The predicate benevolent is applied to the love of 
happiness, to distinguish it from all the forms of selfish 
love of happiness, and from that involuntary love of 
happiness, which of necessity belongs to the nature of 
all sentient beings. In this last sense of love, no man 
good or bad in the possession of his reason, can avoid 
loving and seeking his own happiness in all his volun- 
tary doings, any more than he can avoid all thinking. 
This kind of loving happiness is not a matter of choice, 
but altogether of absolute necessity. This is what all 
men do and must do while they have the use of then- 
faculties. (See q. 114.) 

167. "What are some of the most important specific 
duties that belong to the simplest form of benevolent 
love? 

(1.) Love to the happiness of brute animals of all 
kinds which are capable of happiness. " The merciful 
man is merciful to his beast." 

(2.) It is our duty to seek, but never to sacrifice, our 
own highest or eternal happiness. " Flee from the 
wrath to come." Matt. 3:51. "Lay hold on eternal 
life." 1 Tim. 6 : 12. " Lay up for yourselves treasures 
in heaven." Matt. 6 : 20. " Oh, that there were such 
an heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep aU 
my commandments always, that it might be well with 
them and with their children forever." Deut. 5 : 29. 

(3.) It is our duty to seek the happiness of our 
fellow men, to be just, honest, and truthful in aU our 
commercial dealings, and to be faithful to fulfil our 
promises to them, and to regard their rights of property 
and their right to a good name, so far as they have that 
right. " As we have therefore opportunity, let us do 
good unto aU men." Gal. 6 : 10. " If thine enemy be 
hungry, give him bread to eat ; and if he be thirsty, 



212 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 167. 

give him water to drink." Prov. 25 : 21. " Love your 
enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them 
that hate you, and pray for them who despitefully use 
you, and persecute you ; that you may be the children 
of your Father who is in heaven: for he maketh his 
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth 
rain on the just and on the unjust." Matt. 5: 44, 
45. We ought to love a sinner because he is capable 
of happiness and capable of promoting it, that is, 
because he is capable both of happiness and holi- 
ness. 

(4.) It is our duty to pity and relieve the distressed 
and miserable, to clothe the naked, feed the hungry, 
plead for the widow and fatherless, and to visit and 
comfort them in their affliction, to remember those that 
are in bonds as bound with them, and to obey the 
righteous laws of civil government. These deeds are 
virtuous only when performed in the exercise of benev- 
olence. 

(5.) There is a duty of meekness and forbearance 
under the reception of injuries, and of forgiveness of 
those who injure us. " Forbearing one another and for- 
giving one another." Col. 3 : 13. " If ye forgive not 
men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive 
your trespasses." Matt. 6 : 15. These deeds, also, are 
virtuous only when they spring from benevolence. 

(6.) It is our duty to promote the happiness of 
heaven, of the angels, and of God. There is joy in 
heaven over men who turn from sin to holiness. An- 
gels and God rejoice over holiness on earth, and we 
ought to increase that joy to the utmost extent in our 
power, by increasing that holiness. Here we see that 
different forms of benevolence may to some extent in- 
clude each other. 



Quest. 168.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 213 

168. What is implied in the second and more com- 
plex form of benevolence ? 

The second form of benevolent love may be regarded 
as somewhat complex, because it implies two things : 
(1.) The love of general happiness ; (2.) The love of 
the natural means of that happiness ; because they pro- 
duce, or are the means of happiness, and for no other 
possible reason. 

169. What are some of the most important duties 
which belong to the second general division of benevo- 
lence ? 

The most important duties, consisting in love to the 
natural, in distinction from the moral, means of happi- 
ness, are, the duty to gain knowledge, property, health, 
and power — both physical and mental. To this end^ 
duty requkes temperance and total abstinence from 
every hurtful thing, diUgence, industry, prudence, econ- 
omy, and frugality in providing the necessary comforts 
of life, the means of living and of doing good. " K 
any man provide not for his own, and especially for 
those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and 
is w^orse than an infidel." 1 Tim. 5:8. " Provide 
things honest in the sight of all men." Rom. 12 : 17. 
" This we commanded you, if any would not w^ork 
neither should he eat." 2 Thess. 3 : 10. " Let him 
that stole, steal no more : but rather let him labor, 
working with his hands the thing which is good, that 
he may have to give to him that needeth." Eph. 
4: 28. 

170. In what does the third form of benevolence con- 
sist? 

The third form of benevolent love is the love of holi- 
ness, and is designated complacential benevolence. It 
consists in the love of benevolent means of happiness. 



214 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 171. 

We regard it as complex in its nature, because it im- 
plies two things, viz. the love of happiness and the 
love of holiness. It implies the love of the happiness 
of holy beings, because they are holy, and not merely 
because they are sentient beings. 

Complacential benevolence should be exercised in a 
reasonable proportion, as far as our faculties will ad- 
mit, to the amount of holiness which is its object. 

Complacent, benevolent love of holiness implies dis- 
placent, benevolent hatred of sin ; for holiness and sin 
are moral opposites. Of necessity, we hate that which 
opposes what we love. I cannot choose to go north 
and south at the same time. While I choose to go 
north, I must hate that which compels me to go south ; 
e. g. a man making his way for his life from the un- 
healthy regions of the torrid zone to the more healthy 
climate of the north, will hate to be compelled to go 
back. 

171. What are some of the most important specific 
forms of complacential benevolence ? 

(1.) To make diligent, earnest, and persevering efforts, 
on a broad scale, to promote the holiness of ourselves 
and others ; to persuade sinners to become reconciled 
to God ; to send the gospel to all lands, that the world 
may be converted to holiness ; to choose the society of 
holy persons, in order to the promotion of each other's 
holiness, — are duties in which complacential benevo- 
lence is exercised. 

(2.) Brotherly love and kindness ; love to the disci- 
ples of Christ, because they are his disciples ; pur- 
pose to make holy beings happy, because they are 
holy. 

(3.) Justice, as a virtue, implies love to holiness and 
hatred to sin ; it promotes holiness and happiness ; it 



Quest. 172.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 215 

discourages sin and prevents misery, both by rewards 
and punishments. 

In the exercise of justice, holy beings, men, and 
angels are made happy by the moral Governor of the 
universe, because they have chosen to promote the gen- 
eral happiness ; and wicked men are made miserable, 
because they have chosen to seek their own private, 
selfish, and lower good, rather than and in opposition 
to highest general good. All this is done because it is 
necessary to promote the greatest public good. 

Justice rewards the holy for promoting happiness, 
and punishes the wicked for preventing happiness and 
promoting misery. Its object in all this is to promote 
holiness and happiness, and to prevent sin and misery. 
Justice bestows those rewards, and inflicts that punish- 
ment, which the greatest public good and happiness 
require (including the happiness of all who have not 
forfeited it by their invasion of the public good), for 
this reason, and for no other, that the public good so 
requires. 

(4.) Gratitude is the choice to requite a benefactor, 
— to promote his happiness, because he has chosen to 
promote ours. Gratitude, as a virtue, is love of the 
holiness and happiness of a benefactor. 

N. B. It is to be remembered that benevolence, in 
some of its exercises, is not precisely confined to any 
one of its specific forms, but includes more or less of 
the others. 

The fourteen following questions and answers arise 
from the three general forms of benevolence above 
named : — 

172. (1.) Why are we bound to love one individual 
more than another with the different forms of benevo- 
lent love ? 



216 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 173. 

There are five comprehensive reasons why we should, 
with the different kinds of benevolent affection, love 
some persons more than others. 

1st. Some persons are capable of more happiness 
than others. 2d. Some persons are capable of promot- 
ing' more happiness than others are. 3d. We can do 
more to promote the happiness of some than of others, 
e. g. our children, neighbors, etc. 4th. And some are 
more holy than others, and, by their holiness, do pro- 
mote more happiness than others. 5th. We know more 
of the holiness of some than we do of others, and we 
can do more to promote the holiness of some than of 
others ; and the greater the amount of holiness and 
happiness, the more valuable it will be. 

173. (2.) Why ought we to love a holy man ? 

We ought to love a holy man, 1st. Because he is 
capable of happiness. 2d. Because he is capable of 
promoting happiness. 3d. Because he is supremely 
devoted to the work of promoting happiness, and that 
by the best means, viz. by promoting holiness, which is 
itself promoting happiness. 4th. Because our love to 
him will be a source of happiness to ourselves; or, 5th. To 
him and to all holy beings who shall ever have a knowl- 
edge of that love. 

174. (3.) Why should we love God more than all 
other beings ? 

We should love God supremely, 1st. Because our 
love to him will please him more, give him greater 
pleasure, than our love to any or all other beings would 
give to them ; i. e. he will take more pleasure in our 
love to him than all other beings can take in our love 
to them. 2d. Because that love to him which is neces- 
sary to please him is necessary to promote the highest 
happiness of bein^ in general, or the whole universe. 



Quest. 175.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 217 

3d. Because there is a greater amount of holiness in 
God than in all other beings. 4th. Because the rea- 
sons why any being ought to be loved more than an- 
other, exist to a greater extent in God than in all other 
beings. 

175. (4.) Why is veracity or truthfulness a universal 
duty, at all times, in all places, and under all circum- 
stances ? 

Do you say because it is right, reason demands it. 
True. But our question goes deeper, and asks for the 
reason why it is right, — why does reason demand it ? 
This is the question. 

And this the answer. 1st. Because the general wel- 
fare demands it. The highest degree of universal hap- 
piness demands it. 2d. Trust in God, and the honor 
of God demand it. 3d. Self-respect — the true dignity 
and worthiness of every man's soul demand it. Lying, 
self-degradation, remorse, shame, and misery go to- 
gether, as they most fitly belong together in the nature 
of things. 4th. If exceptions to the rule be admitted, 
we can never know when or where to stop in admitting 
them. For all these reasons universal veracity is right, 
— is obhgatory. We must practice veracity, or in all 
these ways we shall ultimately sacrifice both individual 
and the general good, well-being, and happiness. 

These considerations most plainly commend them- 
selves, as adapted firmly to settle the question in every 
honest mind. Nothing more than plain, honest, com- 
mon sense, is needful, to perceive that the common 
good demands a strict adherence to the principle of 
universal veracity. 

Universal veracity and truthfulness must be the rule, 
admitting of no exceptions, or the highest general good 
must, to some extent, be sacrificed. Any other rule 
19 



218 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 176. 

would endanger the public welfare, and prevent, to a 
greater or less extent, the highest general good. 

The rule of universal veracity cannot be intelligently 
obeyed for this end, without a benevolent regard for the 
highest holiness and happiness of the universe of moral 
beings. 

176. (5.) "What is the difference between veracity as 
a virtue, and mere selfish truthfulness ? and how does it 
appear that veracity as a duty is benevolence ? 

1st. There is, in the human mind, a natural, instinc- 
tive propensity to speak the truth. Speaking the truth 
merely to gratify this propensity or instinctive impulse, 
is not virtue. 

2d. There is a sense of meanness which attends 
speaking falsehood. There is no virtue in truthfulness, 
merely to avoid this sense of meanness. 

3d. Truth may be spoken for no other than purely 
selfish ends, or for the accomplishment of the most 
wicked designs. Surely this is not virtue. 

4th. When a person aims at the highest good, or at 
the general welfare as a controlhng principle of action, 
in telling the truth, his veracity is virtuous, — is true 
benevolence. Truthfulness is just hke any other spe- 
cific action in this respect. When it is in fulfilment of 
a benevolent design, it is benevolent usefulness or pure 
benevolence ; when in fulfilment of a selfish purpose, it 
is sin, — voluntary prevention of happiness and promo- 
tion of misery. 

Benevolent love exercised in veracity may be directly 
and merely to promote happiness, or to promote both 
holiness and happiness. 



Quest, m.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 219 



CHAPTER XIV. 

JUSTICE IN ITS VARIOUS MODES AND FORMS. 

Before considering particularly the topic of justice, 
it seems needful to define the terms merit, demerit, ill- 
desert, guilt, and guilty. 

Merit. The desert of approbation, honor, praise, or 
reward. The desert of that which the public good re- 
quires should be rendered to him who has done well. 
In an iU sense it is synonymous with. 

Demerit and ill-desert. These terms signify the desert 
of disapprobation, dishonor, and punishment, — the 
desert of that infliction of suffering which the safety 
of the public weal demands. 

Merit, demerit, and ill-desert, are simply the desert 
of that which the public good demands should be ren- 
dered to those moral agents who do well or ill. 

Guilt. A person can become guilty only by his own 
act of sin. The guilt of the sinner is inseparable from 
the fact that he has committed sin. The term expresses 
the state of the sinner into which he has brought him- 
self by his sin. This state implies two things, 1. The 
fact that he has sinned, which can never be done away. 
2. The necessity that he should be punished for his 
sin, which may be removed only by an atonement 
upon condition of repentance and faith in Christ as 
an atoning Saviour where the Saviour is known. 

177. (6.) What is the generic idea of justice, — jus- 



220 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 177 

tice in its broadest sense, — that which alone may be 
properly termed general justice ? 

General justice, — justice in its most comprehensive 
sense, — is that action and state of mind which fulfils all 
that moral law or moral obligation or duty requires. It 
is only another name for righteousness, holiness, general 
benevolence, universal love and good-will, or doing that 
which is just and right, — doing that which ought to 
be done. Whatever being should do all this would be 
just, whether Creator or creature. And his justice 
would consist in doing all that benevolence requires, — 
all that can be done for the greatest good. A creature 
who had done all this would be justified before God by 
deeds of law. 

Justice, in all cases, is that which is demanded by the 
greatest public good and well-being, so that this demand, 
in all cases and circumstances whatsoever, is the foun- 
dation and measure of justice. 

The demands of reason and conscience, of eternal 
truth and righteousness, the requirements of the highest 
individual and general good, and the demands of jus- 
tice, are all one and the same demand. And whenever 
any of these demands or rights are violated, justice is 
violated. 

While individual, private good must be held subor- 
dinate and subservient to the public good, universal and 
private good mutually subserve, and are always per- 
fectly consistent with, and mutually imply, each other. 
One never need to be sacrificed for the other, except in 
the case of crime, and, therefore, with this exception, 
never ought to be. 

Whatever accomphshes that which moral obligation, 
or the highest general good demands, fulfils the de- 
mands of justice. 



Quest. 178.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 221 

178. (7.) To what does general justice, according to 
Dr. Edwards, chiefly have respect ? 

General justice chiefly has respect to the eternal, un- 
originated law of right, and consists in compliance with 
the demands of that law. According to Dr. Edwards, 
" General or public justice respects what are called the 
rights of a community, whether a city, state, empire, or 
the universe. This kind of justice [or rather justice in 
the generic sense] requires the public good ; and when- 
ever that is violated or neglected, the public is injured, 
... To practice justice in this sense, is no other than 
to act from public spirit, or from love to the community, 
and with respect to the universe, it is the very same 
with general benevolence." — Vol. i. p. 73. " General 
or public justice comprehends all moral goodness. . . . 
In this sense, whatever is rights is said to be just^ or an 
act of justice ; and whatever is wrong or improper to be 
done, is said to be unjust or an act of injustice. To 
practice justice in this sense, is to practice agreeably to 
the dictates of general benevolence, or to seek the glory 
of God and the good of the universe. And whenever 
the glory of God is neglected, it may be said that God 
is injured or deprived of his right. Whenever the gen- 
eral good is neglected or impeded, the universe may be 
said to suffer an injury.^'' 

With regard to general justice, " as it comprehends 
all moral goodness, it is not at aU opposed to grace ; but 
comprehends that as well as every other virtue, as truth, 
faithfulness, meekness, forgiveness, patience, prudence, 
temperance, fortitude, etc. All these are right and^^, 
and the contrary tempers or practices are wrong and 
injurious to God and to the system ; and therefore in 
this sense of justice are unjust. And even grace itself, 
which is favor to the ill-deserving, so far as it is wise 
19* 



222 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 179. 

and proper to be exercised, makes but a part ... of 
justice." — Vol. ii. pp. 29, 30. 

" The requirement of the public good is the exact 
measure of justice in this case " * of punishment due to 
the sinner, without an atonement. The rules of justice 
in this case as in all others, are determined by the re- 
quirements of the general good. 

179. (8.) What, therefore, is the original foundation 
of justice and the sole measure of its requirements ? 

The greatest possible happiness is the sole founda- 
tion of justice. This implies that the greatest possible 
universal good and the power to promote it constitute 
the original foundation of justice and of moral obli- 
gation, and therefore the sole measure of its require- 
ments. 

The requirements of justice are identical with the 
demands of moral obligation and the demands of the 
greatest universal good, and are made only upon beings 
having power to promote that good. By these princi- 
ples, therefore, justice must be ultimately and finally 
measured, in the adjudications of the eternal judgment. 
This is general justice. 

180. (9.) What are some of the most important 
modes and forms in which justice is exercised ? 

Justice has commonly been divided into three kinds : 
commutative, distributive, and general justice. We 
think this division highly calculated to produce confu- 
sion of ideas and to mislead. Because, 1st. It seems 
unnecessary, and an abuse of language to designate 
one branch of general justice by the term which in- 
cludes all the branches. 2d. Distributive justice in- 
cludes all that general justice does, and therefore, 3d. 

* Dr. Edwards's Works, vol. i. p. 500. 



Quest. 181.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 223 

Commutative justice includes nothing which distribu- 
tive justice does not. Distributive justice, as it has 
been sometimes explained, is rather a circumstantial 
than an essential attribute, — essential only in the ad- 
ministration of a merely legal system. 

We choose rather to designate the chief forms in 
which general justice is exercised, by the following 
appellatives : distributive, commutative, governmental, 
atoning, and forgiving justice. 

181. (10.) What is distributive justice ? 

Distributive justice is rendering to every one that to 
which he has a right, and that which is due to him on 
account of rights which belong to the public, and to 
God in the exercise of general benevolence. It is doing 
to every one that which ought to be done, whatever 
the reason is why it ought to be done. There seems 
to be, therefore, no sufficient reason why distributive 
justice should be called a kind of justice ; for it seems 
to comprehend all that is comprehended in general 
justice. The term distributive appropriately expresses 
a quality of justice, as it refers to individuals. 

When justice is employed in distributing rewards 
and penalties to the subjects of a moral government, 
such as (according to their personal character and con- 
duct, — according to their rights and deserts, — merits 
and demerits) are demanded in a merely legal system 
by the interests, welfare, best good and happiness of 
the public, it is then termed distributive justice in the 
most restricted sense. 

" Commutative justice in the recovery of debts, has no 
respect at all to the character or conduct of the debtor, 
but merely to the property of the creditor. Distribu- 
tive justice in the punishment of crimes has no respect 



224 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 181. 

at all to the property of the criminal ; but merely to his 
personal conduct." — Dr. Edwards, vol. ii. p. 29. 

Distributive justice (in the restricted sense sometimes 
given to it) requires the distributing or rendering to 
every man his dues, whatever these dues may consist 
in, whether they are due as rewards to which he has a 
right, or as property or reputation or whatever it may 
be to which he has a right, or as penalties due to him 
as exacted by public rights. 

On the ground of distributive justice, every man has 
a right to his own person, liberty, and safety, to his 
own flesh and blood, muscles and bones and brains, 
and to all his mental powers, and he has a right to 
protect, preserve, and use them for his own profit and 
the public good, — he has a right to a just reputation, 
to the safety of his family, to his property, and to fidel- 
ity in the fulfilment of engagements made to him. 
And then general justice or benevolence requires him 
to use all his powers, rights, and privileges, for the best 
good of the whole. 

As to the right and obligation of promises, no man 
has a right to make or fulfil a promise, or to exact the 
fulfilment of one, even if made under oath, when the 
promise cannot be fulfilled without the violation of 
moral obligation, nor without violating the laws of 
both God and man. 

It seems to us that commutative justice is but a form 
or branch of distributive justice, and that both distribu- 
tive and commutative justice are but more particular 
applications of general justice, or general benevolence. 
Distributive justice demands the rendering to every 
man his due, because both general and particular jus- 
tice require and demand it. To violate distributive jus- 
tice would be to violate general justice. 



QuKST. 182.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 225 

N. B. Viewed in their true and comprehensive light, 
individual and public interests never really clash or 
conflict with each other, except when the individual has 
forfeited his rights and interests by wickedly injuring 
the public in their rights and interests, and even then 
under the gospel of Christ, when that is obeyed, there 
is no clashing between individual and public interests. 

General benevolence, general and distributive justice, 
when exercised in doing what is demanded by the high- 
est general good, are one and the same thing. 

182. (11.) What is commutative justice ? 
Commutative justice is rendering an equivalent for 

what is received. It respects property and matters of 
commerce, and the fulfilment of promises made on 
conditions, when the conditions have been complied 
with. It requires the equal exchange and restitution 
of property. It is the moral law of trade, and ought to 
be obeyed in aU commercial transactions. Commuta- 
tive justice requkes the restitution of property borrowed 
in whatever form. It requires a fair compensation in 
wages paid for labor or services received. Any viola- 
tion of commutative justice involves a violation of 
general public justice and benevolence, because by 
commutative injustice the public interests and happi- 
ness are in various ways invaded and damaged. We 
also conceive that commutative injustice is a violation 
of general and distributive justice, as may be seen from 
what has been said on distributive justice. 

183. (12.) What is governmental justice ? 

That exercise of justice which is peculiar to a perfect 
moral governor may be designated governmental jus- 
tice. 

The character of general justice and benevolence is 
an essential qualification for a perfect moral governor. 



226 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 184. 

But this is not peculiar to a moral governor, — it is 
common to all virtuous beings. That exercise of jus- 
tice which is necessary to establish and sustain his 
authority, or the authority of his law, is peculiar to a 
moral governor. This must be done by rewards be- 
stowed upon obedient subjects, and either by penalties 
inflicted upon the disobedient, or by a substitute for 
deserved penalties adapted to the same end, which 
would be accomplished by the execution of those pen- 
alties. Justice in the moral governor requires that 
these rewards and penalties should be adapted to show 
the value of obedience and the evil of disobedience, and 
to furnish the strongest motives for obedience and for 
avoiding disobedience. These rewards and penalties, 
these necessary sanctions of law, must have this adap- 
tation to show the value of obedience, and to furnish 
the strongest motives for it, to the end that these sanc- 
tions may adequately support the authority of the gov- 
ernment as the necessary means of the greatest public 
good. 

In the case of transgression, if a substitute for the 
penalty can be provided which equally sustains the au- 
thority of the law, and thus guards the public welfare, 
justice being that which requires the promotion of 
greatest universal good, now demands that the substi- 
tute should be provided, and when that is provided and 
accepted, justice no longer demands the infliction of 
the penalty for the transgression upon the penitent be- 
liever, it being incompatible with justice that pardon 
should be granted during persistence in sin. Atoning 
and forgiving justice are but forms of governmental 
justice in particular relations. 

184. (13.) What is atoning justice ? 

Atoning justice is that by which the moral governor, 



Quest. 185.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 227 

acting according, to the demands of the highest possi- 
ble good, and of his own infinite wisdom, provides a 
substitute for the penalty of transgression, adequate to 
secure the ends of penalty in the public safety, so that 
he can be just and remit that penalty ; i. e. forgive re- 
pentant transgressors, restore them to favor, and grant 
them the privileges of obedient subjects. That repent- 
ance which constitutes the condition of forgiveness, 
consists in turning from sin to the practice of holiness, 
with a full and hearty purpose of permanent obedience. 

185. (14.) What is forgiving justice, in view of an 
atonement ? 

While forgiving justice is mercy to the sinner, exer- 
cised in showing him favor to which he has no right, 
viewed in his relation to law and to his ill deserts as a 
transgressor, under a merely legal administration, and 
not in his relation (as a penitent, reformed, and obedi- 
ent subject) to the substitute for the deserved penalty 
provided in the atonement, nor in his relation to an 
atoning Mediator; — it is favor which he does not and 
cannot, as a sinner in his relation to law, deserve, be- 
cause in this relation as a sinner he has forfeited all 
right to favor ; — while forgiveness is thus mercy to the 
sinner, it is but fulfilling the demands of benevolent 
love, wisdom, and justice towards the holy subjects of 
the kingdom of God, and towards the repentant, for 
whom a ransom has been provided. 

The claim for pardon belongs not to the transgressor 
as a matter of justice, while viewed according to his per- 
sonal character and ill deserts ; but his claim for pardon, 
so far as he has any, is simply on the benevolence of the 
moral governor, which can now be wisely exercised 
towards him, with due regard to the public safety. The 
claim or right to pardon is not vested in the transgres- 



2ii NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 186. 

sor, on the ground of his personal deserts, but in God, 
and arises from his regard to the best interests of his 
kingdom, and especially of his loyal kingdom, of which 
the penitent sinner now forms a part. 

This is only the claim of general benevolence, being 
identical with general justice — mercy to the sinner, 
because unmerited, although a righteous benevolence 
to him, and a just benevolence to a holy universe. 

Thus, in the exercise of forgiving mercy, God is just, 
and only fulfils the demands of his own infinite wis- 
dom, benevolence, or justice. This is mercy to the sin- 
ner, because by transgression having forfeited all right 
to favor, considered strictly in his mere relation to law, 
he has also incurred the ill-desert of a just penalty, 
such as protection to the public weal demands, until a 
substitute, adequate to the same end, be provided by 
the moral governor and accepted on the part of the 
transgressor, by a compliance with the conditions of 
pardon, on which it can be justly bestowed. 



CHAPTER XV. 

MORAL GOVERNMENT. JUSTICE, GRACE, AND MERCY. 

RIGHT AS A QUALITY OF LAW AND OF MORAL ACTION. 

186. What, then, must be the object of a righteous 
moral government? 

From the nature of benevolence and justice, it fol- 
lows that ' the object of all human governments which 
are good and righteous is to secure the best order and 
highest possible happiness of aU over whom they are 
instituted.' To secure such an object for the universe j 



Quest. 187.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 229 

is the object of the moral government of God. Having 
this object constitutes the righteousness of all these 
governments. 

187. What are the necessary qualifications of a per- 
fect moral governor ? 

A righteous and perfect moral governor must be able 
and disposed to make, and to make known those laws 
which, if obeyed, \^rLll secure to his subjects the high- 
est possible happiness of each individual, and of his 
kingdom as a whole. He must also be able and will- 
ing to execute those laws according to the principle of 
eternal right, equity, and honor, or according to the 
principle of perfect, impartial, and universal benevo- 
lence, or in such a manner as the greatest good of his 
subjects demands. 

Since, as we have seen (q. 16), that the object of a 
righteous moral government is to be gained by moral 
influence, rather than directly by physical force or 
power, it becomes important to understand the differ- 
ence between them, that we may adequately perceive 
the wisdom and benevolence by which the moral gov- 
ernment of God is adapted to secure the obedience of 
his subjects and the greatest happiness of his obedient 
subjects, and that we may feel the force and weight of 
our obUgations to obey, and to admit the necessity and 
justice of the penalties of disobedience. 

188. What, then, is moral influence, as distinguished 
fi*om mere force ? 

Moral influence is the influence of motives, which 
move and lead men to make moral choices, and to carry 
out those choices in moral action. Moral power is the 
power to exert this influence. Any conceivable amount 
of moral influence which can be shown to be possible, 
may be resisted by the agent who is the subject of it, 
20 



230 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 189. 

because moral influence is only the inducement of mo- 
tive to choose ; and always when one choice is made, 
another choice might be made in its stead. For this 
reason, a given result of moral influence, however great, 
is not the necessary — the only possible result, because 
this influence might be resisted and the result might be 
different. But it is not so with physical power and 
effects in the world of matter. (See q. 15.) 

189. What is physical power and influence ? and 
how is the influence of physical power distinguished 
from moral influence ? 

Physical power is that which, when exerted in like 
circumstances, always must produce like effects. It is 
that which, when exerted, does and must produce its 
appropriate effects. This is the uniformity of the laws 
of nature in the material world. 

When God exerts creative omnipotence, creation 
must come to pass; something must be created, and 
that the thing designed. The effect must be produced, 
and there is no power to the contrary able to resist 
omnipotence and prevent the result. By the mere 
physical omnipotence of God, all the laws of nature in 
the material universe are fixed, controlled, or suspended 
according to his pleasure, or carried into execution, so 
as to produce the effects designed by their author. 

The rock, unsupported, must fall. When powder, 
properly confined within a rock, explodes, the rock must 
split. When the necessary power comes upon it, the 
water-wheel must move, and the machinery must be 
driven to certain effects, which must result therefrom. 
And in the circumstances there is no power to the con- 
trary. This is the distinguishing difference between 
moral influence and physical power, mere force. 

No power to the contrary is the universal law in the 



Quest. 189.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 231 

world of matter. In the natural, as distinguished from 
the moral world, when the power of physical causation 
is exerted in the proper circumstances, the appropriate 
effects must follow, by a necessity which there is no 
power to resist. And this is the natural necessity of 
physical power. It belongs to the natural, material 
world. When effects or events come to pass by natu- 
ral necessity in the world of matter or mind, there is no 
power to the contrary except that by which that neces- 
sity itself is controlled. When effects or events take 
place in my mind by a natural necessity, I have no 
power to the contrary. When I act under moral influ- 
ence, as I do in all my responsible acts, I have power 
to the contrary. 

In the moral world, moral acts are all performed 
under diverse moral influences. But moral influence in 
a given direction is never irresistible. Under the diverse 
moral influences which are upon us in all our moral 
acts, we always have the power of choice, and this by 
a metaphysical necessity implies the power of contrary 
choice, for these reasons, — 

Power to the contrary is the universal law of respon- 
sible, moral action, while no power to the contrary is 
the universal law of physical influence, power, causa- 
tion, and effects, as distinguished from the moral influ- 
ence of motives, and from moral, accountable acts. 

Therefore, moral power and moral influence are of a 
nature entirely different from physical power and 
physical influence, and from the influence of that power 
which produces a natural necessity. 

Here it is important to observe, that physical power 
may be made use of to produce motives, but if good 
moral results are secured, this must be done by the 
moral influence of the motives, and not immediately by 



232 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 189. 

the physical force. The physical omnipotence of God 
in his providential government is used as the means of 
procuring, to some extent, the motives by which his 
moral government is administered. 

As moral agents form their moral character by their 
moral acts, performed under a moral influence, which 
they have power to resist, their moral action might be 
different, and of course their moral character is in their 
own power, and might be bad, or might be good, as 
they are most sacredly bound to have it good, virtuous, 
benevolent, or holy. 

Therefore, again ; moral character cannot be directly 
produced by a natural necessity, nor by physical power 
exerted upon a moral agent, because physical power 
produces its immediate effects by a natural necessity, 
leaving no power to the contrary. 

Only physical effects can be immediately produced 
by physical power and influence. 

Physical effects must he only what they are. Moral 
results — moral acts and moral character might be 
different, and therefore, always might and ought to be 
good and benevolent. 

By physical power rocks may be rent, forests felled, 
nations conquered, steam-engines, water-wheels, and 
all kinds of mechanical machinery may be irresistibly 
driven to useful operations and results. By physical 
power a universe of material worlds may be created, 
upheld, and caused to move through the immensity of 
space, and an infinite variety of effects may be pro- 
duced in them, according to fixed laws, enforced by 
physical Omnipotence, in accordance with the good 
pleasure of their Creator's will. 

But as well might these effects be produced by the 
moral influence of truth and motives, as that moral 



Quest. 190.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 233 

character should be an effect^ or be immediately pro- 
duced by physical power, exerted upon a moral agent. 

As well might forests be felled by moral influence, 
and rocks split with arguments, and the furrows of the 
field be induced to roU over and the earth to open its 
bosom to receive the seed of the sower, by the per- 
suasive power of eloquence, or ' as well might the sun 
and moon be governed by the ten commandments,' as 
that a sinner should be converted, morally reformed and 
made truly virtuous, by the direct agency of mere 
physical Omnipotence. 

190. What truth of practical importance follows 
from these premises? 

Hence we infer, means should be appropriately 
adapted to wisely chosen ends. 

1st. Physical power, means, and causes are adapted 
only to the immediate production of physical ends, — 
mere effects. 2d. Moral influence only is appro- 
priately adapted to the immediate production, or 
change of moral character. 3d. And right moral 
character only^ consisting in benevolence, is adapted to 
secure the most valuable happiness of each and every 
individual in the universe of moral beings, and thus it 
appears that benevolence alone, in moral character, is 
adapted to secure the greatest amount of universal 
happiness. 

191. What does justice require of a moral governor 
in the administration of law in a merely legal system, 
and how does it appear that justice, in its various appli- 
cations in moral government, is nothing but benevolence 
in those particular relations ? 

In a moral government by mere law and its sanc- 
tions, rewards and penalties aside from an economy of 
grace and mercy : — 

20* 



234 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 191. 

(1.) Justice requires of a moral governor, who has 
qualifications necessary to administer a perfect moral 
government, that he should adapt all his laws and 
specific commands to the promotion of the highest gen- 
eral happiness, and to this end, that he should adapt all 
his requirements to the several abilities, and opportuni- 
ties of his subjects, to know and do their duty, so that 
they should be required neither more nor less than to 
promote as much happiness as they can, by the best use 
of all their powers. 

(2.) That he should reward the obedient and punish 
the transgressors according to their good or ill deserts, 
which deserts are, and must be, measured by what the 
public good requires, to the end that the laws shall best 
protect the public peace, order, and happiness of the 
community, and of course that rewards and penalties 
shall be distributed in the way, and to that extent, 
which, according to his wisdom, knowledge, and power, 
is best adapted to promote the greatest amount of hap- 
piness in his kingdom. 

(3.) That his laws should require of each individual 
that conduct which will promote his own highest hap- 
piness in the long run, and the greatest amount of the 
general happiness on the whole, that is within his 
power. So that no one shall ever be required, except 
for crime, to lose his own highest permanent good, or 
to do or suffer any thing, which is subversive of the 
highest general good. 

(4.) Since justice requires of the moral governor that 
all his laws, rewards, and penalties be so administered 
as to secure, in the highest possible degree, the happiness 
of his subjects, and, by consequential necessity, they 
must be so administered as to promote that amount of 
holiness which to him is the highest possible in his 
realms. 



Quest. 192.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 235 

192. What is the difference between grace and jus- 
tice? Since general benevolence and general justice 
are the same thing, and since all the grace which God 
bestows is dictated by, and granted in the exercise of, 
general benevolence and justice, how can grace differ at 
all from justice ? 

Grace differs from justice in this, that God, the moral 
governor, when the public good does not forbid, and when 
a substitute for penalty has been provided, may grant 
as unmerited favors, to the miserable and ill-deserving 
as viewed in their own personal character, and which, 
of course, according to their personal deserts, sinners do 
not deserve, and in justice to them in this relation, may 
be withheld. When the demand for inflicting penalty 
and withholding favors, which is made by the public 
good, is removed by the provision of a substitute, which 
can be done only by an atonement, e. g. the atonement 
of Christ, and by its acceptance on the sinner's part, 
then benevolence and justice to the obedient universe 
demand that the sinner be restored to favor ; but it is 
grace to him, because under the mere administration of 
law he could deserve nothing but penalty. 

The right of demand, in the case of a criminal, that 
a penalty should be inflicted according to his iU deserts, 
is vested not at all in him, but in the moral governor, in 
behalf of his own rights and of the general good of his 
subjects. When this demand arising from the public 
good is satisfied by ari atonement, the moral governor 
is satisfied, and justice is satisfied, so far as no longer 
to forbid the exercise of grace, while general justice and 
general benevolence require that exercise^ just so far as 
the general good can be promoted by it. 

W^hen commutative justice is satisfied, then that does 
not forbid, nor stand at all in the way of, generous pres- 



NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 193. 

ents being made to persons, who have no claim for 
them, either according to commutative or distributive 
justice. Bestowing such presents, of course, is of 
grace to them and not of debt. When happiness can 
be promoted by presents, benevolence is exercised in 
granting them. 

" Grace, as opposed to commutative justice, is gratu- 
itously to relinquish property or to forgive a man his 
debt." " Grace, as opposed to justice in the distribu- 
tive sense, is to treat a man more favorably or mildly 
than is correspondent to his personal character or con- 
duct." — Dr. Edwards, vol. ii. p. 80. 

193. In what, then, must grace consist to be virtuous 
and holy ? 

Favors granted to the ill-deserving (which, of course, 
they have no right to demand on the ground of their 
own merits), for the purpose of promoting happiness 
and adding something to the general good, is grace, 
and is one specific mode in which general benevolence 
and justice is exercised. 

Favors to the ill-deserving, so far as justice in all its 
modes relates to such beings in their relation to a legal 
system merely, might in justice to them be withheld. 
To grant that to any which could not, in strict justice 
to them, nor without the highest injustice in their legal 
relations, be withheld, is not of grace, but of justice. 
It is granting to them only that which, in strict justice, 
they have a right to demand. 

194. What is the difference between grace and 
mercy ? 

Mercy is more nearly synonymous with grace, ac- 
cording to Webster, than with any other word in our 
language. According to its etymological derivation 
it has more of the meaning of pity, or relief granted 



Quest. 195.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 237 

to the suffering. According to its theological use, it 
means favor, pity, compassion to the suffering and 
guilty. 

Favor to the undeserving, — that to which they 
have no personal claim on the ground of their own 
merits, — is grace. Favor to the z7/-deserving is both 
grace and mercy. The grace which sinners in the first 
place need, is that influence of the Holy Spirit which 
convicts and reproves of sin, renews and sanctifies the 
heart, and tlien^ on repentance, the grace and mercy 
which they need is forgiveness, when regarded only in 
their relation to law, justice might punish; i. e. for- 
giveness is that to which, as sinners, they have no 
claim, when in justice to them as such they might be 
punished, — remission of penalty, which, according to 
distributive justice, as sinners, they deserve, and there- 
fore in justice to them^ in this relation, might be inflicted. 
Mercy, then, is forgiveness where justice might have 
punished. Here it may be inquired, 

195. K in justice to the sinner, as a subject of mere 
law, penalty might be executed, why does not justice 
demand its execution ? 

The first answer is. The right of demand is in the 
hands of the moral governor, and consists in the neces- 
sity that his law and authority should be supported, 
and the public happiness, peace, and order should be 
secured and protected. This demand for the support of 
authority is satisfied by the atonement made by the suf- 
ferings and death of Christ, so that noiv upon condition 
of repentance, reformation, and faith in him, the moral 
governor may be just and the justifier of the penitent 
believer. Because the public good and happiness no 
longer demands the death of the sinner, justice now, 
in none of its modes, demands that penalty should be 



238 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 196. 

executed. The moral governor may now go forth to 
the granting of pardon in the exercise of general, im- 
partial benevolence (being identical with general jus- 
tice), for the purpose of promoting the eternal happiness 
of his holy kingdom. 

The second answer is. That the sinner is taken out 
of his mere relation to law and placed under an econo- 
my of grace and mercy, where forgiveness may be 
granted in the exercise of justice. 

Mercy can never be wisely or righteously granted 
but in subordination to general justice, and consist- 
ently with distributive justice. Justice must be satis- 
fied, that mercy is consistent with the general safety 
and happiness, before it can be granted in a righteous, 
moral government. And this is all that justice de- 
mands» 

196. Is there any thing in the idea of right which 
does not inherently belong to benevolence ? 

It has somewhere been said, that there is a meaning 
of right to be distinguished from benevolence. It is 
somewhat difficult to understand exactly what is meant 
by this, unless it be something like the following : 

(1.) Right is a quality of moral law. This law is 
right, not because it is benevolence, not because it is 
the voluntary promotion of highest happiness, for it is 
neither ; but the law is right, because it requires benev- 
olence, and because benevolence is the voluntary, de- 
signed promotion of the highest happiness in the agent's 
power. 

The rightness of law consists in requiring benev- 
olence. The rightness of benevolence consists in aim- 
ing at the highest good, — in doing what the law re- 
quires, — in being voluntary obedience to law. So far, 
then, as the rightness of the law is distinct from the 



Quest. 197.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 239 

Tightness of benevolence, there is a right to be distin- 
guished from benevolence. 

(2.) Or, right as a quality does not express precisely 
the same idea as benevolence, of which right is a 
quality. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE THAT VIRTUE IS FOUNDED 
IN UTILITY. 

197. What is the comprehensive import of the state- 
ment that virtue is founded in utility ? 

(1.) By utility is meant usefulness, or the promotion 
of happiness. 

The following statements of Sir Wm. Hamilton hap- 
pily show what utility is, and that he was a utilita- 
rian : — 

" Considered absolutely, or in itself, the philosophy 
of the mind comprises two several utilities, according 
as it, 1st. Cultivates the mind, or knowing subject, by 
calling its faculties into exercise; and, 2d. Furnishes 
the mind with a certain complement of truths, or ob- 
jects of knowledge. The former of these constitutes its 
subjective, the latter its objective utility." 

" I am not one of those who think that the impor- 
tance of a study is sufficiently established when its 
dignity is admitted ; for, holding that knowledge is for 
the sake of the man, and not man for the sake of the 
knowledge, it is necessary, in order to vindicate its 
value, that every science should be able to show what 
are the advantages which it promises to confer upon its 



240 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 197. 

student. I therefore profess myself a utilitarian ; and 
it is on the special ground of its utility that I would 
claim for the philosophy of the mind, what I regard as 
its peculiar and preeminent importance. But what is 
a utilitarian? Simply one who prefers the useful to 
the useless, — and who does not ? But what is the 
useful ? That which is prized, not on its own account, 
but as conducive to the acquisition of something else ; — 
the useful, in short, is only another word for a mean 
towards an end ; . . . [whatever is useful is a meanP — 
Lectures on Metaphysics, by Sir Wm. Hamilton, Edinb. 

pp. 2, a 

(2.) Benevolent usefulness is the chosen promotion 
of highest happiness, as its ultimate object. This im- 
plies that virtue is that kind of voluntary utility which 
has the highest happiness for its ultimate object ; and 
from this it follows, that the desire of utility, or of 
gaining and promoting happiness, is the primary and 
essential motive, without which holiness is an impos- 
sibility. 

(3.) Therefore, the susceptibility of the desire of high- 
est utility, or of a desire to promote the highest happi- 
ness of all sentient beings, is an essential element in 
the power to fulfil moral obligation ; and therefore, this 
desire of utility, and the susceptibility of this desire, 
are indispensable elements in the foundation of moral 
obligation. Let it be remembered that by the founda- 
tion of obligation we mean all that which is essentially 
prerequisite to the possibility of moral action, and to 
the existence and fulfilment of obligation. 

(4.) Benevolent utility, or the intention of promoting 
the greatest amount of happiness, is, in and of itself, 
virtuous, because, by the intrinsic tendency of its un- 
changeable nature, it is efficacious to promote the high- 



Quest. 197.J OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 241 

est happiness in the agent's power. This, we think, is 
what President Edwards meant by virtue's being a 
good in itself. Benevolence is efficacious to produce 
the highest happiness in one's power, because it aims 
at the promotion of highest happiness, and is designed 
to be efficacious in the promotion of that happiness. 

(5.) Perfect benevolence is the necessary and indis- 
pensable means of highest happiness. Nothing else is 
or can be productive of happiness so valuable, in kind 
or degree, as benevolence is. Wherever the highest 
virtue is, there is the production of the highest happi- 
ness in the agent's power, either immediately or in its 
more remote consequences, or both. And the promo- 
tion of highest happiness is nowhere else but where the 
efficacious tendency of holiness is. 

If highest happiness can be found as the production 
of any other action or cause, aside from supreme be- 
nevolence, we admit our doctrine must be amended. 

(6.) An act of choice is constituted benevolence by 
being a choice of the highest good, and choice of the 
most efficacious means of that good known or properly 
supposed to be in one's power. Therefore, by benevo- 
lence, and only by benevolence, can a man promote the 
highest good in his power. 

(7.) The essential relations of holiness to happiness 
are principally comprehended in the foar following 
statements : 1st. A person in holy action must have 
for his ultimate subjective and objective end and ob- 
ject the greatest general happiness, including his own, 
which is known, or properly supposed, to be in his 
power; 2d. The desire of personal happiness is the 
primary motive to holiness, and is essential to the pos- 
sibility of its performance ; 3d. Holiness is the designed 
or chosen means of the highest and most valuable 
21 



242 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 197. 

sum total of happiness ; or, 4th. Benevolence is, by the 
intrinsic tendency of its own nature, in and of itself, 
the indispensably necessary and efficacious means of 
highest happiness to the individual and the universe, in 
the agent's power, when his benevolence is an entire 
fulfilment of all his obligations. 

By the doctrine that benevolent rectitude is founded 
in utility, we mean also that benevolence is constituted 
holiness by these its principal relations to happiness ; 
and that supreme, impartial, and universal benevolence 
includes all that is comprehended in holiness in all its 
forms of manifestation. Also, that the relations of holi- 
ness to happiness constitute its only and all its real 
value and moral excellence, and that to promote all the 
happiness of ourselves and others which is actually in 
our power, by the best use which we can make of our 
faculties, comprehends our whole duty ; therefore when 
this is done, all our duty is done. It should always be 
remembered that these relations of benevolence to hap- 
piness imply the correlative relations to misery. 

(8.) Since holiness and sin are moral opposites, the 
vileness, odiousness, or turpitude of sin is founded in 
its relations to happiness and misery. These relations 
consist in its voluntary hurtfulness, — in its effectual 
tendencies to prevent happiness and promote misery. 
Its turpitude consists in its being a voluntary damage 
to the universe, and this depends upon its being the 
clioice of the less in preference to the greatest good, — 
the choice of the private and partial, in opposition to 
the general and universal good ; so that the relations 
of sin to happiness consist in its being the voluntary 
prevention of highest happiness, and the voluntary pro- 
motion of misery that cannot be measured nor esti- 
mated. 



Quest. 198.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 243 

198. What gives this doctrine of benevolent utility 
and rectitude so strong a hold upon the popular mind ? 

The chief reason why this doctrine takes so strong a 
hold upon the popular mind, when properly explained 
and fairly understood, is not because it can be esteemed 
as congenial to the selfish heart, nor because it fails to 
set forth the excellence of holiness or the exceeding sin- 
fulness of sin, — for it does the opposite of all this, — 
but rather because it so decidedly commends itself to 
sound reason, to the common sense and conscience of 
mankind. 

199. What is the sum of the evidence that supreme, 
perfect benevolence has an effectual tendency, which 
will actually secure the highest amount of good and 
happiness in one's power? 

It has been a leading design of different parts of this 
discussion to exhibit the evidence of this doctrine. 

To sum up the substance of this evidence, it may be 
noticed: (1.) That virtue is the intelligent choice of 
the highest good in one's power. 

(2.) Choosing an object, or to promote an object, 
which is in our power, is the sure way to obtain or 
promote that object. If in this way we could not ob- 
tain the object of our choice, and of our laborious and 
faithful pursuit, this would prove it not to be in our 
power. For these reasons, supreme, impartial, and uni- 
versal benevolence (when it is the entire fulfilment of 
one's obHgations) is the sure, certain, and only way to 
promote the highest happiness, usefulness, or hoUness 
which is trull/ in our power. 

(3.) An object that is not within my power, nor at 
aU within the reach, nor even supposed to be within 
the reach of my influence, is not to me an object of 
choice. I can make no choice in regard to that which 



244 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 199. 

I know not to be within my power. The nature of 
choice forbids it. The devil and his angels are doomed 
to eternal misery, "reserved in everlasting chains, 
under darkness unto the judgment of the great day." 
Jude 6. 

But I can make no choice about that misery, until 
something about it is, or is supposed to be, within my 
power or influence. I may be in such a state of mind 
that I would choose one way or another, if the mat- 
ter were within my power. I may love God for his 
retributive justice, because that justice promotes what 
I choose to promote, viz., the good and happiness of 
God's kingdom. Or a man may hate that justice, be- 
cause it opposes what he has supremely set his heart 
upon, viz., his own selfish interests. 

Let me know that there are masses of gold in the 
centre of the earth, or in the centre of the sun, and I 
could make no more choice about that mass of wealth 
and means of happiness, than if it existed only in im- 
agination. If it were within my power, then I could 
choose concerning it, but not till then, or until by some 
hallucination I might suppose it to be in my power. 

But suppose any good and the means to obtain or 
promote it to be within my power, then my choice of 
that good would imply and include the choice of the 
means necessary to obtain it. Then to choose it would 
be to obtain it. The choice of it, in such a case, would 
put that good in my possession. 

(4.) To suppose that chance would or could be the 
means of the highest happiness, or even of happiness 
equal to that which can be produced by intelligent 
design, would be to make reason a worthless, useless 
thing, and to degrade wisdom and knowledge to a level 
with ignorance and folly. And then there would be no 



Quest. 199.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 245 

obligation and no need to use our reason in the pursuit 
of happiness. All which is absurd, and therefore false. 
(5.) If different degrees and means of happiness are 
within my power, the highest degrees and the most 
efficacious means of happiness which are within my 
power, are as truly within it as the lower degrees are. 
Then to choose to obtain and promote the highest hap- 
piness in my power (if the intent and endeavor corre- 
spond to my ability), would be to obtain and promote 
that happiness. And then the choice of that happiness, 
or the aim to obtain, to produce or promote it, properly 
persevered in, would be the production or the promotion 
of it. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF BENEVOLENT UTILITY. 

It has been claimed by different and able moral phi- 
losophers in opposition to the doctrine of benevolent 
utility, that it is inconsistent with the structure of lan- 
guage and with the meaning of certain words, viz. : — 

That it perverts the true meaning of right, rectitude, 
virtue, and kindred terms in various languages ; that it 
substitutes the effect for the cause ; that, according to 
this doctrine, virtue is too nearly synonymous with 
interest, advantage, usefulness, utility, tendency to pro- 
duce, or production of happiness, expediency, and pru- 
dence ; that it leaves no room for the distinction between 
virtue and beauty, virtue and sublimity, etc. ; that it 
takes away from conscience its appropriate office, and 
from the word conscience its true meaning; that ap- 
21* 



246 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 200. 

proval would be little or nothing besides calculation of 
tendencies and results. 

In short, that the important defect of the whole 
theory is, that it does not embrace the foundation prin- 
ciple of right, and therefore can give no moral system. 

If these objections to the doctrine which we hold 
should prove to be valid, and therefore impossible to be 
removed, we should be in a sad dilemma, not knowing 
what to believe, for, if valid, they must be acknowledged 
to be weighty, and fatal to our doctrine. 

Our next object, then, must be to inquire into the 
validity of these objections. 

To begin with the terms right and rectitude. 

200. What is the legitimate meaning of the terms, 
right and rectitude ? 

There is a natural rightness, and there is a moral 
lightness, or rectitude. 

(1.) Natural rightness is the fitness of natural things 
to each other. A right line is a straight line. Its length 
is the shortest distance between two points. Its right- 
ness is its fitness to that distance, or to be the measure 
of it. A mortice is right when it is adapted to the end 
for which it is made. A tenon is right when it is fitted 
to a right mortice. A brace is right when it is fitted 
to the place and object for which it is needed in the 
building. Any timber belonging to a frame is right, 
when it is adapted to answer the purpose for which it 
is wanted in the building. A coat is right, when it is 
properly fitted to the form of the man who wears it, or 
for whom it was made. Any thing is right in this sense, 
when it is adapted to the end for which it was de- 
signed. 

Any mechanical work is right, when it is performed 
according to the rule by which such work should be 



Quest. 201.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 247 

done. The Tightness of the work consists in its fitness 
and adaptation to the rule. 

All this is natural rightness. 

(2.) Moral rightness or rectitude is the chosen, volun- 
tary adaptation of moral conduct to the moral law, which 
requires its subjects to produce the highest possible gen- 
eral amount of happiness. Moral rightness or rectitude 
is the chosen fitness of a moral act to this end. It is 
the agreeableness — the correspondence of moral acts 
with righteous law. 

Moral obligation is founded (as we have seen q. 109, 
§ 3) in the nature and relations of moral beings, by 
which they have the power and opportunity of promot- 
ing happiness, and in the nature of those things by 
which they have the means of promoting happiness, 
and it consists in the requisiteness that moral beings 
should make it their supreme and ultimate object, to 
promote, in the highest degree in their power, the uni- 
versal happiness. Moral rectitude consists in the agree- 
ableness, fitness, and adaptation of moral acts and moral 
character to this nature and to these relations. For 
these reasons we say that moral law is founded in the 
nature of things, i. e. in the nature of these things. 

That conduct which is meant to be adapted to the 
highest general happiness, is also adapted to the highest 
happiness of the agent. 

Moral rightness or rectitude, therefore, is the chosen 
adaptation of our voluntary acts to the law requiring 
the production of the highest happiness, of ourselves 
and of all others within our influence. 

201. What answer is required to the objection that 
this doctrine substitutes the effect for the cause ? 

Should it here be said, that this theory substitutes 
the effect for the cause, — that right exists before, — that 



248 NATUIIE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 201. 

it is antecedent to its production of happiness, — that 
right is the cause, and happiness is the result, and, there- 
fore, that the production of happiness is a distinct thing 
from right, and does not belong to its nature, we reply, 
This being a metaphysical objection, requires a meta- 
physical answer if any. 

(1.) Suppose that a right act precedes the production 
of happiness as much and no more than a cause pre- 
cedes the production of its effect, wUl that make the 
objection valid ? We think not. 

It would not follow from this, that the tendency and 
efficacy of virtue to produce happiness, or its production 
of happiness, does not belong to its nature. To say 
that the tendency of holiness to produce highest happi- 
ness belongs to its nature, and that its nature is to pro- 
duce highest happiness, is no more substituting the 
effect for its cause, than to say 1st. That the tendency of 
a cause to produce an effect belongs to the nature of a 
cause ; and 2d. That it is the nature of a cause to pro- 
duce an effect, is substituting the effect for the cause. 

All which this appears to amount to is, that the right 
act precedes the production of happiness logically, but 
not chronologically, — in the order of nature, but not so 
in the order of time that there should be the least space 
of time between the effect and its cause, — and not that 
virtue is not the cause of happiness, and, therefore, not 
the actual production of that happiness. 

The rule of right action must exist and be understood, 
before the right action by which the rule is to be obey- 
ed can be performed. Power to perform a right act 
must exist before a right act can be performed. But 
all this does not imply that there is any right, or right- 
ness in fact, in deed, in action, until the action is 
performed. 



Quest. 201.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 249 

Power is not cause until it is exerted in the production 
of effects ; e. g. power exerted supports a rock, and is, 
therefore, the cause which supports the rock. The cause 
produces its effect when and while the power is exerted, 
and that is while the cause exists and the power is in 
operation. 

Take another example. If you light up a blaze in a 
flash of powder, when does that blaze beg-in to shine ? 
at the time it is lighted or afterwards ? At the time 
surely. 

When does this blaze emit light? Surely while it 
burns, and not in a future time. 

When I exert my power in performing a right act, 
the act is performed, not afterwards. The exertion of 
the power is the act. Suppose that in time past I chose 
God for the portion of my soul, and for the comprehen- 
sive purpose of pleasing God, and that I actually did 
please him by doing so. If my act pleased him, I pro- 
duced pleasure in the mind of God. When did I 
please him ? At the time in which I performed the act, 
by which I pleased him, or in some later period of 
time ? To say that I pleased God after that pleasure 
of his was produced, that I performed the act by which 
I pleased him, before I pleased him, and pleased him 
after that, would be trying to make a distinction where 
there is no difference, — it would be an attempt at meta- 
physical hair-splitting where there is no hair to split, 
and like an attempt to split a mathematical Hne, or to 
divide a mathematical point. 

(2.) Again ; suppose I view in contemplation a vir- 
tuous act, thinking that I ought to perform it. " I see 
the right, and approve it too." This contemplation of 
the right produces a pleasant emotion of approval within 
me, and excites the desire to have this emotion con- 



250 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 201. 

tinued and increased by the performance of the right 
act in contemplation. Without a desire to perform the 
act, there can be no motive to perform it. And if the 
act in contemplation does not excite the feeling of 
approbation, and awaken the corresponding desire, while 
it does not, the act cannot be performed as a right act. 
But I have these emotions of approbation and a desire 
to do the right act, and, being moved by this desire, I 
perform the act, and am happy in performing it. There 
is a happiness in choosing God. To choose God or 
any other object for my portion, when happiness is all 
on the other side, is inconceivable and impossible. A 
supposed choice in which there is no happiness, is not a 
real choice. ["J^ keeping them [God's commands] there 
is great reward." Right, seen or perceived, produces 
pleasure before it is possible to perform a right act. 
The right act produces pleasure in its performance, and 
will be the ground, cause, or reason of pleasure forever 
afterwards, while remembered or thought of. Now if 
holiness is absolutely in its own nature unchangeable, 
then efficacy to produce happiness immutably belongs 
to its nature, and is an essential element of it. And 
if there were no tendency in holiness to give happi- 
ness to the agent in contemplation even before it is 
entered upon, to such an agent holiness would be an 
eternal impossibility. 

That this must be so, would seem to be irresistibly 
evident from the fact, that moral action, in order to be 
holy, must be designedly adapted to produce highest 
happiness, as the supreme and ultimate object of its 
performance. 

The very end of the moral law is to require such 
action as is, in the highest possible degree, adapted to 
produce the happiness of each obedient subject and of 



Quest. 201.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 251 

the whole universe. Action known to have no tendency 
to produce happiness, if it were among the natural pos- 
sibilities in human action, would entirely fail of being 
what the law of right requires. 

(3.) Once more : For illustration, motion is the mov- 
ing of some object. The motion is when the object 
moves, not after. Cause is the exertion of power pro- 
ducing an effect. There is no time, no extent of dura- 
tion, between the causing, producing, and production of 
the effect. The causing, producing, and production is 
one and the same, precisely identical thing. As cause 
is the exertion of power producing effects, so virtuous 
acts are the exertion of the power of action in pro- 
ducing happiness, and, therefore, virtue and the intelli- 
gent, chosen production of highest happiness in one's 
power, in our conception, is one and the same thing, the 
nature of one is the nature of the other. As the act of 
God in creating the world was the production of it, so 
his holy action in doing good to his creatures in pro- 
ducing and promoting their happiness, is the production 
and promotion of their happiness. Now, therefore, we 
are here again brought to the unavoidable conclusion, 
that the nature of virtue consists in its chosen and effi- 
cacious tendency to produce, and in its actual produc- 
tion of highest happiness. Virtue aims to produce, and 
therefore does produce, happiness, and thus is the pro- 
duction of the happiness, both of the holy agent and 
of others. 

Take away from virtue either its tendency or 
its Intention to promote highest happiness, and its 
nature is annihilated, because it would be an impossi- 
bility. 

To say that virtue is at one time, and that its produc- 
tion of happiness is exclusively in an after-time, so that 



252 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 201. 

one is not the other, appears to be an attempt to sepa- 
rate a thing from itself, or to divide indivisibility. We 
leave it to the reader to decide whether the objection 
above considered is fairly disposed of. 

But suppose that virtue precedes the happiness which 
it produces as much as a cause precedes its immediate 
effects. Suppose there is even an immeasurably short 
space of time between virtue and the happiness which 
it produces, will it not be virtue still ? 

Does not tendency to produce effects, and actual pro- 
duction of effects, belong to the nature of a cause ? Who 
can doubt it ? For the same reason, who can doubt 
that tendency to produce and production of happiness 
belongs to the nature of holiness ? 

It is not needful to the doctrine of benevolent utility, 
to suppose that virtue does not precede the happiness 
which it is designed to produce as much as a cause 
precedes its immediate effects, nor that it does not pre- 
cede the production of happiness as much as a cause 
precedes the causing or production of effects. 

Take away from a cause all tendency to produce 
effects, and you can have no cause left. So let it be an 
established fact, that no virtuous act in time to come 
shall have any tendency to promote any happiness to 
any being, and let this fact be everywhere known for 
an absolute certainty, and then not another holy act 
can ever be performed, for the all-sufficient reason, that 
in such a case there would be no object, for which it 
would be possible to perform a holy act. 

(4.) On the supposition that some anti-utilitarians 
may think that we have not answered this objection to 
their fuU satisfaction, we would remind them that it 
belongs no less to them to remove this objection, from 
its bearing upon their doctrine, than it does to us to 



Quest. 201.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 253 

remove it, from the bearing which they suppose it has 
upon the doctrine of benevolent utility. 

Let us consider, then, how this objection, if it be 
valid anywhere, bears upon the best definition of virtue 
which the wisest anti-utilitarian can give. And we 
take, for example, the following : " Virtue, as a quality, 
is that which excites the feeling of obligation, approba- 
tion, and expectation of reward." We have no objec- 
tion to this definition. It is perfectly right and good, 
as far as it goes ; only it does not show what that qual- 
ity is which excites our approbation. Every one knows 
that this feeling of approbation of an act which we 
have performed is a feeling of peculiar happiness. 

According to this definition, is not the virtue, or the 
conception of it, which excites this happy feeling, logi- 
cally before the feeling which it excites ? If our defi- 
nition of virtue in the concrete is chargeable with put- 
ting the effect for the cause, for maintaining that virtue 
is that act of the will which designedly promotes high- 
est happiness, let the anti-utilitarian show how much 
less than ours his definition of virtue is justly liable 
to the same charge. 

Now, we should like to have some wise anti-utilita- 
rian show to the world, if he can, that virtue, as a qual- 
ity, does not, in the order of nature, according to this 
definition, as really precede the happy feeling which it 
excites, as virtue, according to our definition, does pre- 
cede the happy feefings which it produces ; and then let 
him show how much less than ours his definition puts 
the effect for the cause. 

And then, in addition, let our anti-utifitarian tell the 

world how much longer, according to our theory, virtue 

exists before its production of happiness, and before the 

happiness which it produces, than virtue as a quality, ac- 

22 



254 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 202. 

cording to his theory, exists before its excitement of the 
feehng of approbation, and how much before this happy 
feeling which it excites. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 



OBJECTIONS CONTINUED. 



But to return from this digression to the considera- 
tion of the general objection, that the doctrine of be- 
nevolent utility is inconsistent with the structure of 
language and the meaning of particular terms. 

According to the doctrine of benevolent utility, 

202. What is the difference between interest and 
duty? 

(1.) My interest includes my highest happiness, and 
all the means necessary to it. The highest good of 
the universe belongs to the necessary means of my hap- 
piness, and therefore my interest includes the greatest 
good and happiness of the universe. To be more par- 
ticular, my interest includes air to breathe, food to eat, 
water to drink, clothes to wear, all my powers of body 
and mind, knowledge and the means of knowledge, — 
all those means of happiness which are involuntary and 
of course have no moral character, as well as my high- 
est holiness possible to me, or, which is the same thing, 
all the rational, voluntary, and virtuous means of my 
happiness which are in my power. My interest in- 
cludes all which my duty does, and much more. "What- 
ever is for my advantage is for my interest. 

(2.) My duty includes only the voluntary, intended, 
or virtuous means of the greatest sum of happiness in 



Quest. 203.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 255 

my power ; and yet it includes nothing which my inter- 
est does not. It is always for my highest interest to 
do my duty. My duty and my highest interest never 
clash, but always perfectly coincide. My duty includes 
only my voluntary actions ; my interest includes my 
possessions and my duty. 

Since my interest includes a great many things be- 
sides my duty, which are involuntary, and duty includes 
nothing but voluntary, rational action, which I am 
bound to perform, therefore, obligation and duty are as 
far from being synonymous with interest, according to 
the doctrine of benevolent rectitude, as holiness is from 
being synonymous with happiness, or possessions with 
action. 

203. What is the difference between virtuousness and 
usefulness ? 

(1.) Mere usefulness, or tendency to produce happi- 
ness, or direct tendency to add to the sum of general 
happiness, or to individual happiness, or the mere pro- 
duction of happiness, is not virtue. All this belongs 
to the labor of an ox. 

Intelligence, truth known, has a very direct and pow- 
erful tendency to produce happiness, and a higher hap- 
piness in kind and degree, taking in the whole of 
duration, than any thing else would have that could be 
substituted in its place. Mere unintended, involuntary, 
unknown, and unthought-of tendency of any kind, how- 
ever direct or powerful, is not virtuousness, nor any ap- 
proximation to it. There may be, even, intelligent and 
voluntary production of some happiness where there is 
no virtue, and naught but sin. Sin produces some hap- 
piness, and may prevent some pain, or there would be 
no temptation nor motive to commit it. And then 
there would be no possibility of committing it, any 



256 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 203. 

more than there is of practising holiness according to 
the anti-utilitarian theories. 

(2.) Every thing- that promotes happiness is useful 
But nothing is virtuous but that which is intelligently 
and benevolently useful. Many more things are means 
of happiness, and are useful, than are benevolent or 
virtuous. This useful quality belongs to every thing, 
except happiness, which has any value, and constitutes 
all the real value that pertains to every thing ; that is, 
it constitutes all that the term value expresses, and 
which belongs to all these things, except happiness. 

There may be voluntary usefulness, in a narrow, con- 
tracted sense, where the greatest usefulness in one's 
power is not intended ; but there can be no holy benev- 
olence where the greatest usefulness known to be in 
one's power is not chosen or designed. Virtue is be- 
nevolent usefulness. It is rational, chosen, highest vol- 
untary usefulness. No other usefulness is virtuous. All 
other usefulness is not virtue. 

A good citizen and a kind neighbor, who is truthful 
and honest in all his pecuniary transactions, but who 
has no holiness, may be useful in many ways. But the 
usefulness of any man is not holiness, if he does not 
intend the highest general usefulness known to be in 
his power. " If I give all my goods to feed the poor, 
and have not charity," — if it be done from a lower ob- 
jective motive than the highest general welfare, — there 
is no virtue in all this. Whatever usefulness there may 
be in it, promotion of highest good and usefulness in 
my power is not intended, and therefore there is no vir- 
tue, no impartial love to the general well-being in it 
all. All unintended usefulness is not virtue ; i. e. no un- 
intended usefulness is virtue. 

Any undesigned result, any unintended, involuntary, 



Quest. 203.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 257 

unthought-of production of happiness which could not 
at all be expected, according to the common course 
of things, to appertain to an action, however intelligent 
the action may be, constitutes no part of the true ele- 
ments of virtue. I may read a chapter in the Bible for 
mere sport, or I may sing a scriptural anthem only to 
make money to use for a selfish purpose, and my sing- 
ing and reading may be unintentionally productive of 
the conversion of a sinner to righteousness, and, be- 
sides this, may tend to the general good in other ways ; 
but this production of good, and all supposable ten- 
dencies to good, which may be the accidental conse- 
quence of those acts, are not virtuous in any degree, 
because the acts in question are not intended to pro- 
duce any such results as here supposed, nor the highest 
good in any way ; they were performed with no such 
design. And, as a matter of fact, they are not produc- 
tive of so much good as they would be if they had 
been done for the right end and object, viz. the* highest 
good. This action is from a lower motive than the 
highest good, and therefore does not tend to the highest 
good, as actions from the higher motives do. Action 
in which the highest good known to be in our power 
is not intended, cannot be said even to tend to the 
highest good. Perfect holiness, or the supreme inten- 
tion to promote the highest happiness in our power, 
secures higher good than can be promoted in any other 
way. Nothing else will so satisfy the demands of our 
own conscience, and secure that feeling of peculiar joy 
and satisfaction which attends and follows the appro- 
bation which reason and conscience give to benevolent 
usefulness. 

Benevolent intention gives higher satisfaction to be- 
holders, especially to such as are holy witnesses, and to 
22* 



258 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 204. 

all holy beings, to whom the knowledge of such iaten- 
tion may come, than any other intention does. Noth- 
ing is holy that is not in any way useful. All perfect 
holiness is the highest possible voluntary usefulness. 
But mere usefulness is not holiness. 

204. What is the difference between the usefulness 
of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, and the usefulness 
of benevolence, — between virtue and beauty, — virtue 
and grandeur, — virtue and sublimity ? 

Whatever is grand or subhme excites feelings of 
peculiar pleasure, and is so far useful and good. But 
in this there is no voluntary usefulness. Neither beauty, 
grandeur, nor sublimity is a design to promote happi- 
ness, and therefore is not virtue. The usefulness of 
these qualities is not voluntary usefulness, — it is not 
the intended production of highest happiness. 

The usefulness of created qualities is a very different 
thing from the usefulness of benevolence, which is the 
production of happiness by the design of a rational 
being, and is, therefore, voluntary usefulness or virtue. 
Virtuousness consists in the qualities of moral acts, 
which make them virtuous. Beauty, sublimity, and 
grandeur are qualities of objects which have no moral 
character. As such they are not moral qualities. 

Beauty presents itself to the imagination mainly 
through the eye or the ear. It pertains to many created 
objects as a quality of those objects, — to many animals 
and inanimate things, — to many of the works of na- 
ture and art. It pertains to sounds, as in music, elo- 
quence of speaking or reading, and even to thought 
and style. Virtuousness pertains only to voluntary and 
designed usefulness, or to voluntary action. 

Sublimity pertains to exhibitions of vast power, to 
vast objects, great and high mountains, extended plains. 



Quest. 205.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 259 

rivers, oceans, the sun and moon and starry heavens, — 
to courage, daring in the midst of great danger to 
secure objects of sufficient importance. A mighty 
general conducting the movements of an army in the 
midst of battle, is much more often an object of sub- 
limity than he is a virtuous man. There may be great 
sublimity in a man's sacrificing his life to save a city, 
when there is no virtue in the act. The term beauty is 
sometimes used in a figurative sense, to mean virtue 
itself, and the term beautiful to mean the virtuous 
quality of moral acts. 

" Whatever controversies and variety of opinions there 
are about the nature of virtue, yet aU (excepting some 
skeptics, v^ho deny any real difference between virtue 
and vice) mean by it something beautiful^ or rather 
some kind of beauty^ or excellency. It is not all beauty 
that is called vktue ; for instance, not the beauty of a 
building, of a flower, or of the rainbow ; but some 
beauty belonging to beings that have perception and 
will. It is not aU beauty of mankind; for instance, not 
the external beauty of the countenance or shape or 
gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice ; but it is 
a beauty which has its original seat in the mind. But 
yet perhaps not every thing that is called a beauty of 
mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of 
understanding and speculation. There is something in 
the ideas and conceptions of great philosophers and 
statesmen, that may be called beautiful ; which is a 
different thing from what is most commonly meant by 
virtue. But virtue is the beauty of those qualities and 
acts of the mind that are of a moral nature ; i. e. such 
as are attended with desert or worthiness of praise or 
blame. ^^ — Edwards on the Nat. of Vir. chap. 1. 

205. What, upon the true doctrine of benevolence, is 



260 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 205. 

the difference between virtue and calculation of ten- 
dencies and results ? 

Virtue is obedience to a known law. Some calcula- 
tions are necessary, sometimes, to find out what the 
law requires in particular cases. Undoubtedly duty 
requires, and that quite often, that such calculations 
should be made. And when made in obedience to the 
call of duty, it is difficult to see what else they can be 
but virtuous calculations. How any theory" of virtue 
can be devised which will remove the necessity of such 
calculations, may not be easily conceived. 

When a man counts the cost of different kinds of 
action, for the purpose of deciding upon the right and 
benevolent, and for the purpose of acting rightly, his 
calculation is virtuous. All virtue involves either a 
calculation, or an intuitive perception, of the different 
tendencies and adaptation to different results, which 
belong to different actions, before it could be determined 
whether such actions could be performed with a benev- 
olent intention or not. When a man calculates what 
it shall profit him if he gain the whole world and lose 
his own soul, for the purpose of a righteous decision, 
and then acts according to such decision, virtue is in- 
volved, both in the calculation and the subsequent ac- 
tion. 

Obligation, duty, requires that all the calculation 
should be made which is necessary to ascertain what 
actions we ought to perform. 

Although it is an important part of the business of 
life to find out by calculation what our duty is, it by no 
means follows that to do what we know to be our duty, 
is not a much greater part. When a person makes a 
calculation, not for the purpose of subserving the highest 
good, whether it be to obtain money or fame, or any 



Quest. 206.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 261 

other object, his calculation has no virtue in it. It is 
rather sinful. The same rules should be adopted in 
deciding the moral character of any process of calcula- 
tion, which ought to be employed in determining the 
moral character of any other voluntary procedure. 
(See q. 146.) 

206. What, upon the true theory of virtue, is the 
difference between calculation and approbation ? 

To approve sometimes means to approbate or ex- 
press approbation. But more strictly speaking, appro- 
bation is the perception of the rectitude of an action. 
It is the mind's judgment or cognition that a moral 
action is right. Calculation is sometimes a necessary 
preliminary to the formation of such a judgment or 
cognition. Approbation is either an intuitive percep- 
tion, judgment, or cognition that an action is right, or 
it is a judgment that an action is right, based upon 
calculation or testimony. 

207. What is the difference between mere intellectual 
and virtuous wisdom ? 

Mere intellectual wisdom is a skilful perception or 
discernment of the adaptation of means to any kind of 
ends. In this simply, there is no virtue. A man may 
be as wise as a serpent, and have no virtue. He may 
be wise to do evil, and, at the same time, " to do good 
have no knowledge " or disposition or intention. 

Virtuous wisdom implies an intelligent perception, 
and the chosen use of the best means to accomplish 
the best ends ; or an intelligent and voluntary adapta- 
tion of the best means to the best ends. 

208. What is the difference between prudence and 
virtue ? 

Perfect holiness is the highest prudence. 



262 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 209. 

No action is holy which is inconsistent with the most 
consummate prudence. Sin is consummate impru- 
dence. 

Prudence consists in a wise forethought of the natu- 
ral results, which may be expected from our actions, 
and in a skilful care to avoid danger and secure good. 
Needless exposure to danger and the loss of good is 
both imprudence and sin. " The prudent man foreseeth 
the evil and hideth himself, but the simple pass on and 
are punished," — punished for their imprudent simplic- 
ity, which, of course, must be sin. So far as prudence 
or imprudence partakes of a moral character, it impHes 
the voluntary exercise and choice of the mind. 

It is prudent to meet danger resolutely and promptly, 
when by so doing greater danger can be avoided. Pru- 
dence requires that a man should take care of his 
health, safety, and property. It is prudent in summer 
to lay up food for winter, and in prosperity to prepare 
for adversity. There may be much of these lower 
kinds of prudence where there is no virtue, because the 
highest good is not regarded. 

There is no virtue in that prudence, in which there is 
no regard to the highest good. " I wisdom dwell with 
prudence," ' and nowhere else. Prudence belongs to my 
nature. The prudence with which I dwell, being an 
element of my nature, is a virtuous prudence.' 

209. Can the prudence of holy action be distin- 
guished from its holiness ? 

Take away from any action all that regard to the 
highest good which is demanded by the highest pru- 
dence, and you will have no holiness left. Intelligent 
prudence is an essential element in the nature of holi- 
ness. The prudence of holiness is a holy prudence. 



Quest. 210.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 263 

" It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that it 
is impossible to be properly virtuous without pru- 
dence." — Aristotle's Ethics, p. 175. 

The difference between mere worldly prudence and 
holy prudence is as plain as the difference between a 
mere regard for personal safety, and the highest regard 
for universal well-being. 

210. What is the difference between expediency and 
right action ? 

Rectitude is the highest, broadest, most comprehen- 
sive voluntary expediency. To fulfil moral obligation 
is always in the highest degree expedient, but never 
inexpedient. Sin, in this comprehensive sense, is never 
expedient, but consummately inexpedient. Expediency 
and rectitude both refer to voluntary conduct. 

Men sometimes call that expedient which they know 
is not right, such means, for instance, as are adapted to 
gain the objects of their unrighteous pursuit. Expedi- 
ency sometimes signifies the adaptation of means to 
ends, without any regard to the moral character of the 
means or ends. That meaning of expediency which 
is inconsistent with rectitude, is a narrow and un- 
worthy sense, though not very uncommon. 

That which is expedient, in the most comprehensive 
sense, will be found to be always coincident with what 
is right and obligatory. 

About the same difi'erence obtains between right and 
expedient, as between right and prudent. Prudence is 
always expedient. To regard one's safety and health 
merely, is both prudent and expedient, in a lower sense 
than virtuous expediency. It is expedient to be kind 
and amiable and to give alms, but these and a thousand 
other expedient things may be done w^ithout performing 
a virtuous act. All these things may be done because 
they are expedient in relation to selfish ends, and, of 



264 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 211. 

course, not because they are right, and expedient to 
obtain the highest good. The vilest men may regard 
the safety of their persons, possessions, friends, and 
country, because it is expedient, and at the same time 
have no regard to what is right, and no regard to the 
highest good and happiness of the universe, nor to the 
authority of God. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

OBJECTIONS CONTINUED. 

211. Does the doctrine of benevolent rectitude and 
utility take away from conscience, as a complex fac- 
ulty, its appropriate office, or from the term conscience 
its true meaning ? 

Some things said of conscience in Chapter XIIL 
would apply here, but to give a full answer to this 
question, there are some other things to be considered. 

Conscience is a complex faculty, having two offices. 
The first is to decide what actions are right and what 
actions are wrong ; the second is to exercise the feel- 
ings of the sensibility appropriate to these two kinds 
of action. 

(1.) Reason and conscience, employed in perceiving 
the moral character of voluntary actions, is the same 
faculty. It is in the exercise of our reason and con- 
science that we decide what action is right and what 
is v^ong. We decide the tendencies of actions by their 
perceived and known results. By the designed and 
known tendencies and results of an action, conscience 
decides its moral nature. 

In the use of our conscience and reason, we know 



Quest. 211.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 265 

that no action, that nothing is of a moral nature, which 
does not involve choice, purpose, design, or intention. 
Whatever action we know is designed to do injury, to 
promote pain or misery, we, in the use of our reason 
and conscience, know to be wrong. " The moment 
unnecessary pain is inflicted, sin is committed." What- 
ever action we know to spring from the design to pro- 
duce the highest happiness in one's power for all within 
the reach of his influence, that action conscience de- 
cides to be right, virtuous, and holy ; e. g. God makes 
us happy by " sending us rain from heaven, and fruitful 
seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." By 
this we know he designs to make us happy, because in 
this way he does make us happy. By the effects and 
results of his design, we know so far what that design 
is; and by these we know its tendencies and moral 
natm-e to be holy, right, and good. To know these 
things, is the first department of conscience. 

(2.) When conscience, in its fijst office, perceives the 
right or wrong of any moral acts of ourselves or others, 
its second office is to excite and exercise, in the sensi- 
bility of the soul, the appropriate feelings of approba- 
tion and complacency, or of disapprobation and displeas- 
ure and disgust. When conscience decides our own 
designs and doings to be right, it excites the involun- 
tary feelings of self-approbation, a happy feeling of 
complacency, of peculiar joy. When conscience per- 
ceives our conduct and pm-poses to be wrong, it excites 
the involuntary feelings of disapprobation, disgust, self- 
condemnation, self-reproach, and remorse, in diff"erent 
degrees. 

Thus we see the office of conscience is complex, in- 
volving the intellectual perception of the moral quality, 
the right and wrong of actions, and exciting the appro- 
23 



266 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 212. 

priate feelings in the sensibility of the soul. Conscience 
does not cognize right and wrong as pertaining to the 
phenomena of the intellect, nor of the sensibility, but 
of the will. 

In the two offices of conscience we see its true na- 
ture, and the correct meaning of the term. 

212. What is a good and tender conscience ? 
When, in the exercise of our reason, we perceive that 

our supreme purpose in all we do is to promote the 
highest good and happiness of all within our influence, 
we have the testimony of what is called in Scripture a 
good conscience, a conscience void of offence toward 
God and man. When our reason, properly and faith- 
fully exercised, decides our intentions to be right, then 
we have a good and pure conscience. A tender con- 
science is quick to feel, in view of any even the small- 
est wrongs of ourselves or others, and of course it im- 
plies a quick perception of wrong. 

213. What is a guilty, or an evil conscience ? 
When reason, appropriately exercised, condemns our 

conduct as sinful, we have a guilty or an evil con- 
science. 

214. What is meant by a seared and hardened con- 
science ? 

When, by continued practice in sin, our sensibility 
becomes so stupefied, and we are so slow to feel, that 
we have little or no feeling in view of sin, either our 
own or that of others, our consciences may be said to 
be hardened and seared as with a hot iron. A sensi- 
bility which is slow to feel, in view of sin, is a hardened 
conscience. 

215. How can a person be certain that his conscience 
will guide him in the way of holiness ? 

We have seen (q. 149), that conscience is God's vice- 



Quest. 216.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 267 

gerent in the soul, and as such has a rightful authority 
to control the actions of our wills. Therefore, appro- 
priately exercised, conscience must guide ns right. In 
order to be certain that conscience does guide us right, 
we must be certain that we make the best use of our 
reason, the Bible, and other means in our power to en- 
lighten our conscience, and then be sure that we follow 
where conscience leads, and it will not fail to guide us 
in the way of holiness. In this way, conscience may be 
an infallible guide, a guide that will not fail. 

" Morality requires, not only that a man should act 
according to his judgment, but that he should use the 
best mea*ns in his power that his judgment be accord- 
ing to truth. If he fail in either of these points, he is 
worthy of blame; but, if he fail in neither, I see not 
wherein he can be blamed." — Dr. Reid on the Active 
Powers, Essay V. chap. 4. 

216. Why does conscience decide some actions to be 
virtuous, and others sinful ? 

Conscience perceives that some actions of the will 
have such an efficacious tendency to produce, that they 
actually do produce, the highest happiness in the agent's 
power. It also perceives that those acts of the will 
which produce such results are designed to produce 
them, and that a design to produce the highest happi- 
ness in our power is therefore the voluntary, chosen 
production of that happiness. For these reasons, con- 
science decides that such actions are virtuous. 

Those actions of the will w^hich conscience perceives 
are not designed to produce such results, and because 
they are not so designed do not produce such results as 
the highest happiness, but the opposite results of deep- 
est misery, for these reasons, conscience decides to be 
wrong. This decision of conscience, that certain acts 



268 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 217. 

of the will are right and others wrong, is an exercise of 
the reason, and not of the sensibility. 

217. What answer does unperverted reason give to 
the question, Why am I bound to be benevolent ? 

To say that I am bound to be benevolent because I 
am, instead of giving an answer, is rather an implicit 
confession that I cannot give an answer, or to claim 
that no answer is needed. If benevolence, and not 
happiness, were ultimate^ this might be a proper answer, 
as far as any answer could be. 

But conscience affirms a reason can be given why I 
am bound to be benevolent, and that reason is, because 
by benevolence I can promote the most valuable happi- 
ness in kind and degree. Or, I am bound to be benev- 
olent because this is the way, and the only way, to 
promote the highest happiness in my power, and be- 
cause happiness, and not holiness, is ultimate good. 

218. Why, then, am I bound to be voluntarily useful? 
I am bound to be useful to the extent of my ability, 

for precisely the same reason that I am bound to be 
benevolent. No reason can be given why I am bound 
to be benevolent, which is not just as good a reason, 
why I am bound to be useful. Voluntary highest use- 
fulness is benevolence, and nothing else besides volun- 
tary usefulness is benevolence. 

219. What, then, is the ultimate or last reason that 
conscience can give for fulfilling moral obligation ? 

(1.) The ultimate or last objective reason, that can 
be given for fulfilling moral obligation, is, that happiness 
is the only ultimate and absolute good, and that the 
highest happiness of the universe is the highest and best 
conceivable objective object, that can be accompHshed 
by holy action. 

(2.) The last subjective reason that can be given for 



Quest. 219.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 269 

holy action is, that by this only can the agent's highest 
happiness be secured. To sum up these two reasons in 
one, the adaptation of holy action to promote the high- 
est possible amount of universal happiness, is the last 
reason that an enlightened and rational conscience can 
give for fulfilling moral obligation; because this in- 
cludes both the ultimate objective object and the ulti- 
mate subjective object of holy action. 

The ultimate object of holy action must be the last 
reason that can be appropriately asked for or given for 
such action. Bear in mind here that the object of holy 
action implies a desire for that object. 

If happiness is the only good complete in itself, and, 
therefore, the only absolute good, and if the highest 
general happiness is the only possible ultimate object 
of holy action, the man who cannot see that he is 
bound to perform a kind of actions, because they will 
promote the highest general happiness, must, for aught 
we can do for him, be left to his bhndness. How a man, 
who cannot see this, can be a moral agent and be under 
moral law, we cannot understand. We do not believe 
there is such a man, who has common sense, in the world. 

N. B. — If any one should say that the last and aU 
the reason that can be given why we are bound to be 
holy, has not been given above, let him undertake to 
tell why two and two are four and no more, why one is 
not two, why rc^nd is not square, why black is not 
white, and why absurdity is not real, absolute truth. 
We are here wilhng to leave it for the reader to judge 
whether there is any thing in the doctrine of benevolent 
utility which is inconsistent with the structure of lan- 
guage and the meaning of terms, especially with the 
meaning and office of conscience, and the true nature 
and foundation and extent of moral obligation. 
23* 



270 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Qukst. 220. 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE DIFFERENT TENDENCIES OF BENEVOLENCE TO PROMOTE 
HAPPINESS. 

220. What are some of the most important tenden- 
cies of benevolence to promote happiness ? 

The most important forms in which the tendencies 
of benevolence to promote happiness are manifested, 
are included in the three following. 

Benevolence tends to confer happiness 

(1.) Upon those who approve it; 

(2.) Upon those who are the objects of it ; and 

(3.) Upon those who practice it. 

(1.) Benevolence tends to confer happiness upon 
those who approve it. When men behold conduct, 
whether performed by themselves or others, which they 
judge to be holy, virtuous, or right, or which they ap- 
prove; when they witness an intention of promoting 
happiness, or contemplate their own performance of a 
right action in future, there is a pleasurable feeling pro- 
duced in their minds by this approving judgment, some- 
times called the feeling of approbanon. Men enjoy 
this feeling in different degrees, whether they practice 
virtue or not. This feeling, in view of rectitude, is the 
natural production of virtue, in connection with our 
moral constitution. This feeling, as a motive, is of 
needful influence to the extent of being indispensable 
to the possibihty of a holy act. With all men its in- 
fluence is indispensable. It has an extensive, powerful, 



Quest. 220.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 271 

and salutary influence with a large majority, if not with 
all unholy men, to keep them back fi:om sin, and to 
induce them to turn from sin to righteousness, to the 
practice of virtue. 

How much the pleasure which even ungodly men 
enjoy in this hfe, depends upon their approbation of the 
right, it is impossible to decide. Their well-being, how- 
ever, must to a great extent depend upon their percep- 
tion and approval of the right. 

There is a pleasure in the approval of right. And 
the whole amount of pleasure, thus derived by the uni- 
verse of moral agents, is great. 

(2.) Benevolence confers happiness upon all sentient 
beings who are the objects of it. By it, how many 
hearts, needing consolation and relief from aU the varie- 
ties of suffering which flesh is heir to, have been made 
to sing for joy. By the benevolent, the naked are 
clothed, the hungry are fed, the distressed are comforted 
and made happy, the debased are exalted, the ignorant 
are instructed, the vicious are reclaimed, made holy and 
happy. 

Who can estimate the amount of happiness thus 
secured to the objects of benevolence ? 

All sensitive creatures, rational and irrational, are the 
objects of God's benevolence. All the happiness they 
enjoy, more or less directly depends upon, and is the 
fruit, the intended result, of his love and good-will. All 
created beings depend upon God for all their powers 
and means to obtain, and capacities to enjoy, happiness. 
All the happiness in the universe of every Idnd and 
degree, therefore, in an important sense depends on the 
goodness of God. But for this no creature could exist 
to be happy. 

(3.) Benevolence is, by the intrinsic tendency of its 



272 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 220. 

nature, a source of joy to those who practice it. They 
who practice virtue, derive happiness from it in two 
ways, 

1st. From their own practice of it. Benevolence con- 
fers a higher happiness upon its subjects, than is possible 
for it to confer upon its objects who are not holy. Holi- 
ness as a practice, a pursuit, a life, is an indispensable 
want. It is the one needful thing, without which that 
happiness which it is the end of our being to enjoy for 
ourselves, and to promote for others, can never be 
attained. 

Holiness satisfies the demands of reason and con- 
science. The satisfaction that arises in the mind from 
the exercise of benevolence, — from the testimony of a 
good conscience, is a very peculiar happiness ; it is the 
most excellent and valuable happiness enjoyed by the 
human mind. No other happiness can equal it in kind 
or degree. " Blessed is the man that walketh not in the 
counsel of the ungodly. . . . His delight is in the law 
of the Lord." Ps. i. " It is more blessed to give than 
to receive." Acts 20 : 35. 

" Virtue alone is happiness below." 

" Holiness is the joy of heaven." 

" No joy can be compared to this, 
To serve and please the Lord." 

The nature and tendency of righteousness is to exalt 
in glory, honor, and happiness any individual, nation, 
or community that will practice it, on earth, or in any 
location within the dominions of Jehovah. " Righteous- 
ness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any peo- 
ple." Prov. 14 : 3, 4. 

2d. They who practice benevolence derive happiness 
from loving its practice by other moral beings. AU 



Quest. 220.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 273 

who practice holiness love its practice when they wit- 
ness it in others. The love of holiness includes the 
love of happiness, and of all beings which are capable 
either of happiness or of both happiness and hoHness, 
so that to love holiness includes the love of every ob- 
ject which is worthy of love. Holiness, as an object of 
love, can never come in competition with the love of 
any object that is worthy to be loved, because the love 
of hoUness comprehensively includes the love of every 
worthy object. For these reasons, no object of love 
can be superior to hoUness as a source of happiness. 

Love, in all its senses, voluntary and involuntary, — 
love to an object implies pleasure derived in some way 
from that object. From the nature of mind no object 
can be loved which is not to the mind in some way a 
source of pleasure. The tendency of holiness to confer 
happiness upon those who love it, is that which malies 
it an object of the intensest interest, and of love to holy 
beings, who have made trial of it, and know by their 
own experience what it is. And tliis is one thing 
which commends benevolence to the complacential love 
of all rational beings. As a general rule, holiness, con- 
templated in others, affords as much happiness to the 
person who contemplates it, as he has of a voluntary, 
complacential love for it. " Great peace have they that 
love thy law." Ps. 119 : 165. In the complacential, 
voluntary love of virtue there is a kind and degree of 
joy, which is not found in mere approbation of right. 
What this joy is, he alone who feels it knows. By the 
love and practice of benevolence this wide world might 
have been a habitation of blessedness, and all of its 
inhabitants might have been rendered eternally blessed 
and happy. 

Let us now consider what bearing this view of the 



274 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 221. 

tendencies of benevolence to promote happiness has 
upon the question, 

221. Do these tendencies of benevolence belong to 
its moral nature ? 

To bring this question to a fair trial here^ let us, as 
far as it is possible, suppose all these tendencies of 
benevolence to promote happiness to be entirely sepa- 
rated from it. 

Separate from benevolence in thought, 

(1.) Its tendency to secure the approbation of moral 
beings, and the feelings of peculiar happiness conse- 
quent upon that approbation. 

(2.) Its tendency to make its objects happy. 

(3.) Its tendency to promote the happiness of those 
who practice it, and exercise towards it complacential 
love. 

Were all these tendencies to be removed from benev- 
olence, its nature would be annihilated, and there would 
then be, in none of its senses, abstract or concrete, any 
holiness left. There would be nothing left that can be 
approved, and, therefore, nothing which can excite the 
consequent feeling of approbation, — nothing to please 
its beholders, nor those who practice and love it. Noth- 
ing to please God nor any holy being, — nothing left to 
excite in any mind a desire to practice it, nothing in its 
nature left in which benevolence can be exercised^ and, 
therefore, there would be no possibility left that holi- 
ness should have an object, an approver, or an agent, 
to approve, to love, or to practice it, or to be benefited 
by it. 

This supposition, then, if it could be and should be 
realized, would destroy all possibility of the existence 
of holiness, and all its value^ if its existence were a 
possibility. 



Quest. 222.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 275 



CHAPTER XXI. 

THE ELEMENTS OF RIGHT AND WRONG ACTS, WHICH CONSTI- 
TUTE THEM RIGHT OR WRONG. 

Having established the doctrine that no other than 
acts of the will can be morally right or wrong, in the 
light of the previous discussion, let us now consider the 
following question : — 

222. What makes certain acts of the will right, and 
certain other acts of the will wrong ? 

Certain voluntary acts of the mind are right because, 
(1.) They are designed to promote the general well- 
being in the wisest manner, and to the highest degree 
in the agent's power, that is, they are benevolent. 
(2.) And these benevolent acts are right, because this 
is the rational way, and the only way, in which this 
object can be accomplished. (3.) And because this 
object includes every object which can be included 
in the ultimate end of all benevolent action, and ex- 
cludes every other object. (4.) This is the right and 
the only right ultimate object of moral action, because 
happiness is the only absolute and ultimate good, and 
because the greatest amount of general happiness, and 
that which promotes and secures it includes aU that 
belongs to and constitutes the greatest conceivable 
good, viz. the greatest sum total of universal holiness 
and happiness. 

For example, you saved a drowning man's life, and 
you did this not by accident, but by design, and strenu- 



276 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 222. 

ous effort for that end. If this act was performed in 
fulfilment of a supreme purpose to add as much as you 
can to the general happiness, then it accomplished that 
result, and it was right for the two reasons that it did 
accomplish, and was intelligently designed to accom- 
plish, the best result in your power. The moral rela- 
tion of that act to the best result in your power, 
consisting in the happiness produced, was, that it was 
the intelligently designed cause of its promotion, and 
this relation to the object was what made this action 
right, benevolent, and useful, or benevolent usefulness. 
It was right for the twofold reason that it was, and was 
designed to be, useful. By having this relation, that is, 
by being what it was, it was the fulfilment of obligation. 
That it was not useful merely and only because it was 
right, appears to be self-evident. It was the design to 
save which saved the man, and not the moral rightness 
of the design which saved him. If you had saved the 
man for a selfish purpose, he would nevertheless have 
been saved, but your act would not have been virtuous. 
Supremely selfish men save others from drowning, 
without performing virtuous acts. 

The rationally supposed tendency of your efforts to 
save the man, constituted an essential element in the 
ground of your obligation to make those efforts. Sup- 
pose you had been standing upon the bank of Niagara, 
and you had seen the man going over the falls, where 
you would have known that all the efforts in your power 
would have no tendency to save him. Then this known 
want of tendency in any efforts within your power, 
would have shown that you was under no obligation 
to make them. For these reasons, that which makes 
an intention right is, that it has a right object, and a 
rationally supposed tendency to gain that object. 



Quest. 223.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 277 

The foundation of the obligation lies in the agent's 
power to fulfil it, in accomplishing the object aimed at. 
This relation, above designated, of the intention to its 
object, constitutes this act of the will right, or this rela- 
tion of the act is its rectitude, or rightness or adapta- 
tion, or efficacious tendency to produce, or its produc- 
tion of, happiness. It is no essential matter by which 
of these terms you designate it. It will be the same 
thing in substance, whatever name is given to it. 

223. Why are certain acts of the will wrong ? 
Certain acts of the will are wrong, because they are 

not designed to promote the highest general good, and 
because they are designed to accomplish some less, 
lower, partial, or selfish object, and thus they wilfully 
hinder, rather than promote happiness, and instead 
thereof, produce misery. K an act be done for a less 
noble object, and from a lower motive than a desire to 
add to the general happiness, it will be selfish, and 
wiU not promote the general good, but prevent it and 
promote misery, and therefore it will not have that rela- 
tion to the general good, which constitutes its rightness 
or rectitude, but it will have that relation which consti- 
tutes its wrongness, its ^^righteousness. 

If we do not know an act to have either of these 
relations, we cannot know it to be either right or wrong. 
To know an act to be right, is to know it to be from 
the higher motive. To know it to be wrong is to know 
it to be from the lower motive. We must have some 
conception of highest good, before we can aim at it, — 
before we can choose between the higher and the lower 
good. 

224. Is it certain that a design to advance the general 
good will accomplish that result ? 

Let it be remembered that our obligations are meas- 
24 



278 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 225. 

ured by our abilities. When we do all we can and in 
the wisest manner which our talents will admit, to ad- 
vance the highest good, nothing can be morally more 
certain, than that the highest good will be advanced to 
the extent of our power. Nothing can be more certain 
than that supreme, impartial, universal benevolence, 
when exercised to the extent of our ability, will pro- 
mote the general welfare. 

* The objection has been made to the doctrine of 
utilitarians, that many right acts do not tend to highest 
happiness. But utilitarians have always triumphed.' 
By the necessity of its nature, virtue always does and 
always will tend to the highest universal happiness, and 
it will accomplish the highest amount of happiness in 
the agent's power, when that power is, to the extent of 
his obligation, exerted. To suppose that benevolence 
should not tend to happiness, is the supposition of a 
mere absurdity. Therefore, in an argument to prove 
that tendency to produce happiness does not belong to 
the nature of holiness, it does not amount to much, to 
say that ' benevolence is right, let it tend which way it 
will,' so long as it will tend to happiness, and so long as it 
forever will promote the highest happiness in the agent's 
power, when his obligations are fully complied with. 

The certainty of this truth implies that the produc- 
tion of happiness belongs to the nature of virtue, and, 
therefore, the primary ground, cause, or reason why an 
act is right, is its chosen adaptation and efficacy, or 
its intent and tendency to promote the highest happi- 
ness in the agent's power. 

225. But is it not also true, that a right act pro- 
duces happiness, because it is right ? 

Certainly. A right act is not only right, because by 
design it produces highest happiness, but a right act, in 



Quest. 225.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 279 

certain ways, produces some kinds of happiness, because 
by its design and tendency it is right. 

(1.) The pleasant feeling of approval in those who 
merely approve of right acts, without practising them, 
is produced by the rightness of those acts. That be- 
nevolent acts produce this happiness, is an effect and an 
evidence of their rectitude, but the primary ground of 
this approbation is, that these acts were designed and 
thus fitted to promote highest happiness. Here, then, 
is an incontestable case in which right acts produce 
happiness, because they are right, and in consequence 
of their being right. 

(2.) Right acts please holy beings, because those acts 
are right, and they are pleased in consequence of those 
acts being right. But the primary -reason, why these 
acts please, is, that they were designed and fitted for 
the promotion of happiness. Holy beings love holi- 
ness primarily, because it is the designed promotion of 
happiness. And then, secondarily, it produces their 
happiness, and thus secures their love, or it induces 
them to love it, because of its original promotion of 
happiness. 

(3.) We have seen (q. 201, ans. 2) that a right act, 
viewed in contemplation before it is performed, pro- 
duces some happiness in the mind which excites the 
desire to perform it. But this happiness is produced 
and this desire is excited by the contemplation of the 
act, because the act is viewed as a design to promote, 
and, therefore, adapted to promote happiness. 

(4.) Again ; let a holy mind contemplate a holy law, 
— brightness in the abstract — he is pleased ; his happiness 
is produced by this contemplation of its requirements, 
but the primary ground of this pleasure is, that this law 
requires the promotion of happiness. 



280 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 225. 

(5.) Once more ; the testimony of a good conscience 
makes a man happy, because he has performed right 
acts. But the primary ground of this happiness, aris- 
ing from the approval of his own conscience is, that the 
Tightness of the acts which his conscience approves, 
consists in their designed tendency to promote happi- 
ness. 

In the light of these psychological facts, we are pre- 
pared to see the fallacy of the first part of the follow- 
ing statement, and the truth of the last part of it, " that 
a right act is not right because it produces happiness, 
but it produces happiness because it is right ; " inasmuch 
as an act is right originally, because it designedly pro- 
motes highest happiness, and secondarily, it promotes 
happiness because it is right. The truth denied in the 
above statement is of primary importance, while that 
asserted is only of secondary importance. 

The eternal, universal, immutable, and indestructible 
law of moral action requires every moral agent to pro- 
mote as much happiness as he can, by the wisest and 
best use of all his powers. Every act of obedience 
which fulfils what this law requires, is right. Its right- 
ness or rectitude consists in its conformity or fitness to 
the law, or its agreeableness to the truth implied or 
contained in the law. This law requires its subjects to 
act according to their nature and relations to each other. 
The binding power, the obligation of this law, is there- 
fore founded in the power of its subjects to obey it, or 
in their power to promote happiness. 

When benevolence entirely fulfils this law, it is right, 
and its rightness consists in being what it is, that is, in 
being what the law requires. And it is the intelligent, 
voluntary, designed promotion of the highest happiness 
in our power, when it is a complete fulfilment of obli- 
gation. 



Quest. 225.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 281 



CHAPTER XXII. 

THE IDEA OF RIGHT NOT A SIMPLE IDEA. 

It is claimed that right, rightness, rectitude, virtu- 
ousness, or holiness, is a simple and not a complex idea, 
and that it is a necessary and not a contingent idea, 
and therefore the doctrine of benevolent utility is erro- 
neous, because, according to it, right is a complex and 
a contingent idea. In proof that the doctrine of benev- 
olent utility does not imply that the idea of holiness or 
rectitude is a contingent idea, (see q. 7) ; and here it 
needs no further proof, if we consider that this doctrine 
is founded in the unoriginated, independent, eternal, 
and necessary principle of right. 

If the doctrine of benevolent utility makes virtuous- 
ness a complex idea, be it so. We know not what else, 
in any way, to make of it, without sacrificing the truth. 

If those who differ from us think they can form a 
correct conception of holiness in the abstract, as a sim- 
ple idea, we are ready to concede that their views might 
be very harmless, if it could be proved that they do not 
lead to false conceptions of what moral acts should be, 
to be right. As we have already intimated, if we can 
form and maintain just views of what are right acts, 
of what virtue is in the concrete, our view of the ab- 
stract quality may be comparatively harmless. But 
the danger is, that false conceptions of the abstract will 
lead to false ideas of right action. 

Let us, then, carefully consider the question, 
24* 



282 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 226. 

226. Is the idea of rectitude, or right, as the quality 
of an act, a simple idea ? 

To prepare the way to answer this question, it may 
be expedient here to explain, as best we may, the terms 
moral rightness, morally right. 

227. What, then, is the true idea of moral rightness, 
or of morally right ? 

A true and full answer to this question would be em- 
braced in a correct answer to the six following ques- 
tions, although these may not be entirely distinct from 
each other. 

(1.) "What is the first rule, principle, or primary law 
of right action ? or, to present precisely the same ques- 
tion in a different form, according to a different order 
of viewing the subject. What is the fundamental, ulti- 
mate rule of holy action ? (2.) In what does the right- 
ness of this law consist ? (3.) What are right moral 
acts ? (4.) In what does the rightness of right moral 
acts consist? (5.) Why are such acts right? (6.) 
Why is the law right, in requiring the promotion of 
happiness as the ultimate final good ? 

228. (1.) What is the first rule, principle, or primary 
law of right action, or, viewed in the reversed order, 
the ultimate rule of right action ? 

The first rule, principle, or law of right action, as dis- 
tinguished from all irresistible, physical, natural neces- 
sity, is that kind of necessity or requisiteness which 
imperatively requires and obligates rational, sentient, 
and voluntary beings to promote happiness, their own 
and that of others in general, to the extent of their 
power. According to the reversed order, this is the ulti- 
mate rule of right. 

229. (2.) In what does the rightness of the law con- 
sist? 



Quest. 230.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 283 

The Tightness of the law consists : 1st. In its per- 
fect adaptation to the rational, sentient, and voluntary- 
powers of moral agents, according to their several, in- 
dividual abilities ; 2d. In its immediately demanding 
only that which is voluntary ; 3d. In its demanding of 
moral agents those voluntary actions, which would pro- 
mote their own highest happiness ; 4th. And the high- 
est happiness of others possible by the best use of their 
powers, — thus requiring the promotion of the greatest 
and the only possible, absolute, and ultimate good. 

230. (3.) What are right moral acts ? 

Those acts are right in which a moral agent intelli- 
gently and purposely promotes the greatest sum total 
of happiness in his power, including his own highest 
happiness and that of others ; or, those acts are right in 
which the agent intelligently and purposely obeys the 
law which requires him to promote his own highest 
happiness, and that of others in general, as he has op- 
portunity. The law which requu-es a man to love his 
neighbor as himself, requires him to promote the great- 
est happiness of himself and others that is in his power ; 
and those acts are right in which he purposely does 
this. 

231. (4.) In what does the rightness of right moral 
acts consist? 

The rightness or holiness of right moral acts consists 
in their being what the law requu-es, — in their intelli- 
gent, purposed, voluntary fitness or conformity to the 
fundamental law of eternal right requiring moral beings 
to promote their own highest happiness and that of 
others. 

232. (5.) Why are such acts right? 

These acts just described are right, because they are 
what they are, 1st, intelligent ; 2d, voluntary conform- 



2§4 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 233. 

ity to the law of right ; 3d, requiring the promotion of 
the greatest sum of the public good ; 4th, including our 
own, which to us is possible. These acts are right in 
making happiness their ultimate object, because no vol- 
untary action is possible to a rational being, which does 
not have happiness for its ultimate, final object. 

It is right that the greatest amount and extent of 
happiness should be the ultimate end of holy action, 
because this happiness is a greater good than any less 
sum, and because the greatest good of the whole is 
greater and more valuable than any conceivable good 
of a part. 

233. Why cannot the soul's worthiness, nor holiness 
itself, be the ultimate object of holy action ? 

Neither the souPs worthiness, nor holiness itself, can 
be the ultimate object of holy action, because, in their 
own essential nature, both the soul's worthiness and 
holiness must have objects ulterior to themselves. Holy 
action is voluntary, and therefore must have an object 
ulterior to itself. By no other action can the soul's 
worthiness be obtained. If the soul's worthiness had 
in itself no tendency to excite the desire of happiness, 
nor ultimately to promote in any way the gratification 
of that desire in any moral being, then, to act for the 
soul's worthiness would be to every moral being an 
absolute and an eternal impossibility. 

234. (6.) Why is the law right in requiring the pro- 
motion of happiness as the ultimate good, and of the 
highest happiness as the highest ultimate good ? 

The law is right, because it is what it is. It is right 
in requiring the promotion of happiness as the only 
absolute and ultimate good, because happiness is the 
only possible or conceivable ultimate or absolute good. 
The law is right in requiring the promotion of highest 



Quest. 235.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 285 

happiness, because highest happiness is the greatest 
ultimate good which can be promoted, and therefore no 
other greater ultimate good can be righteously required. 
Happiness is the only thing and the only good which 
is or can be the ultimate final object and end of any 
and of all voluntary action, and is therefore the only 
possible end in which holy action can terminate ; and, 
for all these reasons, the law is ri^ht in requiring the 
promotion of highest happiness as the ultimate final 
end of holy action. This, we conclude, is the true and 
last answer which can properly be given to the last 
question which can with propriety be raised on this 
topic. 

To ask why holy action does, and why it must, ter- 
minate in the only possible end in which it can termi- 
nate, seems like asking why any thing is what it is, and 
why it must be what it must be ; e. g. why two are and 
must be two, and not ten. 

235. What is the difference between the rightness 
of a righteous law, and the rightness of a right moral act ? 

The rectitude of a righteous law consists in rightly 
requmng right acts, which consist in doing what the 
law requires. The rightness or rectitude of a right act 
consists in its being obedience to a righteous law. The 
rightness of the act consists in its being what it is, viz. 
that intelligent intent having a tendency to promote 
one's own highest happiness, and that of others in gen- 
eral ; while the intent is to place the individual's happi- 
ness, in promoting the general happiness as the su- 
preme, ultimate object. 

236. Is the idea of the first principle or ultimate rule 
of right action a simple idea ? 

The first principle or law of right action is that re- 
quisiteness which imperatively obligates a rational, sen- 



286 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 237. 

tient, voluntary being intelligently and voluntarily to 
promote his own highest happiness, by promoting the 
greatest sum of general happiness in his power. 

The idea of obligating a rational, sentient, voluntary 
being to perform an intelligent, voluntary, moral act, 
consisting of an intent having a tendency to promote 
one's own highest happiness, by promoting the general 
good, seems to be a very complex idea, composed of 
many simpler elementary ideas. 

237. Is a right act a simple or complex object of 
thought ? 

An act in which the law of right action is fully 
obeyed, is, 1st, the intelligent, 2d, the voluntary pro- 
motion, 3d, of the greatest general good, 4th, includ- 
ing the agent's highest happiness. We are compelled, 
therefore, to conclude that a right act is a complex ob- 
ject, consisting of at least four elements, a true con- 
ception of which must be a complex conception or idea. 
All this can be neither psychologically nor morally a 
simple, but is a complex thing, and, for this reason, a 
true idea of a morally right act must be a complex 
idea. A correct idea of a complex object cannot be a 
simple idea. 

How many simpler ideas may be found as elements 
in the complex idea of a right act, must depend in 
some degree upon the minuteness to which the analy- 
sis is carried. 

238. Is the true idea of the rightness of the moral 
law a simple or a complex idea ? 

The rightness of the law, as we have just seen (q. 
229), consists in at least four particulars or elements. 
An adequate idea of the rightness of this law must, 
therefore, embrace a distinct idea of each of these four 
elements, which would constitute a complex idea. 



Quest. 239.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 287 

Should it be said, in objection to this, the Tightness of 
the law consists of that in the law which excites the 
feeling of approbation, and therefore the idea of it is a 
simple idea ; it may be said, in reply, the rightness of 
the law is a complex object, and therefore the idea of 
it must be a complex idea. 

239. Is the true idea of the rightness of a right act a 
simple or a complex idea ? 

A right act we have seen is a complex object, con- 
sisting of various elements. And the rightness of the 
act consists in the fitness or conformity of the various 
elements of this complex object, to the various elements 
of a complex law. 

From the previous discussions, the inference appears 
to be fully authorized, that the idea of rightness, as a 
quality of moral acts, is not a simple, but a complex 
idea. 

To give a short and comprehensive statement of the 
argument, derived from this analysis. 

A right act must be the act of a rational, sentient, 
voluntary agent, in obedience to a known law requiring 
that agent to promote the happiness of himself and 
others to the greatest extent in his power. If an act 
must be all this, to have the quality of rightness ; if 
it must be the act of such an agent ; if it must be an 
intelligent, voluntary act, in conformity to known law 
requiring it to be done to promote the agent's happiness 
and that of others ; if an act, to be right, must have aU 
these elements, each of which is essential to its right- 
ness, how an idea of this rightness can be a simple idea, 
is more than our understanding can comprehend. It 
cannot be denied that a right act must be qualified, 
1st, by being an intelligent act of a moral agent ; 2d, 
by being voluntary conformity to known law requiring 



288 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 240. 

such an intent as, 3d, has a tendency to promote both 
the general happiness, and, 4th, the happiness of the 
agent to the extent of his power. 

If an act is destitute of either of these elements or 
qualities, it cannot be right. A rightness consisting of 
several elements, and these at least four in number, viz., 
1st, intelligent ; 2d, voluntary intent and tendency ; 3d, 
to promote general happiness ; and, 4th, to promote the 
agent's happiness, cannot be a simple object, nor the 
idea of it a simple idea. 

If an act be destitute of either of these just specified 
qualities, it cannot gain the approbation of an intelli- 
gent conscience. Although it may be truly said, that 
virtue is that which excites the feeling of approbation, 
this does not imply that that which excites the feeling 
of approbation is not a complex object, as that which 
deserves approbation must be. 

240. What appropriate answer can be given to the 
argument to prove that right is a simple idea, arising 
from the fact that right is that which excites the feeling 
of approbation? 

Should it be said that the rightness of a right act is 
that in the right act which excites the feeling of appro- 
bation, and therefore the idea of that rightness must be 
a simple idea ; it may be said, in reply. That in the 
right act which excites this feeling, is complex in 
its nature, and therefore the idea of it must be com- 
plex. 

To say that virtue, as a quality, is that which excites 
the feeling of approbation, gives no information at all 
of what that is which does or should excite this feehng. 
This is the very thing which we want to know, — the 
all-important thing for us to understand. What that is 
which conscience approves, by this saying we are not 



Quest. 240.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 289 

informed, only it is that indefinite, indefinable some- 
thing which excites certain feelings. 

That virtue is strictly thus indefinable, a class of 
moral philosophers claim. But to maintain this, they 
must prove that no reason can be given why virtue ex- 
cites these feeliijgs ; that no statement can be made ; 
that no description can be given of what that is in vir- 
tuous acts which excites these feelings. 

And then it must follow that approbation, instead of 
being a perception of the intellect and understanding, 
is a mere blind feeling of the sensibility, since sensibility 
cannot see, and therefore it must be utterly incompetent 
to discriminate moral quality. And then it would fol- 
low, that we cannot tell and do not know why we ap- 
prove one thing rather than another, and that we cannot 
even tell what that quality is which we do approve. 
It would also follow, that we do not know what that 
quality is which distinguishes a virtuous act from one 
which is not virtuous, nor what that is which distin- 
guishes a sinful act from one which is not sinful. A 
sentiment thus terminating in absurdity must be erro- 
neous. And then, if you ask him who takes this 
ground, why he is bound to be benevolent, he has no 
reason which he can give. 

To state the argument in another form, — 

Holiness, in the concrete, in all its modes, as we have 
seen, is reducible to the intelligent, free, voluntary choice 
by a moral agent, of promoting, as he has power and 
opportunity, the highest happiness of himself and of 
sentient beings in general, on account of, and in pro- 
portion (according to the best practical estimate of that 
proportion) to, its worth, as consisting in the total sum, 
and as made up of the various parts according to their 
estimable value. 

25 



290 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 240. 

This is virtue in the concrete. All this must be 
where virtue is. Here, as before, appear to be at least 
four elements essential to the abstract rightness of the 
act, without which a virtuous act cannot be performed. 

(1.) The act must have the quality of being dictated 
by intelligence. Intelligence is not jonly j^rerequisite, 
but corequisite, during the time the act is performed, 
and as indispensably requisite to guide in its perform- 
ance as to point out the duty before its performance. 
Without this element the act cannot have the virtuous 
quality. 

(2.) The virtuous act must have the quality of being 
free, voluntary intention. Mere utility, mere produc- 
tion of happiness, not designed or chosen, cannot be 
virtuous. The act producing happiness must be the 
free, voluntary, intentional production of that happi- 
ness, or it will be destitute of one essential element of 
rectitude, — of rightness as an abstract quality of a 
moral act. 

(3.) The design of the virtuous act must be quahfied 
by aiming to promote the general happiness, — it must 
be " good-will to being in general," because, 1st, in a 
virtuous act regard must be had to the greatest good, 
and the general is greater than any private good, or the 
good of a part, however great that part may be; 2d, 
the law of right requires supreme regard to the general 
and highest good, because this includes an appropriate 
regard to the good of the various parts. A regard for 
the general good, of course, includes a regard for our 
own, as a part of the general good. This regard for the 
general good, also, then, is an essential element in the 
quality of a virtuous act which renders it virtuous. 

(4.) The design must be qualified by aiming to pro- 
duce the agenfs happiness, because it is impossible to 



Quest. 241.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 291 

act voluntarily without that design. An act which the 
agent esteems and knows to be destitute of all tendency 
to produce his own happiness, is to him an impossibil- 
ity. And this impossibility consists in the entire want 
of power to perform a voluntary act, for which there is 
no possible subjective motive. The agent's highest 
happiness must be designed in a virtuous act, because 
to act for a less, in preference to a greater good, is not 
virtuous. 

For these reasons, the agent's highest happiness must 
be the ultimate subjective object of all his virtuous 
acts. Therefore, this quality is an essential element in 
the rightness of a moral act. Therefore again, any act 
known to be inconsistent with the agent's highest hap- 
piness, it cannot be his duty to perform. Duty never 
does, — never can require us to sacrifice our own high- 
est eternal good. There can be no rational motive of 
any kind to do so. 

All virtuous self-denial is giving up a less for a greater 
good in the end. If the agent's choice be of a less, 
rather than the known or reasonably supposed greatest 
good to himself, perceived by him to be in his power, 
that choice will be sinful, because he is under obligation 
to choose the greater, and. thus to do as much good as 
he can. Here we have, again, four essential elements 
of rightness in the abstract. 

241. What is Prof. Hickok's argument to prove that 
right is a simple idea ? 

In proof that virtue is not founded in utility, some 
ethical philosophers have been satisfied to affi,rm that 
the conception of right is a simple idea, supposing, per- 
haps, that their statements were sufficiently evident to 
need no confirmation by argument. Others have at- 
tempted to prove that the conception of right is a 



292 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 242. 

simple idea, uncompounded of simpler ideas, and, there- 
fore, incapable of analysis, or of a logical or real defini- 
tion. 

We notice the following by Prof. Hickok. " No 
intellectual process can decompose and show its parts. 
It may be said, as it has been, that for any action to be 
right there must be ; 1st. Understanding; 2d. Free-will; 
3d. Tendency to universal happiness ; 4th. Tendency to 
the individual happiness. But though this should be 
admitted to be a true analysis of right action, it is 
manifestly a mistake to suppose it an analysis of right 
itself. The very first ingredient — an understanding — 
is of no possible use but as it is conditional for already 
perceiving the right. Besides, how know that it would 
be not right to hold to responsibility without such 
assunaed elements? The very attempt at analysis con- 
victs itself of carrying along with it the still simple con- 
ception." — Moral Science, pp. 53, 54. 

242. How can this argument be disposed of? Why 
would it not be right to hold to responsibility without 
the assumed elements supposed ? 

Reply. (1.) If it be admitted (and we see not how 
it can be reasonably denied), that tliis as far it goes, 
is a true analysis of a right act, and that each of these 
assumed elements is essential to its Tightness, as they 
all very evidently are, then it follows, that right itself 
must have in its complex nature, at least these four 
elements in order to be right, because, if either of these 
elements of the act be wanting, no moral rightness can 
remain. 

(2.) Understanding or intelligence is not only pre- 
requisite for perceiving the right, but it is of indispen- 
sable use to guide during the performance of duty. A 
man can no more act virtuously, without the exercise 



Quest. 242.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 293 

of his intelligence, than he can without the exercise of 
his will. So that a moral act to be right must be 
qualifted by the inteUigent element, not only as a pre- 
requisite, but as a corequisite during the performance 
of duty. 

(3.) We know it would not be right to hold to 
responsibility without such assumed elements, because 
this would prevent happiness, and produce an increase 
of misery, — it would do no good, but immeasurable 
hurt, — an inconceivable amount of evil. 

(4.) If this " attempt at analysis convicts itself of 
carrying along with it the still simple conception," the 
evidence of it is so recondite that it lies concealed from 
the utmost stretch of our apprehension. We cannot 
see how this attempt thus convicts itself, any more than 
every other attempt at analysis of any thing must do the 
same, and that is not at all. 

Now, therefore, whether a complete and adequate 
idea of the rightness of a moral act can be formed 
without a distinct idea of these elements, and whether 
this idea, when formed, will be a simple idea, we sub- 
mit to the judgment of every candid reader. 

Therefore, also, we claim that the doctrine of benev- 
olent utility and rectitude is maintained, and is free 
from any objection, arising from the fact that it implies 
that the true conception of rectitude is a complex idea, 
having the essential elements, 1st. of intelligent, 2d, volun- 
tary intent and purposed tendency, 3d, to promote uni- 
versal happiness, 4th, including the happiness of the vir- 
tuous agent. 

25* 



294 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 243. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

KECAPITULATION. RECONCILIATION OF THEORIES. SIN 

NOT THE BEST MEANS OF GOOD. NECESSITY OF DEFI- 
NITE VIEWS OF LAW. 

243. Does the foregoing definition of holiness ex- 
clude every thing that does not belong to the nature of 
holiness ? 

(1.) The previous definition of holiness as voluntary 
action excludes from it all created substances, both of 
matter and mind, and aU their created natures, quali- 
ties, and properties of every kind, in short, every created 
thing. It excludes all things that are what they are 
by the necessity of nature and independent of all caus- 
ation, as there is no power in the universe to the con- 
trary. 

(2.) Virtue, as an act of a rational being, excludes aU 
acts of irrational beings, and of beings who have not 
the possession and legitimate use of their rational 
faculties, so that they can distinguish moral good and 
evil. 

(3.) As a voluntary, moral act, it excludes all mere 
acts of the intellect, all states and exercises of the sen- 
sibilities, all acts necessitated by a natural necessity, 
and all involuntary acts and states of every kind. The 
mere feeling of approbation is a state of the sensibility, 
and, therefore, not virtue. Perfectly sinful beings ap- 
prove of virtue : — 



Quest. 243.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 295 

" Abash'd the Devil stood, 
And felt liow awful goodness is, and saw 
Virtue, in her shape O how lovely, saw, and pin'd 
His loss." 

Milton, Paradise Lost, book 4. 846. 

For the same reason, happiness of all kinds and 
degrees is excluded by its own nature, being a state of 
the sensibility, from partaking at all (in the strictest 
sense) of the nature of holiness. 

(4.) Mere tendency to happiness is not virtue, for 
that is a quality which belongs to created things. 

Mere production of happiness, mere usefulness, is not 
virtue. All useful things produce happiness more or 
less. 

Mere interest is not virtue. Our interest includes 
every thing that is conducive to our happiness, and, of 
course, many created things, all our possessions, but 
possessions are not duty. 

(5.) Neither beauty, grandeur, nor sublimity, is virtue. 
These are qualities of created and material things. 

(6.) Mere prudence and expediency are not virtues. 
Many actions are performed because they are prudent 
or expedient, and not because they are right. No ex- 
ternal action, no executive volition, no specific volition, 
which does not involve or spring from the impartial 
choice of the highest good, is virtue. 

(7.) Intelligence or knowledge is not virtue. Per- 
fectly sinful beings have inteUigence, but this is a phe- 
nomenon of the intellect, and therefore is neither vh'tue 
nor sin. There may be an intelligent act performed for 
a known reason, and not be virtue. Men know why 
they sin. 

Mere voluntariness is not virtue. There may be 
intelligent, voluntary production of less instead of 



296 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 243. 

greater happiness. These three elements thus com- 
bined are sin, and thus combined they are excluded 
by our definition from holiness. 

Our definition excludes from virtue all choice of 
happiness to be obtained, for ourselves or others, by 
selfish or partial love. It excludes all preference of the 
less and inferior, to the greater good. It excludes aU 
voluntary action, v^hich is inconsistent with the highest 
and eternal good of the individual. It excludes all 
choice of any supposed good of any part of God's 
creatures, that is inconsistent with, or in opposition to, 
the greatest good of all intelligent beings. 

Therefore, this definition exclndes every thing that is 
not needful and indispensable by the intrinsic tendencies 
of its nature, for the highest possible good of all intel- 
ligent beings. 

(8.) Wherever and whenever benevolence or virtue 
exists, which fulfils the law to the full extent of its 
demands, there is intelligent, intentional production of 
the highest happiness within the agent's power. 

"Wherever intelligence, voluntariness, and production 
of highest happiness are thus combined, they constitute 
virtue. Wherever this combination of these elements 
is, virtue is. Wherever the intelligent, voluntary intent, 
having a tendency to produce the greatest good, is 
wanting, no virtue can be found. 

Intelligence and voluntariness which produce only 
unintended or selfishly intended happiness are not 
virtue, and by our definition are excluded. Many 
intelligent, voluntary actions in some of their relations 
produce happiness, and are in these relations useful, 
which by our definition are excluded from holiness; 
e. g. all those actions which are prompted by no higher 
principle than natural affection, neighborly kindness, 



Quest. 244.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 297 

humanity, patriotism, or even philanthropy, without 
regard to God, are not holiness. 

Thus it is seen that the foregoing definition and 
discussion of the nature of hoHness, exclude from it 
every conceivable act and thing, except impartial and 
universal benevolence, and those actions in which this 
benevolence is exercised, or which are dictated by it, or 
spring from it. 

244. Does this definition include every thing which 
belongs to virtue ? 

According to the definition in question, universal, 
perfect, and permanent holiness includes all that can be 
done by aU intelligent, rational beings, to promote the 
highest amount of happiness and holiness of every 
indiuidual, and of all intelligent beings, that is possible 
for each and all to do, by the best use of all their 
powers. 

The highest possible benevolence of each and all, 
towards each and all intelhgent beings, united with a 
proper regard to the welfare of sentient animals, in- 
cludes aU that belongs to virtue in the highest possible 
degree of it. 

This includes aU that can be wisely done to promote 
the happiness and holiness of the universe. Now, if 
all this were done, it would be the production of the 
highest possible amount of holiness and happiness in 
God's dominions. 

If we have accomplished what we have attempted, 
then this definition of virtue or holiness ^ri:cludes every 
thing that does not belong to it, and includes aU which 
does belong to it, and therefore is a true, full, and cor- 
rect definition. Whether our arguments amount to a 
moral demonstration of the main points of the defini- 
tion, we submit to the judgment of our readers. 



298 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 245. 

245. Does this doctrine of benevolent rectitude and 
utility establish a foundation on which the various theo- 
ries, so far as they are founded in truth, can be recon- 
ciled? 

Our answer to this question is embraced in the an- 
swers to the twelve next following questions. 

246. Does virtue consist in the fitness of moral acts 
to the nature and relations of moral beings, and to the 
nature of things ? 

One theory is that virtue is agreeableness to, or 
founded in, the nature of things. 

According to the doctrine of benevolent rectitude, 
that fitness of benevolence to the nature and relations 
of moral beings, and to the nature of such things as 
can be wisely used to promote happiness, which ren- 
ders it intentionally productive of highest happiness, 
is the quality which constitutes its rectitude, — its 
virtuousness. (See q. 107.) 

According to the doctrine of benevolent rectitude, 

247. In what sense is virtue conformity to the spirit's 
worthiness ? 

Nothing of a moral nature but benevolence, or seek- 
ing to accomplish the highest good, is worthy of a 
rational, immortal spirit. ' Act worthy of the spirit's 
highest excellence,' is a good, though not the ultimate 
rule, and, rightly followed, will lead to the same results 
as obedience to the law of benevolence, because noth- 
ing but true benevolence in moral action is worthy of 
the rational spirit. The object of an intention is what 
characterizes it. And no object short of highest gen- 
eral happiness is worthy of supreme pursuit by the 
soul of man. 

Since highest general happiness must be the ultimate 
object of holy action, the law which requires the best 



Quest. 248.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 299 

promotion of that object, must be the ultimate rule and 
law of rectitude. 

248. In what sense can virtue be said to be obedience 
to the truth ? 

The truth is, that benevolence alone is adapted to 
promote the highest good. Benevolence, therefore, is 
obedience to this truth. All right action is obedience 
to this truth. But not all obedience to truth of what- 
ever kind is right action. Let it be a known truth, 
that a tree is about to fall where a man is standing, 
and the greatest sinner in the world will obey that 
truth if he can, and make his escape. But this obedi- 
ejice to truth is not virtue. 

249. In what sense is virtue agreeableness to the 
order of things ? 

Virtue is agreeableness to that order of things which 
the rule of righteousness requkes. And that is, that 
moral beiags shall promote as much happiness as they 
can. When they do this, the most delightful moral 
order and harmony prevail. 

250. According to the true utilitarian doctrine, what 
is the moral sense ? 

The only moral sense which in reality belongs 
to the human mind, according to the view maintained 
in this treatise, is that intellectual power of perceiving 
what intentions are adapted to promote the highest hap- 
piness, united with the mind's susceptibility of emo- 
tion in view of right and wrong action. 

251. According to the doctrine of benevolent utility. 
Why are the will and commands of God right ? 

The will and commands of God are right, because 
they require of men obedience to the eternal law of 
right, viz., to promote the highest happiness in their 
power. Doing this is pleasing God, obeying his wiU 



NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 252. 

and commands, and honoring him in his authority as 
moral governor of the universe, and, therefore, promot- 
ing his glory in the highest possible degree. 

252. According to the doctrine that benevolence is 
holiness. Why are men under obligation to obey the 
law of eternal right ? 

Men are under obligation to obey the eternal law of 
right, because that law requires of them the best use of 
their powers to promote general happiness. Moral oh- 
lig-ation is that necessity, or requisiteness which moral 
being's are under to proinote the greatest amount of gen- 
eral happiness in their power. The foundation of their 
obligation consists in their power to promote happiness. 
And the last reason which can be given why we are 
under obligation to aim at the promotion of the high- 
est happiness is, that the wisest aim, of which we are 
capable, to promote the highest happiness in our power, 
will promote the highest good. 

253. Is the theory of reciprocal sympathy taught 
by Dr. Adam Smith reconcilable with the utilitarian 
theory ? 

This theory is thus stated by its author: "When the 
original passions of the person principally concerned are 
in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the 
spectator, they necessarily appear to this last as just 
and proper ; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing 
the case home to himself, he finds they do not coincide 
with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him un- 
just and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which 
excite them" (Moral Sentiments, part i. ch. 3), and it 
amounts to this, what an impartial spectator feels to be 
right is right ; or what sound reason and an enlightened 
conscience regard as right is right. Although this does 
not show exactly what virtue is, in the end it leads, in 



Quest. 253.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 301 

our judgment, to substantially the same results as the 
doctrine of benevolent utility. It does this, because 
man is so constituted as naturally to approve, and to 
sympathize with the benevolent design to promote hap- 
piness. The principal objections to this theory seem to 
be : 1st. That it is too indirect to be regarded as the 
natural process of coming to the knowledge of good 
and evil, right and wrong ; 2d. Although, according to 
this theory as developed by its author, happiness is the 
ultimate object of virtue, it does not make it sufficiently 
manifest that the greatest general happiness is the ulti- 
mate object of virtue. The third objection to this 
theory which we notice is, what has been a very great 
and a very common fault in the various theories of 
morality, viz. that it fails to distinguish between the 
involuntary feelings, passions, and emotions of the sen- 
sibility, and the intentions, or voluntary acts, or acts of 
the will. 

According to Dr. Smith, the different accounts which 
have been given of the nature of virtue may be reduced 
to three classes. First. That the virtuous temper of 
mind consists in the proper government of all our affec- 
tions, which may be ej.ther virtuous or vicious, accord- 
ing to the objects which they pursue and the degree of 
vehemence with which they pursue them, and, there- 
fore, virtue consists in propriety. To this class Dr. 
Smith belongs. 

According to the second class, virtue consists in the 
judicious pursuit of our own private interest and happi- 
ness, or in aiming solely at this end, and, therefore, 
virtue consists in prudence. Highest imprudence rather. 

A third class, according to the same author, makes 
virtue consist in those affections only which aim at the 
26 



302 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 253. 

happiness of others, and not in those which aim at our 
own. (Ibid, part ii. § 2.) 

It seems very manifest, that the propriety of moral 
character, in which virtue consists, includes the judicious 
pursuit of our own highest interest and happiness in 
connection with, and in subordination to, the greatest 
general good. So that Dr. Smith's theory, fairly under- 
stood and explained, embraces all that is true in the 
two other classes of views of the nature of virtue he 
has named, and the three classes of theories properly 
explained and united in one view contain the four 
actual elements of virtuous action ; viz. (1.) the intelli- 
gent, (2.) voluntary pursuit, (3.) of individual, (4.) and 
of general well-being. 

An insuperable objection to the second class of views 
above named is, that they, in appearance if not in 
reality, exclude the great and ultimate object of virtue, 
viz. the general well-being, and so terminate in selfish- 
ness, under the name of prudence. An insuperable ob- 
jection to the third class of views of the nature of vir- 
tue is, that these exclude all regard for the individual 
agent's own happiness, and thus would make virtuous 
action an impossibility, in the unchangeable nature of 
moral agents. And thus these views make benevolence 
to be ^disinterested, i. e. so devoid of interest to the 
agent, that to feel any motive or to take any interest in 
the performance of such benevolent acts would be a 
contradiction, an absurdity,and an absolute impossibility 
to any moral agent in the universe. 

From all this the conclusion is evident, that if we 
take the truth aimed at in each and aU of these three 
classes of views, properly explained and united in one 
view, then we have the doctrine of benevolent rectitude, 
as set forth in the foregoing inquiry. 



Quest. 254. J OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 303 

254. Are right and wrong objects of immediate in- 
tuition ? 

As to the theory said to be held by Coleridge, Kant, 
and Cudworth, that right and wrong are objects of im- 
mediate intuition by the reason, it may be regarded as 
correct (whether they held it or not), so far as it im- 
plies that the principle, "We ought to promote as much 
happiness as we can," intuitively commends itself to 
the reason of men, as soon as they fairly understand it. 

255. Is virtue the agreeableness of a moral act, to the 
end for which man was made ? 

If, in the first place, the fact is established, that to 
enjoy and to promote in others the happiness which 
results from holiness, is the end for which man was 
made, then our virtue must consist in acting agreeably 
to that end. Acting agreeably to that end is identical 
with impartial, universal benevolence. 

256. What evidence have we, that the happiness 
which results from holiness is the end for which man 
was made ? 

First, Man is so constituted that he must, by the ab- 
solute necessity of his nature, seek his own happiness 
in all the voluntary actions which he performs. In all 
the voluntary actions which he can perform, his per- 
sonal happiness must be his ultimate subjective object, 
not of choice, but by necessity. 

The desire of happiness is the subjective motive by 
which he must be moved in aU possible voluntary moral 
action. 

Secondly. Man is so made that he can obtain his 
highest happiness in no other way than by the practice 
of holiness. He can obtain his highest interest and 
happiness for eternity only by doing all he wisely can 
to promote the highest happiness in his power, of all 



304 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 257. 

other intelligent beings, in addition to his own, so far 
as they may be known or supposed to come within the 
reach of his influence. If man was made so that he 
must seek happiness, undoubtedly he was made that 
he might seek it in that way in which he can obtain 
and promote the highest degree of it. Therefore, 

That man might gain his highest happiness in tho 
enjoyment of God, by honoring him in all his author- 
ity, — by holiness, or, which is the same thing, by pro- 
moting the general happiness, — is the chief end for 
which he was made. To do this was the chief end for 
which every moral being was made, that was made. 

The consummate skill with which our intellectual 
and moral constitution is adapted to promote highest 
happiness, by benevolent action, proves, beyond the pos- 
sibility of a reasonable doubt, that such was the chief 
end of our creation. There is no better evidence that 
a timepiece was made to keep time, than that man was 
made that he might be happy by promoting happiness, 
or by being holy. 

" We hope there is nobody but will admit that the 
end of God, in creating man, was to render him happy." 
— Burlamaqui on Law, p. 14. 

257. What relation^ then, has moral obligation to the 
end for which man was created ? 

Moral obligation is that necessity which man is under 
to fulfil, for himself and for others, the end for which he 
was made. 

" If it be true that the world has an end, it is equally 
true that this end is absolutely good. If it be true that 
each being has a special end, then it is true that the 
good proper to this being is this end. Again ; if it be 
true that between the end of each being and the end of 
all there is a correlation, so that the end of each being 



Quest. 258.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 305 

is only an element of the end of all, then it is true that 
the good of each being is an element of absolute good, 
and that thus the end of each being has the same nature 
and the same value as absolute good itself. Now, to 
what is the idea of obligation inevitably attached ? To 
that which is a good in itself absolutely. What we were 
ignorant of, we now know ; we have a clear conception 
of it. Good in itself is no other thing than the end of 
God in creation, — than the absolute end of things." — 
Jouffi-oy's Theory of Morals, Walker's Ap. to Stewart. 

258. What inference necessarily follows from this 
view of virtue, and its relation to the chief end of 
man? 

The necessary inference from this view of holiness, 
and its relation to the chief end of man, is, that it is 
the supreme desire of God that aU moral beings should 
secure their highest happiness by holiness in all cir- 
cumstances, rather than by sin in any possible circum- 
stances. So far, then, as men should practice the be- 
nevolence which we have described, if it were to the 
extent of perfect and universal and perpetual holiness, 
they would act according to the supreme choice and 
will of God, as revealed in our moral constitution and 
in his Word. This implies that glorious truth thus ex- 
pressed by the Westminster divines : " Man's chief end 
is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." This is the 
end for which man was made, and this is the end for 
which he ought to live and labor as the supreme end 
of his being. And, of course, sin is not^ but holiness is^ 
the necessary means of the greatest good. 

259. What advantages, may we here conclude, are 
to be derived from having clear, distinct, and correct 
views of moral obligation and moral law ? 

Moral obligation, in the form of moral law, correctly 
26* 



306 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 2G0. 

understood, is a rule of duty which points out the true 
and only way in which a moral being can secure his 
own highest interests, and accomplish the greatest pos- 
sible amount of good for others, and thus fulfil the end 
for which God gave him being. A clear, correct, and 
permanent perception of such a law would be the best 
schoolmaster to guide us to Christ. While doing this, 
it would also serve as a chart and compass through the 
voyage of life to the haven of everlasting rest. Such 
a knowledge of such a law might enable us to pilot 
multitudes of our fellow men through the same voyage 
to the blissful shores of heaven. 

That the doctrine of benevolent utility and rectitude 
so evidently includes whatever of truth is embraced in 
the different theories of virtue, is no small confirmation 
of its correctness, of its correspondence with essential 
truth. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

THE DIFFERENT NATURES, TENDENCIES, AND RESULTS OF 
HOLINESS AND SIN. 

260. What can be affirmed alike of both holiness 
and sin ? In what respects are they alike ? 

Hohness and sin are prompted both alike by the sub- 
jective desire of happiness. They are alike in having 
happiness of some kind and degree as their ultimate 
object, and in being intelligent, free, voluntary acts of 
rational moral agents. 

261. In what respects are holiness and sin unlike, 
and what is the difference ? 



Quest. 2G1.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 307 

(1.) Holiness is obedience to, and sin is transgression 
of, law. 

(2.) Holiness, in all instances, is reducible to the 
choice, purpose, intention, or free, voluntary action of a 
rational moral being, in which he complies with known 
obligation, and obeys a known law which requires su- 
preme, universal, and impartial benevolence, or the pro- 
duction of the greatest sum of general happiness in his 
power. 

(3.) All sin is reducible to the choice, purpose, inten- 
tion, or free voluntary action of a moral agent, in which 
he violates known or knowable obligation, and trans- 
gresses the known or knowable law of universal benev- 
olence, or the eternal principle of right, which forbids 
all selfishness. 

(4.) Holiness is supreme, impartial, and universal 
benevolence. (5.) Sin is supreme selfishness, supreme 
regard to partial good, to the less rather than the great- 
est good. 

(6.) Holiness implies the denial of our desires of the 
less, for the sake of the greater, good. (7.) Sin implies 
seeldng self-gratification by the less, instead of the great- 
er, good. (8.) As benevolence is the principle which 
comprehends all holiness ; so selfishness is the fountain, 
main-spring, or comprehensive embodiment of all sin. 

(9.) Since desire of happiness comprehends all pos- 
sible subjective motive for voluntary action, right or 
wrong, the holy and benevolent, in order to be benevo- 
lent, must gratify their desires for happiness by promot- 
ing the happiness of others, they must place their hap- 
piness in the general good. When others are happy, 
they will feel it. 

The selfish and sinful try to gratify their desires of 
happiness, and they succeed to some extent, by seeking 



308 NATUEJ: and foundation [Quest. 26I. 

selfish, partial, worldly good. Since all, as a matter of 
absolute necessity, and not of choice, must seek their 
own happiness in all they do (q. 114), the virtuous do 
seek theirs, so far as they are virtuous, in the right 
way, — by holiness, as all are morally bound to do, 
while the selfish seek theirs in the wrong. One class 
seek happiness by holiness, the other by sin. One class 
where they can gain their highest happiness, and the 
other where they cannot. 

(10.) In the exercise of perfect holiness, a man 
would regard the greatest happiness of all rational and 
sentient beings, and the necessary means of that happi- 
ness, including hofiness, as the supreme good ; and he 
would prefer and choose that good, so far as it is in his 
power, rather than any thing that can come in competi- 
tion with it. So far as men are holy, they seek their 
own, in subordination to, and in promotion of, the gen- 
eral good. 

(11.) In sin a man practically regards his own grati- 
fication as the supreme good, in disregard of his own 
best good, and the best good of all others within his 
knowledge. Sometimes he may make the partial good 
of some others subservient to his own. 

(12.) The supreme object of benevolence is the best 
good of the universe, including the greatest sum total 
of holiness and happiness. (13.) The supreme object 
of selfishness is self-gratification. Selfishness prefers 
and seeks that gratification which may be derived from 
partial good, rather than that which can be obtained 
from the general and supreme good. For example, that 
gratification which a man obtains from the temporal 
welfare of his family, friends, or country, no matter how 
large the part is. So long as a part is less than the 
whole, and the good of a part is less than the good of 



Quest. 261.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 309 

the whole, for that reason and no other, it will be sin to 
prefer and seek the gratification derived from the less 
good of a part, rather than that which may be derived 
from the supreme and universal good. 

The selfish man places his happiness either exclu- 
sively in his fancied interests, or in those of a part. He 
chooses the less, the inferior instead of the greater. In 
this his sin consists. 

(14.) The benevolent man places and seeks his hap- 
piness in the greatest happiness of all within his knowl- 
edge and influence. In this his virtuousness consists. 

(15.) A man in his selfishness rejects the greatest 
good which is in his power to obtain for himself and 
to promote for others, and chooses the less and inferior 
pleasure in preference to that higher good. And for 
the sake of the inferior pleasure he sacrifices the highest 
good. 

(16.) In the exercise of benevolence a man chooses 
the highest good and rejects the less and inferior, which 
is in competition with the greater. By holiness, moral 
beings may fulfil the end for which they were made. 
(17.) By sin, the fuU accomplishment of the end, for 
which those moral beings who commit it were made, is 
prevented. 

(18.) Holiness fulfils the supreme will and pleasure 
of God, glorifies and honors him in all his authority, 
by promoting the greatest happiness of his intelligent 
kingdom. " As the glory of God, and the greatest 
happiness of the system of the universe, and even of 
the created system, mutually imply each other ; when- 
ever I mention either of them, I wish to be understood 
to include in my meaning the other also." — Dr. Ed- 
wards's Works, vol. i. p. 121. 

(19.) Sin dishonors God, resists his will, and violates 



310 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 262. 

his law, which is holy, just, and good, and tramples his 
will, his laws, authority, and government in the dust, 
and prevents the greatest good. 

262. What, then, is the nature, and the necessary, 
inevitable tendency of virtue ? 

When moral acts entirely fulfil the demands of moral 
obligation, they necessarily and inevitably promote hap- 
piness to the greatest extent in the virtuous agent's 
power. 

As a matter of fact, virtue is a cheerful, joyous pur- 
pose to secure the highest happiness of ourselves and 
others. The nature and tendency of this purpose is to 
secure its object, full as much as it is the nature and 
tendency of any purpose to promote and secure its 
object. And when virtue is the entire fulfilment of the 
law, it is as sure, if not more certain, to accomplish its 
object, than any other purpose is. 

263. What, then, must be the nature and tendency 
of sin, the antagonist of virtue ? 

As we have seen, and as a common matter of fact, 
sin is a purpose to secure one's own temporal happiness, 
including, it may be, that of a few friends or even of 
his country, without regard, or in opposition, to his and 
their eternal happiness, and the general well-being. Its 
nature and tendency is to accomplish the greatest 
misery of the sinner, and of the whole universe. And 
this result would be accomplished if this tendency of 
sin were not thwarted by Omnipotent holiness. 

The designed nature and tendency of holiness is to 
promote the greatest possible amount of eternal and 
universal happiness ; while the real nature and tendency 
of sin is to prevent highest happiness, and to pro- 
mote the greatest amount of universal and eternal 
misery. 



^EST. 264.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 311 

»i * Holiness is the highest wisdom conceivable. Sin is 
consummate folly. 

264. What, then, is holiness which sin is not ? 

Holiness, when it is a complete fulfilment of the 
agent's obligations, is the designed and actual produc- 
tion, by moral action, of the highest happiness in his 
power. The qualities of that act which constitute its 
holiness, are its relations to the happiness produced by 
it. And those relations of the act to that happiness, 
are, that the act is an intelligent choice of that happi- 
ness, and the necessary and indispensable means, — or 
the procuring cause of the happiness. Thus perfect 
holiness is the cause, — the chosen, voluntary produc- 
tion of the highest happiness in the agent's power, both 
for himself and others. 

Intelligent choice, — voluntary, designed production 
of the highest happiness in the agent's power, are 
essential elements in the nature of perfect holiness. 

The tendency of entire holiness to produce the high- 
est good in the agent's power, so far can never be 
thwarted, because, so far as that power is exerted, the 
result must be produced. To suppose otherwise, would 
imply that the good in question is not in the agent's 
power, which is contrary to the proposition. 

But notwithstanding this, the tendency of holiness to 
promote the highest conceivable happiness, is and must 
be thwarted to some extent, though not destroyed, by 
sin, whenever and so far as sin exists at aU and brings 
misery along with it. The tendency of sin to lessen 
and prevent the highest amount of holiness and happi- 
ness may be thwarted to some extent by holiness, but 
cannot be fuUy resisted nor destroyed. Sin has been, 
will be, and forever must be, a damage to the universe. 
The holiness and happiness of the intelligent universe 



812 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 265. 

can never be what they might have been, had sin never 
been known in God's dominions. 

265. What is sin which holiness is not ? 

Sin is the choice of, and is designed to secure, the 
inferior pleasure, notwithstanding it costs the sacrifice 
of the highest good. 

Sin is the known and voluntary prevention of the 
highest good, for the sake of inferior pleasure, in known 
defiance of all the misery which may follow. 

266. What, therefore, is the substantial and final 
difference between the nature and tendencies of holi- 
ness and sin ? 

The designed nature, the intent and tendency of 
holiness is to promote the highest general happiness, in 
kind and degree ; while the true nature and tendency 
of sin is to prevent the greatest possible amount of 
happiness and produce the deepest misery. Holiness 
is the voluntary love and choice of the supreme good, 
and sin is the voluntary love and choice of the infe- 
rior and forbidden pleasure which debases and ruins 
the soul, and is an injury to the best good of the uni- 
verse. 

The results of holiness and sin compared. — Their 
comparative value in the four next questions considered. 

267. What is the amount of self-denial required in 
a life of holiness ? 

(1.) To resist, mortify, and overcome the desires of 
the mind for all those pleasures which are inconsistent 
with our own best good for time and eternity, and are 
inconsistent with the best universal good ; (2.) To re- 
fuse to gratify those desires, for whatever good, when 
by such refusal we have sufficient evidence that a 
greater amount of happiness can be produced than that 
of which we deny ourselves the enjoyment. (3.) And 



Quest. 268.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 313 

to submit to that self-humiliation, and to those mor- 
tifications of pride which are necessary in repentance, 
— these three modes comprise the amount of self-de- 
nial required in a life of holiness. 

268. What is the comparative value of those objects 
which can be obtained and promoted by a life of holi- 
ness, and those which can be obtained and which will 
result only from a life of sin ? 

The value of those objects which can be obtained 
only by a life of sin lies in those pleasures which can 
be obtained only by a sinful use of our mental and 
bodily powers, and by a sinful, forbidden use of the 
good things of Divine Providence. In order to a just 
estimation of this matter, we must subtract from the 
pleasm-es of a life of sin all the enjoyments in that life 
which might be obtained by a life of holiness. 

Now, the good man may enjoy aU the blessings and 
comforts of life which are consistent with his best eter- 
nal good, which the wicked man can have and enjoy ; 
for example, food, clothing, house, home, friends, soci- 
ety, knowledge, influence, and aU the variety of good 
things which the world affords, may be sources of as 
much and vastly more pleasure, when used in obedience 
to a righteous law, and in subservience to the general 
good, than when abused in sin. 

Hence it foUows, that the objects which can be ob- 
tained in a life of sin, and which cannot be obtained in 
a life of holiness, are aU summed up in the pleasures 
of sin for a season, — and a short season it must be at 
the longest ; few moments or days it may be, or a few 
years at most. 

But these pleasures of sin for a season, it must not 
be forgotten, are inseparably connected with an eternity 
of woe beyond the grave ; so that annihilation is in 
27 



314 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 269. 

finitely preferable to continued existence after dying in 
sin. Here, then, we have the short-lived pleasures of 
sin diminished by an eternity of unmitigated misery. 
Summed up, what is their value? Absolutely, infi- 
nitely worse than nothing. 

Now, in contrast with all this, 

269. What is the value of those objects which can be 
obtained by a life of hohness ? 

The objects to be obtained by a life of holiness are, 
(1.) The incomprehensible pleasure and delight which 
God will derive from the eternal life in holiness of one 
soul. " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleas- 
ure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked 
turn from his way and live." Ez. 53 : 11. (2.) The joy 
which this life of holiness will give to angels, to all 
holy men, and to all the myriads of holy beings who 
may ever exist in the dominions of Jehovah. " There 
is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one 
sinner that repenteth." Luke 15: 10. (3.) The victo- 
ries which may be gained in the cause of truth and 
righteousness by a life of holiness, and in reclaiming 
sinners, in bringing them back to their allegiance to 
God, and in saving them from the eternal horrors of the 
second death. " He that converteth a sinner from the 
error of his ways shall save a soul from death, and shall 
hide a multitude of sins." James 5 : 20. (4.) The pre- 
vention of sin and misery in one's own soul, in the 
present life and a future eternity, united with the end- 
less blessedness of rejoicing in the glory of God, and in 
the happiness of his holy kingdom ; having in this life 
peace of conscience, joy in the Holy Ghost, the favor 
and fellowship of God, and for the future having the 
approbation, confidence, and love of aU holy beings 
without end. 



Quest. 2ro.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. SltP 

Here then, on one hand, for the motives, tempta- 
tions, and allurements to sin, we have the pleasures of 
sin for a season. On the other, to deter from sin, the 
reproaches of conscience, the pangs of remorse, the dis- 
approbation of the whole universe of rational beings, 
and all the consequences of sin, in the loss of our own 
souls, and in all the eternal damage that will be done 
by our sins to the universe of God. To allure us to 
hohness, we have the blessedness of an endless life, and 
all the happiness and holiness which we can promote 
in glorifying God, and in the advancement of the best 
good of his everlasting kingdom. (Comp. q. 150.) 

270. Is it a very great, as well as a very common, 
mistake, to suppose that a virtuous, holy life detracts 
from a person's true, solid pleasures and highest happi- 
ness in the present life ? 

(1.) From what has been established in the preced- 
ing inquiry, it follows that to suppose a religious, holy 
life detracts from one's true, solid pleasures and highest 
happiness, is a most stupendous mistake, characterized 
by the most consummate folly. " Eeligion never was 
designed to make our pleasures less," but, on the con- 
trary, to exalt them to the highest pitch of enjoyment 
practicable for the present life, as well as for that which 
is to come. 

(2.) Since every person desires and seeks happiness, 
there is, in his nature, in the very constitution of his 
being, solid ground for the appeal to be most earnestly 
made to him, sustained by the utmost certainty of its 
truth, that his highest happiness for time and eternity 
can be obtained and secured only by a virtuous and 
religious life. In view of truth previously estabhshed, 
this appeal may be made with full confidence of suc- 
cess, if a thorough or a fair consideration of it can be 



316 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 271. 

obtained, and unless it is wilfully, persistently, and 
most unwisely and wickedly resisted. And even then 
it may be hoped, that by the grace of God, the sinner 
may be persuaded voluntarily to listen to the voice of 
wisdom, obey it, and turn to God, and make heaven 
secure. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

THE FOREGOING VIEWS OP HOLINESS AND SIN TESTED BY 
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS, AND BY AN APPEAL TO THE 
BIBLE. 

271. The question now to be tried is, 

Do the views of holiness and sin expressed in the 
preceding chapters correspond with human conscious- 
ness ? 

(1.) If the studious and earnest inquirer after truth 
chooses to be fully satisfied on this point, he can answer 
this question for himself, by carefully reviewing what 
has been said in this discussion, with the question, 
whether it corresponds with his own consciousness, dis- 
tinctly before his mind. 

(2.) Conscious guilt implies the voluntary violation 
of known obligation (or which could and ought to have 
been known), when we had power to fulfil it. We are 
not conscious of guilt, in doing as we have done, when 
we are conscious that we did not and could not know 
better than to do as we have done. Nor are we con- 
scious of blameworthiness, in not having performed an 



Quest. 271.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 317 

act of any kind which we had not adequate power to 
perform. We are conscious of regarding impossibili- 
ties not to be duties, and of regarding it to be our duty 
to do as much good as we can ; i. e. we are conscious 
of regarding our duty to be measured by our ability. 

(3.) Since the most valuable and the greatest possible 
sum of universal happiness depends upon the greatest 
possible sum of universal holiness, as its necessary 
means, without which it could not exist, and since if 
this holiness does exist, this happiness must, it seems 
impossible that any man, who understands this matter, 
should esteem either holiness or happiness alone as the 
greatest good, or that any such man should fail to see 
that both united are essential to the greatest good. 

If, as we think, we have demonstrated that holiness, 
separated from all its possible tendencies to happiness, 
is an impossibility, and if it is true, as we think we have 
proved, that highest universal holiness and happiness 
are, in the nature of things, mutually dependent upon 
each other, and inseparably connected with each other, 
then the greatest possible amount of universal holiness 
and happiness united, is the great good, the supreme 
good, the summum bonum. (q. 102.) We believe that 
neither highest hohness nor highest happiness can exist 
without the other. The truth of this proposition must 
be disproved before it can be shown that either holi- 
ness or happiness apart from the other, i5, or can be a 
greater good than the other. 

Now if a man should say that he is conscious of 
esteeming either universal holiness or universal happi- 
ness as a greater good than the other, our reply would 
be, we are conscious of believing that he esteems these 
things to be what they are not, — that his estimation 
is not according to the truth, or that he does not fairly 
27* 



318 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 271. 

represent, or does not understand, what his conscious- 
ness is. It seems irrational to suppose that happiness is 
the only ultimate end, to obtain and promote which all 
the holy action that ever was or ever will be in the uni- 
verse was put forth, and yet to suppose that this hap- 
piness is not worth the labor it costs. Nor does it 
appear any more reasonable to suppose that holiness is 
not worth as much as the happiness of which it is the 
necessary means. 

(4.) A man may, indeed, give me a cup of cold 
water, in such circumstances as to evince to me that 
he is actuated by a spirit of impartial, universal benev- 
olence, and I may consider that benevolence exercised 
through a long life as a greater good, — as worth more 
than the cup of cold water which he gave to me. So 
I may regard the infinite benevolence of God, exercised 
through eternity, as a greater good, — as worth more 
than all the happiness which he ever conferred upon 
me, or ever will confer upon any other individual. But 
that all his benevolence is worth either more or less 
than all the happiness which wiU ever result from his 
omnipotent holiness, I am not conscious of perceiv- 
ing. 

(5.) It seems to me that I am conscious of perceiv- 
ing that to aim at the greatest usefulness, or at the 
production of the greatest good and happiness in my 
power, requires as little calculation as it does to have 
my intentions benevolent or right. 

(6.) We are conscious that to perceive an action of 
the wiU, 1st, to be on the whole and in the highest 
degree useful ; 2d, to be designedly and actually produc- 
tive of highest happiness in one's power ; 3d, to be 
benevolent ; 4th, and to perceive that action to be right, 
are aU substantially one and the same thing, and there- 



Quest. 272.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 319 

fore as little calculation is necessary in one case as in 
the other, or rather these four cases are all substantially 
one and the same. (q. 146.) 

272. (7.) Is the fact that a doctrine is easily under- 
stood an objection to it? That virtue, according to 
the doctrine of benevolent rectitude, is so easy to be 
understood, has been made an objection to it. 

Reply. In the Word of God, the way of holiness is 
represented to be so plain that " a wayfaring man 
though a fool shall not err therein," and that " he may 
run that readeth [a description of] it." If the way of 
holiness was not easy to be understood, the largest part 
of mankind would be unable to walk in it. That the 
doctrine of benevolent rectitude is so easy to be under- 
stood, instead of being an objection, is a very weighty 
consideration in its favor. 

(8.) We believe that every man is conscious that his 
object in all he does is to obtain happiness, and, there- 
fore, we believe that a strict observation and scrutiny 
of his own consciousness wiU show that he is truly 
conscious of being moved in all he does by the subjec- 
tive motive of a desire for his own happiness, as we 
have shown to be the fact. (q. 58, § 10.) And if a de- 
sire to obtain and promote happiness is the conscious 
subjective motive of holy action, then happiness must 
be the ultimate object of such action. 

Having, in the preceding discussion, so largely made 
quotations in illustration and confirmation of the doc- 
trine and arguments of this treatise, from some of the 
most eminent divines and ethical philosophers, who 
have lived in these latter ages of the world, this method 
of confirmation and line of argument need not here be 
repeated. It seems needful here only to refer to those 
citations already made. It now remains only to 



320 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 273. 

cap the climax of the argument by an appeal to the 
Bible. 

273. Does the doctrine that holiness consists only in 
universal, impartial benevolence correspond with the 
Bible? 

In the following portions of the sacred word, God 
appeals to that eternal principle of right, which is the 
fundamental law and moral constitution of the universe. 

" O house of Israel, are not my ways equal ? Are 
not your ways unequal ? " Ez. 18 : 29. " Judge I pray 
you betwixt me and my vineyard. What more could 
have been done to my vineyard, that I have not done 
in it ? " Isa. 5 : 34. " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself." Mat. 22 : 39. " Whatsoever ye would that 
men should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this 
is the law and the prophets." Matt. 7 : 12. 

That this primordial principle of right is the ba- 
sis on which all divine legislation proceeds, and on 
which all the commandments of God are founded, is 
manifest by the following Scriptures : " Thou shalt have 
no other gods before me." Ex. 20 : 3. " Thou shalt 
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all 
thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy 
mind, and thy neighbor as thyself." Luke 10: 27. 
" God is love." 1 John 4 : 16. " Love is the fulfilling of 
the law." Rom. 13 : 10. " The end of the command- 
ment is charity out of a pure heart." 1 Tim. 1 : 5. 

These passages from the Word of God show also 
that impartial, universal benevolence comprehends all 
the duty which God requires of men. 

That the goodness or holiness of God, and that which 
he requires of us, consists in doing good or promoting 
happiness, is implied in the following : " He left not him- 
self without witness, in that he did good, and gave us 



Quest. 274.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 321 

rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts 
with food and gladness." Acts 14 : 17. " Do good to 
them that hate you, . . . that ye may be the children 
of your Father who is in heaven; for he maketh his 
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth 
rain on the just and on the unjust." Matt. 5 : 44, 45. 

274. Are the motives by which men are urged in the 
Bible to be holy, addressed to their desires of happiness 
and dread of misery ? 

That the motives by which men are urged in the 
Bible to be holy, are addressed to their desires of hap- 
piness and dread of misery, appears in the following 
texts : 

" Flee from the wrath to come." Matt. 3:7. " Lay 
hold on eternal life." 1 Tim. 6 : 12. " This is eternal 
Hfe, to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom thou hast sent." John 17 : 3. " The wages of sin 
is death. But the gift of God is eternal hfe." Rom. 
6 : 23. " The soul that sinneth it shall die." Ez. 18 : 
4. " The nation and kingdom that violl not serve thee 
shall perish." Isa. 60 : 12. " Blessed is the man that 
waiketh not in the counsel of the ungodly." Ps. 1 : 1. 
" Great peace have they who love thy law." Ps. 119 : 
165. " Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well 
with him." Isa. 3 : 10. " Blessed are they who do 
hunger and thirst after righteousness." Matt. 5 : 6. 
" Blessed are they that do his commandments." Rev. 
22 : 14. " It is more blessed to give than to receive." 
Acts 20 : 35. " Cursed is every one that continueth not 
in aU things written in the book of the law to do them." 
Gal. 3 : 10. " Woe to the wicked, it shaU be iU with 
him." Isa. 3 : 11. Passages like these are scattered 
through the Bible. 

In addition to the quotations from Scripture aheady 



322 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 275. 

made, we might multiply them to an indefinite extent, 
in confirmation of the sentiment that the desire of hap- 
piness and the dread of misery is the primary motive ad- 
dressed to men in the Bible to persuade them to be holy, 
and, therefore, that happiness must be the ultimate ob- 
ject of all right action. On these passages of revelation 
we may rely for an immovable support of the doctrine 
of Benevolent Rectitude and Utility. It is, therefore, 
with unfeigned surprise, that we read in the Presbyie- 
rian Quarterly Review, that " it must certainly strike 
the mind of the careful reader, how little, to say the 
least, this idea of [enjoyment^ as the end of the individ- 
ual or that of the world, is made prominent in the 
Bible." — Dec. 1855, p. 458. 

We submit this point to the decision of every care^ 
ful reader of the Bible, when he has considered how 
many times we are called upon to secure the blessed- 
ness of eternal life, and to lay up treasures in heaven, 
and how many times blessedness is promised to the 
righteous, and misery threatened to the wicked. 

275. Why^ therefore, are the objective motives of the 
Bible addressed ultimately to men's desires of happi- 
ness and dread of misery ? 

Because this is the only possible ultimate principle 
to which they can be addressed, and this must be so as 
long as the constitution of the human mind remains 
unchanged. 

276. Why is holiness in the Bible called wisdom, and 
wisdom said to be the principal thing ? 

Because holiness is the one thing needful, — needful 
to please God and glorify him, — needful to answer the 
end of our creation, — needful to secure eternal happi- 
ness for ourselves, and to promote the greatest extension 
of happiness throughout the kingdom of God, and be- 



Quest. 277.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 323 

cause for these reasons holiness is the highest wisdom, — 
the greatest prudence, — the most consummate useful- 
ness, — the most comprehensive expediency, — the most 
excellent moral beauty, — and the most noble and exalted 
moral subhmity ; in short, because holiness is the most 
excellent and most efficacious means of the most excel- 
lent happiness and exalted felicity, glory, and honor, not 
only of the moral governor of the universe, but of all 
under his government who will practice holiness. 

277. Why is the sinner in the Sacred Oracles called 
a fool? 

The sinner is called a fool in the Sacred Oracles 
because he seeks the gratification of his desires where 
he cannot find his highest happiness, either for time or 
eternity. By spending his probation in the commission of 
sin, he is guilty of the most consummate folly and wick- 
edness, not that he commits the greatest number of the 
most wicked particular acts, but that the one comprehen- 
sive process of destroying his own soul, in connection 
with the natural results of such wickedness, in the ruin 
of others, and in the prevention of good in the kingdom 
of God, is unsurpassed and unsurpassable folly and 
wickedness. How different from this is the dictate of 
wisdom, " Do thyself no harm." " What shall it profit 
a man, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his 
own soul, or what shall a man give in exchange for his 
soul?" Acts 16: 28, and Mark 8: 36. "Them that 
honor me I will honor, but they that despise me shall be 
lightly esteemed." 1 Sam. 2 : 30. 

278. What reason has God himself given why it is 
his supreme desire and preference that men should be 
holy and not sin. 

" I sent unto you all my servants the prophets, rising 
up early and sending them, saying. Oh, do not this 



324 NATUEE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 279. 

abominable thing which I hate." Jer. 44 : 4. " Be ye 
therefore perfect, even as your Father who is in heaven 
is perfect." Matt. 5 : 48. " Ye shall be holy : for I, the 
Lord your God, am holy." Lev. 19 : 2. God's hatred 
of sin, and his holiness are among the reasons assigned 
by him for demanding our holiness. God is almighty, 
but that is no reason why we should be almighty. 

279. Why, then, is the holiness of God a reason for 
our hoKness ? 

Since God is holy, if we obey him, obedience will 
make us happy and promote the happiness of others. 
A holy, sin-hating God cannot permit his enemies to 
be permanently happy under his moral government. 
Iniquity must be their ruin. " As I live, saith the Lord 
God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but 
that the wicked turn from his way and live." Ez. 33 ; 
11. " I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, 
wherefore turn yourselves and live ye." Ez. 18 : 32. K 
God has no pleasure at all in the sin and death of the 
wicked, but has great pleasure in their repentance, holi- 
ness, eternal life, and blessedness, then it is his supreme 
preference that men should always be holy, rather than 
that they should commit sin. Since God is holy, if his 
rational creatures would be happy, they must be holy, 
and thus cooperate with him in making others happy. 

One very important reason which God at one time 
gives for his preference of holiness to sin, without allud- 
ing to any other, is, that it might be well with the Is- 
raelites and their children forever. And thus he ex- 
claims : " Oh that there were such an heart in them 
that they would fear me and keep all my command- 
ments always, that it might be well with them and 
their children forever." Deut. 5 : 29. " If thou hadst 
known the things that belong to thy peace, but now 



Quest. 280.] OF MOEAL OBLIGATION. 325 

they are hid from thine eyes." Luke 19 : 42. Here we 
have God's supreme desire and preference of holiness 
to sin, and the only and ultimate assigned reason for 
that preference is, that he has no pleasure in their sin 
and death, but has a pleasure in their eternal life and 
happiness. 

280. What is the true method of forming rules for 
moral conduct, so as to be sure they are right ? 

In forming moral rules, the first thing to be done is 
to ascertain the fundamental or first principles, or the 
necessary and intuitive truths of morality, and to make 
such deductions as must necessarily follow from them, 
resulting in the general law which requires the highest 
general happiness to be loved and sought; and then 
the second thing to be done is, to learn by experience, 
and by all practical ways, the best means and methods 
of accomplishing those ends of goodness or happi- 
ness. 

These are self-evident truths : 1st. That all duties 
are possibilities ; 2d. That I am bound to do good, and 
to love my neighbor and other sentient beings, so as 
to promote as much happiness and prevent as much 
misery as I can. To all who fairly understand these 
affirmations, we judge they are either self-evident, or 
necessarily deducible from such truths as are self-evi- 
dent and necessary ; and to the extent in which they 
are understood, we believe they are universally admit- 
ted. What child of Adam, having common sense, can 
be found who will deny that we ought to do all the 
good we can, i. e. promote as much happiness and pre- 
vent as much misery as we find to be in our power? 
What moral truth is there more universally admitted 
than this ? Not one. 

The only question remaining regards the ways and 
28 



326 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 280. 

means best adapted to do good, or, which is the same, 
to promote happiness and prevent misery. 

Whatever God requires by the light of reason, or the 
precepts of revelation, we may know to be right and 
best adapted to promote happiness and prevent misery. 
That God commands, is conclusive, unquestionable 
proof that the thing required will promote happiness. 
Whatever we know to be right and obligatory, as be- 
nevolence, love to God, good-will to sentient beings in 
general, justice, faithfulness, veracity, gratitude, tem- 
perance, chastity, and love to our neighbor, doing to 
others as we would that they should do to us, obe- 
dience to parents, to civil government, etc., we may 
safely and certainly conclude to be in the highest de- 
gree promotive of happiness, for ourselves and others, 
for the public and for individuals. 

In regard to those particular and specific duties which 
depend on circumstances, no absolute and unchangea- 
ble rules can be formed. The rules of duty in such 
cases must be formed by the best light we have and 
can obtain from observation and experience, by apply- 
ing general principles to particular cases, according to 
circumstances, as best we can, always having in view, 
as our supreme and ultimate end, the most valuable 
amount of general happiness in our power. In decid- 
ing, in particular or doubtful cases, what duty requires, 
we must regard that as our duty which appears, by the 
best means we have of judging, to be best adapted to 
the promotion of happiness. In aU circumstances of 
doubtful duty, adopt that course which appears to be 
best adapted to do good and promote happiness. In 
all expenditures of money for buildings, dress, food, 
and all that appertains to style of living, or for what- 
ever pleasures of life, the simple inquiry should be, 



Quest. 281.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 327 

What will best promote happiness ? and the supreme 
object should be to do that which, according to the best 
judgment we can form, is best adapted to promote the 
greatest and most valuable amount of happiness. 

281. How shall a person know whether he is really 
and truly virtuous ? 

If a person finds himself consecrated in heart and 
life to the service of God, in obedience to his will, re- 
vealed in his Word and written on the conscience, so 
that it is his supreme purpose to do all the good and 
promote aU the happiness in his power, and proved to 
be his purpose by its being carried out in the acts of 
his daily life, — then his character is truly virtuous, but 
not otherwise. If he regards his own interests and 
pleasures more than the rights of God and the well- 
being of his fellow men, if he habitually disobeys any 
known rule of duty, if he intends to continue in any 
known sin, if he has no compassion for the poor and 
the oppressed, if it be not his daily prayer and labor to 
promote the kingdom of Christ and the reign of right- 
eousness in the world, if it is not his supreme object 
to do all the good in his power, how dwelleth the love 
of God in him ? 



328 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 282. 



CONCLUSION. 

CONDITIONS OF ACCEPTANCE WITH GOD. — THE WAY TO 
BECOME HOLY CONSIDERED. 

282. In what ways can moral beings stand with ac- 
ceptance before God ? 

If the nature, foundation, and extent of moral obli- 
gation, — if the nature and tendencies of holiness, — if 
the nature and tendencies of sin are what, in the pre- 
vious discussion, they are represented to be, then it fol- 
lows that, in accordance with the Bible, there are two, 
and only two, ways in which moral beings may stand 
with acceptance before God and inherit eternal life. 

The first is by a complete fulfilment of all their ob- 
ligations, in performing the deeds required by the moral 
law, — the law of eternal right. ObKgation which can- 
not be fulfilled cannot exist. This way of justification 
by the deeds of the law is possible to moral beings 
only before their commission of sin, by their voluntary 
deeds, in which they transgress known law. After 
transgression, whenever they should be brought to stand 
on trial by law, by the law which they have trans- 
gressed, their condemnation must be inevitable, for the 
plain and simple and only reason, that by their own 
transgression they have become guilty, and so they 
must forever remain and stand before God, unless, 
upon condition of repentance, they obtain a pardon, 
which cannot be granted without reference to an atone- 
ment, — to an adequate substitute for penalty. 



Quest. 283.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 329 

The second and only other method of salvation, then, 
indeed the only method of salvation for sinners, is by 
repentance, and by faith in Christ, when Christ is 
known. It becomes, then, a question of vital inter- 
est, — 

283. What are repentance and faith, as the condi- 
tions of salvation ? 

(1.) Repentance is a radical change of voluntary 
moral character. It is a thorough renunciation of sin 
and a departure from the ways of transgression, and a 
corresponding devotion and consecration to the duties 
of a holy life. It is waging a perpetual warfare with 
sin, until a final victory is gained. Repentance implies 
a godly sorrow in view of the shame, degradation, 
disgrace, moral pollution, and iU-desert which sin has 
brought upon the soul, and in view of the damage 
which sin has done to the sinning agent, and to the 
interests of God's moral kingdom, which can never be 
fuUy and entirely repaired. When repentance is what it 
should be, it is an intention to part with all sin imme- 
diately and forever, and to fuLfil entirely aU. future 
obligations by the fuU discharge of every duty. Re- 
pentance is a change in the controlling principle, the 
governing purpose of a person's life ; it is changing the 
supreme object of love and pursuit. It is adopting 
the principle of right for the supreme rule of duty ; it 
implies an abhorrence of a life of sin, and a real, hearty 
forsaking it. It is submission to the will of God. 

What repentance ought to be, and therefore can be, 
is manifest by the following. " Let the wicked forsake 
his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts [that is, 
his wicked intentions] : and let him return unto the 
Lord, and he will have mercy upon him, and to our 
God, for he will abundantly pardon." Isa. 55: 7. 
28* 



330 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 284. 

" Repent and turn yourselves from all your transgres- 
sions ; so iniquity shall not be your ruin. Cast away 
from you all your transgressions whereby you have 
transgressed : and make you a new heart and a new 
spirit ; for why will ye die O house of Israel." Ez. 18 : 
30, 31. " Break off thy sins by righteousness." Dan. 
4: 27. 

284. But how can repentance and faith be performed ? 

Repentance can be performed as the Psalmist says he 
performed it. " I thought on my ways and turned my 
feet unto thy testimonies." Ps. 119 : 59. Consideration 
is an essential preliminary to repentance. When a sin- 
ner suitably considers the enormity of his sins as 
committed against a God of perfect love, of long for- 
bearance and tender mercy, who is not willing that any 
should perish, but that all should come to repentance " 
(2 Pet. 3:9); when he considers the shame, disgrace, 
degradation, and moral pollution and suffering which 
his sins bring upon himself ; and when he considers the 
sacred nature, foundation, and extent of the obligations 
violated by his sins, — the nature, tendencies, and results 
of his sins in the prevention of happiness and produc- 
tion of misery ; in contrast with the results which might 
be produced by his repentance and holy life, the wonder 
and astonishment in heaven, and the philosophical 
mystery on earth, is, that he should fail to repent. 

When a sinner has any desire to repent, let him think 
on his ways, in the light of the previous discussion, and 
in the further light of the Bible, of reason and his own 
conscience, and let him thus arouse himself to repent- 
ance, as a work now on hand to be done, to be done in 
earnest and without delay. And let him remember that 
" the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the 
violent take it by force." Let him choose God for his 



Quest. 284.] OF MOKAL OBLIGATION. 331 

moral governor, and take the laws of God's government 
for the rule of his obedience, and accept the pardon of his 
sins, as offered in the gospel ; let him justify his Maker, 
admit the justice of his own condemnation, and let him 
cast himself on the mercy of God in Christ, and thus 
make God the portion of his soul. Let him yield to 
the leadings of the Divine Spirit, and thus secure the 
aid of his gracious influence, " for as many as are led 
by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Let 
him trample aU the temptations to a continued Hfe in 
sin under foot, and submit to aU the self-denial, humili- 
ation, and self-mortification, which is necessary in the 
confession and renmiciation of his sin. 

Let the sinner remember that this work of fixing his 
heart on God, is a work for him to do (in the exercise 
of his own power given by his Creator), by his own 
free act and choice, — that it is to be done under such 
gracious influences as God may please to grant him, 
and under the moral influence of such motives as his 
obligations and truth present, and as he can summon, in 
view of which he himself is to decide, by his own 
choice, where and how he will spend his eternity. Let 
him not under any consideration relinquish this work, 
nor falter in it, until he has actually accomplished it. 

" There is a time we know not when, 
A point we know not where, 
That marks the destiny of men 
To glory or despair. 

There is a line, by us unseen, 

That crosses e\ery path ; 
The hidden boundary between 

God's patience and his wrath. 

To pass that limit is to die. 



332 NATUKE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 284. 

Oh, where is this mysterious bourn 

By which our path is crossed ; 
Beyond which, God himself has sworn 

That he who goes is lost ! 

How long may we go on in sin ? 

How long will God forbear ? 
Where does hope end, and where begin 

The confines of despair. 

An answer from the skies is sent : 

' Ye that from God depart, 
While it is called to-day, repent, 

And harden not your heart.' " 

J. A. Alexander, D. D. 

About this work of repentance, we have one thing 
more to say, which should never be forgotten. If this 
work of repentance is never done, until one is com- 
pelled to do it, by some physical influence, or some 
irresistible and omnipotent power, it will remain undone 
forever. 

Repentance unto life is a saving change in the ruling 
choice of the mind, whereby the sinner doth, with grief 
and hatred of his sin, turn from it unto God as the 
supreme object of his love, with full purpose of, and 
endeavors after, entire obedience. The way, and only 
way to do this work, is to consider the reasons why it 
should be done, — to consider the demands of God, of 
reason, and of conscience that it should be done, and 
then acting wisely in view of these demands, obey them. 

Faith in Christ is such a rational conviction of truth 
revealed concerning him as leads to a voluntary exercise 
of the mind, wherein the repentant sinner commits his 
soul to Christ as a Saviour, and trusts in him alone for 
pardon and salvation as he is offered to us in the gospel. 



Quest. 284.] OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 333 

The way to exercise faith in Christ is to receive and 
obey the truth revealed concerning him. 

Now by repentance and faith in Christ, a life of hoK- 
ness is attainable. While it is a fact that men as will- 
ing servants of sin, yield themselves to its dominion, it 
is also true that God, in the exercise of justice, has made 
them able to obey the law, which he holds them bound 
to obey, under the penalty of his righteous displeasure. 

The original foundation of men's obligation to obey 
a righteous law, is laid in their constitution as moral 
beings, i. e. in their ability to fulfil all its demands. 

Under the gospel our obligations to a life of perfect 
and permanent holiness have a twofold foundation. 
In the first place we are under the original obligations 
arising fi:om the natural powers of our moral consti- 
tution ; in the second place, we are under the addi- 
tional obligations of the promised aid of the gracious 
influences of the Holy Spirit, upon condition of our 
compliance with the gospel. 

For these reasons a life of entire holiness is now in 
a double sense attainable. To attain this life, the 
moral powers of the mind must be put in earnest 
requisition, in cooperation with all the support and aids 
which God in the exercise of justice, love, and mercy, 
is ever pleased to bestow. This cooperation with the 
Holy Spirit must be carried on by faith in Christ as an 
Almighty Saviour, as the only mediator between God 
and man. "We must commit our souls to him as being 
willing and " able to save them to the uttermost that 
come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make 
intercession for them." Heb. 7 : 25. 

To attain to a permanent state of the entire fulfil- 
ment of all our obligations to God, we must receive 
Christ in all his ofl^ices as our Saviour, Mediator, Re- 



334 NATURE AND FOUNDATION [Quest. 284. 

deemer, and Sanctifier, as our prophet, priest, and king. 
Doing this, if having faith in the gracious promises of 
the sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit, we comply 
with the conditions of these promises, and appropriate 
them to ourselves, there is a twofold ground of assur- 
ance that a character of entire holiness is attainable in 
this life. 

Seeing, then, that there is this twofold ground of 
assurance that entire holiness of character is attainable 
in this life, let every one enter at once, without any 
more loss of time, upon the pursuit of entire sancti- 
fication in the practice of holiness, and not rest satis- 
fied until he has gained the victory over every sin^ and 
then, by a patient continuance in well-doing, go on to 
seek for glory and honor and immortality, and thus to 
make higher and higher attainments in holiness until 
death is swallowed up of life. 

And now, in conclusion, the author's prayer to the 
Infinite and Almighty One is, that he may be permitted 
through grace to meet in heaven many, who, by the 
divine blessing on this attempt to make known his 
truth and advance his kingdom among men, shall have 
been induced to prepare for glory, and then from time 
to time in ages to come, that he may be permitted to 
welcome to that holy and blessed land some who 
have been persuaded to turn from sin to 

" Holiness, the road 
That we must take to dwell with God." 



So let it be. Amen. 



APPENDIX 



[Referred to on page 31.] 

A SPECIMEN OF SOCRATIC REASONING. 

A conversation, copied from an English grammar printed in London, 1721, 
between a Thomist and another, about the efficacy of Divine Providence, 
supposed to be the specimen of Socratic reasoning to which Dr. Franklin 
somewhere alludes, as that from which he learned to confound his oppo- 
nents when he could not, to his own satisfaction, answer their reasonings. 
The Thomist is represented by A. 

A. I WONDER you are so obstinate as to deny that God has an 
efficacious operation in the sins of men, which the Scriptures in 
many places so openly and plainly testify. 

B. I only deny that I understand how this is done. Per- 
haps my dullness makes that a difficulty to me, which is obvious 
to another. But I would willingly be informed by you, because 
I can neither believe nor condemn what I do not understand ; 
what, therefore, do you mean by an efficacious operation in the 
sins of men ? do you mean that he makes them sin ? 

A. Far be that from me, for so God would be the author of 
sin. Man commits sin, not God. 

B. Do you mean, that God makes men to commit sin, or 
forces them to commit sin ? 

A, I would not have expressed this in so rude a manner ; but 
God, in a dark and unknown manner, so permits sin that it must 
necessarily be committed. 

(335) 



336 APPENDIX. [Note A. 

B. You used before the word operation, now you use the 
word permit, pray do they mean the same thing ? 

A. These words do not absolutely mean the same thing, but 
they must be joined together, so that what God does should be 
called an efficacious permission ; for God neither makes sin nor 
does he simply permit it. 

B. You, therefore, mean that God permits something, and 
does something, so that sin necessarily follows. 

A. That is what I mean. 

B. Perhaps, then, God does in this what he does who, cut- 
ting down the dykes, lets the waters in to overflow the fields. 
For he does something in breaking down the dykes, and he per- 
mits something in suflfering the sea to pass through the breach. 

A. My mind could not have been expressed by a more happy 
similitude. 

B. According to our common way of speaking, we should say 
that he who made a breach in the dyke had let in the waters, 
nor would any accuse the dyke or the sea of any manner of 
fault ; but you, if I mistake not, accuse man of the fault, and 
say man, not God, committed the sin. Wherefore your effica- 
cious permission seems unintelligible to me. 

A. Do you not observe that as to the things themselves there 
is a vast difference between them ? For men are endowed with 
understanding, conscience, and will, which the dyke and sea have 
not ; and for that reason, that is a crime in man which is not so 
in the sea and the dyke. 

B. But I ask you whether that which God does o;' permits, 
has that efficacy (for that word you have likewise used), that 
men can no more not sin when that has ordered it, than the sea 
not overflow the fields through the beach which affords a free 
passage ? 

A. You have my meaning. 

B. According, therefore, to you there is the same relation in 
that sense between God and sin, as there is between the man 
who made the breach in the dyke and the destruction of the 
fields. 

A. There is, as to the event, for both are equally necessary. 



Notea.] anti-utilitarian theories. 337 

B. The action, therefore, of both, according to the custom of 
speech, may be expressed in the same manner. That is, — as 
he who broke down the dyke is called the cause of the loss of 
the fields, because he did that which necessarily produced that 
loss ; so God is the author of sin, since he has put man under 
the necessity of sinning. 

A. I told you before that I will not make use of those rude 
expressions. 

B. But either I do not understand what you say, or it comes 
to that point ; for we must not regard the empty sound of words, 
which signify nothing, but mind the ideas to which they are 
annexed. 

A. What ! will you prescribe rules to me of speaking, as if I 
did not know how to hold a discourse ? You sufficiently under- 
stand that my opinion is that God has to do with evil, that he is 
not a mere, bare spectator, but is so far an agent, that upon his 
acting, men commit sin. 

B. If God did nothing before the sin, would not the sin be 
committed ? 

A. No, for nothing is done without the efiicacy of Divine 
Providence. 

B. What, do you believe that man alone cannot violate laws ? 

A. That he can, I deny, when I deny that any thing can be 
done without the efficacy of Divine Providence. 

B, God, therefore, helps us to do wickedly in the same man- 
ner as he helps us to do well. 

A. You mistake, for in evil we must distinguish the action, 
from the viciousness of the action. God helps us to the doing 
of the action, but not to the vice of the action. But in good 
actions he helps us to the good that is in the actions. 

B. I beg you to inform me, what do you mean by the words 
an action, and what by the viciousness of an action ? 

A. I will make it plain to you by this example: In the 
hatred of our neighbor there is the action of the hatred, which 
in itself is indifferent, and is only called bad when directed to 
an unlawful object, and good when to a lawful. Next, there is 
the relation of that action to the object, which is evil. God does 
29 



338 APPENDIX. [Note A. 

not concur to this relation, though there is a necessity of his 
concurring to action, without which it could not be done. 

B. By what you have said I suppose you mean that God 
first generates in the mind of man hatred, in general, which is 
in itself neither good nor evil ; then there comes another rela- 
tion to the object, as in the example to our neighbor. Do I 
understand you ? 

A. Partly, you do, but not entirely, for I do not think there 
is any such existence as hatred in general, which should after- 
wards be determined to a certain object ; this is contrary to 
experience. 

B. Does God, then, create that very hatred that is directed 
against our neighbor ? 

A. Most certainly the hatred, but not the relation. 

B. But does that hatred exist without that relation ? 

A. Not at all, for the very moment that it is created in our 
minds, it is the hatred of our neighbor. 

B. According, therefore, to you, God creates such an 
hatred, which coexists in such a manner with a vicious relation, 
that it cannot be separated or distinguished from it but by ab- 
straction. 

A. He does so. 

B, Can this hatred, thus generated in the mind of man, be 
by the man directed to the lawful object, as vice, for example ? 

A. It cannot ; for the action of God being past, the certain 
event must necessarily follow. 

B. I beseech you, sir, if a man should put a burden on an- 
other's shoulders, which he that bore it could not afterwards 
throw off, and by that means should break his ribs, would not 
he that put on such a burden be looked on as the breaker of his 
ribs, if he had known the event of his action ? 

A. Most certainly. 

B. Should a man push another, walking by a river-side, into 
the water, who should there be drowned, should we not say that 
he who thrust him in drowned him ? 

A. Certainly. 

B. Yet there are some men who would say, that you are in 



NoteA.] anti-utilitaeian theoeies. 339 

an^rror in this admission, and insist that the imposing and the 
thrusting was produced by the men supposed, but not the break- 
ing the ribs, and the drowning, just as you suppose God gener- 
ates the hatred which is directed against our neighbor without 
that evil relation. 

A. It is most evident, that the men instanced, were guilty of 
the fracture and the drowning ; but the matter is otherwise with 
God, who is not obliged to give account to poor miserable men 
of his administration. 

B. But if he did what you wickedly persuade us [it would 
follow], both that all sinners must be acquitted of any crime, 
and that God himself, who compels the sins [so called must be] 
condemned. 

A. Do you not know that God's ways are not our ways, nor 
his thoughts ours ; shall man reply against God ? 

Hence it is evident to all that hear it, that Mr. A. the 
Thomist, either knows not what he means, or makes God the 
author of sin. 

It is said that Dr. Emmons, by way of eminence the great 
expounder of the Divine Efficiency scheme, once proposed to a 
circle of friends (perhaps his former pupils), to read to them a 
sermon on the six days' work of creation, which he had been 
writing, when one of them asked, " What do you prove? " Said 
the Doctor, " I prove that the proper work of creation was fin- 
ished in six days, so that the creation of all things which can 
properly be said to be created was finished in six days." 

" Well," inquired his friend, " have you proved that the work 
of creating our moral exercises was finished in the six days ? " 
The Doctor was so nonplussed that he refused to read. 



340 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 



[Referred to, p. 68.] 
SECTION I. 

What are some of the principal points of doctrine, held 
by men eminent for talents and learning, inconsistent with the 
truth, that power to the contrary choice is essential to moral 
agency and responsibility ? 

1. It has been held, that acts of willing or choosing are not 
voluntary acts, but that only those acts which are produced or 
caused by or proceed from acts of the will, are voluntary. 

Eeply. If those acts of mine, which are called acts of will, 
are not voluntary, then they are necessitated, and if they are 
necessitated, then those acts of body or mind which are caused 
or produced by them are not voluntary, but necessitated also ; 
e. g. If the act of my mind by which my hand is raised, is not 
voluntary, then the raising of my hand is not voluntary but 
necessary ; for if the act of will is put forth by which the hand is 
caused to rise, then the hand must rise, and I have no power 
to the contrary. I cannot both will to raise my hand and hold 
it still at the same time. So, then, instead of the motion of the 
hand being exclusively voluntary, all that is voluntary in the 
process is the act of will by which the hand is raised. To deny 
that the mind is voluntary in willing is a simple absurdity, as 
well as a contradiction. It is the same as to deny that the 
mind wills when it wills. 

The delusion that the mind is not voluntary in its acts of will 
and choice, is occasioned and led on by the supposition that 
moral quality belongs to the involuntary constitutional propen- 
sities, desires, aifections, and feelings of the sensibility, and 
which, from the necessity of nature, are not voluntary exercises, 
and are not immediately in the mind's control, and, of course, 



Sect.l] anti-utilitaeian theories. 341 

cannot by any possibility of themselves, independent of their 
connection with the will, possess any moral character. (See q. 
447.) 

To maintain that the mind is not voluntary in willing and 
choosing,* is a virtual denial of the power of moral agency, 
and, of course, is a denial of the foundation of moral obliga- 
tion. 

2. Another doctrine, inconsistent with the principle of power 
to the contrary, is that sin consists in constitutional, innate, invol- 
untary dispositions, inclinations, desires, affections, or propensities, 
which precede all choice and voluntary action, and is accord- 
ing to the following words of Dr. Alexander, the Princeton 
Review, and Dr. Woods. 

" Voluntary wickedness is nothing else but bringing into act 
what before existed in principle in the soul." — p. 150. "Our 
moral character radically consists in our feelings and desires. 
That all virtue consists in volition is not true." — p. 208. 
" There are exercises of mind which do not involve any exer- 
cise of will; and that our volitions have nothing of a moral 
nature but what they derive from the motives from which they 
proceed." — p. 207. " Our desires and affections are not subject 
to our volitions." — p. 200.t 

With no little indignation, the Princeton Review, Jan. 1853, 
in its article on Dr. Alexander's Moral Science, utterly con- 
demns the following statements : 

" 1st. A limitation of moral quality to actual choice, with the 
power to the contrary choice at the same moment, and in the 
same circumstances. 2d. As a consequence, plenary ability in 
fallen man to fulfil all God's commands. 3d. That all dispo- 
sitions, desires, feelings, and principles, lying back of and un- 
caused by choice, in the manner aforesaid, have no moral 
character." Of course, then, the Princeton reviewers hold that 
impenitent sinners have no adequate power for right action, and 

* See Dr. Woods on Mental Philosophy, in the Theological Review, 
1834, p. 86. 

[ Moral Science ; by Archibald Alexander, D. D , late Prof, of Theol- 
ogy, Princeton. 

29* 



342 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

that they are chargeable with sin before any voluntary action at 
all. 

" Every man must decide, and does decide, that a propensity, 
inclination, or disposition to sin is the very [^essence of sin, and 
the only thing which makes any outward action or [^any volition 
sinful." — p. 135. " It is as true of Adam as of any other man, 
that every sinful volition and act of his presupposed a sinful 
disposition, and must have arisen from it." — p. 112.* 

" No volition or choice of the mind can be considered sinful, 
unless it is connected with a sinful disposition or affection, and 
prompted by it." t 

Eeply. That which precedes all choice and voluntary action 
cannot be avoided, and, of course, cannot be sin. To suppose 
that to be sin which cannot be avoided, is in contravention of 
the intuitive principle, that what ought to be done can he done, 
and what ought to he avoided can he avoided. Since power to 
know and perform his duty is essential to the nature and obli- 
gation of a moral agent, the supposition that any thing whatever 
which precedes all choice and voluntary action is sin, must be 
utterly untrue and without reason. 

Those innate, constitutional, involuntary dispositions, inclina- 
tions, desires, and propensities, which belong to our nature, or 
by a natural necessity result from it, are sources of the tempta- 
tions which prompt us to the commission of sin. But if we do 
not yield to temptation, by the voluntary consent of the mind to 
pursue the forbidden gratification, no sin is committed. And 
none is or can be justly laid to our account. If we had not the 
adequate power to resist temptation, there could be no obliga- 
tion to resist it. And then there would be no sin in yielding to 
it. If we do not yield in any degree to temptation, there is no 
sin in being tempted. Jesus Christ was " in all points tempted 
like as we are, yet without sin." — Heb. 4 : 15. 

Our constitutional propensities and desires are not only the 
sources of our temptations to sin, but tliey are the only possible 



* Dr. Woods's Reply to Dr. Ware's Letters. 

t Dr. Woods's Remarks on Dr. Ware's Answer, p. 24. 



Sect.L] anti-utilitaeian theokies. 343 

sources of subjective motive to right action. Without a suscep- 
tibility of motives to right action, we should have no power to 
know or perform our duty, and, of course, without such a sus- 
ceptibility we should not be moral agents, for the reason that 
what ought to be done can be done, and what ought to be 
avoided can be avoided. Hence innate, inborn, concreated, 
sinful depravity, is an impossibility, — an utter absurdity. 

3. It has been correctly held, that natural necessity is that 
which men are under from the force of natural causes, as dis- 
tinguished from moral causes. And that natural necessity is 
the connection between causes and effects which are not of a 
moral nature, and that it cannot be resisted by all the power of 
mind and body. "We think that that necessity by which an 
event takes place is a natural necessity, where there is no power 
to the contrary. 

In connection with this doctrine of natural necessity it has 
been held, that ^ moral necessity is the necessary connection be- 
tween moral causes and effects. And by moral causes is meant 
inclinations and motives, and by moral effects is meant moral 
acts and moral character. And that this connection is full and 
fixed, infallible, unavoidable, unalterable, unfrustrable, and irre- 
sistible by any power that can be supposed in the case.' 

And then it has been set forth, * that the difference, between 
these two kinds of necessity, lies chiefly in the nature of the 
two terms connected, or that natural and moral necessity differ 
not so much in their nature as in the things connected,' and 
this, in our view, implies that there is no essential difference be- 
tween natural and moral necessity except in name; since one is 
as absolute as the other. 

In the language of President Edwards, " moral necessity . . . 
is that necessity of connection and consequence which arises 
from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives, 
and the connection there is between them and . . . certain voli- 
tions and actions." "Moral necessity," he says, "may be as 
absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as per- 
fectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary 
effect is with its natural cause." He adds : " When motives or 



344 APPENDIX. [NotkB. 

previous biases are very strong, all will allow there is some 
difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, 
the difficulty would be still greater. And, therefore, if more 
still were added to their strength to a certain degree, it would 
make the difficulty so great that it would be wholly impossible 
to surmount it. For this plain reason, because, whatever power 
men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that 
power is not infinite, and so goes not beyond certain limits." — 
Pres. Edwards on the Will, part i. § 4, pp. 40, 42. 

Now when and where this is the case there can be no power 
to the contrary, and, of course, no power to .choose, and therefore 
no power for free responsible action, because where there is no 
power to the contrary, the necessity by which an event takes 
place, or that necessity by which a certain act must be per- 
formed, is a natural necessity. 

4. Another doctrine of like bearing upon the question before 
us which has been held, is, that man has not power to originate 
his own moral acts, but that his moral acts are produced by the 
creative efficiency of an Almighty cause, which is of course ex- 
ternal to himself and out of his power to control. If this be so, 
then his acts are necessary by natural, irresistible necessity, and 
man has no more power to act in any other way, than as he is 
caused to act by the omnipotent causation of a power not his 
own, than a steam-engine has to draw a train of cars, without 
being acted upon by steam or by any other power. And mind 
is no more an agent with inherent power to act or to originate 
voluntary action than matter is, and then the mind has no more 
power to act, than matter has power to move, without any ex- 
ternal power acting to move it. (See q. 25.) 

The four doctrines last stated amount substantially to the 
same thing, and have substantially the same bearing upon the 
question before us, so that the reasons why any one of them 
should be rejected are good and sufficient, why every one of 
them should be. 

For what reasons should the four last-named doctrines be 
rejected ? 

(1.) If either of these forms of doctrine were true, then those 



sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 845 

mental acts which we call moral, are necessitated by an irresist- 
ible necessity. If this be so, then no matter by what name 
you call this necessity, or what epithets you apply to it, whether 
natural or moral, if it is unavoidable, if it can be neither over- 
come nor resisted, then man has no power to act but in one 
way, and that is in the way in which he does and must act, and 
he has no power of contrary choice — and in reality no power 
of choice at all — no power of voluntary action, nothing but the 
possihility of being acted upon. 

If the premises on which this reasoning is based were true 
and valid, the inevitable result would be, that man is not truly 
an agent. And if these premises were founded in reality and 
truth, they would just as inevitably result in the conclusion, that 
there is but one agent in the universe, as that man is not an 
agent. Doctrines which land so directly in absurdity, cannot 
have their foundation in truth. 

(2.) If our actions are necessitated by a proper irresistible 
necessity, then there is no foundation for moral obligation, and 
so far as we are concerned, free, moral, responsible agency and 
moral obligation, holiness and sin, are nothing but fictions of the 
imagination ; and the common sense of a world is no criterion 
of truth. 

(3.) By this philosophy, if true, all possibility of accounting for 
the origin of the ideas of moral ohligation, right and lurong^ 
would be taken away. For although mere imaginary ideas 
have no corresponding reality, yet they are composed of simpler 
ones which have a corresponding reality. But if all these 
moral ideas are but imaginary, then no simpler moral ideas are 
to be found, of which these could be composed or made up, or 
from which they could be derived. And then it follows that 
all men who use the terms choice, moral obligation, right and 
wrong, i. e. all men of all ages and of all nations, have been 
deluded by terms for which there has been no just occasion, and 
which have no meaning consistent with truth, and in fact no 
meaning at all. All which is inconceivable. 

5. Another form of doctrine, which has been extensively held, 



346 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

inconsistent with power to the contrary, relates to the three 
following points : — 

(1.) Natural ability, (2.) Moral inabiHty, and (3.) Moral abil- 
ity, and is as follows. It has been held by authority of high 
reputation, 

(1.) That natural ability consists in a power to choose only in 
accordance with an existing disposition or according to certain 
motives, called the prevailing and strongest motives, and to act 
only according to such choice,* and that is power to choose and 
act just as they do, and in no other way. And this is all the abil- 
ity which sinners have to do their duty, and is in reality nothing 
but power to commit sin, which is not sin. Therefore, if the 
phrase natural ability is not designed to signify a power of mind 
adequate to the performance of duty, then, the thing which is 
meant, whatever it be, if it exist at all, may exist where moral 
obligation does not. And then it can never constitute the 
ground or measure of moral obligation, nor constitute its posses- 
sor a moral agent. Such natural ability amounts to nothing but 
a natural inability^ so far as any and all duty is concerned. 

(2.) In connection with this doctrine it has been held, that sin- 
ners are subjects of a moral inability, which consists in an en- 
tire want of ability to choose, but in accordance with the exist- 
ing disposition or the prevailing and strongest motives, and in 
the same want of ability to act, save in accordance with their 
choice, thus caused by these strongest motives which they have 
no power to resist. So that sinjiers have no ability to do their 
duty. — Princeton Essays, pp. 266, 267, 277. And thus this 
moral inability is nothing but a natural inability to perform 
duty. 

That the strongest motives always prevail, has never yet been 
proved, and, as we believe, for this very good reason, that it 
never can be. To prove that the strongest motives always pre- 
vail, it has been argued that the prevailing motives are the 
strongest because they prevail, and they prevail because they 

* Princeton Essays, 275, 277; First Series, 1846. 



sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 347 

are the strongest. This reasoning would be good in physical 
causation, but not in morals. But how is it known that the mo- 
tives which prevail are the strongest ? The reply often made is, 
because the strongest must prevail. This, then, is both reason- 
ing in a circle and begging the question. Now we know that the 
motives which prevail are often not the strongest in the eye of 
reason, but infinitely the weakest. 

(3.) A third part of this form of doctrine is, that moral ability 
consists in a right state of heart or a right disposition, which is 
the essence of obedience. 

According to this, men must first begin to do their duty, in 
order to have any ability to do it. — Ibid. pp. 266, 267, 272, 
273, 277. And before they begin, they have not in fact any 
power to begin, and therefore all the ability which men have to 
perform duty is only in name. In reality it is nothing but 
inahility. 

These three notions amount to one and the same thing, which 
is, that men, before they are converted from sin to holiness, have 
no ability of any kind or in any sense which consists in a power 
adequate to the performance of any duty, and this is the same 
as to maintain, that they have a natural inability which consists 
of an absolute impossibility to do a right and holy act, in obe- 
dience to any command of God, or in the fulfilment of any 
moral obligation. 

And then, if these three notions thus resulting in natural 
inability were true, we should be brought again to the doctrine 
of fatalism, and there would be no refuge from it, with all its 
direful train of consequences. As long as the world has com- 
mon sense, it will never believe this doctrine. 

6. An attempt has been made to prove that ' the maxim, that 
no man is under obligation to do that which he has no power to 
perform, does not (according to the common sense of mankind) 
apply to the act of volition, but only to the ability to act accord- 
ing to our will.' — Ibid. p. 277. 

This maxim we have claimed to be self-evident, fundamental, 
and universal in its ap"plication to acts of will, as well as to 
those acts of body and mind which are consequent upon voli- 



348 APPENDIX. [Note B. 

lions, and to this extent to be in accordance with the universal 
reason of mankind. As evidence that this maxim, according 
to the general convictions of mankind, is applicable only to that 
mental and bodily action which follows choice, and not to choice 
itself, it has been alleged, * that the more determined, incorri- 
gible, and irreclaimable a sinner is in his wickedness, — the 
more deliberate, unmixed, inveterate, and invincible his wick- 
edness is, and the greater his inability is, then the greater is 
his guilt, and the more deserving is he of severe punishment, 
and the more ready and unhesitating is every one to form the 
judgment of condemnation.' — Ibid. pp. 281, 282. 

In reply, let it be observed that inability to do right, and de- 
termined and persistent wickedness, do not stand together in 
the same person. Men do not more readily condemn ; they do 
not even condemn a man at all for not doing what they know 
he has no ability to do. 

Such assumptions, boldly asserted, have much influence with 
many minds. But before we are carried away with them, let 
us inquire, — 

Why does every one more readily and severely condemn a 
sinner, the more deliberate, determined, inveterate, and incorri- 
gible he is in unmixed wickedness ? 

The reason why we more readily condemn, and why we en- 
hance our condemnation of any one on account of his more 
deliberate, determined, persistent, and unmixed wickedness, is 
not that he had no ability to refrain from sinning, but because 
of the accumulated evidence of the more atrocious abuse of his 
ability, manifested in perversely and obstinately choosing what 
he might and should have persistently refused, and because we 
regard him as having ample power to avoid the conduct we con- 
demn. And the reason of all this is, that all, even sinful 
choice, the world over, implies in its very nature power to make 
a contrary choice to the one which is made. 

It seems a great and evident mistake, as to what the common 
sense of mankind in regard to this maxim is, to suppose that it 
is not applied by them to all cases of duty. If the act of any 
being must be what it is by an invincible necessity, — if, when. 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 349 

he performs tli« act in question, he has no power to the con- 
trary, — common sense, sound and unperverted reason, must 
and forever will affirm that such an act is neither sinful nor 
virtuous, and for that act that being can be worthy of neither 
praise nor blame. 

7. Strange as it may seem, learned theologians, in the same 
Princeton Essays, p. 257, have entered upon a direct argument 
to prove that when men choose, they have at the time no power 
to make a contrary choice instead of the one which is made. 
And their main argument amounts to this, that there is no con- 
ceivable way in which a contrary choice could be made but in 
choosing by a previous choice to make it, and that there is no 
way to make the previous choice but by a previous choice, 
thus involving the impossibility of an infinite series of pre- 
vious choices. This argument is sufficiently answered by 
the consideration that an infinite series is no more requisite 
to make a different choice, than it is to make the one which is 
made, and that is not at all. 

Further to prove this point, these men raise these ques- 
tions : — 

" Who will claim that it is deemed necessary that they should 
have the property of choosing the exact contrary of what on 
the whole appears most eligible and desirable? So far from 
being essential to, would not such a property be declared by 
them destructive of all responsibility ? " " If, then, the will is 
in a given moral state, how can it be a property of it to put 
forth choices of an opposite moral character? Is this a real 
requisite or a desirable appendage to moral agency ? " — Prince- 
ton Essays, pp. 254, 255. 

The prevailing desires, inclinations, and temptations of some 
men lead them on in constant rebellion against God. Now is 
it a requisite, necessary, or desirable appendage to responsibility 
and moral agency to have the power to resist temptation, to 
repent of sin, and to obey the commands of God ? Certainly. 

The prevailing desires, inclinations, temptations, and strongest 
motives (if you please) of some men, lead them to become and 
continue for a long time gluttons, drunkards, and debauchees. 
30 



350 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

Now, can it be desirable that such men should have power ade- 
quate to resist these desires, motives, and temptations which 
now prevail, and to yield to those motives, desires, and consid- 
erations which ought to be the prevailing motives with them to 
become good citizens and the servants of God ? 

To ask these questions is to answer them. If there could be 
any possible doubt on this point, it ought to be removed at once 
and forever by the command of God: "Thou shalt love the 
Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy 
mind, and with all thy strength." Mark 12: 30. 

When summed up, to what do the seven last considered forms 
of doctrine amount ? 

Although the seven forms of doctrine last considered were 
not so intended by their supporters, yet they appear to consist 
substantially in seven modes of denying, or at least of asserting 
what is inconsistent with, the first principle of moral obligation, 
that what ought to be done can be done ; and they amount to a 
denial that when we make a given sinful choice we have the 
power of making a contrary holy choice, and they imply a de- 
nial that a holy choice is a free, unnecessitated act. And this 
amounts to a virtual denial of the doctrine of free, voluntary, 
responsible agency, which all men know to be true. 

The denial of power to the contrary is virtually denying the 
power to choose at all, for where only one way is possible no 
choice is possible, and therefore this is a denial of the self-evi- 
dent proposition. What ought to be done can be done. This is 
to deny a first principle of human belief. 

What is fatalism ? 

The doctrine that the actions of men are caused by that 
which is to them an unavoidable, invincible, and irresistible ne- 
cessity, is fatalism. 

The doctrine that men have no power to the contrary choice, 
or to act otherwise than they do, — that sinners have no ability 
of any kind to keep the commandments of God, as held by Dr. 
Wilson, the accuser of Dr. Beecher before the Presbytery of 
Cincinnati, — that sinners are not able in any sense to do their 
duty, as held by Dr. Junkin, the accuser of Rev. Albert 



sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 351 

Barnes,* — that impenitent sinners have no power to do Avhat 
God requires, as held by Dr. Joseph Harvey, the compiler of 
the East Windsor creed, — the doctrine that God maintains an 
irresistible, unqualified, absolute control over all the desires, 
emotions, feelings, thoughts, and actions of men, as once was 
taught at East Windsor,t so that all these take place according 
to his supreme preference, choice, and will, is fatalism. The 
doctrine that God has a perfect and unlimited power of control 
over all the action of human beings, and that, by this power, he 
maintains an absolute dominion over, and exercises an entire 
and irresistible control of, all the thoughts, feelings, dispositions, 
motives, and springs of action, as well as over the hearts and 
all the actions of his accountable creatures (as some men teach), 
is fatalism, unmitigated fatalism. That man, as a moral agent, 
is absolutely dependent upon God's unlimited control over his 
conduct, his intellect, and heart, is fatalism, notwithstanding it 
is so much inculcated in reviews, in preaching, and in books on 
mental science. 

These different forms of statement involve the irresistible, 
natural necessity/, that all human action should be just what it 
is. And this necessity is fatalism. It matters not what the 
ground of this necessity is, nor by what name you call it, 
whether moral certainty, moral or natural necessity, divine sov- 
ereignty, divine efficiency, God's control, decrees, or decretive 
will, or the imiversal reign of causation, — the doctrine that men, 
in their moral doings, act under a necessity which is irresistible 
by any power which they possess, is fatalism, downright fatalism. 

By saying this, it is not meant that there is not a true doc- 
trine of divine sovereignty and divine decrees, on which the cer- 
tainty of all events depends, but we mean that any statement 
Avhich logically leads to, or necessarily involves the doctrine of 
the inevitable, natural necessity of men's conduct, so that they 
have no power adequate to do their duty, is fatalism, and is not 



* Trials which came off in the Presbyterian General Assembly, from 
1835 to 1838. 
t Dr. Tyler's Eeview of Dr. Day on the Will, p. 4. 



352 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

supported by reason, nor by divine authority. No way of es- 
cape from this result can be opened by saying that fatahsm " is 
a natural necessity arising from the existence of things in them- 
selves independent of any voluntary or controlling agency." 
This is only one form of fatalism. The doctrine that the ac- 
tions of men are necessitated by an invincible necessity, is fatal- 
ism also, whether that necessity arises from any voluntary con- 
trolling agency, or from any involuntary cause or fate. So far 
as I am dependent on and controlled by any irresistible power or 
cause whatever, I am not free nor responsible. And so far as I 
am free, I am not thus dependent. 

To affirm of the Scriptures that ".they throw the moral world 
into the hands of God as really and as entirely as the natural 
world, [that] they represent him as controlling both alike, 
according to his pleasure," is to make them teach fatalism. — 
Am. Theol. Review, Aug. 1859, p. 401. 

So far as free, responsible agency is concerned, this is fatal- 
ism as downright and positive as language can well express. 
Every thing in the natural world, every particle of matter in 
the universe, when not influenced by the power of creatures, is 
just as God makes it to be, and it moves and acts (so far as it 
may be said to act) just as, according to his pleasure, he causes 
it to move and act, by a resistless causation, — a perfect and 
absolute control. Every rational and enlightened conscience 
knows that in the world of moral agency this is not so. Mind 
is not matter. Men are not machines. Responsible mind is 
not thus controlled. And, therefore, to make the Scriptures 
teach that men are thus controlled, is to make them affirm what 
every enlightened, unprejudiced mind, in the exercise of com- 
mon sense and sound reason, knows not to be true. The Bible 
itself most plainly contradicts this interpretation and under- 
standing of its teachings. The apostle Peter affirms, " God is 
not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to 
repentance." 2 Peter, 3 : 9. God himself, by the mouth of his 
prophet Ezekiel, says, " I have no pleasure in the death of the 
wicked, but that he should turn and live." Ez. 33 : 11. So we 
see, on Divine authority, God does not control the wicked to 



Sect. II.] ANTI-UTILITAEIAN THEOKIES. 853 

act according as he plainly asserts that it is his pleasure they 
should act. After all that God has said of his pleasure that 
men should not go on in sin and perish, but that they should 
come to repentance, — should turn and live, — they do sin on 
and perish in their sin ; therefore, not by his control. 

What comprehensive answer can be given to each and all of 
the seven doctrines above discussed? 

Substantially the same answer is valid against each of these 
seven forms of doctrine. 

They each and all lead to fatalism. If they are true, no 
created being can do otherwise than just as he does. If fatal- 
ism is false, they are. If they are true, there is no such thing 
among men as choice, or power of choice, or moral agency, or 
moral obligation, or right or wrong, or holiness or sin, which 
notions are contradicted by the common sense and universal 
consciousness of mankind. 



SECTION II. 

POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE. 

The August number of the American Theological Review, 
1859, contains an article on the power of contrary choice, which 
says, " The importance of a thorough examination of this no- 
tion is the greater, in that the whole scheme to which it belongs 
stands or falls with it." Very true. The Review proceeds, 
"A wider influence is now at work to turn away the minds of 
ministers and churches from the Calvinistic doctrines, than was 
ever before seen in the course of the history of New England. 
And we have the germ of the whole system here antagonizing 
with Calvinism, in the phrase which we have so imperfectly 
expounded." 

On page 417 it is said, " This phrase, first pronounced, as far 
as we can ascertain, by Dr. Taylor, has been gaining currency 
for about a third of a century." These two solemn affirmations 
by such authority, do not look as though the {supposed) pecul- 
iarities of Dr. Taylor were fast dying out, and soon to be only 
30* 



354 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

among the things that were, as the Boston Recorder and 
Princeton Review would fain make the world believe. " Let 
this germ be displaced from the common mind, and the rest will 
disappear." So we think, but hie labor est : it will be a task 
to do this. 

Again, the Am. Theol. Review says, " We know of very little 
that has been written and published in argument for it. We 
would be glad to see such an argument." — pp. 433, 434. 

We very cheerfully obey the call and accept the implied 
challenge. And the first argument we here present, in proof 
of the plenary power of contrary choice, shall be in the expres- 
sive words of him who spake as never man spake : " Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy 
soul and with all thy strength^ 

Impenitent sinners choose a life of sin. This command re- 
quires them to use their strength in making the contrary choice 
of a life of love to God. The strength or power, the terms 
being synonymous, is theirs, now in their possession, and, of 
course, it was not destroyed by, nor in, the fall of Adam. The 
same thing precisely is required of sinners in all the commands 
in the Bible, to repent and turn themselves, and to be converted, 
and to cast away all their transgressions, and to make a new 
heart and a new spirit. To do the thing which is required in 
these various forms of command, is to use their power of contrary 
choice, in making a choice contrary to their present choice. 
God required the same thing by his servant Joshua, when he 
said, " Choose ye this day whom ye will serve." 

These instances of a " Thus saith the Lord," are better than 
a thousand metaphysical arguments to those who cannot under- 
stand metaphysics. 

For our second argument, we refer our friends of the Am. 
Theol. Review to our whole treatise, one of the main designs 
of which is to prove that the power of choice, or, if you please, 
the power of contrary choice (both being one and the same 
thing), is included in the only possible basis of moral obliga- 
tion. It is one of the plainest dictates of common sense, that 
when and where a given act is unavoidable, there being no 



Sect.il] anti-utilitarian theories. 355 

adequate power of a contrary choice, there neither is nor can 
be any power of choice at all in reference to the act supposed, 
and for this most conclusive reason, there can be no obligation. 
What can be plainer to him who knows what choice is, than 
that choice between good and evil implies both power to choose 
the good, and also power to choose the evil, power to choose 
one, beiqg the same thing, precisely identical, with power to 
choose the other, — the power of choice and the power of con- 
trary choice being simply and absolutely essential to free, 
responsible agency.* 

Suppose, now, that it be a real truth, that when a man makes 
what we call a wicked choice, he is bound by an absolutely 
unavoidable, invincible necessity to make that choice (call it by 
whatever name, — moral necessity if you please), whether it be 
the first act of moral agency or not, and that he is bound by an 
absolute impossibility, and by an unavoidable, invincible neces- 
sity not to make the contrary and opposite choice, it seems to 
us that nothing can be plainer than that in such a case a man or 
a child cannot be a responsible, free agent, to choose between 
good and evil. " Man is not a link in the necessary chain of 
material nature. He is a free creature ; capable of continuing 



^ "We hope the Am. Theol. Review will well consider our arguments, 
and if found to be true and sound, admit to be true such of them as are 
so, but refute any and all that are not so. If they will do this to our 
understanding, we will join with our friends in their repudiation. Truth 
is dearer to us than triumph in the ^vl"ong. It has been said of our work 
that "it is labor to bring forth the wind." Now if it should be truly and 
faii-ly refuted, it will in one sense at least accomplish this result to good 
purpose, and the truth would be better understood. 

As the Am. Theol. Review " is intended to meet the wants of \t1iose 
churches that accept the . . . Shorter Catechism," we hope this Review 
will pay particular attention to instruct those churches on that feature of 
the Catecliism which implies only a limited atonement, and if these 
churches ivant a Saviour that died for the world, and " tasted death for 
every man," showing that if he died for all, then were all dead, we hope 
this Review will fulfil its intention to meet that want, by bringing out the 
fact that Jesus Christ died for the whole world, and by making this fact 
stand out, the Larger Catechism to the contrary notwithstanding. 



356 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

holy as he was created, or of turning to sin." — Prof. Shedd, 
Bib. Sac. 1859, p. 740. Therefore wicked moral agents have 
the power of contrary choice. 

Our next argument on this point shall be drawn from the 
necessity of yielding to the dictates, and satisfying the demands 
of common sense, manifested in the East Windsor creed, which 
says, " Man has understanding and natural strength to do all 
that God requires." If so, then those men who choose the ser- 
vice of Satan, have natural strength or real adequate power, 
which is exactly the same thing, to make the opposite choice of 
the service of God, which he requires them to do. We are aware 
that East Windsor men explain away this part of their creed 
so as, in our view, to make it mean nothing which the terms of 
it properly convey, or which, in the eye of common sense, is 
true. We hope the day is coming, and close at hand, when this 
question shall be brought before the minds of the people, and 
kept there, till they see and suitably appreciate the truth in 
regard to it, and make their appreciation of it felt, by those who 
seek the office and employment of religious teachers. We 
intend to do what we can for this end. 

Our inquiry now shall be, do our friends of the Am. Theol. 
Review deny the power of contrary choice, which we claim to 
be essential to any and every possible basis of the moral obli- 
gation of sinners to obey the requirements of heaven ? 

We have endeavored so to explain this power to the contrary, 
as to leave none of that elasticity in it, of which these review- 
ers complain. 

They say, " It has such an elasticity about it, that if taken up 
to express simply a natural ability, it, by a force residing in 
itself, overleaps the bound, and expresses a \moral ability. For, 
strictly speaking, a power to choose, if we mean any thing more 
than an abstract faculty of choosing, involves a moral power." 
A [mere natural ability to choose is a solecism in languages. 
An ability to choose, whether in a direct or contrary choice, is, 
by force of the terms, more than a natural, it is a moral ability." 

In reply, we say, that a mere abstract faculty of choos- 
ing, which, having the proper opportunity, is not adequate 



SECT.n.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 357 

to cljoose, is a mere nonentity, a nothing but an unthinkable 
absurdity. 

Having quoted Pres. Edwards with approbation, they say, 
" According to these definitions a power of actually choosing is 
a moral ability. A natural ability to choose, is an ability to 
choose if ive will, or an ability that becomes an ability to choose 
as soon as we do choose, and not before ; and as in the case of 
the power of contrary choice, we never do choose it, so it is no 
ability at all." — pp. 423, 424. " The nonsense of the term 
ahility to choose if he will choose, . . . prevents its going to any 
purpose at all." — p. 425. 

That which is here termed and defined as a natural ability to 
choose, is nothing but a natural inabihty to choose. Power or 
ability to choose must exist logically before it can be put forth 
in choice, therefore if it does not exist before it is put forth in 
choosing, it can never exist at all. 

On p. 422 our reviewers say, " The word power usually in- 
cludes the possibility of doing a thing." True, without meaning 
this, it can mean nothing that has any sense in it. 

Again ; another argument, to prove there is no such thmg in 
man as power to the contrary choice, is the assumption that it 
is never exerted. 

The language of the Am. Theol. Review, in the last half of 
the nineteenth century, is as follows, to wit : " That which 
makes it infallibly certain that . . . [the infant] will make a 
sinful choice, excludes the \j)ossibility, the posse, of his making 
a holy choice. Then how do you know that this power of con- 
trary choice exists, when you concede that in all acts of the 
will, in all intelligent beings in the universe, never an instance 
occurred or could occur, wherein it came into exercise ? . . . 
It is conceded that this power of contrary choice never was 
exerted and never will be. How then do we know that it 
exists ? " 

Viewing this argumentation in its true light, what does it 
amount to ? e. g. A man has no power to think or to know any 
thing which he never does think or know, because he never 
does think or know any thing which he never does think or 



358 APPENDIX. [Note B. 

know. Or thus, a man has no power to choose or to do any 
thing which he never chooses to do, because he never chooses to 
do that which he never chooses to do. We think that all that 
class of men, whose opinions are controlled by reason, common 
sense, and the Bible, will never be convinced by such an argu- 
ment, certainly if they look at the argument till they under- 
stand it. 

These citations we have made from this Am. TheoL Review, 
are thus seen, taken together, to prove the full denial, by our 
friends, of the power of contrary choice in any intelligent being 
in the universe. Now, if all this be true and there be no escape 
from it, then we are most manifestly landed in universal and 
inextricable fatalism. The argument to prove this conclusion 
we by no means admit, viz., that this power of contrary choice 
is never exerted. 

If, as we claim abundantly to have proved, this power of 
contrary choice is included in, and is nothing but the power of 
choice between good and evil, then it is exerted in every moral 
choice. If the self-evident, infallibly certain truism, in regard to 
every being in the universe, God himself not excepted, that he 
never performs an act which he never performs, proves that no 
being has power to do differently from what he does, then free 
responsible agency is nothing but a name. That which ends in 
absurdity, must be founded in absurdity. 

We are confident in the opinion, that if this denial by the Am. 
Theol. Review of the power of contrary choice could be substan- 
tiated, it would afford a better argument for the support of athe- 
ism than any other that was ever yet invented. If there be not 
in man a power that renders right doing to him a real possi- 
bility, then there is no basis for moral obligation, nor for a 
righteous moral government over the world, and then we should 
have no evidence that there is a righteous God. If advancing 
arguments which lead or tend to atheism were a sufficient 
ground for withholding fellowship, we should reject some from 
our fellowship whom we are willing now to regard as real, 
though mistaken, deluded Christians — deluded by spurious 
metaphysics. 



Sect.II.] anti-utilitaeian theoeies. 859 

There seems to be another fallacy about this argument from 
the certainty that a choice will never be made which is con- 
trary to all the choices which are certain ever to be made, and 
that fallacy arises from confounding the idea of an unfailing 
certainty, a certainty which merely will not fail, with an infalli- 
ble necessity which can neither fail nor he made to fail. The 
former, i. e. the mere certainty of action, is consistent with free- 
dom of action, and with that power to the contrary choice which 
is involved in and is essential to free agency ; while an infalli- 
hle necessity, that cannot be removed, is not and cannot be con- 
sistent with duty or obligation, or responsibility or blame, not 
even if you call it a moral necessity. Prefixing the term moral 
to necessity, does not change it from the most absolute and in- 
vincible necessity. 

The attempted distinction between natural and moral ability 
and inability, and between natural and moral necessity, is such 
an arbitrary and abusive use of language, that it has led to 
great confusion of ideas, and to an indefinite and contradictory 
use, meaning, and understanding of these terms, moral necessity, 
moral ability and inability, so that they ought to be banished 
from the language. 

To show up the absurdity of the claim that the power of 
contrary choice is never used, let us take this illustration. Sup- 
pose a man able to lift five hundred pounds weight and no more, 
and that, having two such weights before him, he lifts one of 
them. Is not the power to lift the one he does lift, also power 
to hft the other ? and is not the power by which he chooses to 
lift one, power to choose to lift the other ? Or, suppose again, 
he at one time chooses to lift one and at another time the other, 
is it not the same power by which he makes these opposite 
choices ? Is not the power by which he makes one choice and 
lifts one weight, the same with that by which he makes the 
other and contrary choice, and lifts the other weight ? Now, 
suppose that he says two and two are four and two are six, and 
chooses to stop there. Again, he says two and two are four 
and two are six and two are eight, and chooses to stop there, — 
is not the power by which he makes one of these choices iden- 



360 APPENDIX. [NoteB. 

tical with that by which he makes the other and contrary 
choice? No unprejudiced mind, we think, can doubt it. So 
when sinners choose to serve God, is it not with the same 
powers with which they had before practised sin ? 

But these reviewers claim that, according to their doctrine, 
there is a sufficient basis for obHgation in man. Their claim is 
in these words : " When we say that one has an abihty to do a 
thing, if he will, — i. e. has natural ability to do it, though his 
inclinations are hopelessly set against it, — we say what is need- 
ful to show that the obligation to do it is complete upon him." 

Here, then, we have the important and decisive concession, 
that ability to do, in some proper sense of ability, is indispen- 
sably needful to the basis of any and all obligation. But this 
is in contradiction to what they have elsewhere said, viz. " that 
natural ability to choose is a solecism in language. An ability 
to choose, whether in a direct or contrary choice, is, by force of 
the terms, more than a natural, — it is a moral ability." "A 
natural ability to choose is [only] an ability to choose, if we 
wilV Now if we will not, then it is not an ability to choose, 
just " as in the case of the power of contrary choice we never 
do choose it, — so it is no ability at all." Here, then, we leave 
this matter, with a perfect conviction that no rational being on 
earth, in the exercise of common sense, will ever believe that 
no ability at all is a basis of moral obligation. Therefore, ac- 
cording to the Am. Theol. Review, there is no basis in man for 
moral obligation. Now, we see not why their system, being 
without a basis of moral obligation, is not in as bad a plight 
as ours would be without the power of contrary choice. Ac- 
cording to the adage, it is a poor rule that will not work both 
ways. 

Once more ; the Am. Theol. Review says : " We grant that 
all sin is voluntary, in several senses of the term." 

Very well. We most heartily say aynen to this, that all sin 
is voluntary. And we infer with certainty, therefore, that it 
cannot, in any possible case, precede all voluntary action and 
all consent of the will. Now, therefore, when these gentlemen of 
the Review attempt to prove, from what Paul says about lust and 



NoteC] THEOKIES of FINNEY AND MAHAN. 361 

concupiscence, " that the \_propensity to sin which goes before 
the act of the will, [is sin," they make him contradict them- 
selves, and all common sense besides. 

We hold that the truth that all sin is voluntary is self-evi- 
dent to every one who fairly understands it, and therefore the 
doctrine of original sin, in all the multitudinous and opposite 
senses in which its sticklers state it, is contrary both to Scrip- 
ture and reason. " The soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ez. 18 : 
20), but not unless it sins (all sin being voluntary) by its own 
voluntary act of sinning. 

To grant that all sin is voluntary, and then to claim that it 
precedes all acts of will, seems like an attempt to gain the ben- 
efit of such an admission, without in reality consistently adher- 
ing to it. To deny that sin is voluntary, is revolting to the 
popular mind. 



c. 

[Note C, Eeferred to, p. 112.] 

EXTRACTS ON MORAL GOVERNMENT FROM PROF. FINNEY'S THE- 
OLOGY, OBERLIN EDITION, 1846. PROF. FINNEY'S AND PRES. 

mahan's views compared. 

" Utility is an attribute of moral law." " Law proposes the 
highest good of universal being as its end, and requires all 
moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this 
end. Consequently, utility must be one of its attributes." — p. 
15. " That which is upon the whole for the highest good of 
the universe, must be demanded by moral law." — p. 18. 

" The contemplation by us of the joys of others may be and 
often is the means of increasing our oAvn. In this case the ulti- 
mate good is both an ultimate and a relative good ; that is, it is 
both an ultimate end and a means. . . . Our nature demands 
satisfaction, blessedness, enjoyment. This is an ultimate de- 
mand." — p. 50. 

" It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right 
31 



362 APPENDIX. [NoteC. 

would be obligatory if it necessarily tended to and resulted in 
universal and perfect misery, than which a more nonsensical 
affirmation was never made." — p. 18. 

Tendency to good, then, we infer, must be one element in the 
foundation of law and moral obligation. 

" Expediency is an attribute of law, . . . that which is upon 
the whole most expedient is right, and that which is right is ex- 
pedient." — p. 17. 

The doctrine of benevolent utility, as we understand it, is im- 
plied in the above statements. 

Prof. Finney thinks " there is a fundamental difference be- 
tween the condition and ground of obligation. . . . For exam- 
ple ; the possession of the powers of moral agency is the {con- 
dition of the obligation to choose the highest good of being in 
general as an ultimate end for its own sake. But the intrinsic 
value of this good [chosen] is the \_ground of the obligation [to 
choose it]. This obligation could not exist without the posses- 
sion of these powers ; but the possession of these powers can- 
not of itself create the obligation to choose the good in prefer- 
ence to the ill of being. The intrinsic difference between the 
good and ill of being is the ground of the obligation to will the 
one rather than the other." — London Ed. p. 27. 

We think there is not just ground for this distinction, and 
that it tends to confusion. Intrinsic good cannot of itself create 
obhgation that it should be chosen, any more than the posses- 
sion of the powers of moral agency can of itself, when there is 
no good to be chosen, create obligation to choose that good. 
Therefore, both the value of the good and the powers of moral 
agency, knowledge, and opportunity, are essential to the ground 
of obhgation. And further, this distinction between the ground 
and condition of obligation is inconsistent with the following cor- 
rect and important statements of Prof. Finney himself: " Moral 
law is a rule of action founded in the nature and relation of 
moral beings, sustained hy sanctions equal to the merit of obe- 
dience and the guilt of disobedience" 

" Another attribute of law is practicability. That which the 
precept demands must be practicable to the subject. That 



NoteC] theories of FINNEY AND MAHAN. 363 

which demands a natural impossibility is not and cannot be 
moral law." 

"Another attribute of moral law is independence. It is 
\_founded in the self-existent nature of God. It is an eteraal 
and necessary idea of the divine reason. It is the eternal, self- 
existent rule of the divine conduct, the law which the intelli- 
gence of God prescribes to himself." — Ibid. p. 11. 

Since law and obligation are essentially the same (obligation 
being the binding power of law, law without obligation being 
nothing), that which is the ground or foundation of one must be 
of both. The sine qua non of obligation must be a ground, as 
well as a condition of it. We think most surely that Prof Fin- 
ney, in the true and proper sense, as we understand it, is a utili- 
tarian. The sense in which he opposes utility is not the true 
and proper sense of benevolent utility, but the sense of a selfish 
utility, which is not properly, on the whole, utility at all, but in 
reality a detriment in the end. 

In confirmation of these last remarks, we make the following 
extracts from the Science of Logic, by Asa Mahan, D. D. : — 

" Prof. Finney fully agrees with myself [Mahan] in reject- 
ing the doctrine of utility." — p. 259. Pres. Mahan thinks that 
Prof. Finney is quite inconsistent with himself in rejecting the 
doctrine of utility. 

" The advocates of this [Pres. Mahan's] theory agree with 
Prof Finney in the doctrine that the good of being is the ulti- 
mate reason for ultimate intentions of a certain class, to wit, all 
intentions included in willing the good of being." Now, as this 
class includes all good ultimate intentions which are possible to 
the mind of man, this is a good and sufficient ground for a full 
agreement of the parties in the true sense of the doctrine of 
benevolent utility. 

"On the other hand, they [Pres. Mahan and his friends] 
affirm that there are other objects, such as virtue and sin, moral 
character, moral desert, etc., which contain ultimate reasons for 
certain acts of will or ultimate intentions besides happiness as 
a good in itself. Here, and here only, is there a difference of 
opinion." — p. 261. 



364 APPENDIX. [Noted. 

The difference between Finney and Malian on this point, as 
we understand it, is this, that Finney holds that these objects 
last named are real, important, and essential reasons for action, 
but that they are not ultimate (as Mahan holds) ; but that the 
satisfaction found in right acts, and the happiness promoted by 
them, are, in the order of nature, ultimate, i. e. ulterior to right 
intentions in all cases whatsoever, and that this personal satis- 
faction, and the general good in their intrinsic value, are essen- 
tial elements in the ground of obligation. That this last view, 
to wit, that one element in the foundation of obligation consists 
in the value of the highest good, it has been the labor of our 
treatise to establish on a permanent basis ; while we also claim 
that ability to promote that good is included in the foundation 
of obligation. 

From a careful examination of the above statements, and of 
the writings, to some extent, of both these gentlemen, our con- 
clusion is, that if they were logically consistent each with him- 
self, they would agree with each other in holding and teaching 
the doctrine of benevolent utility. That this is the real doctrine 
of Prof. Finney, and that too very ably and clearly defended 
(with the exception of some little inconsistency, and not permit- 
ting it to be called by its true name), we cannot doubt. 



D. 

[Note D. Eeferred to, p. 159.] 

VIEWS OF THE PRINCETON AND THE AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL 
REVIEWS. 

It is quite pleasant to learn from gentlemen of the Princeton 
Review, and to hear them say, that the dogma " that ' sin is the 
necessary means of the greatest good,' is for them to maintain 
who avow it. This is no part of our theology." 

And yet what is thereafter said seems very little, if any, to 
fall short of implying this doctrine, viz. " It is quite certain that 



Noted.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 365 

redemption is the grandest outshining of the perfections and 
glories of God." "It is equally certain that redemption and 
God's declarative glory therein, arc impossible without sin." — 
July, 1859, p. 514. 

Sin, then, according to these statements, is necessary to the 
grandest outshining of the perfection and glories of the Deity, 
so that universal perfection in holiness would have prevented 
the grandest display of God's perfections which, without sin, 
could not have been made. What is this but making sin the 
necessary means of the greatest good, and making God depend- 
ent on sin for the highest, grandest display and greatest promo- 
tion of his own glory. Were it not for the inconsistency which 
follows the rejection of this revolting dogma, the voluntary re- 
pudiation of it from this quarter would afford gratifying evi- 
dence that an encouraging reformation in theology is going on 
in the world. And yet this avowal, after all, proves that the 
peculiarities of New Haven views have not as yet begun to die 
out, as this Review would fain make the world believe. We 
think our Princeton friends will find it dilEficult to extricate this 
doctrine from the Calvinistic system, without making essential 
modifications and important improvements in that system. To 
do this, however, will be comparatively easy, since Dr. Taylor 
has paved the way by his teachings, and by the death blow 
which he gave to this odious notion of man's device in his 
Goncio of 1828, in a note on this topic. 

Certain sentiments, when plainly expressed, are revolting to 
the common sense and feelings of men. Certain others are 
adapted to secure common approbation, when fairly and plainly 
expressed. When men hold the first kind of these opinions 
and reject the latter, it is natural for them still to try to obtain 
the advantage of the acceptable words and forms of expres- 
sions, and to avoid the disadvantage of those which are revolt- 
ing and repulsive. For an example of the first kind, " Sin is 
the necessary means of the greatest good ; " for one of the sec- 
ond, " All sin is voluntary." 

Our brethren of the Am. Theol. Review reject the first of 
these expressions, by saying sin " came into the universe, . . . 
31* 



366 APPENDIX. LNoteD. 

not because it was the necessary means of the greatest good." 
And yet they say that " sin and redemption were permitted to 
have a place in the great plan of God, because he saw that, not- 
withstanding incidental evils, this was the best conceivable plan, 
— the plan most glorious to himself, and best calculated to pro- 
mote the good of the intelligent universe on the whole." And 
further, they say "it is easy to see that the existence of sin 
may be made an ultimate gain to the universe, — an unspeaka- 
ble gain." — pp. 409, 410. 

What can all this fine phraseology mean, but that sin is, after 
all, the necessary means of the greatest good ? Is not all this 
actually implied? If it be so, as is in these quotations stated, 
certainly holiness is not the necessary means of the greatest 
good, because if perfect holiness had universally prevailed, ac- 
cording to the law and earnest requirements of God, the great 
and unspeakable gain obtained by having sin in this plan would 
by this holiness have been prevented. 

We leave it for gentlemen of the Am. Theol. Review and 
the Princeton Review to explain why they reject this phrase, 
and still claim that sin is necessary to the best plan for good to 
the universe ; and also why they of the Am. Theol. Review 
assert that "all sin is voluntary," and still hold that in some 
cases it precedes all acts of will. — pp. 420, 421. 

When Dr. John W. Webster was executed for the murder of 
Dr. Parkman, the community saw and felt and rejoiced in, that 
glorious and impartial exhibition of justice, and of the power 
and majesty of the law, put forth for the protection of the pub- 
lic weal, the prosperity, the interests, property, and lives of the 
citizens. So when God sustains his authority and protects the 
interests and well-being of the subjects of his kingdom, by exe- 
cuting the penalty of his law, and when, by redemption, he 
saves sinners from sin and death and hell, we rejoice in the glo- 
ries and majesty of his reign thus exhibited. 

But suppose, in the case of Webster, he had supported the 
law by liis obedience, and that he had promoted the public 
welfare by doing right ; who would prefer to this his murder 
of Dr. Parkman, that he might rejoice in the glories and 



Noted.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 367 

majesty of the law in protecting the community from ilic 
results of that murder ? So in the case of sin and its penalty 
executed upon irreclaimable sinners, and remitted in the case 
of the reclaimed and redeemed ; who would sacrifice the glories 
and bliss of a perfect heaven, with a perfect God reigning over 
it, for all the glory obtained in consequence, and occasioned by 
the existence of sin, in redemption and in the sufferings of 
hell? 

Who cannot see that the glories and bliss of a perfectly holy 
and happy kingdom, excel those of a kingdom marred by sin 
and eternal misery, notwithstanding all the justice displayed in 
the latter. 

If it were possible for any being to secure the holiness and 
consequent bliss of a perfect heaven, including in it all the 
rational beings in the universe, who would be willing to ex- 
change it for the events which do and will take place in the 
present series, at the expense of all the sin and consequent 
suffering and misery of hell involved therein? 

But before we adopt the conclusion of the Princeton Review 
and of the Am. Theol. Review, let us, as we may be able, care- 
fully contemplate the transcendent glories of an all-perfect God, 
reigning in perfect holiness, over a universe of perfectly holy 
beings, consecrated with all their powers to the doing of God's 
will, as most sincerely and earnestly expressed in the laws of 
nature, in the reason and very constitution of our being, which 
he has given us, and in his revealed Word, and in his solemnly 
expressed commandments, and thus cooperating with God to 
the full extent of all their powers, in promoting happiness to all 
eternity throughout the whole extent of Jehovah's kingdom. 
Who can take all this fairly into view, and behold all the 
powers of all the rational beings God has ever made, and ever 
will make, or might have made (had there been no sin to 
be counteracted and put down), united with the utmost exer- 
tions of Omnipotent wisdom and goodness, in promoting for 
eternity that happiness which results from holiness, — who 
could thus behold all the powers of God and of the universe 
of rational beings thus united for the promotion of the most 



368 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

valuable end, by the most valuable means which, according to 
his own testimony, God could devise ; and then, without con- 
summate arrogance, or consummately bewildered folly, dare to 
afiii'm, There is a better way ? 

We are glad to see the views of opposing brethren of the 
Am. Theol. Review expressed in so good a spirit. We do not 
expect generally to see a better spirit exhibited by those who 
are found on the wrong side of truth, believing that they are 
controlled in all their acts by an agency not their own, as much 
and as irresistibly as the world of matter is thus controlled. 



E. 

[Note E. refeiTed to p. 173.] 
SECTION I. 

ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES DISCUSSED. 

The utilitarian doctrine of Benevolent Rectitude, or that holi- 
ness is relative, and not absolute nor ultimate good, implies that 
utility, or the promotion of happiness, is the ultimate object of 
virtue, and that useful tendency is one essential element in the 
foundation of moral obligation ; and, therefore, that right is a 
relative rather than an absolute idea. 

The utilitarian feature of this doctrine is opposed by three 
anti-utilitarian theories, which are worthy of special notice in 
this investigation. These theories give rise to various objec- 
tions, in various forms, to the doctrine of benevolent utility, the 
most weighty of which we mean to notice and expect to re- 
move. This may not be so difficult to be done as might be 
imagined, since these theories not only overturn each other, 
but as we expect to show, the truth contained in each over- 
throws the errors contained in itself. 

I. The first theory that shall receive attention is directly 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 869 

opposed to the idea that virtue consists in henevolence. Ac- 
cording to this theory, as its supporters claim, " Absurdity is . . . 
inherently rooted in the doctrine itself, of greatest happiness as 
the ultimate end. The important defect of the whole theory is 
that it can give no moral system." — Bib. Sac. 1856, p. 68, an 
article by L. P. Hickok, D. D. " Duty is end in and of itself." 
* Holiness must be not a means but an end, not a utility, not a 
want, but an end to the exclusion of all ends ulterior to itself, 
and, therefore, itself must be the ultimate, — the last end of 
itself.' — Pres. Quar. Rev. 1855, pp. 436, 455. Therefore, 
according to this theory, happiness of any kind or degree can- 
not be the ultimate, final object of virtue. The spirit's worthi- 
ness is the ultimate object of virtue, not the happiness of the 
agent, nor of any other being, nor of all beings together. And 
the ultimate rule of duty according to this theory is, Act ivorthy 
of the rational spirit that you are^ — act according to your 
spirits luorthiness and dignity. 

How, then, does this theory overturn itself? 

1. Virtue, according to this theory, is free, voluntary action, 
and now, since voluntary action of all kinds must by inevitable 
necessity always have an object ulterior to the action itself, 
there can be no holy action which has not an object ulterior to 
itself. 

2. By the showing of its own able and ardent supporters, 
the ultimate subjective object of this spirit worthiness is that 
happy state of complacency and satisfaction by which the senti- 
ment of the reason is filled, constituting the happiness, — the 
enjoyment found in the love of right. 

Thus it is proved that holiness is a utility and a want, and 
happiness is, after all, because it must be by the most absolute 
necessity in the unchangeable nature of holiness, as well as by 
the showing of its supporters, the ultimate, final, subjective 
object of holy action. In this w^ay this w^orthiness theory of 
rectitude overthrows itself, and establishes the main principle 
of the utilitarian doctrine of benevolent rectitude, \az. that 
happiness is the ultimate object of virtue. This worthiness 
theory will be more fully considered in another place. (E. sec. 3). 



370 APPENDIX. [NqteE. 

Let it here be carefully observed, that the principle that holy 
action has no end or object ulterior to itself, is completely de- 
molished by one half of the next theory to be noticed. After 
having discussed the next theory we shall return to a more 
particular consideration of this theory, called " Worthiness of 
Spiritual Approbation." 

II. The next theory of the nature of virtue to be noticed 
is that set forth by several gentlemen whose names are not 
given to the public, in a very able review of Pres. Edwards on 
the Nature of Virtue in the Bibliotheca Sacra, 1853. As in 
this review this theory is more distinctly stated and ably sup- 
ported, in our judgment, than in any other publication within our 
knowledge, with unfeigned respect we propose, for the purpose 
of designation, to term it the BiUiothecan theory of the nature 
of virtue. 

The fundamental principle of this theory is, that " in point of 
time the last good aimed at [in holiness] is the general happi- 
ness." This implies that "All virtue consists in benevo- 
lence." — pp. 721-723. Thus far this is, as it claims to be, in 
accordance and identical with the doctrine of Edwards, and (as 
we judge), is most undeniably true. So incontestably true is 
this position, that it may be regarded as a complete demolition 
of the worthiness theory above considered, it being self-evident 
if this is right, that is wrong, the two theories being contradic- 
tory. The doctrine of Pres. Edwards on the nature of virtue, 
must be overthrown before the worthiness theory can be ad- 
mitted. 

What is the other part of this theory now under consideration ? 

The second part of the Bibliothecan theory is that the essence 
of virtue does not consist at all in any tendency to secure the 
highest amount of general happiness — that the true doctrine 
(as to the nature of virtue) is not utilitarian, in short, that tlie 
tendency of virtue to secure its object does not belong to its 
nature. This last part of this theory we regard as opposed to 
the Edwardean theory, as well as to the first part of itself. The 
idea that virtue has for its ultimate design and object the great- 
est possible utility, or the promotion of highest general and indi- 



Sect.l] anti-utilitakian theories. 371 

vidual happiness, is evidently inconsistent with the notion that 
utility does not belong to the nature of virtue. That the two 
parts of this theory are logically and psychologically inconsistent 
-with each other, and that the first part of the theory is true and 
completely subversive of the other, — that the first is utilitarian 
and that the last is anti-utilitarian, we shall endeavor to show 
in the progress of this investigation. 

Leaving, then, for the present the general consideration of 
these theories, we proceed to examine various forms of objection 
to the true doctrine, which are derived from them, as well as 
from a third theory, or that form of the Kantial theory held by 
Cousin, which is to be examined in the sequel. 

What, then, may be considered some of the most important 
specific objections, which spring from the anti-utilitarian theories, 
and which have been raised against the doctrine that holiness is 
relative, but not ultimate nor absolute good, — that the desire 
of happiness is the primary subjective motive, and happiness 
the ultimate object of virtuous action ? 

Ohj. I. The most plausible objection to the doctrine that 
holiness is relative good, within our knowledge, perhaps, is that 
holiness is a good in itself. Dr. Emmons, it is said, " believed 
that rectitude, apart from any benefits connected with it, is the 
greatest good," (Works, vol. 1, p. 148) ; and that free moral 
exercises are good or evil [in themselves, without any regard to 
the cause that produced them or the efi'ect that follows them, 
vol. 4. p. 228. To the same effect, an able anonymous writer 
has said, " The love of the general happiness is a good in itself, 
and does not derive its goodness merely from its being a means 
of the general happiness. The love of the general holiness is 
a good in itself, and does not become such by its mere [condu- 
civeness to some other end." — Bib. Sac. 1853, p. 723. 

The phrase good in itself, " good in itself considered," is not 
the most definite and unequivocal in its meaning. Pres. Ed- 
wards often speaks of virtue as a good in itself He says that 
virtue " appears in itself [agreeable and comely, agreeable in 
itself, and immediately [pleasant'' " Communicating good to 
the creatures is what is in itself pleasing to God." — Last End, 
chap. 2, § 5. 



372 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

Virtue is a good in itself, because in itself it is communicating 
happiness. Benevolence is a good in itself, because in itself it 
aims at, and tends to, highest general happiness. "Highest 
happiness is the consequent of holiness [onlyJ^ Holiness gives 
great satisfaction to the soul, it is the joy of heaven ; therefore 
in itself \i is a relative good. In itself it is a good, because it 
has the relation to happiness, of being the voluntary means of 
it. According to Edwards's use of the term, aiming at is tend- 
ing to. He says, " God aims at that which the motion or pro- 
gression which he causes, l_aims at or tends to^ — Last End, chap. 
7, §7. 

The following language of Pres. Edwards is well fitted to show 
what he meant by a thing's being good in itself, when that thing 
is not happiness itself. " That the true goodness of a thing 
must be its agreeableness to its end, or its fitness to answer the 
design for which it was made," (Works, vol. 3, p. 109), and in 
the case of an action the end for which it is put forth. Now 
highest general happiness is the end for which benevolent action 
is put forth, and it is the consequent of holiness only. Therefore 
according to Edwards and sound reason besides, the goodness of 
benevolence consists in its voluntary fitness and tendency to 
secure the end for which it is put forth, viz., the highest happi- 
ness in the agent's power. 

Again : " While Edwards believed that virtue is a good in 
itself, and vice an evil in itself, he yet believed that the chief 
good of the creature's virtue consists in its being an object of 
holy [jpleasure to the Creator, and a means of manifesting his 
glory." _ Bib. Sac. 1853, p. 722. We agree with Edwards that 
holiness in this sense is a good in itself, because in itself it is a 
source of happiness to the Creator and a means of manifesting 
his glory, which is the same thing as being conducive to the 
highest happiness of the universe. Because virtue is in itself 
agreeable and comely and imxaQdasiieXy pleasant, — and because 
it is thus the source of the highest, purest pleasure, and in many 
ways the designed cause of good and happiness, it is in itself a 
relative good and a most glorious and praiseworthy good, 
and indeed the only praiseworthy good. Thus we arrive at the 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 373 

conclusion that holiness in its essential nature is relative gooil, 
and the highest conceivable relative, but never an absolute good, 
independent of all its relations to, including its conduciveness of, 
happiness ; it is never a good in itself, in the sense of absolute, 
ultimate good. 

Again : the truth that happiness is, and holiness is not, abso- 
lute good, in the strictest sense of absolute, is fully evident in 
the affirmation that happiness, when once it exists, is good (but 
not in a moral sense) independent of and separated from all its 
possible relations, and entirely irrespective of every thing be- 
sides itself; while holiness, in its essential nature, has relations 
on which the possibility of its very existence depends ; so that 
to separate it from these relations, when it comes to be put 
forth, would be to annihilate the possibility of its existence, — 
the possibility of its being put forth. 

That this conclusion is in accordance with the Edwardean 
theory, and with the truth also, we think fully appears from the 
following extract. " It may, therefore, be proper to observe, 
that let what will be God's last end, that he must have a real 
and proper \_pleasure in : whatever be the proper object of his 
will, he is \_gratijied in. And the thing is either [^grateful to 
him in itself ; or for something else for which he wills it : and 
so is his further end. But whatever is God's last end, that he 
wills /or its own sake ; as \_grateful to him in itself; or which is 
the same thing, it is that which he truly [delights in, or in which 
he has some degree of true and proper [pleasure.'^ " If he is 
not indifferent, then he is [truly gratified and pleased in the 
fulfilment of his will : or, which is the same thing, he has a 
[pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in attaining his 
end, then the attainment of it belongs to his [happiness.'"' — Last 
End, chap. 1, § 4. 

From all this it is most manifest that, in the view of Pres. 
Edwards, whatever besides happiness is a good in itself, is in 
itself also a source or means of happiness, and that no rational 
being can regard any object besides happiness as good in itself, 
in which he has no pleasure or happiness ; and, therefore, that 
every thing except happiness, separate and apart from all rela- 
32 



374 APPENDIX. [Note E. 

tions of every kind to happiness, is not good in any sense what- 
ever. 

To say, as Edwards in substance has said, that holiness ap- 
pears to be a good in itself immediately without \_calculation of 
consequences, presents no real difficulty in opposition to this 
conclusion. That love to sentient beings in general, — the 
exercise of good-will towards them, will produce some degree 
of the designed happiness, both to the subjects and objects of 
that love, is too evident to require calculation of consequences, 
in order to be perceived. 

In Edw^ards's dissertation on the last end of God in creation, 
he assumed the holiness of God, and, therefore, that which he 
proved to be God's last end is also the legitimate and ultimate 
objective end of all holiness, viz. the highest happiness of the 
universe, or, which implies the same thing, the glory of God. 

We humbly submit that what gives plausibility to the state- 
ment that "holiness is a good in itself" (as an argument against 
our doctrine), and in our view constitutes its real sophistry, is 
that in on« sense it is true, while in another and the only sense 
pertinent to the case in hand, it is not true. (See sec. 3 of note 
E. on the phrase, right a good in itself) It is to us inconceiva- 
ble that holiness should be a good in itself in any other sense 
than that it should be in itself a source or cause of happiness. 

Ohj. 11. Perhaps the most common and most weighty objec- 
tion to the doctrine that benevolence has highest happiness for 
its ultimate object, is ' that it logically leads to and is therefore 
founded in selfishness.' 

This objection is thus stated in the Presbyterian Quar- 
terly Review: "It is hard to oppose logically this happi- 
ness scheme, and yet we do not hesitate to say that reason and 
conscience revolt at it." " When carried out [it] annihilates all 
morality, by destroying the last logical difference between it 
and a wise or an unwise [^selfishness." — 1855, pp. 456, 442. 

That the doctrine of benevolent utility leads to selfishness, 
we believe is the grand objection most commonly urged against 
it. We apprehend that this objection has its source in failing 
to perceive accurately the difference between true benevolence 



Sect. L] ANTI-UTILIT ARI AN T HE OR IE S. 375 

and real selfishness. So far as tlie weight of this objection de- 
pends upon the supposed identity between the doctrine of 
benevolent utility and that which logically leads to selfishness, 
we think it is fully obviated by the definitions already given of 
self-love, selfishness, and benevolence, and of the difference 
between them. (See qs. 114-120.) So far is our doctrine 
from annihilating all morality, that we intend still further and 
in other ways to demonstrate that the doctrine (that holiness is 
relative good and that happiness is the only absolute good, and 
the only possible ultimate object of pursuit, especially of holy 
action) is the only ground on which morality is possible. We 
admire the confession of our reviewer that ' it is hard [logically 
to oppose this happiness scheme,' as he calls it. Is it not a 
little strange that this difficulty, — this impossibility of logi- 
cally opposing this doctrine did not convince him that sound 
reason and enlightened consciences never revolt at it ? Sound 
reason, correct logic, and an honest and adequately enlightened 
conscience never quarrel. They never c??5agree at all. They 
always agree perfectly. It appears somewhat remarkable that 
so able a writer should not see that neither reason, conscience, 
nor logic will ever oppose that which is necessary even to the 
possibility of holiness, or support the contrary doctrine. 

Ohj. III. Another form of argument against the doctrine 
^f benevolent utility is in these terms : 

" Virtue . . . must be not a means but an end. As end it 
must give moral character to pleasures, instead of being char- 
acterized by them." — Pres. Quar. Review, 1855, p. 465. 

1. As end, then, virtue must accomplish a still further end, 
viz. give character to pleasure. This is having an end ulterior 
to the ultimate end, — an end later than the last end, and is like 
extending the end of a line beyond the end. How such an end 
as the above terms are intended to describe can he an end at all, 
in distinction from being a means to ?i farther end, seems impos- 
sible to conceive. 

2. Pleasures, strictly speaking, can have no moral character, 
as we have seen. (qs. 47, 49, 53.) 

Pleasures are phenomena of the sensibilities, and are, there- 



376 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

fore, in themselves in reality entirely distinct from moral char- 
acter. Pleasure is one thing and holiness is entirely another 
thing, inasmuch as the production of a thing is not the thing 
itself. Holiness produces pleasure, or some degree of happi- 
ness. It is not only a means of happiness in fact, but it is 
desigried to be a means of happiness. Nothing is or can be 
holiness, which is not designed to be means of happiness. Ho- 
liness is not only a means of happiness, but it is the only, — the 
necessary means of the highest happiness. It is not only the 
most excellent means of the most excellent happiness, but in a 
very important sense it is the indispensable means of all the 
happiness in the universe, that ever was or ever will be. 

God, in his goodness, has brought into being all the power 
which created beings have for enjoyment, and all the material 
means of happiness which the created universe affords, and the 
holiness of God is the main, original source of his own happi- 
ness ; and, for these'^reasons, the holiness of God is the primary, 
main source of all the happiness that ever was or ever will be, 
in time and in eternity, and throughout immensity. 

That perfect holiness is, and is designed to be, and must be 
the means of highest happiness, is what we intend by saying 
holiness is a relative good. It is difficult to conceive how the 
affirmation, that " virtue must be [iiot a means, but an end," 
could be made by a philosopher, or even by a sensible man, and, 
at the same time, that he should not perceive its entire want of 
truth. If holiness is, as Edwards says it is, in itself agreeable 
and immediately pleasant, then it is in itself a source of happi- 
ness, and therefore a relative good. For these reasons, if vir- 
tue must not be a means, and a voluntary means, it must not be 
any thing. 

Ohj. IV. It has been said : " The idea that all virtue is be- 
nevolence does not logically imply that benevolence is right, 
merely because it is useful. It may be right, even if it should 
be hurtful." — Bib. Sac. 1853, p. 721. 

1. Mere usefulness of any thing, besides the action of the 
will (we admit), is not right in a moral sense. And yet it is 
plainly true, that highest usefulness, being the object aimed at 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 377 

in benevolence, is that which makes benevolence right, or con- 
stitutes its Tightness. An aim is not right in itself apart from 
all consideration of the object aimed at. Highest happiness 
being rationally aimed at, is what makes the aim right. 

2. Suppose, then, that benevolence were on the whole hurt- 
ful, as sin now is, to its subjects and its objects, so that the more 
benevolent a creature should be, the more miserable he would 
be, and the more misery he would communicate to other beings ; 
suppose, also, that the benevolence of God should tend on the 
whole to his own misery, and on the whole to the misery of his 
creatures. Now, on this supposition, the more benevolence, the 
more misery, and of course the more benevolence there should 
be in the universe, the worse off, the more miserable, every be- 
ing in it would be. In such a case, every wise being, who had 
any desire for happiness for himself or for others, would of 
course withhold, and he would be morally bound to withhold, 
all exercise of benevolence designed to promote the happiness 
of himself and of every other being. 

Thus, the supposition that henevolence may he right, even if it 
should he hurtful, appears to begin and end in absurdity, and 
therefore it appears that the idea that all virtue is benevolence 
does logically imply that usefulness, or useful tendency, is one 
essential element in the rectitude of benevolence. The idea 
that all virtue is benevolence not only logically, but psychologi- 
cally implies that utility is an essential element in the rightness 
of benevolence, because, separated from all supposable utility, 
benevolence would be an absolute psychological impossibility, 
involving the impossibility of acting without a motive. (Comp. 
qs. 14, 54, 181.) 

Suppose there could be two kinds or classes of virtue, one of 
which should be useful, and the other in none of its relations 
useful, but in all its relations hurtful, — no sane man, not to say 
wise man, could hesitate which to practice, nor which he ought 
to practice, nor which he ought to avoid. 

Ohj. V. It has also been said, that " Holiness would be the 
greatest good conceivable, even if it did not [tend to secure 
happiness." — Bib. Sac. 1853, p. 738. 
32* 



378 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

Ans. 1. What holiness would be if it were what it is not^ 
and if its nature were so changed that it would not tend to secure 
that which now, by its own true and proper nature, it does and 
must secure, viz. the most excellent happiness and general well- 
being, is not now the question. The manifest reality is, that 
holiness, by being what it is, in the intrinsic tendency of its own 
immutable nature, secures the most excellent happiness con- 
ceivable. That holiness does this, is a conceded and an estab- 
lished, if not an undeniable, truth. And therefore, holiness is a 
means which does and must secure the most important ends, 
and therefore is not in itself an ultimate end, — is not final end 
at all. And on the fact of its being a means to this end of 
greatest happiness, its value depends. 

2. Let it be supposed that neither God, angels, nor men could 
take any more delight or satisfaction in holiness forever, nor 
make it in any way the means of securing happiness. This 
supposition realized would also be its annihilation ; therefore, 
so far from being the greatest good if it had no tendency to 
secure happiness in that case, it could not be practised, and it 
would be good for nothing if it could. 

Ohj. VI. The following statements have been made by dif- 
ferent anti-utilitarians. (See q. 132.) " There is a good inde- 
pendent of the idea of happiness," " which has a worth of its 
own independent of happiness," ^ some higher good than happi- 
ness, whether it can be defined or not.' " Virtue must be not a 
means, but an end." — Pres. Quar. Review, 1855. ' Benevo- 
lence is right, not because of its [tendency, but because of its 
nature.' " The nature of benevolence is one thing, and its ten- 
dency another. The nature of selfishness is one thing, and its 
tendency another." " Rectitude, apart from any benefits con- 
nected with it, is the highest good." ' Benevolence would be 
right, let it tend which way it will.' ' Virtues are not made 
right by their utility.' " When we say that right and wrong 
are inherent in the very nature of things, we simply assert that 
certain courses of conduct are in themselves, in their very na- 
ture and essence, wrong, certain others right; and that they 
are so, [quite independent and irrespective of consequences that 



Sect.L] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 379 

result from them'' — Prof. J. Haven's Moral Philos. p. 49, and 
Bib. Sacra, 1856, p. 263, by the same writer. 

"Uprightness is uprightness; it is right in itself, and may 
often be distinctly known as such, irrespective of all consequences. 
Neither is it a bargain for happiness ; it is prompted by a su- 
preme and direct regard to what is intrinsically good. At the 
same time, it is impossible for us not to desire happiness, for 
this desire, we have seen, is a part of our nature." " The first 
principles of morality [are] right in themselves, irrespective of 
all consequences." — Elements of Mo^ity, by Hubbard Wins- 
low, pp. 285, 311. 

Reply. These statements by different writers, though not ex- 
actly consistent with each other, yet taken together as a whole, 
seem to have substantially the same basis, and appear to imply 
tbat certain moral acts are right independent and irrespective 
of all their consequences, whether designed or not, and of all 
their relations and tendencies to happiness, or misery, or any 
thing else ; and for this reason, taken together, they imply that 
holiness is not a relative, but an absolute good, and of course 
that the idea of virtue is not a relative, but a simple, absolute 
idea, independent of all relations. Now, if such a thing could 
be, as a virtuous, benevolent, or right act not being a relative 
good, i. e. not a good to any being, and of course having no ten- 
dency nor other relation to happiness, there would be just as 
much well-being and happiness, just as much of good to all exist- 
ing beings, without that virtue as with it. How that can be con- 
ceived of as good, or a good, which is not good, nor a good to 
any being in the universe, who can tell ? When we are told 
how this can be conceived we shall have new light. 

1. Such virtue as the above statements imply could not be 
benevolence, for the ultimate object of that is to promote happi- 
ness. 

2. It could not be a design to promote any being's happiness, 
for that would have the two most important relations to happi- 
ness of designing and tending to produce that happiness. 

3. It could neither be a design to please God nor any human 
being, for that would be to promote pleasure ; but pleasure is 
some degree of happiness. 



380 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

4. It could not be that " love which is the fulfilling of the 
law," for love is relative and must have an object loved, and no 
object can be loved which is not, or is not esteemed to be, in 
some degree, a source of happiness ; and then it follows, also, 
that ^^ could not be obedience to the law which requires love. 

5. It could not be the love which Christ exercised in dying 
upon the cross for the salvation of a sinful world, who for the 
joy that was set before him endured the cross. 

6. It could not be any voluntary exercise, because all volun- 
tary exercise, all exercise of the will, implies choice, and all 
choice is to he happy. And all choice, design, purpose, inten- 
tion (especially intention to fulfil moral obligation), has an ob- 
ject and is formed with the idea in the agent's mind of its 
being the means of attaining that object. And again ; as ' de- 
sire of happiness comprehends all possible subjective motive 
which prompts us to all voluntary action, right or wrong,' hap- 
piness must be the ultimate object of all choice that can be con- 
ceived to be possible. 

7. If " a right choice, excluding all happiness, is utterly in- 
conceivable ; " if, as Dr. Emmons says, "the ultimate end of 
all labor is enjoyment," then it follows most conclusively, that 
the statements under consideration, so far as they imply that 
virtue is not a means but an end, not a relative good, but in the 
strict and proper sense an ultimate end, independent and irre- 
spective of its relations and tendencies to effects, consequences, 
and resulting happiness, they are assumptions unfounded in 
truth ; and we are left to the conclusion, that holiness is a rela- 
tive, but not an absolute, as distinguished from a relative, good, 
and in its essential nature must have relation and respect to 
tendencies, results, objects, ends, and consequences. 

8. If all moral action must consist in choice, and if all choice 
is to be happy, and must have an object and must ultimately 
terminate in happiness, then, in our view, to suppose that a 
moral system can be constructed, or any idea of obligation 
formed, independent of, and having no respect to, any idea of, 
or tendency to, happiness, is as impossible as to find a material 
body not existing in space nor in time. 



Sect.L] ANTI-UTILITAEIAN theoeies. 381 

9. If, as Edwards held, benevolence is right because it aims 
at the general well-being, as most evidently it is, then it follows 
that holiness has a most important relation to happiness, viz. 
that of aiming to secure it. Can an aim to secure an object 
exist, with no thought of, and independent of, any idea of that 
object ? Can an aim to secure an object exist, and have no 
relation to, and no tendency to produce, that object ? Now if 
moral obligation requires me to aim at the general happiness, 
then I ought to promote it. All the philosophers in the world 
may safely and without arrogance be defied to show, that any 
man is under obligation to aim at the accomplishment of that 
which he knows not* to be in his power, or to aim at any thing 
when he knows there is no tendency in his aiming to secure the 
object aimed at. He might as well be supposed to be under 
obligation to aim at hitting the moon with a shot from a Paixhan 
gun, or one of the fixed stars with the wad of a pop-gun. A 
supposed tendency of the aim to secure its object, is then essen- 
tial to the obligation of putting it forth. Every one is bound to 
aim at the general welfare, because by aiming to, he can pro- 
mote it. But if a person knew there was no tendency, in his 
aiming to promote that welfare, to advance it, then he would 
know that voluntarily to promote it would be out of his power, 
and then to him there could be no more obligation to aim at the 
general good, than to aim at the accomplishment of any other 
impossibility. For these reasons, voluntary, designed (not 
mere, involuntary, unintended) tendency to promote happiness, 
belongs to the nature of holiness, as an essential element in that 
nature. Therefore holiness is a relative but not an ultimate nor 
an absolute good, and cannot exist without regard to results — 
it cannot exist without regard to both tendencies and conse- 
quences. 

10. The argument of some of these statements now under 
consideration, in objection to the doctrine that holiness is relative 
good, seems very much, if not mainly, based on the assumption 
that the tendency and efficacy of holiness do not belong to its 
nature, that the nature of holiness is one thing and its tendency 
another thing. 



382 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

Now it is a blessed tiling that men do sometimes see truth 
which at other times they overlook and deny. 

If, as Dr. Emmons says, " It is the exclusive nature and ten- 
dency of holiness to produce contentment," then to produce con- 
tentment is both the nature and tendency of holiness, and then 
it would seem that its nature and tendency, to some extent at 
least, involve and imply each other, so that they cannot be 
entirely distinct from each other, so that they must be, at least in 
part, the same thing. 

Again ; if it can be truly said, as Dr. Emmons further says, 
that " The [nature of benevolence is to promote the highest 
good possible," and if " right acts always [tend to highest happi- 
ness," their nature and tendency must, in part at least, be the 
same thing. 

Now, therefore, if the designed tendencies and efficacy of 
holiness to promote happiness do belong to the essential nature 
of holiness, by an absolute and indestructible necessity, in the 
unchangeable nature of things, as they very evidently do, as we 
have proved and as we expect still further to prove in the pro- 
gress of this discussion, then this argument now under consider- 
ation is entirely without foundation, force, or value, against the 
doctrine that holiness is not an absolute, but a relative good. 
How any thing except happiness can be an absolute good rather 
than a relative good, how it can be a good, and not be a good to 
any being, i. e. without having the relation of means to the 
happiness of that being, — how any thing can be good to me 
and have no relation (not even the relation of means), to my 
happiness, it is impossible for me to conceive. For any thing 
besides my happiness, to be a good to me implies that it has 
the relation to my happiness of being the means of it. To me 
this seems a self-evident truth — a mere truism, — really noth- 
ing but an identical proposition ; and therefore to maintain that 
holiness is an absolute good, and that the idea of right is a sim- 
ple and absolute idea, — implying that a design can be right, 
independent of designed results and exclusive of the relation of 
fitness and tendency of the design to secure such results, is but 
to deny manifest truth — that which seems self-evident. 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 383 

Pres. Edwards held, that " A general beauty [and by the 
beauty of right acts he meant, tliat quality of right acts which 
constitutes them right] is that by which a thing appears beauti- 
ful, when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively, and univer- 
sally, with regard to all its [te?idencies and its connections with 
every thing it stands related to." — Nat. of Vir. chap. 1. The 
tendency of holiness to produce happiness, then, belongs to its 
nature, and is one element in the foundation of moral obligation. 

If happiness and the means of happiness comprehend all 
possible good conceivable, as we claim to have proved they do, 
(q. 66) then, virtues are constituted good and right, not by 
their mere, but by their intended tendency to, highest utility, 
— by their being designed to promote the greatest possible 
utility, — not by their being absolute, but by their being rela- 
tive good, as having a tendency to secure good ulterior to them- 
selves, and then, also, that which is neither happiness nor the 
means of happiness, is not in any sense good. 

In further reply to quotations already made, we remark 
again ; to say that virtue would be a good, whether it did or did 
not tend to happiness, seems very much like saying, that twice 
twenty would be forty, whether it were four times ten or not, 
and like saying that godliness would be profitable unto all things, 
whether it were or were not profitable at all. 

To say that benevolence would be right and the greatest good 
irrespective of all its benefits, and even if it were hurtful, seems 
very much like saying, that virtue would be right whether it 
were virtue or not, — that a circle would be a circle though it 
were a square ; — and like saying that the greatest blessing 
might after all be nothing but a curse, — that benevolence 
would be virtue, even if it were sin, and a very good thing, 
even if it were good for nothing. 

Obj. YII. Some, if not all anti-utilitarians, hold that the idea 
expressed by the terms virtuous, right, holy, etc., is a simple 
and absolute idea, and, therefore, no 7^eal definition can be given 
of it, but only a nominal one ; and, therefore, that virtue is not 
a relative but an absolute good. The dogma that moral obliga- 
tion is not in any sense founded in utility, if it were true would 



384 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

legitimately establish this position of theirs, so far as the possi- 
bility of giving any true, real, and proper definition of virtue 
as a quality, is concerned. But the trouble is, it would not 
only prove this, but it would prove much more than this, it 
would prove by far too much. It would not only establish the 
impossibility of defining virtue in the abstract, but it would 
prove the impossibility of defining or forming any just idea of 
virtue in the concrete, i. e. as it exists in virtuous acts; and 
what is still more, this would also prove, as we have before 
often established, the impossibility, according to this obnoxious 
theory, of doing a virtuous act. 

If moral obligation were in no true, real, and proper sense 
founded in utility, if the supposition were true that virtue were 
in and of itself ultimate good, in opposition to the idea that it 
terminates only in the most valuable amount of happiness, then, 
to have an idea of virtue, to know what it is, would be an 
impossibility to the human mind, and to perform virtuous acts 
would be a still further impossibility. 

The conception, that virtue is in itself a good apart from all 
its benefits, and all its tendencies to happiness, that it ultimately 
and finally terminates in itself, and not in the greatest happiness 
as its final object, resolves all holiness into the impossibility and 
absurdity of an infinite and endless series, or into a circle, with 
no place to begin and nowhere to end. (Comp. q. 133.) For 
example and illustration. Take the position that holiness is the 
highest ultimate good, and, therefore, that holiness must be the 
love of the highest good, which higliest good is holiness, which 
is the love of holiness, which is the love of holiness, and so on 
forever, and thus holiness would have no object out of itself on 
which to terminate, and as it is an absurdity and an impossi- 
bility for it to terminate in itself, so, therefore, on this theory, it 
can begin nowhere, and end absolutely nowhere. This, we are 
compelled to conclude, is the landing-place of the last (the 
anti-utilitarian) half of the Bibliothecan theory of virtue, and, 
therefore, that the first (the utilitarian) half of this theory 
is a full and glorious overthrow of the last half. Of the first 
part of this theory we cannot speak too much in its praise. Jt 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 385 

is truly utilitarian, and fully Edwardean. This is high praise. 
Still more, it is the true Bible doctrine. The claim that the 
last (the anti-utilitarian) part of this theory, is JEdwardean, 
therefore, appears to be a mistake. That it is anti-utilitarian 
there can be no doubt, and in our firm conviction it is really 
antinomian, though not designed to be. 

It may now appear that the worthiness theory of virtue sub- 
verts itself, by taking the above position, that holiness is highest 
and ultimate good, and does not terminate in the greatest happi- 
ness as the ultimate end, and thus, as shown above, resolves 
holiness into the absurdity and impossibility of an endless series 
of acts. So far, then, we are left to the conclusion that holiness 
is relative but not absolute good, that tendency to happi- 
ness is an essential element in the nature of benevolence, 
and, of course, in the nature of holiness as a quality of moral 
acts. 

Another form of answering these objections. At the risk of 
being considered too repetitious, we proceed to present the 
following view of the topic in hand. 

Various forms of argument, including the most important, 
against the doctrine of benevolent utility, seem to imply sub- 
stantially the same thing, viz. that holiness is a final end but 
not a means, an ultimate and absolute end in itself, in distinc- 
tion from its being a relative good, and in distinction from its 
having any relation to happiness, and, therefore, that it has no 
relation to happiness, and thus even involving the absurdity that 
benevolence has no relation to happiness. 

1. If holiness consists in voluntary love, — in free choice, as 
has been proved, and as both reason and divine revelation unite 
in showing, then holiness implies some object of choice and of 
love, — some object chosen and loved, besides and beyond holi- 
ness itself. And if holiness have an object loved and chosen, 
then it cannot be an ultimate end, nor in and of itself, in strict 
sense, an end at all, and therefore it can be neither an ultimate 
nor an absolute good, but it must be a relative good ; and fur- 
ther, its relation to its ultimate object must constitute its good- 
ness, and as nothing else but happiness can be its ultimate object, 
33 



386 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

the relations of holiness to happiness must constitute all the 
goodness of holiness. 

2. But should it be said, admitting that in point of time and 
in the order of nature and of the psychological facts as they 
actually take place, happiness is the real ultimate object and 
end of holy choice, still " holiness is an [idtimate good in respect 
of dignity and worth." In reply, we admit that holiness, in 
respect of dignity and moral worth, is the most exalted and 
highest moral good, if these terms can be admitted, when holi- 
ness is the only moral dignity and worth conceivable. But we 
humbly conceive this is not the true and proper meaning of the 
term ultimate. Ultimate we apprehend does not properly 
mean higher up, more noble, more dignified, more valuable, 
more excellent, or more worthy of moral approbation, nor any 
such thing. Ultimate means final, last in the order of time, of 
pursuit, and of acquisition. When we ascend to the top of a 
ladder, the ultimate round, the last one which we reach, is 
highest up ; but ultimate does not mean highest up. When we 
descend, the ultimate round is lowest down. 

3. Again: All love, both voluntary and involuntary love, 
implies some object. All voluntary love implies the voluntary 
taking or seeking some pleasure or delight in some object cho- 
sen, therefore the supposition realized and fully believed, that 
love has no such object, would render all love an impossibility 
and an inconceivable absurdity. 

4. Take the two dogmas that holiness or "rectitude . . . 
is the highest good," and that " holiness is supreme love to the 
highest good," and then holiness is merely the love of holiness. 
Now, according to this view, holiness is end in and of itself, and 
therefore in and of itself most logically ends in the infinite 
absurdity and impossibility of an infinite series of acts, — in an 
endless circle. (See p. 166.) From all these opposing views 
we are compelled to take refuge in the doctrine of benevolent 
utility, and that holiness is relative but not absolute good. 

Ohj. VIII. Different views of Dr. Emmons compared. In 
accomplishing the object of this treatise it seems necessary to 
notice more particularly than we have as yet done, the follow- 



Sect.l] anti-utilitarian theories. 887 

ing views of Dr. Emmons on the topic now under considera- 
tion. As before quoted, he says : — 

"The ultimate end of all labor is rest and enjoyment." 
Again, he says, " Godliness is as profitable as it is possible any 
thing should be. It will gain all the good in the universe. In 
the final issue it will make all the godly as happy as their finite 
and limited capacities will permit. This not only may but must 
be, according to the nature of godliness, and the express decla- 
ration of God himself." " It is the \_exclusive nature and ten- 
dency of godliness to produce contentment." — Works, vol. iv. 
p. 463. 

- If these statements are true, as very clearly they are, then 
the object of holiness is to promote happiness, and its nature 
includes its tendency to promote its object, for the exclusive 
nature and tendency of godliness is to produce contentment, or 
happiness. 

The plain and important truth here implied, this author (if 
we can truly and rightly understand his language) in other 
statements denies or forgets. In another place he says, " It is 
the moral nature of benevolence that renders it morally excel- 
lent ; and it is the natural tendency of benevolence to promote 
happiness that renders it naturally excellent." " The . nature 
of benevolence is one thing, and its tendency another." Just as 
though the intended nature of benevolence to promote happi- 
ness were not its moral nature, and just as though the natural 
tendency of a design to promote happiness did not belong to the 
real and moral nature of that design. Since benevolence is a 
design to promote happiness, 'that the natural tendency of 
benevolence is constituted by, and consists mainly in, its moral 
nature,' appears so plainly true, that it seems difficult to view it 
in any other light than that of a self-evident truth. 

External acts produced by benevolent intentions, it is true, 
have some incidental tendencies, which do not depend on the 
moral character of those intentions. To feed the hungry and 
clothe the naked for a selfish purpose, may have some of the 
same tendencies to happiness which similar external acts, per- 
formed for a benevolent purpose, would have. 



388 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

It is freely admitted, that those tendencies of external actions 
which are not designed, and do not depend upon the moral 
character of the intentions which caused them, do not belong to 
the moral nature of those intentions ; and that those tendencies 
of benevolent acts which are not designed, and do not depend 
upon the moral character of those acts, do not belong to their 
moral nature. But this does not imply that the inseparable 
and designed tendencies of benevolence to promote happiness, 
do not belong to its moral nature. 

That the natural excellence of benevolence is moral excel- 
lence, may be seen by reflecting that when moral acts have no 
moral excellence, they can have no natural excellence but such 
as may appertain to sin. 

When benevolence shall be separated from its moral excel- 
lence, the natural excellence which will remain will hardly 
be worth defending, unless some excellence can be devised for 
it besides that which may pertain to sin. 

It would seem irrational to admit, and like a sophistical use 
of language to say, that the natural tendency or excellence 
which belongs to the moral nature of benevolence is not its 
moral excellence, or that the natural and inseparable tendency 
of benevolence does not belong to the nature of virtue. 

But let us attend to what the Doctor further has to say. 
*' No case can be mentioned nor conceived, in which the moral 
nature of any free moral exercise of the mind can be deter- 
mined by the effect produced. It is absurd, therefore, to sup- 
pose the moral excellence of virtue consists in its [tendency to 
produce happiness, or that the moral evil of sin consists in its 
[tendency to produce misery. They are both founded in the 
nature of things. The one is morally excellent in itself con- 
sidered, and the other morally evil in itself considered, without 
any regard to the cause that produced them, or the effects that 
follow them." — Vol. iv. p. 228. 

Reply. Knowledge merely of the accidental effects of an act 
of will, or of any supposed effects of such an act as might be 
known, without knowing what effects were intended, is not suffi- 
cient to determine the moral nature of a moral exercise. But 



Sect.l] anti-utilitakian theories. 389 

if the effect produced is, and is designed to be, the greatest ad- 
dition to the general happiness in the agent's power, then the 
effect known to be so designed does determine the nature of the 
moral exercise. So essential is this truth, that there is no pos- 
sible way in which the nature of a moral exercise can be deter- 
mined without knowing what effects are designed in that moral 
intention. And this is so, because the moral character of an 
act essentially, entirely, and absolutely depends upon the ulti- 
mate object of that act, whether that object be the highest or a 
lower good. 

Again ; if that benevolence which fulfils the law does always 
produce, and if its intrinsic nature and tendency is known and 
designed to produce, the highest happiness which is in the 
agent's power to produce, then the nature of the exercise may 
be, and must be, determined by its effects, when those effects are 
sufficiently known. 

It is, therefore, a very evident truth, that the nature of moral 
acts is determined by their designed effects, especially if those 
effects are known by the agent, according to the common course 
of things, to be produced by such acts ; and it is evident that 
the moral character of acts can never be determined without 
any regard to those effects which constitute the objects of these 
acts. 

Benevolence is holiness, because it aims to produce, and be- 
cause by its aiming the intrinsic tendency of its nature is to 
produce, highest happiness, — it is in and of itself, — in itself 
considered, it is the voluntary, chosen production of highest hap- 
piness. Its only real and its only moral value consists in its 
known and chosen efficacy to produce happiness. In this sense, 
and in no other, is benevolence, in and of itself, or in itself con- 
sidered, moral excellence. In itself, without regard to its de- 
signed effects, it is nothing, because without an object there 
cannot be a design of any kind, and therefore without an object 
designed there can be no benevolence. 

To prove that the nature of benevolence and that of selfish- 
ness are different and distinct things from their tendencies, Dr. 
Emmons says : " The nature of benevolence and selfishness are 
33* 



390 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

immutable, and cannot be altered by the Deity ; but the [ten- 
dency of benevolence and that of selfishness can be altered." — 
Vol. iv. pp. 296, 297. 

Reply. Their tendencies may be thwarted, but cannot be 
altered. We think those tendencies may be resisted, but not 
annihilated. Suppose that holiness and sin mutually oppose, 
resist, and thwart each other's tendencies, and to some extent 
prevent their designed effects. This does not show that their 
tendencies can be annihilated or changed. If, as we have re- 
peatedly proved, the designed tendencies of holiness and sin 
belong respectively to their natures, their tendencies can no 
more be altered than their natures can be. 

Our good Doctor also says : " There can be no [moral] good- 
ness without good purposes and good designs." — Vol. iv. p. 277. 
Purposes and designs cannot be morally good, without being 
purposes and designs of promoting good effects, consisting ulti- 
mately in happiness, the only absolute and ultimate good. 
Moral goodness, then, must consist in purposes and designs of 
good effects and results. And " Moral goodness [when perfect] 
is essentially the same in all moral agents." — Ibid. p. 226. 
Again : " The perfect goodness of God must move him to make 
the intelligent universe as holy and as happy as possible." — 
p. 213. The goodness and benevolence of God, then, consists 
in his purpose and design to make the intelligent universe as 
holy and as happy as to him is possible. Now therefore, if 
God does not fail of his unchangeable purpose, and meet with 
unavoidable and unforeseen disappointment (and that God does 
thus fail and meet wdth such disappointment, neither Dr. Em- 
mons nor any other man of sense would admit), then the results 
to be produced are the highest holiness and happiness of the 
intelligent universe which to God are possible ; and the good- 
ness of God consists in having these results for its object. 

Here, then, is a case in which the moral nature of a free 
moral exercise is determined by the effect produced. If the 
effect produced had been the greatest amount of misery possible 
to the Deity, this would have determined the purpose by which 
the effect was produced to be of another character. 



Sect.IL] anti-utilitaeian theokies. 391 

But as to the cause of moral acts, Dr. Emmons maintained, 
that " God creates within us free moral exercises, and these 
both sinful and holy." — Vol. i. p. 147, Park's Lecture on Em- 
mons. Maintaining this, it is not to be wondered at, that the 
Doctor should claim that, in deciding the character of moral 
acts, we must not have any respect either to their cause, or to 
their effects, since he held both that a holy cause produces sin- 
ful effects, viz. sins, and that sin is the occasion necessary to 
the best effects, — means of the greatest good. 

SECTION II. 

AN EXAMI^^ATION OF THE KANTIAL AXTI-UTILITARIAN THEORY 
AS HELD BY M. YICTOR COUSIN, OR THE COUSINISTIC THEORY. 

The third theory before alluded to, and to which we now 
invite the reader 's attention, is that held by M. Victor Cousin, 
who is reputed to be one of the most eminent French philoso- 
phers of the present age. One reason why a refutation of the 
error contained in this theory is demanded, is, that it is made to 
appear so plausible and inviting, by the skilful, eloquent, and 
elegant language by which it is set forth and recommended ; and 
another is, that there is so much truth contained in it. 

The sum of the doctrine is this, — that moral quality is found 
alone in acts of the will, — in free, voluntary choice, — that 
right is a simple and necessary idea of the reason, — that utility 
is a contingent idea of the understanding, and derived from ex- 
perience, and is not an element in the idea of right, — that the 
tendencies of holiness do not belong to its nature, — that virtue 
is a good in itself, without any regard to any of its tendencies, 
or consequences whatever, and even admitting that it results in 
ruin, as according to this philosophy it sometimes does, — that 
utility in none of its senses is essential to virtue. 

We quote largely from the language of our author, that it 
may be distinctly seen what his theory is, and what his argu- 
ments are in support of it. These quotations are from the fifth 
chapter of Henry's translation of Elements of Psychology by 



392 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

Victor Cousin, included in a criticism upon Locke on the Human 
Understanding. These quotations we have divided into sections 
and numbered them, so that we could refer to them by their 
numbers in remarks upon them. 

1. "It is an undeniable fact, that when we have done right 
or wrong, when we have obeyed the laws of justice [or right], 
or have broken it, we judge that we merit either reward or pun- 
ishment. It is moreover a fact that we do indeed receive 
reward or punishment; (1.) in the approbation of conscience or 
in the bitterness of remorse ; (2.) in the esteem of our fellow 
men, who, themselves moral beings, judge also of good and bad 
as we do, and like us judge that right and wrong merit reward 
and punishment ; . . . (3.) and finally, if we raise our thoughts 
beyond this world, if we conceive of God as we ought, not only 
as the author of the physical world, but as the Father of the 
moral world, as the very substance of good and of the moral 
law, we cannot but conceive that God ought also to hold ready 
rewards and punishments, for those who have fulfilled or broken 
the law." 

2. " But suppose there is neither [moral] good nor evil, 
[neither justice nor injustice in itself (see p. 371, etc.) ; ^ suppose 

1 "Justice or injustice in itself," any virtue or vice actually performed 
and which in itself has no regard to, nor design of, any result, and which 
of course can have no regard to happiness or misery, is an absurdity, an 
impossibility, an inconceivability, and will remain so until there can be a 
voluntary and virtuous or vicious action without an object and without any 
desire to obtain that object. 

For illustration, take an example before introduced. Suppose I owe 
you a dollar. Justice obligates the payment. Suppose, now, I learn from 
an authentic source, worthy fully to be relied upon, that you, knowing the 
debt have no need in any sense, and no desire nor wish for the dollar, that 
will be disappointed by non-payment, and that not to pay you, will bring 
after it no injury to any one. Now as soon as in knowing all tliis, I know 
that no good will be done by paying and no hurt will be done by not pay- 
ing, neither justice nor moral law any longer demands the payment. 

But now, on the other hand, suppose by my choosing not to pay the dol- 
lar, I withhold from a starving man the only means which he has of saving 
his life, and that by doing this I knowingly and wilfully starve the poor 
man to death. The world is ready to cry out against the injustice of such 



Sect.IL] anti-utilitaeian theoeies. 393 

there is no law. There can, then be no such thing as merit or 
demerit in having broken or obeyed it ; there is no place for re- 
ward or punishment. There is no ground for the peace of con- 
science, nor for the pains of remorse. There is no ground for 
the approbation or the disapprobation of our fellow men, for their 
esteem or their contempt. There is no ground for punishments 
inflicted bj society in this life, nor in the other, for those ap- 
pointed by the Supreme Legislator. The idea of reward and 
punishment rests, then, upon that of merit or demerit, which 
rests upon that of law. . . . Now, then, the most superficial 
observation, provided it be impartial, easily demonstrates that in 
the human mind, in its present actual development, there is the 
idea of right and of wrong, altogether distinct from each other. 
It is a fact, that in presence of certain actions, reason qualifies 
them as good or bad, just or unjust." 

Justice or injustice in itself, aside from all objects to be gained 
or hindered by it, is nothing at all, a mere nonentity. Cousin 
himself affirms " morality has to do with the intentions." If so, 
justice can be executed only by intention. An intention which 
has no object out of itself is just exactly nothing, neither more 
nor less. All intentions have regard to some ultimate object 
out of and beyond themselves. 

Justice in itself is nothing in any sense, except that justice in 
itself when executed is designed to secure as far as possible 
the general well-being, and those interests and that happiness to 
which individuals and communities have a right, and to secure 

cruelty. And why ? Not because there is any justice or injustice in the 
act in itself, that is, in simply paying or not pajang the dollar, aside from 
all known and designed tendencies and consequences of the act ; but be- 
cause of the tendencies and consequences known and designed in and by 
the act of payment or non-payment. Here it is evident that the known 
utility of the act is what renders it obligatory, and its designed utility is 
what renders it worthy of approbation. Designed utility of a voluntary 
act is not mere utility, undesigned, like that of food and clothing, or like the 
irrational utility of an ox or a horse. Doing good to all as we have op- 
portunity both to ourselves and others, voluntary utility, promoting happi- 
ness for all, is precisely what the law of love requires. 

Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. This law cannot be obeyed, 
without regarding both our own and our neighbor's interests and happiness. 



S94 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

those interests of God's kingdom to which he has a right. All 
that the argument which is necessary to support the truth re- 
quires here, is that moral obligation — righteous law — is an 
unoriginated, eternal reality. 

"... The distinctions between right and wrong may be incor- 
rectly applied, may vary in regard to particular objects, and 
may become clearer and more correct in time, without ceasing 
to be with all men the same thing at the bottom. It is an uni- 
versal conception of reason, and hence is found in all languages, 
those products and faithful images of the mind. Not only is 
this distinction universal, but it is a necessary conception. In 
vain does the reason, after having once received, attempt to 
deny it or call in question its truth. It cannot. One cannot at 
will regard the same action as just and unjust. These two 
ideas baffle every attempt to commute them, the one for the 
other. Their [specific] objects may change, but never their 
natures [nor their ultimate object]. Still further: reasor 
cannot conceive the distinction between right and wrong, just 
and unjust, without instantly conceiving that the one ought to 
be done, and the other ought not to be done. The conception 
of right and wrong instantly gives that of duty, of law ; and as 
the one is universal and necessary, the other is equally so. 
Now a law necessary for the reason in respect to action, is for a 
[rational free agent, a simple obligation, but it is an absolute 
obligation. Duty obliges us, though without forcing us ; but at 
the same time if we can violate it we cannot deny it. Accord- 
ingly, even when the feebleness of the liberty and the ascen- 
dency of passion make the action false to the law, yet the reason, 
independent, asserts the violated law as [in right] an inviolable 
law, and imposes it still with supreme authority upon the way- 
ward conduct as its imprescriptible [indestructible] rule. The 
sentiment of the reason and of moral obligation, which reason 
reveals and imposes, is consciousness in its highest degree and 
office ; it is moral consciousness, or conscience properly so called." 

With the exception of the phrase, "justice nor injustice in 
itself," already noticed, this is all right and good and excellent 
so far. But now mark what follows. 



BECT.n.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 395 

3. " Observe distinctly, however, with what obligation has to 
do. It refers to [voluntary] right doing. It bears upon no 
other point, but here it is absolute. It is, then, independent of 
every foreign consideration ; [now take care] it has nothing to 
do with the facilities or difficulties which its fulfilment may 
encounter, nor with the consequences it may entail, with pleas- 
ure or pain, that is, with happiness or misery, that is, again, 
with any motive of utility whatever.^ For pleasure and 
pain, happiness and misery, are nothing but objects of the sensi- 
bility ; while moral good and moral obligation are conceptions 
of the reason. Utility is but an accident, which may or may 
not be ; duty is a principle.^ 

4. " Now is not right doing always useful to the agent and to 
others? That is another question, to answer which we no 



2 Obligation is fulfilled only by the voluntaiy action which that obliga- 
tion requires, and that action must have the end or object which the obliga- 
tion requires it should have. 

Obligation, then, does and must directly " refer " to, and most directly 
"bear upon," the consequences and results, which right action must be 
designed to secure, in order to fulfil what the obligation requires. That 
obligation which requires that voluntary action which is to have nothing to 
do Avith, and is to be entirely independent of, all " consequences it may 
entail, of happiness or misery, pleasure or pain," — and which is to have 
no motive of, and no relation to, utility, I am sux'e is not a conception of the 
reason, and can have no existence either in time or space or reason. Such 
obligation can be neither a necessary nor a contingent idea. It is neither 
rational nor empirical. 

All voluntary love implies some object loved, all choice an object chosen 
to be secured, — all purpose and aim implies an end purposed and aimed at. 
Now if all virtue consists in voluntary love, choice, purpose, aim, or inten- 
tion, then aside from its relation to its object and ultimate end, that is, 
aside from its designed object, consequences, and results, in itself it is 
nothing, and for this reason is not virtue. Therefore, again, since happi- 
ness is the only possible final end, and desire of happiness the only possi- 
ble subjective motive of all voluntary action, that idea of virtue which is 
entirely independent of utility, and has nothing to do with promoting 
happiness or preventing misery, — that vu'tue which has nothing to do 
with its essential motive and only object, is a mere transcendental fiction 
of a bewildered brain, and has no corresponding reality in nature. Bewil- 
dered on this subject surely. 



396 APPENDIX. [Note E. 

longer appeal to reason, but to experience.^ Even if it does, 
and if the useful be always inseparable from the good, yet the 
good and the useful are none the less distinct in themselves ; 
and it is not on the ground of utility that virtue becomes obli- 
gatory, and that it obtains universal veneration and admiration. 
It is admired, and that proves that it is not taken [solely as use- 
ful. Admiration [i. e. moral approbation] is a phenomenon 
which it is impossible to explain altogether by [mere irrational 
and unintended ] utility. 

5. " If the good were nothing but the useful, the admiration 
•which virtue excites would always be on account of its utility. 
But such is not the fact. Human nature is wTong, perhaps, in 
being so formed ; but its admiration is not always the expres- 
sion of interest. The most useful virtuous acts can never be 
so much so as many natural phenomena, which everywhere 
diffuse and maintain life. There is not an act of virtue, how 
salutary soever it be, which can be compared in this respect 
with the beneficent influence of the sun. And who ever 
admires the sun ? Who ever experiences for it the senti- 
ment of moral admiration and respect which the most unpro- 
ductive act of virtue inspires? It is because the sun is 

^ Not exactly another question. We hold this to be the true question, 
viz. Is designed utility to ourselves and others both the object and result 
of virtue ? Suppose, now, we get the true answer to the real point of our 
inquiry, of what importance is it from what source we obtain it, whether 
from reason or experience, or from both ? We hold that sound reason, 
unperverted common sense, the nature, powers, and relations of the hu- 
man mind, all unite with experience in teaching that such an actual con- 
ception of virtue as should either separate or distinguish it from all 
designed and all supposable tendencies to produce happiness both for 
ourselves and others (if such conception were possible), would render virtue 
an actual impossibility, and in every sense an actually worthless thing, if 
it were possible. 

If virtue is and must be designed utility, if the actual utility of virtue 
in some of its relations is essential even to the possibility of virtuous action, 
the mind which can believe that virtue and rational, designed highest pos- 
sible utility or usefulness are in themselves entirely distiiict ideas, must have 
soared into a transcendental region which our poor faculties have never 
been able to reach. 



Sect.il] anti-utilitakian theories. 397 

[iiothing hut useful ; while the virtuous act, whether useful or 
not, is the \_fulfilment of a law to which the agent, whom 
we denominate virtuous, and whom we admire, is [voluntarily 
conformed'' * 

* JUST SO, precisely, excepting the phrase "whether useful or not." It 
is because the sun is nothing hut useful, that the sentiment of moral appro- 
bation for it can never in the reason be perceived, nor in the sensibility be 
felt, — because the utility of the sun is mere undesigned utility, because its 
utility is the necessary production of a natural law, and not the production 
of voluntary obedience to a moral law ; while the approbation which we 
give to a virtuous act, and through the act to the agent for the act, is given 
because the utility of that act is just what the law requires, and is there- 
fore the fulfilment of moral obligation, or moral law, — because this is 
something more than mere utility, viz. designed utility, designed in obedi- 
ence to law, and in fulfilment of moral obligation. 

In the preceding fourth and fifth sections, our reasoner raises a false 
issue, wanders from the true point of inquiry, and goes off on another 
track. 

The question is not, whether mere unintended, irrational, involuntary, or 
necessitated utility, such as is predicable of created objects, of brute ani- 
mals or inanimate things ; nor whether usefulness to the agent is the sole 
ground on which virtue becomes obligatory ; but the true question is. Is 
utility, in some true and proper sense, predicable of moral action, so as to 
constitute it an essential element in the nature of virtue 1 does the law of 
right i-equire voluntary usefulness, intentional promotion of happiness for 
ourselves and others, so that in reality highest general happiness is and 
must be the ultimate objective end or object of duty, and the desire of that 
personal happiness which the general happiness would gratify must be the 
primary subjective motive for performing it "? 

This question we answer in the affirmative, for these reasons : 1 . Hap- 
piness is, as we have proved, the ultimate subjective object of all voluntary, 
intelligent, moral action, and therefore of all virtuous action. 2. The de- 
sii'e of happiness is the subjective motive of all moral action, and there- 
fore of all virtuous action. 3. That conception of virtue which denies 
these propositions, and regards virtuous action as destitute of all utility, 
would (as we have so often shown), if true, make virtue an impossibility, 
and in every sense a perfectly worthless, and therefore a foolish thing, if it 
were possible. 4. Whatever is essential to the possibiUty of virtuous ac- 
tion, is also essential to the foundation of moral obligation; therefore, 
utility, or usefulness, is an essential, though not the sole, element in the 
foundation of virtue. We agree with our author, that the doctrine ' that 
mere irrational, unintended utility of any thing is virtue,' ought to be for- 
ever repudiated. 

34 



398 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

6. " We may derive advantage from an action without admir- 
ing it, as we may admire an action without deriving advantage 
from it. [Not without that advantage which the pleasure of ad- 
miring it affords.] The foundation of admiration, then, is not 
the utility which the admired object procures to others ; still less 
is it the utility of the action to him who performs it.^ The 
virtuous action would otherwise be nothing but a lucky calcula- 
tion (see q. 146) ; we might congratulate the author, but not 
the least in the world should we be tempted to admire him. 
Mankind demands of its heroes some other merit than that of 
a sagacious merchant ; and far from the utility of the agent and 
his personal interest being the ground or the measure of the 
admiration, it is fact, that other things being equal, the phenom- 
enon of admiration diminishes or increases in proportion to the 
sacrifices which the virtuous action cost. But if you wish for 
proof that virtue is not founded upon the personal interest of 
him who practices it, take the example I have given on another 
occasion, of a generous man whose virtue proves his ruin, in- 
stead of being an advantage to him.^ And, to prevent all idea 

^ Directly the reverse of this statement, as it respects others, in our 
view, is the truth, except that utility is not the sole foundation of admira- 
tion, nor the sole element in the idea of virtue, nor the sole element in the 
foundation of obligation. If some degree of the utility of virtue to the 
agent, also, must be seen before virtue to him can be a possibility, as we 
have so often proved, then this point is settled. Doing good to others is 
not only what the law of love requires, but it is what all men approve. 

^ All the sacrifices which virtue requires, or admits of, consist only in 
giving up a less for a greater good. It is true, where virtue costs great 
self-denial, our admiration is increased. But virtue never ruins its true 
votaries. It never requires them to ruin themselves. " The man who 
sacrifices his life on the scaffold may make a very prudent calculation for 
his best interest." — Dr. Henry, our author's translator. He who dies a 
martyr in the cause of virtue, shall secure his eternal well-being. Mar- 
tyrs for the sake of Jesus Christ have gone to the stake with a joy trium- 
phant over death. 

No such case as that which our author supposes ever did, ever will, or 
ever can, occur. Virtue never ruins. The hero who, actuated by a holy 
"benevolence, deliberately and voluntarily consigns himself to inevitable 
death, when indispensably necessary as the only possible means to save his 



SECT.n.] ANTI-UTILITAEIAN THEORIES. 899 

of calculation, suppose a man who sacrifices his life for the 
truth, who dies upon the scaffold young and fresh in life, for 
the cause of justice. 

7. "Here, then, is no future to be looked at, of course no 
chance of ulterior advantage ; and of course no calculation, no 
possible self-interest. This man, if virtue is nothing but utility, 
is a fool, and mankind who admire him are delirious. This 
delirium is nevertheless a fact, an undeniable fact. It demon- 
strates, then, unanswerably, that in the human mind, in its act- 
ual state, the idea of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, is 
one thing, and the idea of utility, of pleasure and pain, of hap- 
piness and misery, is another thing." '^ Truly, just as the idea 
of a complex part is one thing, and the idea of the various 
parts composing a complex whole is another thing. 

The reasoning of our author fully proves that virtue is some- 
thing more than usefulness, or prudence, or sagacious calcula- 
tion of public or private interests. And that something more is 



countiy from ruin, does so with a joy which is infinitely to be preferred to 
that wMch he could have, by saving his life, at the expense of his country's 
rain. Heroes may ruin themselves. But common sense requires more of 
those whom it regards as holy men, than that they should be heroes. Al- 
exander, Hannibal, Caesar, and Napoleon Bonaparte were heroes. But I 
do not know that the world has any evidence that one of them was a holy 
man. Holiness is a better security of a holy man's dearest interests than 
heroism. And yet holiness has made the noblest heroes the world ever 
saw. 

■^ The doctrine of benevolent utility is not that virtue is nothing but util- 
ity. The virtuous man who dies in the cause of truth and justice, is not 
ihidfool who ruins himself, with no gain nor advantage to himself here nor 
hereafter. The sarcastically pretended delirium of mankind is never tested, 
nor proved to be such an undeniable fact by such a case as is here sup- 
posed. 

The precise point, then, so unanswerably demonstrated here, is in fact 
not demonstrated at all. 

The foregoing reasoning does indeed demonstrate that the idea of virtue 
is one thing, and that the idea of mere, undesigned utility, such as may be 
predicated of any thing besides virtuous action, is quite a different J^ing, 
and that utility is not the lohole of virtue. But it does not demonstrate that 
obligation has nothing to do with the consequences it may entail, nor with 
happiness or misery, nor with any motive of utility. 



400 APPENDIX. [NotkE. 

this, that virtue is the rational, intended promotion of those in- 
terests and ends which the wisest sagacity of the agent, by the 
best use which he can make of the reason and all the means 
which God has given him, can decide to be the greatest and 
best, so far as it is possible for him to promote them. 

Again ; the foregoing argumentation of our author, although 
it proves that the idea of the law of right is an idea of the 
reason, does not prove that the idea of the rule of utility (viz. 
that whatever promotes happiness is useful) is not an idea of 
the reason, as much and in the same sense as the idea of the 
moral law is an idea of the reason. It does not prove that one 
of these ideas is any more a necessary or a universal idea than 
the other is, or that either is any more a contingent idea than 
the other is, or that either of these ideas is derived from expe- 
rience any more than the other is ; nor does it prove that great- 
est happiness is not the ultimate object of duty, nor that the 
desire of happiness does not include the only possible subjective 
motive to duty, and therefore, no argument from any of these 
sources is of any avail to prove that utility is not an essential 
element of virtue, and an essential element in the foundation of 
moral obligation. 

In confirmation of our last remarks we make the following 
quotation from a foot-note by the translator : — 

" In his ^ Programm of a Course of Philosophy,' Cousin 
classes the moral principles under two general divisions, con- 
tingent and necessary principles ; the former of which he ob- 
serves are not in fact principles properly speaking, but senti- 
ments or emotions, general indeed, but contingent and variable. 
They are referable to two general instincts — expansion and 
concentration^ Thus far the translator ; now Cousin : 
" Contingent Moral Principles. 

" The general principles which refer to the instinct of expan- 
sion^ constitute what may be called the morality of sentiment, 
variable and not obligatory. — The morality of pity, of sym- 
pathy, of benevolence, considered merely as sentiment or 
emotion. 

" The general principles which refer to the instinct of concent 



Sect.IL] anti-utilitakian theoeies. 401 

tration.) or self-love, constitute the morality of self-interest, vari- 
able and not obligatory. 

" Fundamental principle of the morality of self-interest in 
regard to an action to be performed ; look only at the conse- 
quences relative to personal happiness. 

" The most important general principles which form the moral- 
ity of self-interest : — 

" 1. Do right, abstain from wrong, from hope or fear of the 
rewards or penalties of civil society ; — 

" 2. Do right, abstain from wrong, from hope or fear of divine 
rewards or punishments ; — 

" 3. Do right, abstain from wrong, from fear of blame from 
others, and even of remorse, and in order to gain the pleasure 
of a good conscience and internal happiness. All these contin- 
gent principles relate to the sensibility, and have respect only 
to the individual, to self." 

" Necessary Principles. 

" There is within us a moral principle which is necessary 
and universal, which embraces all times and all places, the pos- 
sible as well as the real, — the principle of right and wrong. 
This principle distinguishes and qualifies actions. Moral reason. 
Special characteristic of this principle: Obligation. — The 
moral law. 

" Enunciation of the moral law : Do right for the sake of right ; 
or rather, will the right for the sake of the right. Morality has 
to do with the intentions." This theory and the like of it are 
properly termed Rightarian. 

" Not only do we unceasingly aspire after happiness, as sensi- 
tive beings, but when we have done right, we judge as intelli- 
gent and moral beings, that we are worthy of happiness. — 
This is the necessary principle of merit and demerit — the ori- 
gin and foundation of all our ideas of reward and punishment, — 
a principle, perpetually confounded with the desire of happiness, 
or with the moral law." — Fragmens Philosophiques, pp. 248-251. 
From the tenor of this whole discussion, and especially from 
these statements quoted from the Fragmens, and from those 
contained in section 1, of the above quotations, it appears to be 
34* 



402 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

Cousin's object to prove, as a fundamental principle, that to act 
from the desire of happiness and dread of misery is nof., and 
cannot be virtuous action. The inference is inevitable, that if 
it be not virtuous, it must be sinful thus to act. 

There is besides this egregious error, a very important truth, 
which appears also to be implied in these statements, viz., 
that to act from hope of reward, or from fear of punishment, 
is only in the full and comprehensive sense, to act from desire 
of happiness and fear of misery. It is difficult to conceive why 
the moral governor of the universe should place us under law, 
supported and enforced by the legal sanctions of rewards and 
penalties, if he did not intend we should be influenced by the 
desire of one, and dread of the other, — desire to avoid penalty. 

Now, we claim to have proved that these motives of desire 
and dread, comprehend all possible subjective motives to the 
human mind for voluntary action. 

That we are right in this position, we think is implied in 
Cousin's statement, that " we unceasingly desire happiness." 

If this be so, then the theory of this prince of French phi- 
losophers is fundamentally erroneous, and is not only inconsist- 
ent with the true doctrine, but is at variance with his own 
teaching. 

Again ; according to these statements, now under considera- 
tion, followed to their legitimate results, all acting from a desire 
of happiness and dread of misery, all regard to, and all seeking 
of, one's own happiness, is finally reducible to that self-love, 
which looks only to personal happiness — to self-interest, and 
has respect o?2Z?/ to the individual, — to self, and therefore, by 
inferential necessity, it must be that selfishness which is the 
source and sum of all sin, and therefore constitutes the only 
moral action possible to man. (See q. 114-120.) 

This teaching of Cousin thus appears to confound all distinc- 
tion between benevolence and selfishness, holiness and sin, or 
rather according to its legitimate results, holiness would appear 
to be an entire impossibility, because it is impossible to act with- 
out the prompting influence of a desire for happiness. 

One of the particular statements, which has its influence in 



Sect. II.] ANTI-U TILIT AEI AN THE OKIES. 403 

leading us to these results, is : " Do right for the sake of 
right." 

This phrase, ybr the sake of right, is equivocal, and may be 
understood in either of the two senses. One of these senses 
accords with truth ; the other does not. (See Note E, Sec. 1, 
Obj. I. p. 371.) 

1. For the sake of right, may mean for the sake of the 
pleasure found in doing right, and for the sake of all the good 
which results from doing right, because doing right is that in 
itself which has an efficacious influence and tendency to secure, 
and does actually secure the best possible results. This evi- 
dently is not Cousin's meaning, although it is that which accords 
w^ith truth. 

2. " Do right for the sake of right." For the sake of that 
which right, independent of all its relations to happiness, is in 
itself, and not for the sake of any pleasure found in doing it, 
nor for the sake of any happy result, not for any motive of 
utility, nor for any ulterior object whatever. (See § 3 of the 
above quotations, p. 395.) This sense. Cousin's language and 
arguments unite in implying, and therefore compel us to under- 
stand. To do right for the sake of right, in this sense, is an 
absurd impossibility, because all virtuous choice must have hap- 
piness both for its ultimate objective and subjective object, and 
the desire of happiness for its subjective motive. 

The inherent absurdity of the theory we are opposing, lies 
in the impossibility of acting without a subjective motive to 
prompt to action, and without any ultimate object on which that 
action can terminate, involving the necessity of an infinite series 
of actions performed as in a circle, with nowhere to begin, and 
nowhere to end, and of course never to reach any result. 

The phrase, right is a good in itself, is also equivocal, and 
may be understood in either of two senses corresponding to 
those above expressed, in which the phrase ybr the sake of right 
may be understood. 

1. It may be intended to mean that right is a good indepen- 
dent of all its relations to happiness, and without having any 
thing to do with happiness or misery, or any motive of utility. 



404 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

And this evidently is the doctrine held forth by Cousin. In 
this sense, we have morally demonstrated that right in the con- 
crete is an impossibility. 

2. This phrase may be understood to mean that right is a 
good in itself, because it is in itself promotive of the highest 
happiness, and of all its possible good results, by being what it 
is in itself, and for no other reason than its being what it is. In 
this sense, right-doing is a good in itself, but in the other sense 
it cannot be a good in itself. To suppose it, involves inextrica- 
ble absurdities. 

Happiness is an ultimate end in and of itself (as nothing else, 
not even holiness, is or can be), aside and entirely separated 
from any and all of its relations to any thing and every thing 
else. Happiness is not choice, and may therefore itself be an 
ultimate end. But all holiness, all right in the concrete, con- 
sists in choice, and cannot therefore be the ultimate object of 
itself, but it must have an end which is not in itself, but an 
end out of, ulterior to, and beyond itself, which finally must be 
happiness. 

N. B. To use a phrase in a sense which expresses error, 
when that phrase may be naturally understood in either of two 
senses, one of which is true and the other false, is perplexing 
sophistry, especially when the difference between the sense 
which expresses truth is not readily distinguished from that 
which implies error. Doing this gives great plausibility to our 
author's reasoning on this subject, in various parts of his works. 
Especially does this appear in his argument which we are about 
to notice. 

Having shown what he regards the difference to be, between 
the idea of right and wrong and the idea of happiness. Cousin 
proceeds to show their relation. The relation of virtue to 
happiness he represents to be this, that the virtuous man is 
worthy to be happy, and that in respect to him happiness is not 
an arbitrary idea, but a right. He says, "At the same time 
when the guilty man is rendered wretched as the effect of his 
vices, do we not judge that he deserves it? In a word, do we 
not judge in general that it would be unjust for vice to be 



Sect.IL] ANTI-UTILITAEIAN theoeies. 405 

happy and virtue miserable ? In vain does reason endeavor to 
conceive vice as worthy of happiness ; it cannot succeed in the 
attempt. It cannot help demanding an intimate harmony be- 
tween happiness and virtue." " The idea of merit and demerit 
is for the reason inseparable from that of the moral law fulfilled 
or violated. Hence the idea of reward and punishment as uni- 
versal and necessary." 

" Without any doubt it is useful to society to punish effectu- 
ally the individual who attacks the foundation of social order. 
This consideration of utility is real ; it is weighty ; but I say 
that it is not the first, that it is only accessory, and that the 
immediate basis of all penalty is the idea of the essential merit 
and demerit of actions, the general idea of order, which imperi- 
ously demands that the merij and demerit of actions, which is a 
law of reason and of order, should be realized." 

" Then comes up the idea of utility, the immediate utility of 
repressing evil, and the indirect utility of preventing it, by 
example, that is by fear. But this consideration has need of a 
basis superior to itself, in order to render it legitimate. Sup- 
pose in fact that there is nothing [morally] good or evil in 
itself, and consequently neither essential merit nor demerit, and 
consequently, again, no absolute right of blaming or punishing ; 
by what right, then, I ask, do you blame or disgrace a man, or 
make him ascend the scaffold, or put him in irons for life, for 
the advantage of others, when the action is neither good nor 
bad in itself, and merits in itself neither blame nor punishment ? 
Suppose that it is not absolutely right, just in itself, to blame 
this man or to punish him, and the legitimacy and propriety of 
infamy and of glory; and of every species of reward and 
punishment are at an end. Still further, I maintain if punish- 
ment has no other ground than utility, then even its utility is 
destroyed ; for in order that a punishment may be useful, it " 
must be just. "Thus the utility of punishment is itself 
grounded in its justice, instead of its justice being grounded in 
its utility. Punishment is the sanction of the law, and not its 
foundation." " The idea of right and wrong is grounded only 
on itself, on reason which reveals it." 



406 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

This reasoning is evidently designed to confirm the conclu- 
sion which our author in his own judgment had previously 
reached, viz. that virtue is not founded at all in utility, and also 
to prove that the justice of rewards and penalties is not founded 
at all on their utility, but on merit and demerit. 

This idea of right and wrong is alluded to in various parts 
of Cousin's works, and more fully discussed in that on the 
True, the Beautiful, and the Good, but we believe the sum and 
substance of his arguments in favor of his views on the nature 
of virtue are contained in the above extracts. 

His reasoning in these last quotations will probably appear 
very clear and very profound and conclusive to many minds, 
and to some able, discriminating, and strong minds, conclusive 
in proof of the main point aimed at. 

To our mind this reasoning appears very clear and very 
conclusive too, but conclusive in proof, not of the main point 
designed, viz. that utility is not a primary and an essential ele- 
ment in the foundation of moral obligation, moral law, and in 
the nature of all right and justice which in sound reason is 
conceivable, but conclusive in proof that utility is not the only 
element in the foundation of obligation, and that rewards and 
penalties, to be just, must be rendered in consequence of right- 
eous law having been, in voluntary moral action, fulfilled or vio- 
lated by rational, moral agents. 

Let us now inquire what the reason is why this argument 
fails to prove the main point in question. In our view, the 
reason why this argument fails in this respect, is that the opin- 
ion which is taken as demonstrated and as the foundation or 
premise of the argument, instead of being demonstrated is 
falsely assumed, and is not, therefore, in reality founded in 
truth. 

The foundation of this argument is, that utility is not an ele- 
ment in the nature of virtue nor in the foundation of the law 
of duty. The validity of a conclusion reached by a logical 
argument, depends on the truth of the premises taken as the 
foundation of that argument. Now, as we claim to have 
proved that utility is an element in the nature of holiness, 



Sect.ii.] anti-utilitarian theories. 407 

and in the foundation of all obligation and law, we claim, also, 
that this argument is founded in error, and its conclusion is 
therefore both entirely without proof and utterly erroneous. 

Again; let us suppose that punishment, in justice, is de- 
served, so that, if inflicted, the transgressor will have no injus- 
tice done him ; suppose, also, that he is thoroughly penitent and 
does not now need reformation, and that the public good does not 
require his punishment ; in other words, so far as utility is con- 
cerned, all necessity for inflicting punishment is in some way 
removed (e. g. by an adequate atonement), so that no crime 
and no misery shall be prevented, and no virtue and no happi- 
ness shall be secured or promoted by punishment. In such a 
case, the universal reason of heaven and earth would cry out 
against the wickedness of that power which should go forth to 
the execution of punishment. And the reason of this outcry 
would be, that there is no good, but rather hurt, done by this 
punishment, and no happiness, but rather misery, promoted by 
it, or, which is the same reason, because there is no utility of 
any kind in such punishment, and therefore it would be unjust 
to the whole community ; although the punishment should be 
no more than what had been, in relation to a legal economy, the 
just desert of the punished. 

The height of sophistry is to make an unsound and spurious 
argument appear to be legitimate, thorough, deep, and sound. 
The argument under consideration has much the appearance of 
being all this. In our view, its fallacy lies not only in taking 
false premises, but in using phrases which in some obvious and 
important sense are true, while in the sense intended they are 
not true ; e. g. Suppose there is nothing good or evil in itself. 
Absolutely right, just in itself. The idea of right and wrong is 
grounded only on itself on reason which reveals it. (See p. 371, 
etc?) 

That there is nothing morally good or evil, just or unjust, in 
itself in the sense which Cousin evidently intends, and by the 
necessities of his argument must intend, we have already re- 
peatedly shown, while in an obvious and very important sense, 
there is a good and right and just in itself. And that sense is, 



408 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

that right is a good in itself, because it is in itself that which 
designedly promotes the greatest happiness. 

For the same reason, in the sense so often refuted and repu- 
diated, there can be in itself no moral good nor evil, right nor 
wrong, just nor unjust. Again ; the idea of right and wrong 
cannot in reason be founded on itself, because all right action 
must have both a subjective and an objective motive, both of 
which, in all possible forms and degrees in which they can ex- 
ist, ultimately involve utility. And for these reasons, utility 
must be one, though not the only element in the foundation of 
moral obligation and moral law and in the nature of virtue. 

One way in which an argument may appear very strong at 
the first view is, by keeping the true issue out of sight, by mis- 
representing, whether by design or not, the opposing opinion or 
theory. This is done in the present case, by arguing as though 
the doctrine of utility, as the foundation of virtue, implies that 
utility is the only element in the nature of virtue, and in the 
foundation of moral obligation ; whereas the true doctrine is, 
that intelligent, voluntary power to obey a moral law which re- 
quires the promotion of the greatest possible amount of general 
happiness, is essential to the foundation of all obligation. And 
that this power, without which right action is impossible, must 
be exerted for this end in all right action. 

Here we conclude our disposition of the Cousinistic theory, 
so far as it is in opposition to that which we regard as the 
true one. 

SECTION III. 

[Referred to, p. 138.] 

AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIEWS OF PROF. HICKOK AND HIS 
REVIEWERS ON THE WORTHINESS THEORY OF VIRTUE, \S> 
THESE VIEWS ARE EXPRESSED IN THE MORAL SCIENCE, IN 
THE PRES. QUAR. REV., DEC, 1855, AND IN THE BIBLIOTHECA, 
JAN., 1856, AND JULY, 1859. 

We now return, as before proposed, to the more particular 
consideration of the worthiness theory of virtue, as opposed to 



Sect. III.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 409 

the doctrine of benevolent rectitude, as this doctrine impHes 
that happiness is the ultimate object of holy action, and that 
tendency to happiness is an essential element of virtue, both in 
the abstract and in the concrete. 

In a work on Moral Science by Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., 
Vice-Pres. of Union College, the following statement occurs: 
" When [the will] yields to the animal impulse, so as to make 
the gratification of the appetite, or highest happiness, its ulti- 
mate end, and thus puts the whole executive agency under the 
dominion of sense, it is an enslaved will. When this capacity 
of will goes out towards either alternative of happiness or 
worthiness as ultimate end, it is choice. When this choice of 
ultimate end is in reference to . . . happiness or worthiness, 
Mammon or God, it is moral disposition giving permanent char- 
acter."— pp. 58, 59. 

According to Dr. Hickok, then, ' highest happiness ' can be 
the ultimate end only of sinful choice, and, according to his use, 
is synonymous with Mammon. Highest happiness cannot be 
the ultimate end of holy choice, and therefore some other thing 
distinct from happiness must be the ultimate end of all holy 
action. This other thing he calls the spirit's worthiness. Now 
if (as we think we have most conclusively shown), happiness 
is, and inevitably must be, the ultimate end of all voluntary 
action possible to moral agents, then highest happiness is the 
ultimate end of holiness. 

To prove that happiness is not the ultimate end of duty, and 
to establish the theory that duty is the ultimate end of itself, 
appears to have been the chief design of this author in this 
book. 

One reviewer* of this work, with apparent approbation of 
the sentiment, says : " One of the main impressions which Dr. 
Hickok's treatise leaves upon the mind is, that duty is end, in 
and of itself." 

Another reviewer,! with still more decided commendation, 



* Bibliotheca Sacra, 1854, p. 183. 

t Presbyterian Quar. Eev., Dec, 1855, p. 465. 

35 



410 APPENDIX. [NoTnE. 

expresses his view of this author's theory in this language : 
" Virtue must he not a means, hut an end." 

This reviewer goes on to say : " But there is a thought which 
. . . must often come up to one who attentively studies Dr. 
Hickok's book. How are we to keep out the idea of happiness 
in the construction of a moral system ? [Alas, alas ! how shall 
we perform an absolute impossibihty !] ... Is it not involved 
in the very thought of preference [certainly] ; and can there 
be nK)ral action without this? [Certainly not.] We prefer, 
it may be said [and most truly said], we must prefer what we 
[voluntarily] love ; the fulfilment of this preference is gratifi- 
cation, and gratification is happiness. The word love, too, is 
inseparable from enjoyment [true] ; and banish love, what 
morality, or idea of morality, can remain ? [Absolutely none 
at all.] Now there is a love of sensual pleasure ; . . . that 
begins and terminates in the body [?], having no respect to the 
rational principle ; there is the love of the fair ; there is the 
love of knowledge ; the love of truth, the love of philosophy ; 
there is the love of benevolence [i. e. benevolent love]. Higher 
than all these [?], there is the love of right, or of what Dr. 
Hickok calls * spirit-worthiness.' And is there not as rich, as 
intense an enjoyment in the gratification of this love of right, 
as of any that rank in the lower departments ? ' O, how love I 
thy law!' . . . The Scriptures are full of this love of right- 
eousness, and the intense emotion of joy it creates in the soul. 
* Thy word is pure, therefore thy servant loveth it.' ... No 
sensual delight can be compared to it. . . . It is ' the joy of the 
Lord ; ' it is the ' fulness of pleasure at God's right hand.' It 
is no sensuous thought of heaven, but the contemplation of the 
everlasting righteousness that is thus described." 

" Here, then, in the love of this exalted worthiness, there is 
happiness of the purest form ; there is an intense joyous emo- 
tion, — an exulting, triumphant, rapturous swell of feehng." 

Now comes the question : " How, then, build the right, or a 
system of morals, on any foundation that would [seem^ in its 
rejection of this idea of happiness, to ignore the only spring, not 
only of all human, but of all spiritual action ? So the objec- 



Sect.itl] anti-utilitarian theories. 411 

tion might be stated. [Very well.] No one can deny that 
we have stated it fairly and strongly." — Pres. Quar. Review, 
pp. 465, 466. 

Reply. Fairly, it may be admitted, but not quite strongly 
enough. Now, if our respected but unknown reviewer would 
consider this objection against the doctrine in hand, so as to 
perceive its full weight, we think he would see that it not only 
seems to ignore, but that it does in fact, in reality, absolutely, 
and forever annihilate the " only spring " of all moral action. 
And then he would not say again, as he has said, " The an- 
swer is prompt, is easy, and, if we mistake not, perfectly con- 
clusive." Now let us be careful here ; " Do not err, my 
beloved brethren." If there can be no desire to obtain or pro- 
mote any object whatever, the attainment of which, it is per- 
ceived, would afford no gratification, — not the least degree of 
satisfaction, pleasure, or happiness ; if there can be no motive 
without a desire ; if there can be no voluntary action without a 
motive ; if nothing can possibly be chosen which is not desired, 
and does not seem desirable ; and if ability is commensurate 
with obligation, then this objection (to the doctrine that virtue 
is not a means, but an ultimate, final end ; that duty, obligation, 
right, has no relation to, but is wholly independent of, any idea 
of happiness) is founded on the immovable rock of the univer- 
sal consciousness and common sense of mankind, and upon the 
rock of eternal truth. 

If Dr. Hickok and his reviewers will fix their minds care- 
fully on this objection, it is difficult for us to conceive how they 
can fail to regard it as unanswerable and fatal. 

But now let us look at the answer which our reviewer says 
" the author furnishes ... in his chapter on the ultimate rule 
of right. This distinction, on which the answer rests, pervades 
the whole of that argument; but it may be regarded as con- 
densed in these few sentences : '1st. We thus find two distinct 
kinds of good ; one as it ministers to gratification, the other as 
it fills the sentiment of the reason. 2d. One is a means to be 
used for an end, and is thus a utility ; the other is an end in 
itself, and is thus a dignity (or worth). 3d. One is measu-red 



412 APPENDIX. [NotbE. 

by the happiness which it confers as a means of gratification ; 
the other by the [complacency it secures in the end of its own 
excellency.' " 

We cannot see that this answer meets the argument of the 
objection at all. What does it amount to ? Of the two kinds 
of good in attempt described in it, ' one is a means of happiness 
and is thus a utility.' The value of this good is measured by 
the happiness it confers. Very well. The other is described 
as " end in itself." And yet it^^^s the sentiment of the reason. 
Now what is this sentiment of the reason ? Is it a state of the 
intellect or of the sensibility ? What can that state be in which 
the sentiment of the reason is filled, but the highest degree of hap- 
piness ? And it also secures complacency. This latter kind of 
good, then, inasmuch as it fills sentiment and secures an object, 
is a means as well as the first kind of good is, and means to an 
end beyond itself, and therefore cannot be an ultimate, final 
end ; and it is a means of securing complacency, but compla- 
cency is pleasure, is happiness. Here then, we have it. Both 
these kinds of good are means of happiness as their ultimate 
end, after all. If, then, a mind having all the acuteness, disci- 
pline, learning, skill, and honesty of Dr. Hickok, cannot intro- 
duce to our thoughts any other good, besides happiness and the 
means of happiness, we may feel safe in view of the reasons 
which we have so often stated, for believing and continuing to 
maintain the doctrine, that holiness has the inseparable relation 
to happiness, of means to their ends. 

Surely, our reviewer was right, when he made the very ap- 
propriate admission : " It is difficult, we admit, to show how 
virtue can be conceived of, without some relation to happiness." 
Virtue having no relation to happiness, cannot be conceived of, 
and the reason is, no such virtue can exist. In fact, no volun- 
tary moral action can be performed, which has no relation to 
happiness. That virtue does, and must, in the unchangeable 
nature of things, have the relation to happiness, of intent and 
tendency to promote it, is reason enough why it should be so 
difficult to show how such a conception can be formed of it as 
excludes all idea of happiness, and all relation to happiness, and 



SECT.m.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 413 

therefore this relation of holiness to happiness constitutes it a 
relative, in distinction from an ultimate and final good. 

The doctrine that duty is a final end, makes it quite as difii- 
cult to find the foundation of obligation to perform it, as it was 
for the ancients to conceive on what foundation the earth ulti- 
mately rested, because all the foundation which they could im- 
agine, must itself finally rest upon nothing, and therefore they 
could conceive for the earth no ultimate foundation at all. It is 
not at all surprising, that the notion in question led this reviewer 
to think of virtue that " it passeth knowledge and all understand- 
ing;" and to term it an unknown quantity. We admit, that 
this notion of virtue eludes all understanding. 

We believe if virtue is not relative good, having happiness 
for its ultimate end, obligation must stand upon nothing ; and 
therefore we believe, that the doctrine that holiness is rela- 
tive good, and founded in benevolent utility or usefulness, or in 
what Edwards terms communicating good., rests on the founda- 
tion of eternal truth, from which no transcendental mysticism, 
no Germanizing philosophy, or French philosophy, nor theolo- 
gizing philosophy, nor any other philosophy, will ever be able 
to remove it, and not even permanently to befog or obscure it 

Again ; that virtue is ultimate, final end in itself, is not proved 
by saying, true virtue " cannot be sacrificed for any thing else, 
without unavoidable debasement and contempt." — Pres. Quar. 
Review, p. 436. This does, indeed, imply that nothing else is 
of greater value, but not that the whole value of virtue does not 
depend upon, and consist in its relation to, an ultimate, final 
end beyond itself, as an object to be gained by itself. 

It is also true, that the highest, greatest happiness cannot be 
sacrificed, without debasement and contempt, because it cannot 
be sacrificed without sacrificing holiness along with it. (See q. 
103 and 104.) But yet it does not therefore follow, that happi- 
ness is higher in the sense of being holier than holiness, nor 
even so high as to be holy at all, even in the least possible de- 
gree. Happiness is not holiness in the least conceivable degree. 
Holiness and happiness may with propriety be distinguished 
as entirely distinct things, so that one is not the other, although 
35* 



414 APPENDIX. [Note E. 

they are inseparably connected with, and most intimately rela- 
ted to, each other. One produces the other. If we were to 
admit, as we must, that happiness is the final object which must 
be aimed at, in all voluntary moral action, and therefore in all 
holy action, it would not follow, as suggested by this reviewer, 
that happiness would be holier than holiness, nor that it would 
partake in any degree of the moral quality of holy action. 

Again ; holiness is not proved to be ultimate, by saying that 
" children manifest the deep conviction of the superiority of the 
ought above all the cravings of want. . . . All human speech 
evinces the universal conviction. All language distinguishes 
the ought from the wantr — Pres. Quar. Review, p. 436, quoted 
from Moral Science, pp. 50, 51. True ; there are wants which 
are not virtue. Air, light, food, drink, health, knowledge, and 
many such things, are wants, but do not belong to the same cat- 
egory with ought. Happiness, and many of the natural means, 
in distinction from the holy means of happiness are wants, but 
they are not holiness. But yet, notwithstanding all this, holiness 
is a universal, most needful, imperative want, and is infinitely 
more worthy of the strongest desire, which is possible to the 
human mind, than any mere worldly good is. It stands out from 
all earthly things, as the one thing needful. And therefore our 
reviewer uttered most important truth when he said, " it is what 
the rational soul should strive for, as something it ought to have 
and must have, whatever amount of misery may [justly be sup- 
posed to] be involved in the struggle." — Ibid. p. 464. Is not 
holiness, then, a ivant ? Certainly. And this Prof. Hickok in 
his Moral Science represents it to be, by saying, " Piety . . . 
is . . . the deepest want of the soul." — p. 326. 

As to what we have just quoted in regard to the convictions 
of children, it may well be thus questioned. Do children know 
that there is any such idea as ought, before they know that they 
have desires which they ought to gratify, or before they know 
that others have desires which they ought to gratify. They do 
know very early that they ought to please their parents. 

But the reviewer proceeds : " We must have a moral sys- 
tem, a supreme moral excellency. If it cannot be found, there- 



Sect.III.J ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 415 

fore, in the world of happiness [and want] or of pleasure- 
seekmg for ourselves, and a pleasurable pleasure-wishing for 
others, then we must seek it in a region which transcends. 
There must be this higher something as the only [satisfaction 
for the ought." — Ibid. p. 438. Ah ! Alas I Satisfaction 1 
But satisfaction of the desire for the ought, after all, is happi- 
ness, and so it will forever continue to be. A virtue, — a 
supreme moral excellency, which has no relation to happiness, 
and which does not consist in seeking happiness, either for our- 
selves or others, surely cannot be found in the world of happi- 
ness : therefore, if found at all it must be found in some higher 
transcendental region, where happiness can never come. Nei- 
ther this author, nor any one of his reviewers, have been able 
as yet to introduce us to a region so high as this. The highest 
transcendental region which even they have been able to reach 
by the utmost stretch of their imaginations, is to have in it a 
satisfaction. And that satisfaction must be the highest in kind 
and degree. John, the Revelator, once said, " I saw a great 
white throne and him that sat on it, before whose face the earth 
and the heaven fled away, and there was found no place for 
them." So no more can there be found a place for that tran- 
scendental region high enough for a holiness which is to have no 
relation to happiness, and is not to consist in seeking happiness 
for ourselves or others ; for wherever God reigns, holiness must 
consist in pleasing him and in seeking to promote the highest 
happiness of his kingdom. Therefore, willing or unwilling, we 
are driven to the inevitable conclusion that a holiness which 
does not consist in any form of seeking happiness, and which 
must have no relation to happiness, and is independent of the 
idea of happiness, cannot have a being where God maintains 
his moral government. 

But this reviewer, in a still further effort to find this tran- 
scendental region of virtue, says, " There must, then, be some- 
thing above this, — a right, or righteousness joer se, an absolute 
agathon, a ' spirit worthiness ' not resolvable into happiness, or 
the love of happiness, or the aim or desire to promote happi- 
ness ; and this had better be taken, even if we have thus to 



416 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

take it, as an unknown quantity." — Pres. Quar. Review, 
p. 438. 

Here we see again, when transcendental mysticism tries to 
conceive and express the idea of a holiness which is in itself 
ultimate and has no relation to happiness, nothing is brought 
forth after all but an unknown, and we may add, an unknowa- 
ble, unthinkable, inconceivable something, or more properly a 
nothing, called a quantity. 

An aim implies an object aimed at, an object outside of and 
beyond itself. The aiming and the object are two distinct 
things, as really as choice and the thing chosen are two things. 
Therefore neither aim nor choice can in their own nature be 
ultimate. But the objects finally aimed at and chosen alone 
are ultimate. 

If the love of and the aim to promote the greatest happiness 
of sentient beings in general is not true virtue, then the Ed- 
wardses, Bellamy, Hopkins, Andrevv Fuller, Emmons, the 
Bibliotheca Sacra (1853, Review of Edwards), and (as we 
think) the common sense of New England and all the world 
besides, have been on this point most deeply in the wrong, and 
very wofully mistaken. We have given the testimony of the 
Bible on this point in another place (q. 274). 

Again : That this reviewer in his transcendental flight, can- 
not soar high enough to find the region where there can be a 
holiness, that is an unknown quantity, having no relation to 
happiness, fully appears from the following statements which he 
afterwards made, as well as from the statements already quoted : 
" Ethics by itself is a pure, intelhgible science ; it is as purely 
scientific as mathematics." " The Bible assumes that men can 
know these relations, and the duties that spring out of them." — 
p. 453. Surely, then, virtue has relations that can be known, 
and the idea of moral excellence is not an unknown, unknow- 
able, inconceivable something which cannot be defined. It can 
therefore be no rational objection to the theory of benevolent 
usefulness that it is so easily understood, that " the way -faring 
man, though a fool, shall not err therein." 

Again : " Human duties are modified by what God has re- 



SECT.m.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 417 

vealed to us of the human fall and human redemption, and so 
they are by all the degrees of human culture, and all the 
circumstances of human history ; but their ground remains the 
same; their general relation to the rank and worth of the 
human spirit, remains the same. Their connection, too, with 
human happiness, whether as means or end, remains the 
same." 

Duties, we see again, spring out of relations, and must have 
a relation to, and cannot be performed without any idea of, 
happiness, and no duty can be conceived of " which is indepen- 
dent of the idea of happiness." 

Again : " There are but two distinct opposing views. . . . 
One makes the moral character of acts to be determined by 
the amount of happiness they tend, or are intended to produce. 
The other refers them to some higher good than happiness, 
whether it can define it or not, — a good which may include 
happiness . . . , — a worthiness of the soul, in itself and in its 
relations to other souls, especially the Great Soul ; of which 
spiritual state the production of enjoyment, or the [intent to 
produce [enjoyment, is one, though not the chief excellency." — 
Pres. Quar. Review, p. 455. That good which may include 
happiness, and of which the production of enjoyment is only 
one excellency, is not independent of all idea of happiness. 
* There is, indeed, a happiness, — an enjoyment in the love of 
right, with which no sensual joy can be compared.' 

After all, this reviewer with his author fails entirely of ex- 
pressing an " idea of the good, or that which has a worth of its 
own, independent of [its relation to] happiness." Now, there- 
fore, we think it was very becoming in this writer, especially 
after his own rich experience of the difficulty in the case, that 
he should make the confession, " It is hard to oppose logically 
this happiness scheme" of benevolent usefulness. Logically 
to oppose a doctrine founded on self-evident, eternal truth, 
always will be hard. 

Here let us carefully notice : * What is the ultimate rule of 
right, — of that duty which is end in itself and of itself, — of 
that virtue which must be not a means but an end,' and which, 



418 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

according to these writers, so far transcends the law of impar- 
tial, benevolent usefulness ? It is this, " Act worthy of that 
rational, immortal, spiritual being which God has made you." 
Very good indeed so far, if this were all. It is the theory set 
forth in connection with this rule to which we object. Our object 
so far has been to show its contrariety to reason and sound 
philosophy. Its opposition to the Bible we have shown in 
other places. 

When a man obeys the law of impartial, benevolent useful- 
ness, by doing all he can to please God, and to make his king- 
dom happy, he will obey the law of rectitude, and act worthy 
of the true nature and dignity of a rational being, therefore 
greatest happiness must be the ultimate object of that action 
which is worthy of a rational being. Suppose, then, we adopt 
the rule to * act worthy of the rational, immortal, spiritual 
beings which God has made us ; ' the law of benevolent useful- 
ness, which requires us to act with reference to the highest 
good and happiness which we can promote in the universe, 
shows more plainly and fully how to act in a manner worthy of 
a rational, immortal being, and therefore the main, if not the 
only difference (aside from the explanation of the worthiness 
theory), between the two rules or two forms of the rule, is that 
the law of benevolence is plainer and more definitely shows 
what our duty is, and what the ultimate object of that duty is, 
and for these reasons may more justly be termed an ultimate 
rule. Impartial, universal benevolence alone, in moral action, 
is worthy of a rational being. And it is so, because it is the 
rational, intended, and necessary means of the highest universal 
happiness. 

Dr. Hickok in another place has said : " Absurdity ... is 
rooted inherently, in the doctrine itself, of greatest happiness as 
ultimate end. The important defect of the whole theory is, that 
it can possibly give no moral system." — Bib. Sac. 1856, p. 68. 
Of this theory, he says, " it takes tlie greatest ha,ppiness, and may 
be called the theory of benevolence." It has also been called 
the greatest happiness theory. Of his own theory he says, " it 
takes the highest worthiness^ and may be known as the 



Sect.IIL] ANTl-UTILITAKIAN THEOKIES. 419 

THEORY OF RECTITUDE." — Ibid. p. 60. Tliese designations 
do not fairly distinguish the two theories. We claim that im- 
partial benevolence, having for its ultimate and final object and 
end the greatest universal happiness, is precisely identical with, 
neither more nor less than, that obedience which is required by 
the eternal law of rectitude, equity, honor, duty, and right. This 
may, therefore, rightfully be called the doctrine of Benevolent 
Rectitude and Utility. It is identical with the Edwardean 
theory as we understand it. To distinguish the other from this, 
it may be termed the Worthiness Theory of Rectitude. 

Benevolent rectitude has an ultimate object out of itself, as 
every intelligent choice must have. The other, or worthiness 
rectitude, claiming to have an end in itself and to be the end 
of itself, can be likened to nothing so fitly as to a circle, which, 
having neither beginning nor end, runs only round into itself. 
As it claims to have no object out of itself, it can terminate no- 
where and upon nothing. And as there can be no foundation 
for such obligation, either in the nature of God, or in the nature 
of any created agent, nor in the nature of things created or un- 
created, duty, according to this theory, can begin nowhere, and 
therefore can end nowhere. Therefore we submit to the judg- 
ment of a world, that such a theory of such a virtue, as that 
which is end in and of itself, having no final regard to the gen- 
eral happiness, and being entirely independent of all idea of 
happiness, implying an aim, which is aimed at nothing but itself, 
— a choice, which is a choice of nothing but itself, — a love, 
which is a love of nothing but itself, — we submit that such a 
theory has a sufficient degree of absurdity inherently rooted in 
it, to commend itself to all who fairly and fully understand it, 
for their immediate, utter, and final rejection. Surely such an 
aim is not an aim to please God, — such a choice is not a choice 
of God as the supreme delight and portion of the soul. Such 
love is not that love to God, nor that love to our neighbor, 
which both the first and the second command require of the 
children of men. All duty done is performed by, and consists 
in, acts of choice, — acts of voluntary love, design, purpose, in- 
tention, or aiming at some ultimate end, and that final end must 



420 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

be the greatest amount of general well-being. And thus moral 
obligation, according to this worthiness theory of rectitude, is an 
absolute absurdity, and virtue an utter impossibility. It may 
be regarded as one form of the Rightarian or Independent 
morality. 

These two theories, then, are and are confessed to be in fatal 
conflict. The one which stands must be the utter and final ruin 
of the other. And we submit to the judgment of every candid 
mind whether the doctrine of benevolent rectitude is in accord- 
ance with sound reason, the common sense of mankind, and the 
Word of God. " For God is love." 

There is an able review of Dr. Hickok's Mental and Moral 
Philosophy in the Bibliotheca Sacra for April, 1859, the senti- 
ments of which correspond with those of the review of Dr. 
Hickok's Moral Science in the Presbyterian Quarterly of 1855. 

The doctrine of this reviewer and his author he represents to 
be, " To do that and that only which is due to spiritual ex- 
cellency, is the supreme rule of all moral conduct. To be worthy 
of moral approbation in his own sight and in the eye of every 
spirit, is man's supreme good. , . . Here is a rule which is 
moral, and not prudential. It can urge its claims, if necessary, 
in the face of all prudence, and demand for its own sake that 
virtue be sought even if no other good should follow. [_lf the 
soul were to seek to fulfil such a claim for the sake of some ul- 
terior end, as though it would he holy, because and in order that it 
might he thus happy, the very claim that holiness he sought as an 
end in itself, and not as a means to any thing further, would he 
violated, and the soul instead of gaining its moral approbation, 
would be consciously degraded'^ — p. 265. 

According to this it would seem to be a mistake to regard 
him as a virtuous man who should have any reference to the 
recompense of reward, or to regard as virtuous " the prudent 
man [who] foreseeth the evil and hideth himself" But the 
simple, who should disregard all prudence and pass on, might, 
in some supposable cases, be virtuous and thus escape punishment. 

The demonstrated utter impossibility that a virtuous or any 
other voluntary act can be performed without an object ulterior 



Sect. III.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEOEIES. 421 

to itself, and the demonstrated fact that all voluntary acts of 
every kmd must have happiness of some kind for their ultimate 
object, we propose as insuperable objections to the worthiness 
rule of duty, as stated by this reviewer as well as by his author. 

Moral action of any kind, independent of the desire of happi- 
ness, is an absolute impossibility, and therefore reason must 
reject the statement that " Virtue is independent of the desire 
of happiness." — Jacobi. 

This reviewer maintains that man is not such a being that to 
him " The supreme law . . . should be the greatest amount of 
happiness to be gained for himself or for the whole of which he 
is a part." He asks, " Can the validity and authority of such a 
law be urged?" — p. 263. Again: "If they are so constituted 
as to be the most happy themselves by conferring happiness 
upon others, then benevolence should be the rule, but still only 
as prudential, and binding the subject only because he found 
himself in the midst of such a constituted nature of things. A 
code of morals resting upon such a ground, is at the best only a 
calculation of expediencies, and [the practice of virtue, in its pur- 
est form, is only the struggle after happiness as the highest good that 
can he obtained. A brute does nothing less than this." — p. 264. 

That there may be some prudence where there is no virtue 
we have shown (qs. 208, 209). But that there can be virtue 
where there is no prudent regard both to our own and the high- 
est good of others, we see not how to reconcile either with the 
plainest dictates of reason, or with Scripture. If benevolence 
be not the rule, how then is " love the fulfilling of the law." 

If happiness be the only possible ultimate and absolute good, 
as we have proved, what can the practice of virtue be but the 
delightful labor of aiming to promote the highest degree of it 
for all sentient beings including ourselves ? 

This writer has well and truly said, " What is the highest 
good for man ? What are his rights and duties ? These ques- 
tions, which lie at the basis of ethics, cannot be satisfactorily 
answered without some accurate and profound knowledge of 
the human mind." — p. 263. 

Here, then, the question arises, Which is the right view of the 
36 



423 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

nature and powers of the human mind, that in which the doc- 
trine of benevolent rectitude is founded, or that in which the 
worthiness theory has its supposed foundation ? 

The following extracts from an article by Dr. Hickok, in the 
January number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, 1856, show to some 
extent what that view of the nature and powers of the human 
mind is, in which the worthiness theory has its supposed basis. 

"Although here is logically the consummation of benevo- 
lence, yet it were not possible that the human mind should be 
satisfied with it. The susceptibility to benevolent happiness is 
not the highest principle in man or God." — p. 68. 

" Rational spirit can form an insight of what it is, determine 
at once what is due to it, and what is worthy of it ; and can 
thus sit in judgment and pass sentence upon its benevolent grat- 
ifications, and decide whether happiness that is sought in im- 
parting is a virtue or a vice ; consistent with honor and right, 
or dishonorable and wrong. There is thus power over, and 
thereby a freedom in, all this pathological benevolence, and the 
being knows that he is morally held to control all his happi- 
ness, even that of benevolence, by a regard to his own true 
dignity and worthiness. [ Thus a man will judge Ms logical 
theories, and not seldom find his logical and moral convictions 
directly in contradiction.*. . . His rational spirit knows a law 
and an alternative force which his logical understanding cannot 
find nor comprehend^' — pp. 68, 69. 

Here we submit to the judgment of every rational mind, 
whether or not, contradiction or a " law or an alternative force 
which can neither be found nor comprehended by a logical un- 
derstanding," can be a basis for moral obligation or for a system 
of morality. 

" But the inherent impotency of the hypothesis [of benev- 
olent rectitude] — is that it is a. hybrid and cannot propagate 
itself in the line of either parent. It cannot retain its greatest 
happiness principle, and transmit its freedom ; it cannot keep its 
free agency, and hold on to its paternity in benevolence. If 
God's highest principle of action is the gratification of a benev- 
olent susceptibility, then he must go on communicating what he 

* When convictions are in contradiction, some of tlieni must be false. 



SECT.m.] ANTI-UTILITAEIAN THEORIES. 423 

finds within himself, as he is prompted by his own nature, and 
can never go back and judge of this nature by any ethical 
principles, nor control its working by any considerations of 
honor and right. Himself and the benevolent system he 
makes are both conditioned in a nature already given, and 
there is no alternative from the creating to the terminating act." 

" There is only the sentient craving of an unerring judgment 
of what will satisfy it ; and the unavoidable issue is that the 
agency must go out to get it. There is else perpetual wretch- 
edness. God originates nothing ; he only develops the nature 
he finds in himself." 

" But, on the other hand, if God be truly a free agent and 
the personal originator of a free system, then must he have 
seen within himself a principle higher than his want of happi- 
ness in the gratification of a benevolent susceptibility, and 
which both prompted him to, and guided him in, his work, 
above all the principles of nature. A higher light must have 
been given in the insight of what was due to his own essential 
dignity and glory, and in which he might judge when the going 
forth of his benevolent impulses were consistent with ' honor 
and right,' and in this only could there have been a free capac- 
ity to guide his search for benevolent happiness, and make his 
benevolence in this way to be, not a constitutional sentiment, 
but a moral attribute, an ethical virtue." 

" The attempt to stand here on the nature of free agency, 
and yet holding that agency by the judgment of what is great- 
est happiness through the cravings of an inbred nature, will 
inevitably share the same fate as all the former hypotheses ; 
the position while taking a full-sighted observation for it, wiU 
logically transmute itself to another, and, instead of the delu- 
sive freedom of a constitutional susceptibility, will go over to 
the true liberty of a rational spirit." — pp. 71, 72. 

Does the supposition that God must act from a principle of 
benevolence, i. e. to promote as much happiness as his almighty 
power enables him to do, or be wretched, prove that God in so 
doing is not a free agent ? and, of course, that such acts and 
doings have nothing in them of moral goodness ? 



424 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

If, according to what the nature of rational, moral beings 
is and must be, it be a fact, as we claim to have demonstrated, 
that happiness must be the ultimate object and end of all virtu- 
ous as well as of all other voluntary moral action, then that 
view of the nature of the human mind, and of all other moral 
beings, from which the worthiness theory of virtue is supposed, 
by its friends and supporters, to result, cannot be true and right, 
and the worthiness theory is without foundation. 

If it be impossible to the human mind that any thing but 
greatest happiness should be the ultimate object of virtue, then 
universal, impartial benevolence is virtue, and the only possible 
thing that is virtue ; but if virtue on this ground is not possible, 
then it is not possible on any, and man is not a moral agent, 
and there is no such thing as virtue. 

To prove that virtue is not possible on this ground seems to 
be the object of the above extracts from the writings of Dr. H. 
and of the reviews of his writings from which we have quoted. 

The iield of discussion, — the true battle-ground on which 
this question is to be settled, is the nature, — the true philoso- 
phy of the human mind, including also the meaning of the law 
of God as laid down in the Bible. 

Turn we now to the review. 

We have read this review with interest, on account of the 
doctrines discussed, — the works reviewed, and the ability, 
earnestness, and boldness of the writer. When such writers as 
the supporters of these doctrines come out against the long- 
settled convictions of many of the wisest, ablest, and best of 
men, they must not be offended if their statements are examined 
and opposed with as much frankness, earnestness, and decision, 
as they themselves have used. 

To this review, to the doctrines which it supports, and to 
those on which the worthiness theory rests, we invite the candid 
attention of those who are in a position to influence the public 
mind, and if, after a thorough examination and discussion, car- 
ried on, not in the spirit of angry controversy, but in the spirit 
of a manly regard for truth and right, they are found to be true, 
let them be fearlessly supported and recommended to the accept- 



Sect.IV.] COMPAEISON OF THEOKIES. 425 

ance of all who love the truth throughout the world. But if 
they are found wanting, let them be fairly and frankly refuted, 
without fear or favor in regard to their originators, defenders, 
or opposers. Surely the friends of these doctrines here opposed 
cannot object to the course we recommend. 

When the claim is put forth by so able a writer as our re- 
viewer is, in one of our most learned and deservedly influential 
quarterlies, that the doctrines on which the spiritual excellency 
or worthiness theory of virtue rests, " represent the highest and 
most permanent type of American thinking," it is time that this 
claim should be examined by American thinkers, and the ques- 
tion settled, whether this type of thought corresponds with the 
truth, — the real facts of the subject, and whether it is there- 
fore worthy to be permanent, or that a more rational, profound, 
correct, and truthful style of thought is demanded by the exi- 
gencies of the times, and by the interests of mental, moral, and 
theological science. 



SECTION IV. 

COMPARISON OF THEORIES. — EXTRACTS FROM WHEWELL, POPE, 
MILTON, AND HOMER. 

The worthiness theory of virtue appears to agree substan- 
tially with the Cousinistic (though expressed in different lan- 
guage, and by a different terminology), with the exception that 
Cousin claims that, by a virtuous act, a man may sacrifice his 
highest good, and bring himself to ruin ; while the supporters 
of the worthiness theory admit that virtue does secure highest 
happiness. 

The Bibliothecan and the Edwardean theories agree in re- 
garding happiness as the ultimate object of virtue ; while the 
worthiness and Cousinistic theories agree in denying that hap- 
piness is the ultimate object of virtue. The Cousinistic, the 
Bibliothecan, and the worthiness theories agree in the supposi- 
tion, that the idea of the virtuousness of an act is a necessary 
and simple idea. 

36* 



426 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

The theory of virtue maintained by Pres. Mahan, formerly 
of Oberlin College, agrees with the Edwardean theory in re- 
garding happiness as the ultimate object of right action, with 
some exceptions. It agrees also with the Edwardean, the Cou- 
sinistic, the Bibliothecan, and the worthiness theories, in main- 
taining that moral quality pertains only to voluntary action. 
These five theories all agree that nothing is holiness or sin but 
voluntary action. 

The theory of Mahan regards " virtue as a state in which all 
beings and objects known to us are esteemed and treated ac- 
cording to their intrinsic worth, and for this reason only." Or, 
" Virtue is a compliance with all moral relations." " If it be 
asked why we ought to love our neighbors as ourselves, the 
only answer ... is this : his interest is of the same intrinsic 
value as ours." Fairly understood, these statements appear to 
be true, because they imply that we should endeavor, according 
to our ability and opportunity, to promote the true interests and 
happiness of all, according to our opportunity and knowledge 
of its proportionate worth. Who can say that this is not, ac- 
cording to the true Bible view. Benevolent Utility ? 

Again; Mr. Mahan says: "That we should [interest our- 
selves in the well-being of others, is a first truth of universal 
reason." " God is represented in the Bible [and in the works 
of nature] as deeply interested in all that concerns our well- 
being." These statements being true, greatest happiness is the 
ultimate object and end of virtue. This principle is funda- 
mental, and, followed to its legitimate results, it would lead to a 
true theory of virtue. To establish, as Mr. Mahan has done, 
such a principle as this, furnishes a very solid foundation 
on which to refute all the arguments which he has brought 
against the doctrine that the ultimate object of virtue is utility, 
or that obligation is founded in the relation of virtue to happi- 
ness as its ultimate object. 

Pres. Mahan's theory agrees with the Bibliothecan, the Cou- 
sinistic, and worthiness theories, in holding that the idea of vir- 
tue is a simple and necessary idea, which cannot be analyzed 
into simpler elements. 



Sect.1V.] comparison OF THEORIES. 427 

The Edwardean theory, as we understand it, implies that, 
inasmuch as virtue itself is a complex object, resolvable into 
various elements, the idea of virtue must be not a simple, but a 
complex idea. To this theory we have no objection. Each of 
these other theories, so far as they are in opposition to the 
truth, in our view, contains truth enough in itself, carried out 
to its legitimate results, to remove its own errors; and they 
all contain truth enough, in the same way, to demolish each 
other's errors. All these theories agree with ours in holding 
that the idea of virtue is a necessary idea, as necessary to the 
rational mind as the idea of space. We think it difficult to find 
a theory that has ever been offered to the world, which does not 
contain truth sufficient, if fairly traced to its proper results, to 
establish the true doctrine, in which the facts, that desire of 
happiness comprehends all possible primary subjective motive, 
and that happiness is the ultimate object of all right moral ac- 
tion, are fundamental. It appears evident that the errors of 
the various theories in morals may be corrected by the doctrine 
that happiness is the ultimate object of all voluntary action, 
and therefore of all holy action, and that the desire of happi- 
ness is the primary subjective motive of all voluntary action, 
and therefore of all holy action. In this doctrine, we believe 
that a permanent basis may be established, on which the doc- 
trine of moral obligation will permanently and finally rest. 

Extracts from JVheweU's*- Elements of Morality. 
After having nearly completed this treatise, we had oppor- 
tunity to examine the Elements of Morality, by Wm. Whe- 
well,t from which we make the following extracts, to show 
how far his statements coincide with, and are thus adapted to 
confirm, the fundamental principles which we have taken as 
the premises, from which our argument and investigation pro- 
ceed. 

* Pronounced Hu-el. 

t An English writer of eminence, and author of the History and Phi- 
losophy of the Inductive Sciences. Tlie Elements have been used as a text- 
book at Yale College. 



428 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

§ 37. " Every object of desire, as contemplated by the 
mind, may be described by ia general term as a good. This is 
the most general aspect of the objects of desire. Opposed to 
the objects of desire are objects which we shun, as pain, con- 
straint, and the want or privation of objects of desire. These 
are evils." 

§ 60. •' The term good is so used as to include all the objects 
of the elementary desires ; " and, of course, all the objects of 
choice. 

§ 544. " Happiness is the object of human action in its most 
general form ; as including all other objects, and approved by 
the reason. . . . Happiness is conceived as necessarily an ulti- 
mate object of action. To be happy includes or supersedes 
all other gratifications. . . . The desire of happiness is the su- 
preme [ultimate] desire. All other desires of pleasure, wealth, 
power, fame, are included in this, and are subordinate to it. 
We may make other objects our ultimate objects ; but we can 
do so only by identifying them with this." 

§ 573. " The supreme [we should say ultimate] object of 
human action is happiness. . . . The supreme rule of human 
action is enforced and sanctioned by a belief that it leads to the 
supreme ohjeol of human action. As the rule of temperance 
points to health and comfort ; as the rule of respect for rights 
points to security and tranquillity ; so the supreme rule of Tight- 
ness points to happiness, which includes all other objects, and 
which is an internal comfort and tranquilHty requiring nothing 
beyond itself." 

§ 566. "The moral state and moral progress of each man 
are maintained by his own conviction of certain truths, which 
are the foundation of morality ; and among these truths, one of 
the most important is this, that the course of action which is 
his duty is also his [happiness, when considered in reference to 
the whole of his being." 

§ 574. " The subordinate rules are sanctioned by the belief 
that they lead to their respective results ; " i. e. that they pro- 
mote happiness. 

§ 537. " Pleasure arises from our attaining the objects of 



Sect. IV.] COMPARISON OF THEORIES. 429 

our desires. It is what we feel when our desires are satisfied, 
or in some measure gratified." 

But a little reflection will be necessary to see, that desire of 
happiness includes all the springs of action named by Mr. Whe- 
well in the following citations, and that it is therefore generic 
desire. 

§ 25. " The springs of action in man may be enumerated as 
follows : the appetites, or bodily desires ; the affections [or af- 
fectional desires] ; the mental desires ; the moral sentiments, 
and the reflex sentiments." 

§ 28. " The affections are tendencies or cravings [or desires] 
towards conscious individuals." Under this head he includes 
the passions. 

§ 545. " Since happiness is necessarily the supreme [or 
rather ultimate] object of our desires, and duty the supreme 
rule of our actions, there can be no harmony in our being, ex- 
cept oup happiness coincide with our duty. That which we 
contemplate as the ultimate and universal object of desire, must 
be identical with that which we contemplate as the ultimate 
and supreme guide of our intentions." 

§ 61. " It appears from what has been said, that the different 
kinds of springs of action are distinguished by their different 
objects. The appetites have for their objects things ; the affec- 
tions, persons ; the mental desires, abstractions ; and the reflex 
sentiments have for their objects the thoughts of other persons, 
or our own, about ourselves." 

" The springs of action which we have enumerated, do not 
operate upon man as forces operate upon inert matter. They 
all operate through the wall. A man is moved by these springs, 
when he will do that to which they impel him. Different 
springs of action may operate at the same time, and with oppo- 
site tendencies. The desire of safety would keep the soldier 
or sailor at home, but the desire of gain or glory sends him to 
[sea or to the war. In either case, it is through the will that 
the desires act [i. e. when they result in voluntary action]. He 
stays at home, because he wills to do so ; or he goes forth, be- 
cause he wills it." 



430 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

§ 15. "An action that proceeds from my will or volition, is 
my act. . . . Human actions suppose the freedom of the agent." 

§ 548. " We may remark, that according to the explanation 
given above, of the conception of happiness, it is quite true that 
we ought to act so as to increase as much as possible our own 
happiness and the happiness of others. . . . Since happiness 
is the ultimate object of our aims, and includes all other objects, 
whatever else we aim at, we identify with happiness. What- 
ever other end we seek, we seek that as the far end." 

All this from Whewell so far, seems fully to coincide with the 
results of our own inquiries ; but how this author can reconcile 
all this, and the main drift of his reasoning, with what follows, 
is more than we can comprehend. 

§ 538. " If pleasure be the highest object of human action, 
nothing can be absolutely right ; nor can be right in any other 
sense, than as the right road to pleasure. \^If pleasure he the 
object of human action, we must reject duty as the guide of human 
actionsJ^ 

This seems to be directly in contradiction to many plain as- 
sertions of our author above quoted, and directly in opposition 
to the principles on which the reasoning of his book is founded. 
— (See above, § 537.) « Put this and that together." — Dr. N. 
Emmons. If this humble page should ever meet the eye of 
this learned author, we very respectfully ask him for an expla- 
nation. 

Extracts from the Essay on Man, hy Alexander Pope, Esq. 

The following lines, from the Essay on Man, by Alexander 
Pope, Esq., show that he saw with more or less distinctness, 
the fundamental principles by which the true theory of virtue 
must be supported : — 

" Two principles in human nature reign, 
Self-love to urge, and reason to restrain ; 
Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call, 
Each works its end, to move, or govern all, 
And to their proper [operation still 
Ascribe all good, to their improper, ill. 
Self-love, the spring of motion, acts the soul. 
Reason's comparing balance rules the whole. 



Sect.IV.] comparison OF THEOEIES. 431 

Man, but for that, no action could attend. 
And but for this, wore active to no end." 

" Most strength the moving principle requires ; 
Active its task, it prompts, impels, inspires ; 
Sedate and quiet the comparing lies, 
Eorm'd but to check, delib'rate, and advise. 
Self-love, still stronger, as its object 's nigh ; 
Reason 's at distance and in prospect lie ; 
That sees immediate good, by present sense, 
Reason, the future, and the consequence ; 
Thicker than arguments, temptations throng. 
At best, more watchful this, but that more strong. 
The action of the stronger to suspend. 
Reason still use, to reason still attend ; 
Attention, habit, and experience gains. 
Each strengthens reason, and self-love restrains. 
Let subtle schoolmen teach these friends to fight, 
More studious to divide, than to unite. 
And grace and virtue, sense and reason split. 
With all the rash dexterity of wit." * 

" Pleasure, or wrong, or rightly understood 
Our greatest evil or our greatest good. 
Modes of self-love t the passions we may call ; 
'T is real good, or seeming, moves them all." 

" Pleasures are ever in our hands or eyes. 
And when in act they cease, in prospect rise ; 
Present to grasp, and future still to find, 
The whole employ of body and of mind."| 

" God, in the nature of each being, founds 
Its proper bliss, and sets its proper bounds ; 
But he framed the whole, the whole to bless, 
On mutual wants built mutual happiness."^ 

" Oh, happiness ! our being's end and aim ; 
Good, pleasure, ease, content ! whate'er thy name."ll 

* II. Epistle, lines 53-62, 81-84. 

t By " self-love " understand the constitutional endowment — the involuntary desire 
of happiness, sometimes called the love of happiness, belonging to the nature of man, and 
inseparable from it, of course possessing no moral quahty. By passions, understand 
" modes " of desiring happiness. " For a being to love himself, is to love his own hap- 
piness." — Dr. Edwards. 

t Ibid. 91-94. 123-126. 

§ ni. Epistle, 109-112. 

il IV. Epistle; 1, 2. 



432 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

" Self-love thus push'd to social, to divine, 
Gives thee to make thy neighbor's blessing thine. 
Is this too little for thy boundless heart 1 
Extend it, let thy enemies have part ; 
Grasp the whole worlds of reason, life, and sense, 
In one close system of benevolence ; 
Happier as kinder, in whate'er degree, 
The height of bliss, but height of charity." 

" Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to Avake, 
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake ; 
The center mov'd, a circle straight succeeds ; 
Another still, and still another spreads ; 
Friend, parent, neighbor, first it will embrace. 
His country next, and next all human race.'' * 

Thoughts from Milton's Paradise Lost, in Confirmation of the Right. 

" Be advised. 
God made thee perfect, not immutable. 
And good he made thee, but to persevere 
He left it in thy power ; ordained thy will 
By nature free, not over-ruled by fate 
Inextricable, or strict necessity : 
-4^^ Our voluntary service he requires. 

Not our necessitated : such with him 
Einds no acceptance, nor can find ; for how 
Can hearts not free be try'd, whether they serve 
"Willingly or no, who will but what they must 
By destiny, and can no other choose ? "t 

"But know that in the soul 
Are many lesser faculties, that serve 
Reason as chief ; among these fancy next 
Her office holds ; of all external things. 
Which the five watcliful senses represent. 
She forms imaginations, airy shapes 
Which reason joining or disjoining, frames 
All what we affirm or what we deny, and call 
Our knowledge or opinion ; thence retires. 
Into her private cell when nature rests."J 



* IV. Epistle, lines 363-38. 
t Book V. 523-534. 
X Ibid., 100-108. 



Sect.IV.] COMPAEISON OF THEORIES. 433 

" Best are all things as the will 
Of God ordained them ; his creating hand 
Nothing imperfect or deficient left 
Of all that he had created, much less man, 
Or ought that might his happy state secure, 
Secui'e from outward force ; within himself 
The danger lies, yet lies within his power : 
Against his will he can receive no harm. 

But God left free the will, for what obeys ^ ^ 

Reason, is free, and reason he made right."* 

" He had of me 
All he could have ; I made him just and I'ight, 
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall 
Such I created all the ethereal powers. 
And spirits, both them who stood and them who failed, 
Freely they stood, who stood, and fell who fell. 
Not free, what proof could they have giv'n sincere 
Of true allegiance, constant faith or love 
Where only what they needs must do appear'd 
Not what they would 1 What praise could they receive 1 
What pleasure I, from such obedience paid, 
When Avill and reason (reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled, 
Made passive both, had served necessity, 
Not me 1 they therefore as to right belong'd 
So were created, nor can justly accuse 
Their Maker, or their making, or their fate."t 

" Yet gave me, in this dark estate. 
To see the good from ill. 
And binding nature fast in fote. 
Left free the human will." 

Pope's Universal Prayer. 

" Perverse mankind ! whose will created free 
Charge all their woes on absolute decree ; 
All to the dooming gods their guilt translate, 
And follies are miscall'd the crimes of fate."| 

Homer's Odyssey, translated by Pope. 



* Book IX., lines 344-352. 
t Book III., 97-113 
t Book I., 41-44. 

37 



4M APPENDIX. [NoteE. 



EXTRACTS FROM GROVE, TAYLOR, AND SENECA, FOUND IN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY BY REV. HENRY GROVE, A LEARNED ENGLISH 
WRITER OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE LAST CENTURY, MORAL 
GOVERNMENT BY DR. TAYLOR, AND IN SENECA'S MORALS. 

" The importance of morality is just the same as that of hap- 
piness, with whicli it hath an immediate and necessary connec- 
tion. All men desire happiness, the inclination sticks close, and 
is never to be put off." — Vol. i. p. 3. 

" No one saith, that man ought to desire happiness ; the rea- 
son is, that this desire is natural and uncontrollable, and there- 
fore in general not subject to law. . . In strictness of speech 
man does not make happiness his end, but is rather carried 
towards it by an impetus of nature. In his desire of happiness 
he is not free, but a necessary agent ; even as necessary, as he 
is in the appetites of hunger and thirst. 

" As for happiness it is what a thinking being cannot but pas- 
sionately pursue, never intermitting the degree of his motion ; 
and therefore not to be reckoned in the number of those ends 
which it is our duty to propose ; since nothing is a matter of 
duty which is not some way or other in our power." — p. 247. 

i. " Strictly speaking every man is the sole efficient cause 
of his own actions. The cause of an action, and the agent or 
doer of it, are synonym,oiis terms. Others may supply the mo- 
tives or grounds of the action, they may promise or threaten or 
ensnare [persuade and impress motives], but this is all they 
can do ; for the proper and immediate cause of the action rests 
with the agent, and with no one else. 

ii. " According to the exactness of language, the same indi- 
vidual action cannot belong to more than one man ; or if you 
will, to every single action there can be but one agent. 

iii. " The virtue or guilt of the same numerical action is in- 
communicable." — Ibid. p. 237. 

''Love regarding its object as absent begets desire; as present 
either immediately or in prospect, in reality or imagination, it 
breeds joy. Love of desire abstractly considered, is a simple 
tendency towards good, and retains its name of desire. . . . 



Sect. IV.] COMPAEISON OF THEOEIES. 435 

Desire, being a most vigorous and sprightly principle, is the 
[original of diligence and [of all] activity. All the powers of 
nature without this would be dormant, and the most charming 
objects would be unable to provoke us to the pursuit of them." 
— pp. 340, 341. 

" Were it not for self-love the laws of God in the present de- 
generacy of mankind, would be of little or no force." They 
could be of no force at all, in fact and according to the above 
citations. " Even that ingenuous obedience which good men 
perform to the divine commands, though it be the immediate 
fruit of love to God, had its first rise from self-love. The pas- 
sion, then, is not possibly to be extinguished." — p. 345. 

" Now every man's reason, at the same time that it directs 
him to seek his own happiness in the most likely methods of 
acquiring it, will tell him, that it is fit that every other man, 
who has not forfeited his title to it, should be happy as well as 
himself, and that he should contribute to it, so far at least as he 
will not prejudice himself by so doing. This natural reason 
dictates, and to this therefore the affections must be naturally 
inclined." 

*' But to proceed from reason to matter of fact ; the pity 
which naturally and immediately arises in the human bosom on 
sight of persons in distress, and the satisfaction of mind which 
is the consequence of having removed them into a happier state, 
are instead of a thousand arguments to prove disinterested 
benevolence to be natural to man. We appeal to every man's 
own feeling, and may well trust the cause upon this issue. Did 
pity proceed from a reflection upon our own liableness to the 
same ill accidents which we see befall others, it were nothing to 
the present purpose : but this is assigning an artificial cause for 
a natural passion, and can by no means be admitted as a toler- 
able account of it ; because children, and persons most thought- 
less about their own condition and incapable of entering into the 
prospects of futurity, feel the most violent touches of compas- 
sion. If we reflect upon what passes within us, do we not find 
our compassion for others, and desire of relieving them, and our 
good wishes for others, and joy in their prosperity, in a thousand 



436 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

instances going before, and unattended with any consideration of 
our being in any danger from their evils, or having any interest 
in [except the satisfaction derived from] their prosperity ? Re- 
move the scene to the most distant ages and nations, and we 
as naturally and readily feel for the unfortunate, and wish well 
especially to the honest, the kind, the brave, and well deserving, 
and enjoy peculiar satisfaction in their prosperity." 

" Whatever conduct or behavior proceeds from a prevailing 
regard to my own real improvement and happiness, and amicable 
affections towards other beings [' or love to being in general '] 
that come within my cognizance, is demonstrably right." — 
pp. 30, 31, 32. 

" The internal principles . . . are three in number ; ^Jnclina- 
tion, Reason or Understanding, and Will." 

" Inclination, though it be a principle, is never to be made the 
immediate rule of action." — p. 133. If the clue, given in the 
statement of these three principles, to the formation of the true 
analysis of the human mind, had been duly improved from the 
time it was given, an incalculable amount of error might have 
been swept away and future error prevented, and an immense 
amount of truth discovered and of good secured. 

" Natural laws are founded in the immutable natures and re- 
lations of things, carry their own recommendation with them, 
and were it not for the depravity of mankind, would not need a 
supernatural light for the discovery of their reasonableness and 
obligation." — Vol. ii. p. 7. 

" The law of nature ... is the fundamental law, upon which 
all other laws, whether divine or human, are built, and the great 
fountain of moral truths." — p. 26. 

" The command of the means is included in the command of 
the end." — Ibid. p. 18. 

" It is in the conformity of our wills to right reason that the 
. . . nature of virtue consists." — p. 115. 

" From the nature of virtue, ... it is very easy to form a 
notion of vice. Vice, then, is the settled bent of the will to actions 
dissonant to right reason dictating duty." " Vice or moral evil 
has no other beginning than the freedom of the will." — p. 128. 



Sect. IV.] COMPARISON OF THEORIES. 437 

Moral quality, then, is predicable only of acts of the will, so that 
neither holiness nor sin can be found aside from acts of will or 
voluntary exercises. 

" All men have their rights and properties. One man has a 
claim to this thing, another to that, one man to more of this 
world, another to less. He who is born to least, is born with a 
right to life, liberty, and safety." — p. 252. Here we have the 
substance of our bill of rights as set forth in the declaration of 
independence. 

" And then as to that charming delight which immediately fol- 
lows the giving joy to another, or relieving his sorrow ; and 
which, when the objects are numerous, and the kindness of im- 
portance, is really inexpressible, what \can this be owing to ? . . 
The conscience [consciousness] of approving one's self a bene- 
factor to mankind, is the noblest recompense of being so ; \_doubt- 
less it is, and the most interested cannot propose any thing so 
much to their own advantage ; notwithstanding which the in- 
clination is unselfish. The pleasure which attends [or consti- 
tutes] the gratification of our hunger and thirst, is not the 
cause of these appetites ; they are previous to any such pros- 
pect; and so likewise is the desire of doing good, with this 
difference, being seated in the intellectual part, this last, though 
antecedent to reason, may yet be improved and regulated by it, 
and is no otherwise a virtue than as it is so." — pp. 346-349. 

It seems here needful to remark, that benevolence, i. e. good- 
will to others in limited circles, may be disinterested in the 
sense above expressed, and yet not partake of the holy quality 
of universal or general benevolence, or good-will to being in 
general. To set this matter in its true and proper light we cite 
the following from the second volume on the Moral Government 
of God, by Dr. Taylor, late Prof, of Theology in Yale College, 
p. 257. 

" When, however, we contemplate justice or veracity, or any 
particular disposition, purpose, volition, separately from, or as 
not including either the selfish or benevolent principle of the 
heart, it is neither morally right nor morally wrong. At the 
same time it must be admitted that justice, veracity, etc., each 
37* 



438 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

being conceived as a particular subordinate purpose or disposi- 
tion without general benevolence, and including its appropriate 
executive action, are in some sense right, but not morally right. 
They are right, as they are fitted to promote some limited good 
necessary to the general good. It may be truly said of any 
of these particular acts, that it ought to be done. But its right- 
ness or oughtness is not a moral \_holy'] rightness or moral [^o/y] 
oughtness, for this is a predicate only of (general) benevolence, 
or that which includes it. The rightness or oughtness of any 
particular subordinate disposition or purpose and its executive 
action, without including benevolence or selfishness, is the same 
kind of rightness or oughtness in relation to the end of action, 
which is predicable of the structure of a watch or a pen in rela- 
tion to the end for which it is made — that is, a mere natural 
Jitness. The particular virtues of justice, veracity, etc., differ 
from benevolence considered as the governing principle of the 
heart, not as excluding it, for as virtues they necessarily include 
it ; but as including something more, viz. particular subordinate 
dispositions, purposes, to perform the particular actions which 
are necessary to the production of the general good. Benev- 
olence, as the term is employed in this connection, is a govern- 
ing, practical principle — a controlling disposition or purpose to 
secure the highest well-being of all by all those particular affec- 
tions, etc., and executive doings which are necessary to accom- 
plish this end, while each particular virtue of this class consists 
of benevolence, which prompts the particular affection, purpose, 
etc., and in the particular affection, etc., which is prompted 
by it." 

To return to our quotations from Grove : — 

" Society could not subsist but by the succor it borrows from 
hope and fear [or desire to gain happiness and shun misery] ; 
neither could religion be kept up but by the same means. 
Nothing but these can ordinarily restrain men from vice, or in- 
vite them to the practice of virtue ; and they are the main- 
springs of action, and rewards and punishments are the weights 
which put these wheels and springs in motion." — p. 380. 

"Man never exerts himself but when he is roused by his 



Sect.1V.] comparison OF THEORIES. 439 

[^desires ; wLile they lie dormant, and there is nothing to raise 
them, his excellence and abilities will be forever undiscovered." 

— p. 285. 

Is duty commensurate with our ability to know and do it ? 

" The fundamental duty of all morality is a sincere endeavor 
to know, and, as far as known, to perform all the duties we 
stand obliged to." " We can do no more than inquire impartially, 
and then honestly act according to the best judgment we can 
make of those things, after having inquired into them ; all be- 
yond this is impossible, and therefore no part of our duty." 

Extracts from Seneca's Morals, in favor of the right. 

"Virtue, I know, rests in the intent'' — p. 19. 

" It is agreed upon at all hands, that ' right reason is the per- 
fection of human nature,* and wisdom only the dictate of it. 
The greatness that arises from it is solid and unmovable ; 
the resolutions of wisdom being free, absolute, and constant ; 
whereas folly is never long pleased with the same thing, but 
still shifting of councils and sick of itself. There can be no 
happiness without constancy and prudence." — p. 96. 

" The blessing of wise men rests in the joy they take in the 
communication of their virtues. If there were nothing else in 
it, a man would apply himself to wisdom, because it settles him- 
self in a perpetual tranquillity of mind." 

" Virtue is that perfect good which is the complement of a 
happy life ; the only immortal thing that belongs to mortality." 

— p. 98. 

" We must labor and climb the hill, if we will arrive at vir- 
tue, whose seat is upon the top of it." " Reason does not en- 
counter this or that vice by itself, but beats down all at a blow." 

— p. 106. 

" There is not any thing in this world, perhaps, that is more 
talked of, and less understood, than the business of a happy life. 
It is every man's wish and design ; and yet not one of a thou- 
sand that knows wherein that happiness consists. We live, 
however, in a blind and eager pursuit of it ; and the more haste 
we make in a wrong way, the further we are from our journey's 



440 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

end. Let us, therefore, first, consider what we would he at ,• 
and, secondly, which is the readiest way to compass it." — 
p. 89. 

" Human happiness is founded upon wisdom and virtue. . . . 
Wisdom is a right understanding, a faculty of discerning good 
from evil ; what is to be chosen, and what rejected ; a judgment 
grounded upon the value of things, and not upon the common 
opinion of them ; an equality of force, and a strength of resolu- 
tion. It sets a watch over words and deeds." — p. 93. 

" If it be true, that the understanding and the will are the 
two eminent facidties of the reasonable soul, it follows necessa- 
rily, that wisdom and virtue (which are the best improvement of 
these two faculties) must be the perfection also of our reasona- 
ble being, and, consequently, the undeniable foundation of a 
happy life. There is not any duty to which Providence has 
not annexed a blessing ; nor any institution of heaven which, 
in this life, we may not be the better for ; nor any temptation, 
either of fortune or of appetite, that is not subject to our rea- 
son ; nor any passion or affliction, for which virtue has not pro- 
vided a remedy." — p. 108. 

" There is no man but approves of virtue, though few pur- 
sue it ; we see where it is, but we dare not come at it." — p. 
128. 

" There is not in the scale of nature a more inseparable con- 
nection of cause and effect, than in the case of happiness and 
virtue ; nor any thing that more naturally produces the one, or 
more necessarily presupposes the other. . . . All the actions of 
our lives ought to be governed with a respect to good and evil. 
And it is only reason that distinguishes ; by which reason we 
are in such a manner influenced, as if a ray of divinity were 
dipped in a mortal body ; and that is the perfection of man- 
kind." 

" The foundation of true joy is in the conscience." 

" It is every man's duty to make himself profitable to man- 
kind."— pp. 131, 132. 

" We must not live by chance ; for there is no virtue without 
deliberation and election. And where we cannot be certain, let 



Sect, v.] AN TI-UT ILIT AEI AN T HE EIE S. 441 

US follow that which is most hopeful and probable. Faith, jus- 
tice, piety, fortitude, prudence, are venerable, and the posses- 
sions only of good men." 

" It is a great weakness for a man to value himself upon any 
thing, wherein he shall be outdone by fools and beasts. We 
are to consider health, strength, beauty, and other advantages 
of that kind, only as adventitious comforts ; we may preserve 
them with care, provided that we be always ready to quit them 
without trouble. There is a pleasure in wickedness, as well 
as in virtue, and there are those that take glory in it too ; 
wherefore our forefathers prescribed for us the best life, and not 
the most plentiful, and allowed us pleasure for a companion, but 
not for a guide. We do many times take the instruments of 
happiness for the happiness itself; and rest upon those matters 
that are but in the way to it. . . . We are for one thing to-day, 
another thing to-morrow, so that we live and die without com- 
ing to any resolution ; still seeking that elsewhere, which we 
may give ourselves, that is to say, a good mind." — pp. 387, 
388. 

" It is dangerous for a man too suddenly or too easily to be- 
lieve himself Wherefore let us examine, watch, observe, and 
inspect our hearts, for we ourselves are our greatest flatterers ; 
we should every night call ourselves to an account, — what in- 
firmity have 1 mastered to-day ? ivhat passion opposed f what 
temptation resisted? what virtue acquired?" — p. 130. 



SECTION V. 

DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT, OR RIGHTARIAN MORALITY. 

Various moral theories may be included under two opposite 
views which have been adopted concerning the nature of mo- 
rality, first, the utilitarian, that the Tightness of right moral 
actions depends upon the ultimate, good, and valuable ends or 
objects purposed or chosen in those actions ; second, the anti- 
utilitarian, sometimes termed rightarian, viz. that the right of 



442 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

certain actions, and the wrong of certain other actions, are in- 
herent in the actions themselves, and independent of all their 
relations to, and of all their connections with, happiness or 
misery. 

The first of these views (perhaps by way of disparagement) 
has been called dependent morality, or the morality of con- 
sequences, because dependent on consequences. The second 
(possibly for the purpose of extollation) has been termed inde- 
pendent morality, inasmuch ns independence is more exalted 
than dependence, and because of its independence of conse- 
quences. The supposition that a moral choice should be made 
and continue to exist, irrespective and independent of any and 
all effects, results, consequences, ends, and objects intended and 
chosen, or that the moral character of a choice should not de- 
pend at all upon the object chosen to be accomplished, is an 
absolute impossibility, a thing impossible to be thought, and in- 
conceivable to be done, because it involves a positive contradic- 
tion and a complete absurdity. By this most manifest and un- 
deniable fact, the vain notion of independent morality seems to 
us to be at once and utterly demolished. On how much better 
a foundation than this, any of the anti-utilitarian theories are 
based, we leave for those to judge who are able and willing to 
determine for themselves where the truth lies. 

According to the first of the above theories, the intrinsic 
value of the happiness promoted by virtue is one element in 
the ground of obligation, and power to promote happiness the 
other, or rather both these grounds are implied in the power to 
promote happiness. According to the other, obligation does not 
rest nor depend at all upon the value of the good promoted by 
virtue, nor is the desire of happiness a possible motive to vir- 
tue, nor can happiness be either the subjective or objective, 
ultimate object of virtue. The truth concerning this so-called 
theory of independent morality, which we claim to have proved, 
is, that, according to it, there neither is nor can be any ground 
whatever for the existence of moral obligation to any creature, 
for this one plain and simple reason, that the theory takes away 
the possibility of complying with such obligation. 



Sect, v.] ANTI-UTILIT AEI AN THEOEIES. 443 

Some of the most eminent supporters of the first of these 
theories, viz. of dependent morality, are Aristotle of Stagira, 
Seneca, Bishop Richard Cumberland of England, John Locke, 
Bishop George Berkeley, John Brown, Henry Grove, the Ed- 
"vvardses, father and son, Drs. Timothy Dwight and Nathaniel 
Wm. Taylor. The principles of this theory are found also in 
Butler's writings and Bellamy's, and we think also in the writ- 
ings of Rev. Andrew Fuller. 

" Probably no mind outside of the pale of Christianity, has 
made a more discriminating and truthful representation of the 
natural sentiments of the human mind than Aristotle." — Prof. 
Shedd, Bib. Sacra, 1859, p. 736. 

Aristotle says, " Now the end being an object of volition, and 
the means objects of deliberation and deliberate preference, the 
actions which regard these must be in accordance with deliber- 
ate preference, and voluntary. . . . And virtue also must be in 
our power ; and in like manner vice : for whenever we have 
the power to do [an act], we have also the power not to do 
[that act] ; and whenever we have the power not to do, we have 
the power to do." 

"Vice is voluntary. Or else we must contradict what we 
have just said, and deny that man is the origin and the parent 
of his actions, as of his children. But if this appear true, and 
w^e have no other principle to which we may refer our actions 
than those which are in our power, then those things, the prin- 
ciples of which are in our power, are themselves also in our 
power, and voluntary ; and testimony seems to be borne to this 
statement both by private persons individually, and by legisla- 
tors themselves; for they chastise and punish those who do 
wicked deeds, unless they do them upon compulsion, or through 
an ignorance for which they [the legislators] are themselves to 
blame ; and they confer honor on those who do good actions, 
with a view to encouraging the one and restraining the other. 

" And yet no person encourages us to do those things which 
are neither in our power nor voluntary, considering it not worth 
while to persuade us not to be hot, or cold, or hungry, or any 
thing of this kind ; for we shall suffer them all the same." 



444 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

" If, then, as is said, the virtues are voluntary, . . . the vices 
must be voluntary also ; for they are just as much so as the 
virtues. Now about the virtues we have spoken generally, . . . 
that they are in our own power, that they are voluntary, and 
that they are under the direction of right reason." — Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 6Q, 67, 70. 

" Every art and every scientific system, and in like manner 
every course of action and deliberate preference, seems to aim 
at some good ; and consequently ' the good ' has been well 
defined as that which all things [i. e. all voluntary action] aim 
at." " If, therefore, there is some end of all that we do, which we 
wish for on its own account, and if we wish for all other things 
on account of this, and do not choose every thing for the sake 
of something else (for thus we should go on to infinity so that 
desire would be empty and vain), it is evident that this must be 
^the good' and the greatest [or the ultimate] good. Has not, 
then, the knowledge of this end a great influence on the con- 
duct of life? and like archers, shall we not be more likely to 
attain that which is right, if we have a mark ? " 

" Since all knowledge and every act of deliberate preference 
aims at some good, let us show what that is. As to its name, 
indeed almost all men are agreed ; for both the vulgar and the 
educated call it happiness : but they suppose that to live well 
and do well are synonymous with being happy." — Ibid. pp. 
1, 3, 5. 

" Morality, the quality of virtue or guilt, of praise or blame, 
pertains [^only to the actions of intelligent and rational beings, 
and [_onlg to the voluntary actions of such beings." " A moral 
act is always, I suppose, a voluntary act." — Prof. Haven's 
Moral Philos. pp. 59, 60. 

The above extracts from Aristotle show that Prof. Haven is 
right in saying, that "to make virtue a merely intellectual 
affair, overlooks, according to Aristotle, an essential element of 
oar nature, — i. e. the moral element, the natural instinct of the 
soul, which demands and strives for the good, and which ap- 
proves and is satisfied only with that which is right in human con- 
ducl; and endeavor. Virtue, then, is not so much a thing to be 



Skct.V.] ANTI-UTILITAKIAN THEORIES. 445 

learned, as a thing to be done or practised, in the following out 
of this natural craving and instinct of the soul." " Nature lays 
the foundation [of moral obhgation] in so constituting the mind 
that it craves and approves the good ; reason and intelligence 
build on this foundation. . . . Our good and evil dispositions 
are originally in our own power. . . . The highest good, the 
chief end and motive of human endeavor, Aristotle concedes 
to be happiness in some form." — Ibid. 73, 74. 

■From this last cited statement of Prof. Haven concerning 
the doctrine of Aristotle, and according to the above quotations 
from the Stagirite himself, it is evident that both the doctrine 
of Aristotle and the teaching of Prof. Haven himself in the 
above statements, imply that happiness is the ultimate end of 
virtuous action, in other words that happiness is the ultimate 
good sought in right moral action, and that the constitutional 
craving or desire of the happiness to be found in right action, 
is the primary subjective motive to virtue, and an essential part 
of the ground of moral obligation. And further, that the 
ground of moral obligation consists also in the intrinsic value 
of that happiness which is the ultimate good, — the last object 
sought in and by holiness, and in the moral powers of moral 
agents, by which they are rendered susceptible to the influence 
of that object, and so rendered able to secure and promote it. 

That this doctrine so clearly and manifestly implied in the 
teaching of Aristotle and of Prof Haven, and withal so clearly 
true, should be so little understood and so poorly appreciated 
in the last half of the nineteenth century, seems to be a just 
occasion of astonishment. We are ready to ask, how can this 
be accounted for, except that there is either some prejudice or 
some love of darkness rather than light, yet remaining in the 
world ? 

Prof. Haven regards " the eternal nature of things as the 
ground of rights After having endeavored (in plain contra- 
vention to his own teaching as shown above) to produce the 
most conclusive arguments against the doctrine that virtue is 
founded in utiUty, he says : " We seem to be driven, then, to the 
only remaining conclusion, that right a?id ivrong are distinctions 
38 



446 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

immutable and inherent in the nature of things." — Moral Phil, 
p. 46. 

To us these statements seem rather indefinite, and yet at the 
same time to be susceptible of a meaning exactly true, and in 
agreement with the doctrine of benevolent utility, the very doc- 
trine they were intended to refute. Let us, then, understand 
definitely what the things are, the eternal nature of which con- 
stitutes the ground of obligation. 

The only sense which accords with truth, that we can per- 
ceive in the proposition, " that right and wrong are distinctions 
immutable and inherent in the nature of things," implies that 
obligation, in its own eternal, independent, and immutable nature 
is founded in the nature of moral beings, and in their relations to 
the happiness of all sentient beings, which is in their power to 
promote (for what other things than these can constitute the 
ground of obligation?), since this promotion of happiness com- 
prehends all the duty which God requires, or which is possible 
to conceive of. This is the doctrine of benevolent utility or 
benevolent rectitude. 

Now let us not be deceived by regarding the sound of words 
rather than their sense. Is it not true that the eternal nature 
of moral obligation is such, that whenever rational beings exist 
having the requisite powers to promote happiness, these powers, 
in their relation to the intrinsic value of the happiness M^hich 
they can promote, constitute the foundation of the obligation of 
these beings to do good in the kingdom of God ? 

Now this seems to us to be the only true sense of the state- 
ments we are considering, and to comprehend all the good sense 
to be found in them. 

As we understand the matter, Emmanuel Kant held the theory 
of independent rightarian morality. In his Critique of Practi- 
cal Reason, he endeavored to separate and clear our moral 
judgments from any discerned relation to happiness or well- 
being. His maxim was, do right for the sake of the right — 
which, as a practical rule, is useful, and easily understood, but 
when exalted to a speculative criterion of moral action, involves 
the philosopher in self-contradiction. If we mistake not, it cer- 



Sect, v.] ANTI-UTILIT AEI AN THE OKIE S. 447 

tainly did so involve the German sage. For in deducing and 
dejfining his general rule for moral action, he was compelled to 
consider its relations to the well-being of man, as the criterion 
of its fitness to be a general rule. Moreover, in his moral ar- 
gument for the being of God, he was forced to find it in the 
necessity for the moral order of the universe, in other words, 
for a state of things in which the virtuous are made happy, and 
the vicious miserable. 

It is now acknowledged, by the ablest German critics, that in 
these reasonings he came back again to the very ground of the 
relation of actions to happiness, which it was the object and 
boast of his system to escape. 

We do not blame this philosopher for thus coming back to the 
ground which he had tried to escape, because he was compelled 
by the well nigh, if not quite, irresistible demands of common 
sense to do so. And so it ever must be, when men undertake 
to run away from common sense in their reasonings upon inde- 
pendent, anti-utilitarian, or rightarian morality. Common sense 
will be their master at last. 

So it has been with our American anti-utilitarian philoso- 
phers and preachers. All who set up the claim that right is 
the ultimate end, and is independent of consequences aimed at, 
— consequences ultimating in happiness, when they come to 
treat upon practical morals, have been obliged to reason upon 
the ground, which, in their theories, they have repudiated. I 
do not know of one exception, and I never expect to know of 
one ; for the simple reason, that common sense will not allow it. 
It is impossible. We believe that in the formation of practical 
rules of morality, it is as impossible to keep consistent with the 
error of the independent, rightarian morality, as it is to act con- 
sistently with the error, that there is no material world, except 
in ideas. 

Now why should young America attempt the vain task, the 
more than herculean labor of inculcating, sustaining, and estab- 
lishing, the repudiated errors of old Germany ? Why should 
this be, but that ' we Americans are ever ready to dress our- 
selves in the cast-off clothes of other nations, without knowing 



448 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

exactly what they taught, or whether their reasonings have 
stood the test of criticism ? ' 

The errors of the Kantian theory of morals, have been 
spread far and wide by Coleridge, Cousin, and their followers 
in France, England, and in this country. One of the last, but 
by no means the least of the followers of Kant, has recently 
appeared in this country as the authoress of a learned work, 
entitled Intuitive Morals, and is no less involved in self-contra- 
diction than her illustrious predecessors. 

SECTION VI. 

INTUITIVE MORALS. 

An anonymous Essay on Intuitive Morals, was published in 
London in 1855, and republished in this country in 1859, said 
to have been written by a lady. In our judgment, this essay 
exhibits as much ability, learning, and excellence of style, as 
any thing we have seen in support of similar sentiments, not ex- 
cepting the writings of Theodore Parker himself. This writer 
thus acknowledges her obligations to Mr. Parker : '• The au- 
thor's obligations to the writings of this great and brave man, will 
be visible everywhere to those acquainted with them." 

In this treatise, some fine things, excellent, true, and right, 
are said. It professedly " teaches, 1st. What is the Moral 
Law. 2d. Where it is to be found. 3d. That it can be 
obeyed. 4th. Why it is to be obeyed." — p. xvi. To the teach- 
ings of this essay, we have four objections. 1st. It is self-contra- 
dictory, as well as contradictory to reason and common sense. 2d. 
It is anti-scriptural. 3d. It contravenes the established facts of 
psychology. 4th. It is based in a false psychology. 

In establishing these objections, some things advanced in sup- 
port of one of these objections, may be seen to be valid in sup- 
port of some of the others. 

In setting forth and confirming our Ohj. I. viz., that the 
teaching of the intuitive morals is self-contradictory, as well as 
contradictory to reason and common sense, we have four ques- 
tions to consider. 



Sect. VI.] ANT I-U T I LI T AKI AN THEOKIES. 449 

First question. What are some of the most important and 
fundamental principles laid down in this essay, to which we can 
give our full assent ? Ans. 1. " The moral character of good 
and evil, is a real, universal, and eternal distinction, existing 
through all worlds, and forever, wherever there are rational free 
agents." — p. 4. 

2. " The moral law is the resumption of the eternal necessa- 
ry obligation of all rational free agents to do . . . those actions 
which are right." — p. 62. But this amounts only to the self- 
evident truism or identical proposition, that moral law, obliga- 
tion, duty, requires right actions, without expressing any inti- 
mation what actions are right, which is only saying that right, 
duty, obligation, moral law, terms signifying the same thing, re- 
quires a certain kind of actions, called right. Right requires right. 

3. " The [first] truths of morals are necessary truths. The 
origin of our knowledge of them is intuitive, and their proper 
treatment is deductive" to some extent. — p. 112. "Intuition 
will teach me that I must [ought to] love my neighbor." — p. 116. 
" We need not doubt that benevolence is right." — p. 77. " The 
[fundamental principles of] moral law [are] found in the intui- 
tions of the human mind." — p. 136. 

4. "Moral law can be obeyed." 

5. "I have spoken of the obligation of man to obey the 
eternal right, considering such obligation as it is truly 
founded, simply on the nature of moral actions and moral agents. 
I have affirmed such obligation as the fundamental postulate of 
sound ethics, a necessary truth given in the nature of man, and 
incapable of demonstration as the axioms of geometry." — p. 14. 

6. " The bounds to which this power of causation belonging 
to me extend, are the bounds of my responsibility." — p. 156. 
" Duty . . . always requires of us to do our very uttermost for 
the [^benefit of our neighbor and the perfection of our own 
souls." — p. 180. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." — 
p. 92. "In all . . . cases the bounds of our freedom are those 
of our responsibility." — p. 214. 

Add to the idea of benefiting our neighbor that of benefiting 
all sentient beings to the extent of our ability, and then these 
38* 



450 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

fundamental principles carried out to their legitimate results, 
we believe would constitute a complete theory of morals, and a 
full support of the doctrine of benevolent rectitude. 

Our second question concerning the "Intuitive Morals" is, 
What positions and assumptions are taken in it from which we 
must dissent, as subversive of the above principles and of the 
true theory of morals ? 

1. "I have sought (and this has been my chief aim) to place 
for the first time, as the foundation of ethics, the great but 
neglected truth that the end of creation is not the happiness, 
but the virtue of rational souls." — p. viii. 

2. " That law is a bare obligation . . . standing out all the 
more grandly in its naked dignity when divested of extraneous 
authority, of a protective system of rewards and punishments, 
or of any end of utility whatever." — p. 10. 

" Virtue as truly defined is perfectly [antithetic to happiness. 
The sacrifice which the virtuous man makes of his gratification 
to the law is wholly unconditional on a future increase of hap- 
piness to be gained thereby. His surrender is complete, and 
grounded solely on the right of the law so to command him. 
If he be tempted to act from desire of future happiness, his 
action ceases to be virtuous ; if he act without any prospect or 
chance of future happiness, his action becomes more and more 
virtuous as such happiness recedes from his prospects." — pp. 
38, 39. 

" God . . . made us for that only end for which he could 
work, — immortal righteousness." — p. 169. 

" The motive, therefore, which, if we are to be virtuous, must 
be the determining one of our moral freedom, cannot be at all 
in the direction of happiness." — p. 190. Of virtue this ac- 
complished writer says, "I affirm that its essence lies in the 
renunciation of happiness." — p. 246. 

These two sets of statements seem to us to be mutually and 
utterly subversive of each other. If the first statements, those 
to which we assent, are true, they overthrow and utterly de- 
molish those statements cited in answer to our second ques- 
tion. If virtuous action can have no " end of utility," if it 



Sect. VI.] ANTI-UTILI T AEI AN THEORIES. 451 

" cannot lie at all in the direction of happiness," if the essence 
of virtue lies in the renunciation of happiness, then virtue is an 
absolute impossibility, as we claim to have fully proved in the 
previous discussion ; and then, too, if a man is morally bound 
utterly to renounce his own happiness ; to love his neighbor as 
he does himself, would be not to love him at all ; and then, 
moreover, there could be no motive nor obligation to exercise 
benevolence, because the end aimed at in benevolence is happi- 
ness, or, as this writer says above, " duty requires us to do the 
uttermost for the benefit of our neighbor." In confirmation of 
these positions, 

Our third question is. What are some of the numerous state- 
ments which our lady author has made (for we must not spoil 
the argument for the sake of the ladyship), inconsistent and 
contradictory to the main point, which it was the object of her 
book to establish, viz. that happiness is not at all the idtimate 
subjective end of virtue, nor the desire of happiness the subjec- 
tive motive to virtue ? 

1. " Happiness, properly speaking, is the gratification of all 
the desires of our compound nature, and [moral, intellectual, 
affectional, and sensual pleasures are all to be considered as 
integers, whose sum, when complete, would constitute perfect 
happiness." — p. 218. Qualify this statement by the fact that 
happiness, as near perfect as is attainable, consists in the gratifi- 
cation of those desires only which are consistent with our 
highest attainable happiness, and then we think it would be 
true. If so, then it follows that happiness must be the ultimate 
gratification of the desire of right, and therefore it is proved 
that the ultimate subjective object and end of the desire or sense 
of right, or of the fulfilment of obhgation, is and must be happi- 
ness. 

To the same purpose we quote again : 2. " This power of 
the reason to attach an [interest of its own to the performance 
of its behests, was undoubtedly necessary for beings like our- 
selves, afiected by sensitive excitements totally different in kind 
from the causal laws of reason. This is the internal (as all 
nature is the external) system of rewards and punishments 



452 APPENDIX. [NoteE. 

wherewith our Father guides his children towards the \hlessed 
end of their creation, and upholds the justitia rectoria of the 
universe. Unconsciously this sense of pleasure in a virtuous 
act, the thought of the peace of conscience which will follow it, 
or the dread of remorse for its neglect, [must mingle with our 
motives." — p. 225. 

Now this interest attached to right-doing, this blessed end, and 
this thought of the peace of conscience, which must mingle with 
our motives, include the very thing, to separate which from all 
its relations to right action as any part of the motive for its 
performance, appears to have been the chief design of the 
Essay. And thus that design is most thoroughly thwarted. 

3. Again : " Let the [benefactor] have so managed his 
charity that [the beneficiary] has no knowledge of his bene- 
factor, and let him be entirely free from all thought of buying 
the rewards of heaven. What will he now feel ? He receives 
no gratitude ; he entertains no new hope ; but his inmost soul 
\_glows with the consciousness that he has done right for the 
right's own sake ; he feels a throb of joy, not having its origin 
in any gratified desire, but swelling up from the very depths of 
his being, where dwells the true self of self, whose law he has 
obeyed. His moral sense enjoys its highest gratification" — p. 229. 

To our mind this also is relinquishing the foundation of the 
whole theory. 

" For the right's own sake." What else can " doing right for 
right's own sake " mean but doing it for the sake of the interest 
consciously felt in doing right, or the interest felt, and con- 
sciously felt, in the blessed results of doing right, or for the 
sake of gratifying the desires of the mind for right doing, and 
its desires for the blessed results of that doing, in the promo- 
tion of well-being ? Surely nothing else. 

Our fourth question on this Essay is, What has its author said 
which shows that happiness is and must be the objective end, as 
well as the subjective end, in virtuous action ? 

1. The quotation just made from p. 229. 2. On the eighth 
page of her preface she speaks of " the most blessed end which 
infinite love could desire." If there is any sense or force in 



Sect. VI.] ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 453 

terms, wfiat can the blessedness of any end be, aside from hap- 
piness ? And would not a universe of perfect holiness and hap- 
piness, from the beginning onward to eternity, be a more blessed 
object gained, than a universe without happiness, so marred by 
sin as the present is ? 

3. " In morals, intuition will teach me that I must love my 
neighbor, and reflection will thence deduce that I am bound to 
relieve the wants of the poor to the best of my ability." . . . 
"Experience must teach me which way will most effectually 
benefit him, and then intuition will teach me that whichever 
[way] does so, it is my duty to pursue." — p. 1 1 6. In such a 
case, my neighbor's happiness is the object of my virtue. It 
were easy to multiply passages of this sort to a great extent. 
But it is needless. One more must suffice. 

4. She speaks of " a life of religion, in which the \_delight of 
God's presence, the reverence for his moral attributes, the [^de- 
sire to obey his will, and the consciousness of his everlasting 
love had grown continually clearer and stronger, and of which 
prayer, deepest and intensest, had been the very heart and 
nucleus, till we had found God drawing ever nearer to us as we 
draw near to him, and vouchsafing to us that communion whose 
[bliss no human speech may ever tell." — p. 277. 

Take out of this sublime passage the desire and the motives 
of happiness, of unutterable bliss, both subjective and objective, 
and its beauty, force, and meaning are all gone. Thus we see 
that this writer's own statements imply that happiness must be 
both the subjective and objective end of virtue. 

5. To cap the climax of absurdity and contradiction, we cite 
two passages of a different character : " As we are not to be 
moral for the sake of any end, neither are we to be religious 
for any reward." — p. 199. 

The Essay closes with this question : '• Shall I be good and 
do good because it is right ? " i. e. Shall I be disposed to do 
good and do it, and not feel any possible or conceivable iiiterest 
in being good or doing good, or in the good accomplished ? We 
are obliged to understand this question in this sense by the 
main drift of the Essay. Now, according to this, I must do 



454 APPENDIX. Note E. 

good to my neighbor In a state of entire indifference to his 
good ; I must not even desire it. I must act for his good with- 
out having that good for the objective end of my action ; in- 
deed, I must act for his good, without having any end to aim 
at, because I am not to he moral for the sake of any end, 

John Young, LL. D., of Edinburgh, on the 193d page of a 
work of his entitled " The Mystery," says : " With all possible 
emphasis, therefore, we repeat, that in the noblest sphere of 
activity, to have no end is higher than to have the highest end. 
The moral which finds its reason in itself is far above the 
merely intellectual, which contemplates ends and calculates con- 
sequences." This corresponds with the statement of our au- 
thoress, that " we are not to be moral for the sake of any end." 
A voluntary action that must be performed without an end, 
either objective or subjective, must also be performed without a 
subjective motive. We leave it to the reader to judge, whether 
such an action ever was, or ever can be, performed by any 
rational being whatever. A theory which legitimately and by 
necessity leads to such absurd results, as we think the theory of 
the Intuitive Morals does inevitably, must itself have its basis in 
essential error. 

Therefore, these results, taken together with the answers to 
the above four questions, prove that the theory set forth in this 
Essay is self-contradictory and in opposition to reason and com- 
mon sense. 

Ohj. II. The theory of the Essay is anti-scriptural. (See 
q. 273-4.) Inasmuch as this theory throughout implies that de- 
sire of happiness and dread of misery, or hope of reward and 
fear of punishment, as motives, vitiate the action of which they 
are the motives, it is anti-scriptural, because the Scriptures 
very often set forth these motives in powerful array, and oftener 
still allude to them, in their appeals to men to secure their vir- 
tue. The dogma, " that the end of creation is not the happi- 
ness, but the virtue of rational souls," which our authoress says 
it has been her chief aim to place for the first time as the 
foundation of ethics, is in direct opposition to Rev. 4: 11 : "O 
Lord, thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they 



Sect.yl] anti-utilttarian theories. 455 

exist and were created." According to this, the 'pleasure of 
God himself is the ultimate subjective end of creation. 

Ohj. III. To make virtue, and not happiness, the ultimate 
end of virtue, is to make it end in the absurdity of an endless 
series, which is to make it end nowhere, or to make the highest 
virtue acting without an end, as our authoress affirms it is. And 
thus this theory contravenes the established facts o^ psychology. 

This dogma, which this writer attempts to place, for the first 
time, as she thinks, as the foundation of ethics, is directly con- 
tradicted by her own assertion, that " benevolence requires that 
happiness should be bestowed upon every sentient being." — 
p. 253. Again she speaks (in contradiction to her fundamental 
dogma) of that "almighty, changeless will which has decreed 
the holiness and happiness of every spirit he hath made." — 
p. 278. Since happiness is the result of holiness, if God has 
decreed both the holiness and happiness of his creatures, not 
their holiness, but their happiness, is the ultimate end of the 
decree. But where the evidence of such a decree is to be 
found, we do not know. We think the Bible most plainly 
teaches a contrary doctrine. Most surely, no such decree has 
ever yet been fulfilled. As we understand, the teachings of 
reason and the Holy Scriptures, neither reveal any such de- 
cree, but, taken together, they prove that there is and can be 
no such decree. The supposition, that God could decree and 
secure the universal and perpetual holiness and happiness of 
all rational spirits for this life and that which is to come, once 
established as truth, since he has executed no such decree, 
would furnish an argument against the benevolence of God 
which has never yet been answered, and, as we believe, never 
can be. But the possibility of such a decree, or its execution, 
as that supposed by our authoress, can no more easily be proved 
than the one just alluded to. 

Ohj, IV. Another fundamental objection we have to offer 
against this theory, and which we believe to be good against 
most of the false theories in morals, is, that it is founded in a 
false psychology, as well as self-contradictory. If this is a 
well-grounded belief, it shows the immense importance of study- 



456 APPENDIX. [NotbE. 

ing, so as to understand a correct psychology. Now for the 
proof of this. 

1. This writer has truly said: "In all . . . cases, the bounds 
of our freedom are those of our responsibility." — p. 214. But 
amidst so many and plainly contradictory statements, it is very 
difficult, in some cases, to determine either what she really be- 
lieved or meant on the whole. She speaks of " the free man, 
[who] therefore . . . is, as such, purely moral." — p. 142. 

2. She says : " Moral evil, then, philosophically considered, 
is simply the weakness, the non-exertion, of the homonoume- 
non. It is not a positive thing at all. It is not a choice of vice 
by the higher self, for that self can, by the very necessity of its 
nature, legislate only the universal moral law. It is not a 
choice of vice by the lower self, for that self is by its nature 
un-moral, un-free, and incapable of determining its choice with 
any reference to moral distinctions ; but solely according to its 
instincts and other solicitations." — p. 146. 

3. " Of the twofold condition of man we now perceive the 
consequence. In the sensible world, and so far as he is sub- 
jected to its mechanic laws, he is a slave, a mere machine, 
acted on by instincts within and sensations from without, im- 
pinging on his sensory. In the supersensible, he is free, not 
governed by mechanic, but by moral laws, of which he is to 
himself the lawgiver." — p. 143. 

4. "Again. I have already referred to the distinction be- 
tween that realm of noumena in which we are free causes, and 
that world of phenomena in which we are locked up in neces- 
sity. So far as our desires are concerned, they are the result 
of our original nature, modified by those circumstances of our 
past life which have passed beyond our recall. So far as the 
solicitations which the external world offers to our desires, these 
are also independent of our choice. If, then, we merely follow 
our desires to their gratification, where is our freedom ? It 
may be said that we exercise freedom in prudently postponing 
present to future enjoyment. But this is fallacious, and no 
more true freedom than that of the spider M^aiting till its prey 
is fairly entrapped. I wish not only for happiness, but for as 



Sect. VI.] ANT I- UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 457 

much happiness as I can get. That is a part of my instinctive 
nature not dependent on my will. If prudence, then, teach me 
that to obtain the greater happiness I must postpone the lesser, 
my determination to do so is decided by the same necessity 
which would have urged me to snatch at the first gratification 
offered." — pp. 188, 189. 

From these positions, if true, it would follow : 

(1.) If sin be nothing positive, if it be not choice by the 
higher self, nor by the lower self, then it is not voluntary trans- 
gression of law, and then it is nothing in any sense. 

(2.) If men's actions in the sphere of the supersensible are 
free in only one direction, called right, there is in that region or 
sphere no moral freedom at all. 

(3.) If, in the sphere of the sensible, men are slaves, and if, 
so far as influenced by their desires, their actions are necessita- 
ted, since their desires constitute all possible subjective motives, 
then there is in this sphere also no such thing as moral freedom. 
at all, and therefore, no moral obligation, and on this ground the 
notion of intuitive morals would be a mere hallucination, and 
then to limit our responsibility by the bounds of our freedom 
would be to annihilate it. 

A mental philosophy which leads to these results must be 
false. 

A true psychology denies every one of the above positions 
and afiirms that sin is as positive a thing as holiness is ; — it is 
a choice made by a moral agent in the free exercise of his moral 
powers, in transgression of law ; — in every sphere of moral 
action, in the sphere of the supersensible (if there be any such 
sphere), as well as in the sensible, and in all action influenced 
by desire, men are free to fulfil or violate their obligations. 

Some minds of a certain class inclined to transcendentalism, 
may be led away by the eloquence, and the sophistic views and 
reasonings of the Intuitive Morcds, but notwithstanding this, the 
Essay wall probably result in the promotion of ethical knowledge. 
It carries out the anti-utilitarian theory so thoroughly to its 
necessary results in requiring moral action more disinterested, 
or rather more wwinterested, than the teaching of Jesus Christ 
39 



458 APPENDIX. [NotkF. 

requires, that it will have a strong tendency to open men's eyes 
to the unsoundness of principles in which this and all anti-utili- 
tarian theories are founded, as well as the unsoundness of the 
results in which this theory terminates. A good use may and 
probably will be made of this book to show the errors of the 
false theories, and the truth of the right theory of morality. 
The utilitarian and anti-utilitarian theories are in fatal antago- 
nism. If either is true the other is not. 

The comprehensive objection, to all moral theories which 
deny that utility is an element, essential to the foundation of ob- 
ligation, is, that according to every one of them there is no foun- 
dation for obligation, and of course no obligation can exist, be- 
cause no duty is possible on the ground of any one of them. 
Therefore, as w^e have said before, the true battle-ground on 
which the contest is to be decided, lies in the field of Mental 
Philosophy, and in the meaning of the Word of God. 



[Referred to p. 187.] 

STRICTURES ON BR. IIARVEY'S LETTERS TO DR. TYLER, RE- 
FERRED TO P. 162. 

Tn opposition to the maxim that "ability is commensurate 
(vith obligation," Dr. Joseph Harvey, the compiler of the creed 
of the theological school in East Windsor, in a letter * to Dr. 
Tyler, the President and Theological Professor in that institu- 
tion, incurred the responsibility of making the following state- 
ments : " Impenitent sinners . . . have no power to do what 
God requires" — that " God does require of all men what some 
men having unwilling minds have no power to perform." 

* This letter was written to oppose a sermon by Dr. Tyler, the doctrine 
of which was, " God does not require of men more than tliey have power 
to perform." 



NoteF.] ANTI-UTILIT aeian theoeies. 459 

In support of these views aiid in opposition to tlie above 
fundamental maxim, Dr. Harvey used substantially the follow- 
in o^ statements and arguments, althousfh not in the same order. 
In these statements about to be quoted, if we can understand 
them, the terms ' right heart,' ' right disposition,' ' right affection,' 
are used as substantially synonymous with holy love. ' The na- 
ture of the requirement is such that sinners cannot do what God 
requires with no right heart, that is wdth no love at all.' '' The 
law demands the heart or its affections." "If sinners can do 
all that God requires, with a perverse or rebellious heart, then 
why does the law require the affections of the heart as the first 
thing." •• Inability consists in the want of a right disposition, 
or in the exercise of a wrong." " How is it true . . . that 
men can love God w'ith no right affection at all, or even with 
hearts of enmity." " As the heart is the seat of the affections, 
it would seem to be the only power which is able to love." 
" AbiHty is founded on disposition." So that according to this 
no man has ability to do any duty wdiich he has no right dispo- 
sition to do, or which he is unwilling to do. 

' Both \_ahility and inahility to do either right or wrong de- 
pend upon the state or disposition of the heart.' Mark this. 
Ability and inability to perform moral acts of any kind consist 
in the state of the heart, that is, if the heart is in a right state, 
there is abihty to perform right acts, if in a sinful state there 
is ability to perform sinful acts. Now according to this a right 
state of heart or holiness constitutes ability for holiness, and 
a sinful state of heart or sin constitutes ability to sin. And 
ability to do eltlier right or wrong constitutes inability to per- 
form the opposite kind of moral acts. These positions invohe 
the absurdity that hohness already possessed is the only ability 
a man can have for hohness, and sin the only ability he can 
have for sin, thus implying that a moral being can have no 
power to become a sinner before he is a sinner, and no power 
to become holy before he is holy, — no power to perform a holy 
or a sinful act before he performs such act, implying also that 
the first holy or sinful act is performed without the power of 
performing it. All which is contradicted by facts. 



460 APPENDIX. [NoteF. 

" Ability to perform moral duty depends on the disposition, 
for the plain reason that moral duties require the affections of 
the heart, which spring from the disposition." So that ' no man 
can have adequate power to do that duty which he has no incli- 
nation, desire, motive, nor disposition to do.' ' To suppose that 
holy duties can be performed with an unholy heart, is quite 
absurd ' [and therefore we say this supposition involves an im- 
possibility]. 

" Has the sinner, being a moral agent and acting freely ; has 
the sinner, being a sinner, a voluntary enemy to God, and im- 
penitent in that enmity, at the same time power to love God 
and do all that he requires ? In other words, can a man [su- 
premely] hate and [supremely] love the same object ; obey and 
disobey the same law at the same time ? " A denial in the 
form of a question, — the supposition denied involves the 
absurdity and impossibility that a man can serve two masters — 
that he can both do certain things and not do them at the same 
time. That he can both love and not love at the same time. Or 
that he can do two opposite and contradictory things at once. 
Now what does all this arguing amount to, but that impenitent 
sinners, whose hearts are not right in the sight of God, have no 
such desires, motives, inclination, or disposition as constitute a 
right state of heart or holiness, and therefore that it is impossi- 
ble that they should be in possession of power to do what God 
requires, that is, that since their hearts are unholy they have 
no power to become holy and do right or holy deeds. 

The question now is. How far do these statements and argu- 
ments militate against the doctrine that men have the power of 
contrary choice, and, of course, power to do their duty, — or 
that ability is commensurate with obligation ? 

We admit as self-evident truth, that no man can do opposite 
and contradictory things both at once. No man can do certain 
things and not do them at the same time. No man can love 
God and not love him at one and the same time. This truth is 
implied in some of the above cited statements. But these state- 
ments do not make it appear that a man may not have power 
to love God and keep his commandments without using that 



Notef.] ant I- utilitarian theories. 46J 

power in love and obedience. To suppose that one has power 
to love and hate supremely the same object at the same time, 
that is, that he can do both at once, is an absurdity. But that 
while he is doing one, he has power to do the other, instead of 
that which he is doing, is not an absurdity, but an important 
truth, essential to moral responsibility. That a man cannot use 
the power which he has to love God, in loving him supremely 
and in hating him supremely at one and the same time, does 
not imply that the power which he now uses in hating, might 
not, instead thereof, be used in love and obedience. A man at 
a given time may have power to do right, and at the same time 
have power to do wrong and actually use it in doing wrong, at 
that same time in which he might use it in doing right. Indeed it 
involves an absurdity to suppose that any being should have j^ower 
to do either right or wrong, without at the same time having 
power to do the opposite of that which he actually performs. 

They who hate may cease to hate and begin to love with the 
powers they now have, without any new powers, or any change 
in the powers they now have, except that they are used for a 
different purpose. Multitudes have done this. Men, who are 
now holy, but were once sinners and impenitent in their sins, 
have done this. They began to love with the same power with 
which they before had hated. They who love God and obey 
him, may, without any new powers, or any loss or change of 
powers, cease to obey and begin to disobey. Our first parents 
and the fallen angels did this. They sinned with the same 
power with which they had obeyed. 

If the sinner is a voluntary, free moral agent, as he must be, 
or he could not be a sinner, then he has all the -power which is 
essential to constitute him a moral agent (q. 13), all that is 
essential to free agency, and of course all that power which 
is essential, and is prerequisite both to the performance of duty, 
as well as to the commission of sin. 

That he is voluntary in his enmity, implies that he has power 
to avoid it. A man cannot be voluntary in that which he has 
no power to avoid. There can be no choice nor voluntariness in 
regard to that about which only one way is possible. 
39* 



462 A r P E N D 1 X . [ MoTK F . 

The fallacy of the above reasoning of this writer, lies in as- 
suming that the sinner does not, and cannot have any desire, 
inclination, or motive to do his duty, and that his ability for 
moral action consists only in his sinful disposition, which disposi- 
tion, it is claimed, consists only of sinful desires and inclinations, 
and thus is " sin itself in its most aggravated and malignant 
form." Now if this be so, then all sin must be preceded by that 
which is sin. 

If no future sin can ever be committed, until a previous sin 
shall take place, which is to constitute the ability to commit it, 
then there will never be another sin, nor another sinner. Just 
so in regard to holiness ; if there shall never be another holy 
act performed until a previous holy disposition comes to pass, 
consisting of holy love and which is to constitute the ability or 
power to love and obey God, then not another holy act nor holy 
agent will ever come into being. In other words, if a right 
heart or holy love be the only adequate power to love or obey 
God, then there will never be another holy heart, until there 
shall first be a holy heart to constitute the power to have a holy 
heart, and then absolute inability to have a holy heart is inevi- 
tably to reign forever over all who are now sinners, and over all 
creatures who shall hereafter come into being. 

Again ; if it be now true that there is no power adequate 
to perform holy love, but that which consists in a right heart, or 
which is the same thing, holy love, then it has been true in all 
past time. And then there never was any holiness, except 
when there was previous holy love, to constitute the power of 
putting it forth. Which time never was. Holy love never 
existed before the first holy love, to constitute the power of ex- 
ercising that love. The same inference also would follow in 
regard to sin. There never was a sin before the first sin to 
constitute the power of committing it. 

The same reasoning which is employed to prove that sinners 
have no power to become holy, is just as good to prove that holy 
beings have never had power to become sinful, which is contra- 
dicted by facts. 

The same fallacy is involved in assuming that ability to per- 



NoteF.J ANTI-UTILITARIAN THEORIES. 463 

form duty depends on a holy disposition, or a holy state of the 
heart. To assume that all ability to sin should be founded upon 
sin, is very manifestly a complete absurdity, as well as an im- 
possibility. It is an assumption which confounds the distinction 
between motives to sin and sin itself, between involuntary feel- 
ings and voluntary acts, between states of the sensibihty and 
acts of the will. The supposition implies that sin must exist 
and come to pass, before there is any ability or power to sin. 
If it should be said that the disposition, on which ability to sin 
depends, is native, inherited, or it belongs to the constitution of 
the soul, then that disposition is necessitated by natural, unavoid- 
able necessity, and therefore cannot be sin. And then, on 
this ground, all sin would be an impossibility. All which is 
absurd. 

Again ; if all ability for holiness depends upon a holy dispo- 
sition, which is itself holiness, then as we have before seen, 
duty must be performed before there is or can be any power to 
perform it. And then all holiness is an impossibility. This 
same writer has said, " obligation is founded on moral agency." 

Reply first. Now by the sinner's moral agency must be 
meant, either his sin, or the powers by which he is constituted 
a moral agent, and by which he commits sin. The first of these 
senses is the legitimate and proper meaning of the terms, the 
sinner's moral agency, viz. his sin. If in this sense of the sin- 
ner's moral agency, his obligation is founded upon it, then sin is 
the foundation of his obligation not to commit sin, and to obey 
God. And the very essence of the sin, which constitutes this 
foundation of obligation to obedience, is that sinful disposition 
which constitutes his absolute inability to obey. And if all this 
were true, then just so long as this foundation of the sinner's 
obligation continues, if that should be forever, this very foun- 
dation of obligation will make it necessary, by the most absolute 
necessity conceivable, that his obligation should be forever 
violated. A strange foundation this of moral obligation ! Here, 
then, we again have the monstrous absurdity of necessitated sin 
— and sin, too, necessitated by the very foundation of the sin- 
ner's obligation. Our staunch defender of ultra orthodoxy in 



464 APPENDIX. [NoikF. 

another place has rightly said, " Where there is no obligation, 
there can be no violation of it, and therefore no sin." 

Second reply. Since moral agency consists in the moral 
actions of moral agents, and must be either holy or sinful, either 
the fulfilment or violation of moral obligation, moral agency im- 
plies that ability which is prerequisite to moral agency, there- 
fore if obligation is in any sense founded on moral agency, it 
must be because it is founded on the powers prerequisite to 
moral agency, and implied in that agency. But suppose it 
should be said, that we have not taken the terms moral agency, 
in the sense intended by the writer. It seems difficult to con- 
ceive of any other sense except the one above noticed, viz. 
those powers which constitute the ability prerequisite to the 
performance of both sinful and holy acts, and to the formation 
of either a holy or a sinful character. Indeed, this writer has 
elsewhere explained the terms moral agency by the terms nat- 
ural power. So that there seems to be no possible, rational 
sense, in which obligation is founded on moral agency, except 
that it is founded on the powers which are prerequisite to moral 
agency, powers adequate to the performance of duty. Power 
not adequate to duty is not a foundation of obligation. Adhering 
to the above position of our author would be giving up the no- 
tion that obligation ever transcends ability, and adopting the op- 
posite truth, that ability is commensurate with obligation. 

Again ; our author has said, in his controversy with Dr. 
Tyler, " The maxim that obligation and ability are, and must 
be, commensurate in moral relations, is subversive of all sound 
doctrine, as well as repugnant to common sense." 

Reply. Then all the world is, and ever has been, destitute 
of common sense ; and he who regards obligation as founded 
upon moral agency, so far as he does this in any rational sense, 
is in the same predicament. The meaning of this maxim, so 
thoroughly repudiated by this writer, is simply this, what ought 
to be done, can be done. Obligation rests on ability adequate 
to fulfil it. Where this ability is wanting, no foundation can be 
found for any obligation whatever. Nothing can be the present 
duty of any being, which transcends his present power to obey. 



Notef.] anti-utilitarian theories. 465 

Again ; in support of the dogma of ahsolute inability, our 
autlior has said : " Disposition, or state of heart, enters largely 
into ability to do moral acts ; " and " ability is founded on dis- 
position." From which it follows, that the sinner's state of 
heart, inchuation, desires, motives, and disposition constitute an 
absolute inability to obey God ; and yet this ' inahility is the 
sinner's crime, — the very essence of his criminality, — it is sin 
itself, in the most aggravated and mcdignant form." 

If this be so, then again we have it, that power to sin is 
founded on sin, in its most aggravated and malignant form. 
And this involves the fatal absurdity of confounding sin itself 
with the power which is prerequisite to all sin. And then the 
frst sin of a moral agent must come upon him, without his 
having any power to commit or avoid it; and then all his 
future sins also must be committed by a natural, unavoidable, 
invincible necessity. And then farewell forever to all moral 
distinctions, and with them all common sense besides. 

In further support of the dogma of inability, and in opposi- 
tion to the doctrine that men have power adequate to the per- 
formance of their duty, this writer has alleged that this latter 
doctrine tends to the following errors : — 

Error 1. The doctrine of ability consisting in power ade- 
quate to the performance of duty, must drive its advocates "to 
downright Arminianism." " There is a family likeness [using 
the argumentum ad invideam'] between the power of contrary 
choice, self-determining power, and natural ability." If by self- 
determining power be meant power to form one's own moral 
character, so as to be good or bad, by originating or performing 
moral acts (and not the power to determine choice by a pre- 
vious choice, and that by one still previous, and so on forever, 
and thus involviiig the imj)ossibility of an infinite series), then 
the power of contrary choice, the self-determining power, and 
natural ability, are one and the same power. This power is the 
glory of a moral agent when employed in serving God, and 
need not to be ashamed of itself, only when employed in the 
commission of sin. If Arminius did believe this, or any other 
truth, that is no reason why another man should 7iot. 



466 APPENDIX. [NoteF. 

Error 2. Dr. Harvey says : " If God requires nothing of 
men that they have no power to do, why should they not feel 
independent ? They are so in fact, and why shotild they not 
enjoy it ? " Answer. The doctrine that in God we live and 
move and have our being, that God creates and sustains moral 
agents, with power adequate to do what he requires, is the true 
doctrine of our dependence as creatures, and is an utter denial 
of our independence. As to our dependence as sinners, so far 
as sinners are dependent on God for the gracious influences of 
his spirit to overcome their obstinacy in sin, they originate that 
dependence themselves, by their being so persevering in their 
wickedness. Take away from them their power of obedience 
to God, and then they will have no power to persist in disohQ- 
dience. Therefore, the doctrine of adequate power is essential to 
correct views of our dependence, as sinners, on God for renew- 
ing and sanctifying grace, while it also recognizes our depend- 
ence as creatures. 

Error 3. Another alleged error, consequent upon the doc- 
trine of adequate ability, is, that " men, in their natural state, 
are prompted, by a conceit of natural ability, to regard the gov- 
ernment of God as partial and unjust." " It is a doctrine that 
exalts man against God, and strengthens in sinners a spirit of 
pride and rebellion." Answer. Just the opposite of all this is 
obviously true. If God holds men liable to an adequate pen- 
alty for not doing what he requires, justice makes it necessary 
that he should render them able, by giving to them and by up- 
holding in them power adequate to do what he continues to 
require of them, or the mind of man is incompetent to know or 
conceive what justice is. That God should not require of men 
any duty beyond their power to perform is essential to his 
justice; and when sinners see that he does not do this, they 
know that for all their pride and rebellion they have no justify- 
ing excuse, and therefore the tendency of this doctrine is to 
exalt God and abase the sinner. 

Error 4. Again, it is said : " The idea of this power will tend to 
blind [the sinner] to his guilt, to quiet his conscience, and make 
him feel that the remedy is in his own hands. ... He will be 



Notef.] anti-utilitarian theories. 467 

ready to say to himself, what do I care for the guilt, so long as 
I have power to do all that God requires ? " Answer. So far 
is this from the truth, that the doctrine of power adequate to 
the discharge of duty is absolutely essential to the foundation of 
obligation, and therefore to any just sense of guilt, and to the 
self-condemning power of conscience. This doctrine gives to 
conscience such a power to bite and sting as no other doctrine 
can. On no other ground can it be said to the sinner, " Thou 
hast destroyed thyself." As to the remedy being in their own 
hands, if men had not power adequate to do their duty, no 
duty would be binding, and so they could violate no obligation, 
and in such a case they could not sin, and therefore they could 
not need a remedy. One part of the remedy which sinners 
need is an atonement. Power to do all that God requires is 
not power to atone for sin. This God never requires. With- 
out an atonement and without repentance, the sinner must suffer 
the penalty of a violated law, which he had power to obey, and 
which he ought to have obeyed. So that if he neither cares 
for his guilt, nor repents of his transgressions, he must suffer 
the just penalty of his deeds. True, pardon is offered him; 
but he must accept, he must comply with the conditions of par- 
don by repentance and faith in Christ, or he cannot escape con- 
demnation. But how is he to do this, the very thing which 
God requires, with no power to do it ? Without the power of 
doing what God requires, no being could be a sinner to need a 
remedy from sin, nor could any such being be benefited by the 
remedy which God has provided for sinners. Therefore, the 
doctrine that God requires no more of us than he has given us 
power to perform, does not put it in the power of a sinner to 
provide any remedy for his past sins. 

Error 5. Again, it is alleged that Felix was a believer in the 
doctrine of adequate power. " He thought he had power to do 
all that God required, or he would never have lost the oppor- 
tunity which he had. And this doctrine w^as the cause of his 
eternal ruin." Answer. The logic of this is, that had Felix 
known that he had no power to do what God required, he would 
not have lost his opportunity to do what he had no power to do. 



468 APPENDIX. [ Note F. 

If he had known that he had no power to obey God, he would 
have obeyed him at that time and place, and thus escaped eter- 
nal ruin. Such reasoning will never convince the world. 

Error 6. Once more. To cap the climax of objections to the 
doctrine of adequate power, it is asked on this ground, " What 
need of Christ?" Answer. Do felons and murderers stand 
in no need of pardon, because they could have kept the laws 
which they have broken ? or do they refuse a pardon for such 
a reason ? Do sinners, who have violated the commandments 
of God in all their moral doings, stand in no need of salvation 
through Christ, because that in all the law and the prophets 
they are required to love God no more than they can, no more 
than with all their heart, and with all their soul, and with all 
their strength, and with all their mind ? If they do not, for this 
reason, need a Saviour, " then is Christ dead in vain, and our 
faith is also in vain, and the gospel is without meaning." Surely 
an objection which leads to such results is groundless. The 
doctrine that God requires of men no more than he gives them 
power to perform, is the only doctrine on which his justice in 
the sinner's condemnation can be vindicated. And this is the 
only doctrine by Avhich it can be shown that we stand in need 
of Christ, or that we can be benefited by the remedy which he 
has provided. 

Prof. Park, of the Theol. Seminary, Andover, in the Biblio- 
theca Sacra, 1851, p. 600, commenting on an article in the 
Princeton Review, says : " Let us give one illustration of the 
fact that men must often, whether they will or not, obey those 
principles of common sense by which he who inspired the Bible 
meant that we should explain it. . . . Andrew Fuller says, * I 
have proved that natural strength is the measure of men's obli- 
gation to love God,' and he often repeats, ' we are only required 
to love God with all our strength.' But our worthy reviewer 
regards this as one of the radical principles of Pelagianism, and 
remarks : ' If there is any thing of which the sinner has the 
innate conviction, it is that the heart, the affections, his inherent 
moral dispositions, are beyond his reach ; that he can no more 
change his nature than he can annihilate it.' Does tliis gentle- 



NoteF.] anti-utilitaeian theokies. 469 

man, then, who will, we trust, admit the sinner's obligation to 
be holy, agree with the advocates of ' ability commensurate with 
obligation ? ' No, not always ; not in some of his theorizings, 
not at the moment of controverting that truth. But what will 
he say as a man f Can a child be under obligation to lift a 
mountain with his unaided hand ? or to see through the globe 
with his unaided eye, or to hear the conversation of the anti- 
podes with his unaided ear? 'By no means,' our critic will 
respond, 'for the maxim that ability is commensurate with 
obligation does apply to external acts/ Very well. The first 
step is gained. Can a child be under obligation, then, to 
learn all the languages of the world in one day, or to under- 
stand all the sciences in one hour ? ' By no means,' our re- 
viewer will answer, ' that old maxim does apply to intellectual 
operations.' Very well. Then a second step is gained. Now 
for the third. You will say that ' the maxim has no more to do 
with the obligations of moral acts than the axioms of geometry 
have,' nothing at all, then, to do with moral acts ! This is 
sweeping enough. But let us see. Can a man be under moral 
obligation to love God this moment with a love infinitely more 
ardent than that of the highest angel ? Can he be under obli- 
gation to love the universe with a benevolence equal to that of 
God himself ? Can the infant of a day be under moral obliga- 
tion to exercise as much of holy feeling as is exercised by him 
who is omnipotent? Are not these moral acts? You have 
wisely conceded that a creature cannot ' be required to create a 
world, nor an idiot to reason correctly.' Why not ? Because 
in these things power must be equal to duty. But can a crea- 
ture be under obligation to annihilate the world, or to annihilate 
his own nature ? Is he able to annihilate himself ? No. And 
yet he is equally unable to make himself a new heart. Is he, 
then, required to perform this impossibility ? And if not re- 
quired to repent, does he disobey any requisition in not repent- 
ing ? Does he sin ? Now we know we shall get the right 
answer at last. We know there is a vis medicatrix curing the 
soul as well as the body of its disorders, and working itself 
through all sorts of metaphysics, and now it forces from the 
40 



470 APPENDIX. [NoteF. 

Biblical Repertory words which *end the strife.' ^ 3fan cannot 
be under obligation to do what requires powers which do not be- 
long to his nature and constitution,^ Still again it affirms : . . . 
' The unfortunate and improper use of the word " necessity " by 
Edwards and his followers, has done more to prejudice the 
minds of sensible men against his system than all other causes. 
According to the proper usage of language, hberty and necessity 
are diametrically opposite ; and to say a thing is necessary and 
at the same time free is a contradiction in terms. Certainty and 
necessity are not the same ; for though every thing necessary is 
certain, every thing certain is not necessary. Volitions in cer- 
tain given circumstances may be as certain as physical effects, 
but volitions are free in their very nature. A necessary volition 
is an absurdity, a thing inconceivable. To call this certainty a 
" moral necessity," a " philosophical necessity," will forever mis- 
lead and create confusion of ideas in the most exact thinkers.' " 

Now we may safely conclude, ' Impenitent sinners are able to 
repent, and cast away all their transgressions, whereby they 
have transgressed against God, and make for themselves a new 
heart and a new spirit as God requires them to do ; ' because, 
according to Andover and Princeton, and all the world besides, 
not even excepting Dr. Harvey himself, the compiler of the 
Mast Windsor creed, and notwithstanding ail the denials of the 
doctrine made at Princeton and by Dr. H. ability is commensu- 
rate with obligation ; and this maxim does extend, as far as 
obligation does, to external, to intellectual, and to all moral acts 
of every kind. 

In this opponent of Dr. Tyler we have another illustration 
of the fact that, willing or unwilling, men must often obey the 
principles of common sense in which this maxim is founded. 
This gentleman has said, "I consider the maxim, that ability 
and obligation are and must be commensurate, in moral rela- 
tions, as subversive of all sound doctrine, as well as repugnant 
to common sense ; " and yet, after all, he is compelled in the 
exercise of common sense, to assert the opposite truth, viz. that 
" obhgation is founded upon moral agency," i. e. upon the powers 
of a moral agent, or upon "natural power," as he elsewhere 



NotkF.] ANTl-UTILITAEIAN THEORIES. 471 

uses the term moral agency to mean.* " And now also the axe 
is laid unto the root of the trees ; therefore, every tree which 
bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the 
fire." Matt. 3 : 10. " Am I therefore become your enemy be- 
cause I tell you the truth ? " Gal. 4:16. 

In confirmation that ability must be regarded as commensu- 
rate with obligation, we adduce the following from a sermon on 
ability, by Dr. Tyler, and from the creed to which he was at 
the time bound to conform, and which ought to be regarded as 
good authority by the Pastoral Union, of Connecticut, and by 
the friends of the East Windsor Theological School. 

J)r. Tyler in this sermon lays down the doctrine that " God 
does not require of men, what they have no power to perform." 
— p. 9. In support of this doctrine, he says, "My hearers, can 
you feel that it would be right for God to require of you what 
you have absolutely no power to do ? Can any rational crea- 
ture in the universe think it would be right ? " — p. 11. " Does 
God punish his creatures eternally, for not doing what they 
have no power to do?" — p. 12. " The divine commandments 
. . . are all limited by the faculties of those on whom they are 
imposed. God does not require us to make any new faculties 
or to employ in his service those which we do not possess. 
All that he requires, is that we should serve and glorify 
him to the extent of the powers which he has given us." — p. 14. 
" God does not require us to love him more than with all our 
heart, soul, strength, and mind." 

Again ; " It has been said that mankind have destroyed their 
power. . . . But I would ask, have they destroyed their power ? 
Have they put out the light of reason, that they cannot know 
their duty ? Have they extinguished their conscience, that they 
cannot feel their obligation ? Have they annihilated the power 
of volition, that they cannot choose between good and evil ? 
In short, have they destroyed their rational nature ? " — p. 12. 

This language goes the whole length of what we have 
claimed, on this topic, whatever the writer's meaning may be, 

* See Harvey's Second Letter to Dr. Tyler. 



472 APPENDIX. [NoteF. 

and however inconsistent with this, other things, he has elsewhere 
said, may be. 

Again ; Dr. Tyler, in his letter of 1855 to Dr. Harvey, in 
defence of this sermon on Ability, says : " The creed of the Pas- 
toral Union shows . . . that they did not regard the doctrine of 
the sinner's natural ability to be an error ; for they inserted it 
in their creed as a truth to be maintained. This creed shows 
also in what form sound New England men were in the habit 
of maintaining this sentiment, which is the very form in which 
it is maintained in my discourse. ' Man has understanding and 
natural strength to do all that God requires of him.' Or what 
is the same, ' God does not require of men what they have no 
power [strength] to do.' " * 

" I am aware that it may be that your views on this subject 
have undergone a change. ... If this be so, I would inquire 
whether we might reasonably expect some recantation from 
yourself, before you proceeded to condemn others for no other 
crime but that of continuing to follow your example ? Permit 
me to bespeak some forbearance, on your part, towards those 
brethren who have not yet been able to see that the change is 
for the better, and who still adhere to that form of sound words 
which you prepared for them twenty years ago." 

Dr. Harvey, by his own admission, was the author or com- 
piler of this statement quoted by Dr. Tyler from the East 
Windsor creed. In his second letter to Dr. Tyler he says, 
" that the creed of the [Connecticut] Pastoral Union was com- 
piled by me, I believe is true." 

We leave our readers to judge of the attitude in which these 
facts place the East Windsor school and its supporters. 



* Quoted from the East Windsor creed compiled by Dr. Joseph Harvey, 
to which the professors are required yearly to give their assent. It has 
been claimed by the friends both of Dr. Tyler and the friends of Dr. Har- 
vey, that Dr. Harvey in this controversy was triumphant in the argument 
against Dr. Tyler, and in support of the doctrine that God does require of 
impenitent men what they have no jyower to perform. 



LIBERTY, CAUSATION, AND VIRTUE. 473 



NOTICE OF M COSH ON LIBERTY, CAUSATION, AND VIRTUE. 

The Method of the Divine Government, by Rev. James 
M'Coshj LL. D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in 
Queen's College, Belfast, Ireland, fifth ed. Edin., we have exam- 
ined with the deepest interest and much delight. This work 
proves its author to be an original, comprehensive, profound, 
and discriminating thinkei\ 

From this work we make the following citations, partly in 
confirmation of what we regard as truth, and partly in illustra- 
tion of what we esteem as erroneous. Prof. M'Cosh holds 
himself to be a necessarian, according in this point substantially 
with Edwards, in opposition to Sir "VYm, Hamilton, Cousin, etc. 
Yet while speaking of ' necessarians, even of the highest order, 
as afraid of making admissions to their opponents,' he says, " we 
believe that none of them has fully developed the phenomena of 
human freedom." " Now we hold it to be an incontrovertible 
fact, and one of great importances that the true determining 
cause of every given volition is not any mere anterior incite- 
ment, but the very soul itself by its inherent power of will. 
He has not scanned the full phenomena which consciousness 
discloses, who denies the real potency of the will, — a potency 
above all special volitions, — and the true power exercised in 
producing these volitions." We would ratlier say, exercised iu 
these volitions. — Divine Governinent, fifth ed., p, 541. 

This seems to us to be a full, clear, and concise statement of 
the liberty of the will. 

Again we read, p. 271, "There is an essential freedom im- 
plied in every exercise of the will. For the proof of this we 
appeal to the consciousness, the universal consciousness." " The 
mind has not only the power of action, but the anterior and far 
more important power of choice." " It is implied further that 
the choice lies within the voluntary power of the mind." And 
yet after all this, this author professes to be a necessarian, and 
holds to " the reign of causation in the will." Here, then, we 
40* 



474 APPENDIX. 

would ask our author liow an act of the will is an effect ? and 
what is its cause? Should he say, the will itself, — the power 
to choose. We reply, power is not cause till it is exerted. An 
exertion of the will is an act, and not an effect produced by, 
and therefore consequent upon, an act, or the action of a cause. 
To say that an act is an effect produced by a cause, i. e. by the 
action of power, — an act produced by an act, seems to be not 
a very metaphysically accurate use of language, and liable to 
occasion confusion of ideas. An act implies an agent, as 
thought a thinker. An agent is a cause when by his acts he 
produces effects. (See q. 25.) 

Again ; our author says, " We are happy to find our views 
on this subject [moral qualities] coinciding with Dr. Chalmers. 
'We would now affirm,' says he, 'the all-important principle 
that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary.' " — p. 
310. We think it a just criticism which Prof. M'Cosh makes 
upon Dr. Chalmers, that " he has confounded the will in some 
of its exercises with mere sensibility," and yet that this criticism 
is truly applicable to the learned Professor himself, and to most 
other writers on ethics. For example, our author just before 
he makes this criticism on Chalmers, says (pp. 309, 310), 
" There is an act of the will wherever there is . . . preference, 
. . . wherever there is . . . desire." And then, "To prefer 
pleasure to pain, honor to disgrace, society to solitude," he gives 
as acts of will. Now is it in the power of the human mind 
not to desire pleasure in preference to pain ? If not, then how 
is this desire a choice, — an act of the will ? 

A stricter line of demarkation between the voluntary and 
involuntary, — the phenomena of the will and those of the 
sensibility, between created or inherited constitution and moral 
character than has yet generally been drawn, is greatly needed ; 
also between generic, predominant purposes (which constitute 
character) and subordinate, specific volitions, which receive their 
character from the generic. A clear perception and statement 
of the two facts revealed in consciousness, viz. the desire of 
happiness is the comprehensive motive to all possible volun- 
tary action right or wrong, and that happiness is the ultimate 



LIBERTY, CAUSATION, AND VIRTUE. 475 

object of all possible voluntary action, would give strength and 
firmness to some of the positions taken in this work of Prof. 
M'Cosh's. 

Again; on page 313 our author says, "The field of possible 
virtue and vice is wide as the domain of the will. Virtue may 
consist in other mental affections besides mere benevolence." 
How can this last affirmation be correct ? Benevolence is right 
action of the will, and must include all right action of the will 
(see qs. 158-176). There is a benevolent love of God, and a 
benevolent hatred of sin, and a benevolent as well as a just de- 
termination to punish transgressors, and the justice of this 
determination consists in its benevolent regard to the highest 
general good. 

Again ; Prof. M'Cosh remarks, '^ If the supporters of this 
ethical system, or the greatest happiness principle, had so stated 
it as to represent the intent to produce utility, or the purpose to 
do a beneficial act, as constituting a virtuous action, their views 
would not have been inconsistent with the proposition now laid 
down." — p. 308. This is just precisely what the doctrine of 
benevolent utility implies. We quote once more, " Wayland's 
work [on moral science] will continue to be reckoned a stan- 
dard one, even by those who do not accord altogether with his 
theory of virtue." — p, 318. In our view it is a praise to Dr. 
Wayland's work that in practical ethics his reasonings are based 
upon the theory he has rejected in the first part of his treatise. 
This is only the common, the necessary fate of writers who 
reject the true theory of benevolent utility. 

Notwithstanding all that we admire in " The Method of 
Divine Government," we cannot see the self-consistency of its 
author when he says, " We have endeavored to show that there 
is a holy quality in virtuous action itself, separate from all its 
tendencies or results ; and that the human mind is led by its 
very nature and constitution to commend that quality [indepen- 
dently of the consequences which may follow from the one or the 
other." — p. 326. 

Keply. When we approve of the character of Jesus Christ, 
in that " he went about doing good," do we have no respect to 



476 APPENDIX. 

the good which was accomplished by, and was consequent upon, 
his benevolent design? It is impossible that w^e should not. 
" God has not left himself without witness, in that he did good, 
sending us rain from heaven, filling our hearts with food and 
gladness." When this witness testifies to us, through our glad- 
ness, of the goodness which produces it, do we not think of the 
consequences of God's benevolence? When we witness one 
man executing his design to injure another in acts of injustice 
and cruelty, causing pain, poverty, anguish, and death ; in con- 
demning his malice, have we no respect to its consequences, — 
its designed consequences ? — no respect to what he has done ? 
The question answers itself, 

Of the method of investigating the mental as well as the 
material sciences, the Professor very justly says, " In the one 
branch as in the other there should be an orderly observation of 
facts." " The only essential difference between the two lies in 
this, that in one we take the senses, and in the other, conscious- 
ness, as our informant." — p. 289. 

We think if this author should read and fully appreciate the 
views of Dr. Edwards, and his expl^na-tions of his father's 
views, which were his Qwn, the Professor would not judge as 
he now does, that '^ Edwarcls's theory fails in giving a proper 
foundation of justice." — p. 318. We would take this occasion 
to record the saying of Dr. Emmons, that "the elder Ed- 
wards had the most reason, while the son w^s the greatest 
reasoner." 

Just before the printing of these sheets was completed, " The 
Intuitions of the Mind,'' a work of very distinguished abiUty, 
was, by a friend, commended to our notice. In this work we 
find the freedom of the will stated with ^ very satisfactory 
prominence and clearness. For example : 

" The will is free. In saying so, I mean to assert not merely 
that it is free to act as it pleases. ... I claim for it an anterior 
and higher power, a power in the mind to choose, and when it 
chooses, a consciousness that it might choose otherwise." This 
is what we call power of the contrary choice. " It is a first 
truth equal to the highest, to no one of which will it ever yield. 



LIBERTY, CAUSATION, AND VIRTUE. 477 

It cannot be set aside by any truth whatever, not even by any 
other first truth, and certainly by no derived truth." " It is 
alone in the sanctuary of the will, that freedom is to be found." 

— pp. 308, 309. 

Prof. M'Cosh has other statements on this topic, full, clear, 
and explicit. It is diflBcult to conceive how any statement could 
be more so. He speaks of the self-acting mind. But he holds 
to the law of causation in the will. His statements on this 
point, are indeed modestly made, but, by no means are they so 
clear and sure, as those are in regard to freedom. We cannot 
avoid the impression that there is a degree of faltering in his 
statements of the law of causation in the acts of the will, and it 
seems very becoming that there should be, when there is at the 
present such an array of the ablest minds who are conscious of 
the strongest conviction that the law of causation does not ex- 
tend to the acts of the will. For illustration of these remarks, 
take the following : " I am inclined to say that causation must 
have some sort of place in the will, as in all other creature 
action. But causation in regard to the will, may be of a totally 
different character from causation in acts of intelligence and 
feeling." 

" While our intuitions seem to me to say that causation has a 
place even in voluntary acts, it does not say what is the nature 
of that causation. This is to be determined by an inductive in- 
quiry into the operations of our voluntary acts. And here we 
are met at once by the fact that man has freewill. This fact 
cannot set aside the other fact, that our volitions are caused ; 
but as both are facts, the one must be so stated as to be seen not 
to be inconsistent with the other. And when we contemplate 
our volitions by the light of consciousness, we discover at once 
that causation does not operate in the will, as it does in the ma- 
terial universe, or even in our intellectual and emotional actions." 

— pp. 193, 194. 

Why, then, should it be called causation, since it is so totally 
different from all that is called causation everywhere else ? It 
appears to me that the will acts upon occasion of the motives 
presented to the mind, and not by causation. Can the action of 
a self-acting mind and causation of those acts, go together? If 



478 , APPENDIX. 

our acts are caused, must they not unavoidably be what they 
are caused to be ? And if this be so, then where is the power 
of contrary choice, or the power of any choice at all, or of any 
ground of responsibility ? We cannot see. 

We seem to be conscious that one of two things must be true, 
either we do not understand our author's statements of the law 
of causation of the acts of the will, or else they are inconsistent 
with the freedom of the will. They appear most surely to in- 
volve a plain contradiction. Here we must let the matter rest, 
till we obtain further light. 

In the manly, catholic, scholarly spirit, in which " The Intui- 
tions " are written. Prof. M'Cosh says, " I will most willingly 
listen to any one who will give a better account — that is more 
in accordance with our constitution." — p. 312. This is what 
we have above tried to do. If the professor was in circum- 
stances that he could lend an ear to our suggestions, we would 
invite his attention on one point, to the words of an author 
whose opinions we know he would feel bound to respect. 

We copy from ' The Intuitions^ 

" In all classifications of the powers of the mind which have 
the least pretensions to completeness, there has been a recogni- 
tion of another class, under the name of the will or feelings, or 
the erective [rousing] or motive powers ; they may perhaps 
be best designated as the motive or moral powers, so as to 
embrace unequivocally the functions of the conscience." — p. 
279. " They are at least, three in number, the Appetencies, — 
including the Emotions, — the Will, and the Conscience." 

" There are native Appetencies [constitutional desires] of 
the Mind leading to Emotions. Man is so constituted that he 
is capable of being swayed in will, and so in action, by certain 
motives, that is, by the contemplation of certain objects 
or ends, while others do not influence him. It would 
serve a very important end to have a classification of these, 
that is, of [all] the springs of human will and action. ... In the 
absence of any arrangement sanctioned by metaphysicians gener- 
ally, it must suffice to mention some of the principal motives." 

" 1. Mankind are evidently inclined, involuntarily and vol- 
untarily, to exercise every native power, — the senses, the mem- 



LIBERTY, CAUSATION, AND VIRTUE. 479 

ory, the imagination, the power of language, the various rational 
powers, such as abstraction, comparison, causality, the emotional, 
voluntary and moral capacities." " 2. Whatever is contemplated 
as capable of securing [^pleasure is felt to be desirable, and 
whatever is apprehended as likely to inflict [^pain [we desire 
should be] avoided." " 3. There are certain appetencies in man 
bodily and mental, which crave for [^gratification, and this inde- 
pendent of the [pleasure of their indulgence. Of this descrip- 
tion, are the appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, and the mental 
tendencies to seek for knowledge, esteem, society, power, prop- 
erty," etc. — pp. 280, 281. "4. Man is impelled by an inward 
principle more or less powerful in the case of different individu- 
als, and varying widely in the objects desired, to seek for 
[pleasure in contemplating] the beautiful in inanimate or in 
animate objects, in grand or lovely scenes in nature, in statues, 
paintings, fine composition in prose or poetry, and in the coun- 
tenances or forms of man or woman." — p. 281. "5. It is not 
to be omitted that the moral power in man is not only (as I 
hope to show) [a knowing and Judging faculty [and therefore 
an intellectual power], it has a prompting energy, and leads us 
when a corrupt will does not interfere, to such acts as the wor- 
ship of God and beneficence to man^ done because they are 
right." " 6. Whatever is appetible we may wish that others should 
[enjoy, while we may desire that they should be preserved from 
all that is unappetible, such as restraint, pain and sin. Man is so 
constituted as to be stirred to desire and prompted to action by 
the contemplation of other beings to whom he is related, such 
as God when he knows him, and his fellow men, more especially 
certain of his fellow men, such as his countrymen and kindred, 
and those who have bestowed favors upon him. I must ever 
set myself against the miserably degrading doctrine of those 
who represent man as utterly selfish in his [constitution, and 
capable of being swayed by no other considerations than those 
which promise pleasurable gratifications to be realized by him- 
self." — p. 282. " The appetencies, native and acquired, stir up 
emotion, which is called forth by an apprehension of objects as 
fitted to [gratify or disappoint these appetencies. Let us call 
whatever accords with them the appetible [desirable] and what- 



480 APPENDIX. 

ever runs counter to them, inappetible [impossible to be de- 
sired] ; then the law is that the appetible, when in prospect, calls 
forth hope, and when realized, [_joy ; whereas, the inappetible, 
when in prospect, excites fear, and when realized, sorrow," pain, 
suffering. — p. 283. 

" It should be observed, that while the mind is impelled by 
such appetencies towards certain objects, it has not necessarily 
before it the general principle by which it is actuated, nor in- 
deed a general idea of any description. It contemplates an 
individual object, as about to give it pleasure, or about to add to 
its power or fame, and it at once longs for [desires] it without 
generalizing its aim. Here, as in other cases which have passed 
under our notice, the mind is actuated by principles which are 
not before the consciousness, as principles." Very good. We 
wish all we have written in this treatise to be understood in the 
light of what is said in this paragraph, if we understand it. 

" Properly speaking, the will does not furnish incitements ; 
these [all] come from the appetencies which we have just been 
considering." We must stop quoting, though tempted very 
strongly to continue. 

If what seems to us the inconsistency of the above quoted 
statement of the 3d class of motives were removed, then we 
should have entire, what we consider the foundation of our whole 
doctrine as to benevolent rectitude and utility, namely, that De- 
sire o/* Happiness includes all possible motive for voluntary ac- 
tion, right or wrong. Can there be a craving for gratification 
independent of the pleasure to be secured by indulgence ? Is not 
gratification and pleasure substantially the same thing ? Most 
surely ; if not, we do not understand our own consciousness. 
That such acts as the worship of God and beneficence to man 
should be done because they are right, when being regarded as 
right because they tend and are intended to glorify God, and ul- 
timately to promote the happiness of sentient beings in general, 
is all consistent with the doctrine of benevolent utility and rec- 
titude. So that gratification, pleasure, enjoyment, happiness, 
blessedness, felicity, or whatever it may be termed, is, and must 
be, in point of time, the ultimate subjective and objective object 
in which all virtuous, benevolent, holy action must terminate. 



INDEX. 



Ability, the basis of obligation, pages 60, 108-112, 186, 187. 

commensurate with obUgation, 109, 185, 347-352, 460, 461, 468- 
472. 
Agent, moral, defined, 22. 

faculties of, 32-36, 436, 478. 
Acts distinguished from effects, 30, 474. 

no law of causation, except that of self-activity in acts of will, 

Note B., Sec. 2, 350, 351, 477. 
mental, classed, 40. 
moral, all voluntary, 47-51. 

not necessitated, 29, 46. 
of will, terms which signify, 39. 

reasons why some are right, and some not, 240, 241, 267-269, 
275-280. 
Anti-utilitarian definition of virtue, 253. 
Atonement of Christ, a substitute for penalty, 226-228. 
opening the way for the pardon of the penitent, 336, 337. 

Basin of water and censer of fire, 64. 
Bed of down perfumed with roses, 168. 
Benevolence defined, 123-126, chaps. 9-12. 
consists in right acts of will, 205. 
that use of the will which secures the harmony of the soul, 270- 

274. 
includes all the virtues, 205-218, 

tendency of its nature to highest happiness, 148-175, 239-245. 
necessary means of highest happiness, 233, 241, 272, 273,278, 

310, 315, 367, 368. 108. 
the ultimate or last reason which can be given why a benevolent 
act is right, 137-139, 268, 269, 383. 

41 (481) 



482 INDEX. 

Benevolence — continued. 

disinterested, 180. 

its different tendencies described, 270-274. 

its different forms, 208. 

simplest form, love of the happiness of sentient beings, 208. 

specific duties under it, 211. 

second form, its specific duties, 213. 

third form, complacential benevolence, 213. 

its specific duties, 214, 215. 

its objects, 206. 
BiBLiOTHECAN THEORY of virtue, stated, 370. 

one half of itself refuted by the other half, 370, 371, 384, 385. 

Cause and Causation, 30, 335-339, 350-353, 355-358. 
Character, how formed, in what it consists, distinguished from con- 
stitution, 25, 29, 37, 38, 47, 232. 

Christian, what is essential to, 182-184, 107, 180, 267, 327. 

in the formation of, no law of causation except that of self- 
activity, 476-478. 
Choice, what it is, and what is implied in choosing, 52-61. 

includes all action of the will, 21, 39, 52. 

nothing besides can have moral quality, 21, 46, 47 etc., 70, 107, n. 

analyzed, 55-59. 

power of contrary, 22, 24, 44, 53-55, 59, 345, 348-352, 460, 464, 
465, 476. 

objects of, 21, 70, 83, 115, 127, 128, 137-139, 190, 370, 397. 
Class of persons addressed in this treatise, 8. 
Conscience, 38, 39, 192, 193, 195-198. 

defined, 196, 199, 211. 

a good and tender, an evil and guilty, a seared and hardened, 266. 

a complex faculty, 196, 264, 265. 

Difficulty, for want of terms, how remedied, 12. 
Definition of terms, 21-27, 33, 65, 74, 77-80, 85, 219, 230, 386. 
Desire, how originated, 56, 72, 73, 34, 38, 47, 55, 71-74, 169. 
a state or exercise of the sensibility, 38. 
objects of, 21, 33, 72, 67, 74. 

of happiness, including fear and dread of suffering, comprehends 
all possible motive of voluntary action, 33, 34, 57, 59, 60, 67, 
70, 72, 74, 160, 209, 397. 



INDEX. 483 

Desire — continued. 

of happiness, an innate, constitutional, and therefore an una- 
voidable principle of action, 117-122, 147. 
happiness, the only ultimate object of, 57, 60, 75, 76-79, 80, 83, 
84, 115, 128, 140-145, 137, 139, 169, 209. 
Doctrine of Benevolent Rectitude and Utility, explained, 
239-245. 
distinguished from various theories^ 9, 10, 419, 480. 
other theories reconciled with it so far as they contain portions of 
truth, 298-306. 
their fundamental errors exposed, 340, 361, 368-425, 441-472. 
not a simple idea, 281-283. 

reason why it has so sti'ong a hold on the common mind, 243. 
the impossibility of any foundation for obligation in anti-utilita- 
rian theories, 151, 155, 163, 168, q. 133, p. 240, 274, 373-377, 
397. 
tested by human consciousness and the Bible, 316-325. 
Duty, within the limits of possibiHty, 18. 
and interest distinguished, 254, 255. 

End of our creation, 303, 305. 

Faith in Christ, the condition of pardon, 235, 332, 334. 
Fatalism defined, 350-353. 

turning point between, and free agency, 52, 54. 
Forgiveness or pardon, 227, 228, 235, 238, 328. 
Free Agency, 52, 59, 340-361, 476-480. 

do<;trines inconsistent with, refuted, 340-364, 368-425, 448-472. 
Fundamental or first principles, 18-21, 25, 26, 84, 105, 107-112, 
113, 114, 325. 

God's supreme preference of holiness to sin, 305, 223, 224. 
Good and goodness defined, 71-77. 
absolute and ultimate defined, 78. 

happiness the only ultimate and absolute, 79 ; relative, 80 
why holiness is relative good, 81, 82. 
happiness not the only, 84. 
natural, 86, 88 ; moral, 88 ; moral goodness distinguished from 

the incidental goodness of a right act, 89 ; in the concrete and 

abstract, 90. 
all included in natural and moral, in absolute and relative, also 

in happiness and tlie means of happiness, 93. 



484 INDEX. 

Gratitude defined, 215. 

Happiness, the only absolute and ultimate good, 79, 94, 137, 190. 
not the only good, 84 ; natural, 86 ; but not moral, 98. 
why bound to seek our own, 66, 119, 127, 128. 
the pursuit of happiness unavoidable, 115, 116. 
tendency to, an element of virtue, 131, 169. 
highest never to be sacrificed, 184, 185, 393,399, q. 104. 
why some have held that tendency to, does not belong to the 

nature of virtue, q. 85, 114-120, 132. 
cannot be innocently sacrificed for any thing else, 378, qs. 103, 
104. 
Highest happiness essential to the perfection of the universe, 126, 

127. 
Holiness and ISin in the concrete, shown to consist in moral acts of 
moral agents, 27-36. 
consist in voluntary acts, 37-51, 191-204. 
moral opposites, 28, 242, qs. 260-265. 
their different results, natural opposites, 28. 
the value of these results compared, qs. 260-265. 
a great mistake in regard to, q. 270. 

the doctrine of, tested by consciousness and the word of God, qs. 
271-276. 
by the writings of the wisest and ablest 
authors, 7, 51, 75, 77, 149, 150, 155, 
156, 168, 170-173. 
consists in benevolence, 129-147, 190, 205-218. 
tendency to happiness essential to its nature, 148, 175, and to the 

possibility of its existence, 35, 60, 67, 154, 155, 160. 
of God a reason for our holiness, 324. 
the way to become holy, 330, 334. 
in all cases preferable to sin, 158, 159, 364-368. 
a relative good, 81, 82, 102, 137 ; a want, 414. 
cannot innocently be sacrificed for any thing else, qs. 103, 104. 
its value compared with that of happiness, 99-102. 
a good in itself, 371-374, 379, 392, 393, 403, 404. 

Idea of Holiness, virtue or right, not a simple idea, 163, 169, 
281-293 

unsurpassed in power, permanency, and extent, 1 2. 
Infinite sekies, rightarian theories involving the absurdity of, 

166, 167, 349, 384, 386, 403, 419, 155. 



INDEX. 485 

Influence, moral defined, 24, 229, 230 ; can be resisted, 24. 
Intellect defined, 38 ; its office, q. 150. 
Intellectual and mental distinguished, 38. 
and moral wisdom distinguished, 261. 

Justice, defined, as identical with benevolence, 214, 215, 219. 

its foundation, ultimate rule, standard and test, the general good, 

19, 20, 220, 222. 
the moral constitution of the universe, 19, 20. 
some of its modes and forms, distributive, commutative, govern- 
mental, rewards and penalties, atoning and forgiving justice, 
222, 228, 234. 
Justice, grace, and mercy distinguished, 235-238. 

Law, moral, identical with obligation, 363 ; can be violated, 23. 
the only way to be justified by deeds of, 328. 

Mercy, forgiving justice, 227. 

grace and justice, their relations and difierence, 237, 238. 
Moral government defined, 25, 228, 229. 

distinguished from physical force, 229-233. 

qualifications of a moral governor, 229. 

what benevolence requires of, 233, 234. 

quality predicable only of acts of will, 29, 46, 47-51. 

acts, no law of causation in, except that of the self-activity of the 
mind, note B. sec. 2, 350, 351. 

powers, designated, 36, 438, 478. 
Motive, defined, 33 ; subjective and objective, 32, 63, 74, 144, 162. 

Nebuchadnezzar's furnace, 168. 

Necessity, meaning of, 19, 27, 43, 343, 344, 350, 352, 470. 

does not control acts of will, 29, 46, qs. 54, 352, 476-478. See 

Fatalism and power to contrary choice. 
of seeking our own happiness while having the use of our moral 

powers, absolute, unavoidable, irresistible, 115-120. 
of thinking, invincible, 23, 43. 

Object of writing the Inquiry, 6, 7, 10-12, 325-334. 
Obligation, moral, its meaning, 22. 

meaning of its nature, foundation, and extent, 25, 110-112. 

its nature, foundation, and extent, 107-110, 300. 

its foundation, 35, 60, 113-145, 160, 240, 407. 



486 INDEX. 

Obligation — continued. 

coextensive with ability, 19, 108, q. 145, note F. 

304. 

Pain, not a possible ultimate object of desire or choice, 55, 73. 
Power to know our duty essential to obligation, 18, qs. 123-125, 146, 

147. 
Principles stated, 18-21, 25, 26, 84, 105, 107-112. 
Prudence and expediency distinguished from virtue, 261-263, 113, 

325. 
Pursuit of happiness a natural, inevitable necessity, 115-120. 

Repentance and Faith defined, qs. 282-284, p. 227. 
Reason, the last that can be given for moral obligation, 268, 269, 383. 
Keasons for writing the Inquiry in questions and answers, 7, 8. 
Right, not ultimate, 60, 68, 441-448. 

Sanctions of law, 226, 227, 234. 

Selfishness, the generic source of sin, 121, qs. 157, 123, 309, 310. 

Self-love, 117, 119, 120, 430-442. 

Sensibility, 38 ; its office, 192-194. 

Sin defined, 28, 29, 31, 307, 308, 316 ; moral evil, 94. 

all voluntary, 47, 59 ; can be avoided, 18, 59. 
Sinner, why in the Bible called a fool, 323. 
Sophistry defined, 404 ; specimens of, pointed out, 402-404. 

To think, an irresistible necessity, 23, 43. 

Utility, or tendency to happiness, an element in the foundation of 

obhgation, 10, 239-242, 397. 
Ultimate rule of right, 21. 

Will defined, terms signifying acts of, 42 ; its office, 194, 197, 201 ; 
the right arm of power in the soul, 195 ; the consent of the 
will the point where moral quality begins, 41, 42, 47-51, 21. 

Worthiness, theory stated, — refuted by itself, 369 ; reviewed more 
at length, 408-425. 



INDEX TO AUTHORS. 



Alexander, 331, 332, 341. 
Am. Theol. Rev. 121, 352, 353, 

354, 357, 360, 365. 
Aristotle, 116, 120, 263, 443, 

444. 
Bacon, L., 122, 124, 128, 142, 

143, 146, 147. 
Bib. Sacra, 130, 136, 150, 156, 

175, 370, 371, 372, 376, 377, 

409, 420, 421. 
Blackstone, 51. 
Brown, John, 77. 
Burlamaqui, 49, 80, 108, 115, 

134, 136, 304. 
Butler, 18, 34, 48, 75, 76, 111, 

115, 119. 
Chalmers, 47. 
Cousin, 178, 392,405. 
Cumberland, 51. 
Davies, 140. 
DesCartes, 17. 
Edwards, Pres., 49, 50, 83, 115, 

118, 125, 259, 343, 383. 
Edwards, Dr., 48, 59, 68, 115, 

123, 135, 138, 140, 144, 156, 

221, 222, 223, 236, 309. 
Emmons, 48, 136, 156, 380, 382, 

387, 391, 476. 
Finney, 361-363. 
Fitch, 11, 50. 
Fuller, A., 468. 
Grotius, 51. 

Grove, Rev. Henry, 434-439. 
Hamilton, Sir Wm., 239, 240. 
Harvey, 459-472. 
Haven, 109, 156, 379, 444, 445. 
Henry, 398. 
Hickok, 104, 292, 369, 373, 409, 

422, 423. 



Homer, 433. 

Hopkins, S., 140, 145. 

Hopkins, Pres. M., 177. 

Jebb, 56. 

jouffroy, 305. 

Kant, 446. 

I^JNOX, 56. 

Locke, 39, 56. 

Mackintosh, 47. 

M'CosH, Prof. James, 178, 473- 

480. 
Mahan, 363, 426. 
Milton, 139, 195, 295,432, 433. 
Pa LEY, 171. 
Park, 468-470. 
Pope, 431-433. 
Presb. Quar. Rev. 369, 374, 375, 

378,409-417. 
Princeton Essays, 346, 347. 
Princeton Review, 341, 355, 364, 

469,470. 

PUFFENDORF, 51. 

Reid, 47, 141, 149, 175, 267. 
Seneca, 439-441. 
Shakspeare, 76. 
Shedd, Prof., 355, 443. 
Smith, A., 300. 
Spring, 108. 
Stewart, D., 119, 120. 
Stowe, Mrs. H. B., 38, 57. 
Taylor, N. W., 48, 163, 437, 

438. 
Tyler, B., 471, 472. 
West, Stephen, 49. 
Westminster divines, 305. 
Wools, Leonard, 342. 
Whewell, Wm., 428-430. 
WiNSLOW, 379. 
Young, LL. D., John, 454. 
(487) 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-21 1 1 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




013 592 147 6 



